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Propaganda

# PERSPECTIVES

MAY 1971

PATRICE LUMUMBA UNIVERSITY: TRAINING IN THE "SCIENCE  
OF REVOLUTION"

INSIDE THE 24TH CPSU CONGRESS

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
HOW THE KREMLIN TRAPS JOURNALISTS

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KHRUSHCHEV MEMOIRS AUTHENTIC

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May 1971

THE PATRICE LUMUMBA PEOPLE'S FRIENDSHIP UNIVERSITY  
OF MOSCOW

Lumumba University, which even some Soviet officials admit was founded "to educate students from underdeveloped countries so they can return to their homelands to become the nucleus for pro-Soviet activities," is eleven years old. It was when former Soviet Premier Khrushchev visited Indonesia in February 1960 that he made the first public announcement of the Soviet Government's intention to establish a "University for Friendship Among Peoples," as the institution was first called, in order to offer training to the national intelligentsia cadres for Afro-Asian and Latin American countries. Months before, however, word had been spread among students already studying at Western universities about the impending announcement. Arab and Asian students in West Germany, for example, not only knew that the university was coming into being, they even knew details of its organization plan.

The Early Days

For the first academic year, according to Soviet sources, some 43,500 applications for admission had been received by 31 July 1960, the final date set for submission. From these, 501 applicants from 63 countries were accepted including 193 from Africa, 142 from Southeast Asia, 120 from Latin America, and 46 from the Near East. Also enrolled for the first year were some 50 Soviet students from the Central Asian and Caucasian republics. Some governments objected to the way in which Moscow bypassed them in the selection of students. Burma, for example, decided that the enrollment list of Burmese students (of whom there were 35) sent direct to Moscow via the Soviet embassy in Rangoon, constituted a violation of Burmese regulations and refused to give the students exit visas. India insisted on taking a hand in the selection of students as did Indonesia and Nepal. As a result of these interventions, student departures were either canceled or delayed and the gates of the new Friendship University swung open on 1 October 1960 with only 300 students in attendance.

During the late 1950's the majority of students entering the USSR from the developing countries were drawn from the Middle East and Southeast Asia, but in the early 1960's the emphasis switched to sub-Sahara Africa,

and the new entrants from Africa rose sharply from about 400 in 1960 to about 2,000 in 1962. Africans have accounted for fifty-five to sixty-five per cent of the total number of new students from the developing countries every year since 1962. The largest number have come from Somalia, Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria which, together, have sent more than 3500 students to the USSR since 1959. In their eagerness to attract students from lower economic and social strata, the Soviet officials were initially overly lax as far as entrance requirements went and many students were accepted without any or with very little secondary school education. The Soviets soon discovered that the "poor students" for whom Patrice Lumumba had been established were also poorly qualified for academic studies. The dropout ratio was high and by 1967 some 850 students had been sent home because of academic failures. This inability to meet minimum academic standards contributed to widespread dissatisfaction among the students and was an important factor in the December 1963 demonstrations by African students. Subsequently the Soviets gradually raised the standards for admission and imposed stricter controls over the behavior of students in residence. In fact, there have been widespread reports of near-segregation of Asian and African students, who have resented and complained about the constant surveillance and restrictions on their activities.

#### Student Recruitment

The Soviets use two approaches in recruiting students for training at Patrice Lumumba: official, through bilateral cultural agreements or under sponsorship of United Nations agencies (i.e., with the approval of the students' home governments) and unofficially, through Communist parties or front organizations such as friendship societies and trade union groups (i.e., illegally without the consent of the students' home governments). For example, in February 1961, when the university was officially renamed in honor of the deceased Patrice Lumumba, such groups as the International Union of Students, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the World Federation of Trade Unions, and the International Organization of Journalists all renamed their scholarship funds which became part of the "International Patrice Lumumba Scholarship Fund."

Many governments have now imposed stricter controls on students leaving their countries and the illegal scholarships are a smaller proportion of the total than they were up to the mid-1960s. A factor in encouraging home governments to exercise greater caution may well have been the exposure in mid-1963 of Pavel Erzin, a prorector and recruiter for

go abroad for higher studies. To crown all, there is a statement that 'preference will be given to Indo-Soviet Cultural Society workers.'" In February of this year, according to a TASS dispatch, Prem Sagar Gupta, General Secretary of the India-USSR Society, said that approximately 4,000 applications to the university will come from India during this year.

#### The Academic Level

Only about one third of the some 12,000 foreigners studying in the USSR go to Patrice Lumumba University. For the rest, those whose level of training will often have a bearing on the ultimate success or failure of a given Soviet economic or technical aid project, openings are available at some 170 of the various polytechnical, scientific, agricultural or other specialized institutions of higher education scattered throughout the country. The role of Lumumba Friendship University, as Pravda noted on the occasion of the institution's tenth anniversary last year, is to "strengthen the position of progressive forces" in the world struggle. On the same occasion, the university's rector, Sergei Rumyantsev, held a press conference at which he said that 2,335 students had graduated from his university since it was founded. Rumyantsev also quite frankly alluded to the university's political character saying it had originally been founded because of appeals from "representatives of progressive circles in a number of countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America." These "representatives" talked of the need for forming national cadres, but also allegedly said such an institution would "render great support to the liberation movement."

During Rumyantsev's press conference, held 28 January last year, the rector fielded a number of questions posed by both Soviet and Western journalists. The rector seemed, to Western journalists at least, notably defensive in answering questions which probed Lumumba University's academic standards, the qualifications of its applicants, and problems related to the Lumumba graduate's return to his home country. One correspondent asked how many students drop out and why. Rumyantsev said that an average 150 drop out annually, most are either first year students with insufficient preparation or students who develop serious illness or those who have "adjustment difficulties" (unspecified). One correspondent commented: "As the final trumpet blast fades away, one is struck with the notion that even after ten years Lumumba University is still striving to establish its reputation as a serious educational institution."

Patrice Lumumba University, as holding the rank of General in the Soviet Union's secret police, the Committee for State Security (KGB). Erzin, who stayed on with the university until at least 1968, was identified as a KGB officer by a fellow KGB operator, Yury Rastvorov, who defected to the West in the early 1960's. A 17 April 1963 London Daily Telegraph article had described Erzin as on his way to Indonesia from India where he reportedly recruited more than half of the 50 Indian students he planned to have admitted to the university during the next academic year.

Currently, Soviet extra-legal student recruitment continues in countries that have no bilateral agreements for student exchanges with the USSR, such as Iran and many Latin American countries. The practice also prevails in countries where the Soviet Union wants to attract more students than are provided for under bilateral agreements or where it wants to maintain good relations with the local leftist organizations and to train their members, such as with the most recent cases in Mexico and Ceylon. In these situations, scholarships are offered directly through trade union, student and other front groups, as previously mentioned. Or, students may be recruited from among groups already abroad and studying in the West. Since the students' home governments are bypassed, many countries are unaware that they even have nationals studying in the USSR. For example, when the new ambassador from Cyprus arrived in Moscow in 1963, he was surprised to learn that at least 50 Cypriot students were studying at Patrice Lumumba.

Any foreigner who has not been offered a scholarship but who wants to attend Patrice Lumumba University can apply directly to the university or can apply through the Soviet embassy or consulate in his home country. Many countries, aware of the threat of illegal recruitment, now forbid direct applications to the university. In 1962, for example, India established a selection board especially for students applying to Patrice Lumumba. Yet as late as March 1969, the National Council of the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society ran an ad in the New Age weekly, inviting applications for scholarships of five to six years' duration to Lumumba University. Commenting on the ad, Current newspaper noted, in its 19 April issue of that year, "Other countries advertise through the Government of India, but this one dispenses with that formality. Application forms for scholarships of other countries are obtainable free of charge, but this ad says, 'Applications on prescribed forms only will be entertained. Forms available on payment of Rs 5.' This should enable quite a large sum to be collected from thousands of frustrated students wanting to

NEW YORK TIMES  
 18 April 1971

CPYRGHT

Soviet Union:

## What They Do At Old Lumumba U.

MOSCOW — Lumumba University, which the Soviet Union established to educate students from non-Communist developing countries, celebrates its 11th anniversary this year. The school, on Moscow's south side, has figured in the news recently in conjunction with reported revolutionary movements in Mexico and Ceylon.

According to dispatches from Mexico City last month, some of the people arrested for revolutionary activities there were said to have attended Lumumba University some time ago and to have made North Korean contacts while in Moscow. Similarly, radical leftist insurgents in Ceylon are also said to have a Lumumba background, and the Ceylonese were reported to have expelled North Koreans in connection with the present civil strife.

The suggestion that students at the university are being trained for revolutionary activities against existing governments in their home lands cannot be documented here. Nor has there been any information about North Koreans at Lumumba, for students from Communist countries are normally placed in other universities.

The Soviet press has been silent on any link between Latin-American or Asian revolutionaries and Lumumba. Published commentaries on the unrest in Ceylon have described the insurgents as anarchists financed by Western intelligence agencies.

However, there is little doubt that, in the five or six years of their studies, foreign students are exposed not only to the Soviet way of life — one-fourth of the 4,000-member student body and the entire teaching staff are Soviets—but also to the political cross-currents that the Asian, African and Latin-American newcomers bring with them.

Information has been released on the procedure and

criteria that guide the selection of Soviet students for Lumumba University. However, observers have noted that they appear to be somewhat older than ordinary Soviet college entrants.

Although all formal political activities are prohibited on the campus, there is known to be frequent controversy — and even strife — among the foreign students. Soviet authorities are said to be particularly concerned over occasional evidence of Maoism and adherents of the militant guerrilla tactics of Che Guevara.

Basically, however, foreign students are expected to seek a professional education at the Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University, as the institution is officially called. It was named for the Congolese leader, who in 1961 was killed under obscure circumstances in the Katanga region.

The annual freshman class consists of 225 Soviet citizens and 600 foreigners; the latter are selected from applications sent through the education systems of their home countries and on an individual basis. Competition is strong, with as many as 7,000 and 8,000 applicants for the 600 foreign openings.

On arriving, the foreigners are put through a preparatory, one-year course. The course is designed to give them intensive training in Russian so that they can understand the lectures, all of which are in Russian. The preparatory program is also intended to fill any gaps in the academic backgrounds of the new arrivals, and may be extended to two years if the student is particularly poorly prepared.

Like ordinary Soviet universities, Lumumba does not offer a general liberal arts program, but assigns students immediately to any of six professional schools. They are the Schools, or Faculties, of Economics and Agriculture, Medicine, Science and Engineering.

In an attempt to make the courses as relevant as possible to the particular needs of the developing countries, Soviet educators have added subjects not normally taught at the Soviet college level. They include tropical forestry, crop cultivation, animal husbandry, economics and law in the neutralist parts of the world and architecture in tropical climates.

The largest single contingent last year — 964 students — was from Latin America, with as many as 109 from Mexico alone. Next came the African group of students, numbering 834, with the largest national representation consisting of 81 Kenyans.

As a general rule, Lumumba does not admit students from other Communist countries; they are placed in regular Soviet universities. Nor does it admit Japanese, on the ground that Japan is an advanced industrial nation that does not fall within the concept for which the university was intended.

Like regular Soviet college students, foreigners at Lumumba get free dormitory space, plus a monthly stipend of 80 to 90 rubles (\$88 to \$99). This is substantially higher than the 30 rubles a month received by Soviet students.

There have been about 2,500 graduates so far since the first graduating class of 18 in 1965. A small percentage stays on for post-graduate work, and the university has conferred 20 doctorates to date.

—THEODORE SHABAD

SOVIET UNION #3  
1970

A few words about the Patrice Lumumba University from its Rector SERGEI RUMYANTSEV:

When we opened the doors of our country's first international institution of higher learning we knew that we were embarking on a great experiment. There was no doubt that our staff would be able to provide the necessary teaching for people who had chosen to become mathematicians, physicists, engineers, agronomists, lawyers, historians or doctors, for Soviet higher education had already proved its worth. The uncertainty lay elsewhere: would it be possible to form a cohesive, friendly community of young people from different countries, with varying views and social backgrounds?

Some foreign specialists and journalists gave us "friendly" warnings. The Russians, they said, have without knowing it, taken on the impossible. They don't realise that these Africans, Indians and Latin Americans are simply not capable of analytic thinking. In short, they were telling us that this was our own business, of course, but nothing would come of this noble effort.

We did in fact encounter certain difficulties, but they were by no means insurmountable.

The entrance examinations disclosed some serious gaps in the applicants' knowledge of the natural sciences; many of those who held secondary school-leaving certificates actually had insufficient educational qualifications for entrance to a Soviet institution of higher learning. It was a question of inadequate preparation for material reasons rather than lack of ability. And there is a big difference between the two.

To bring the students up to the requisite educational level, we organised a special Preparatory Department, offering, among other subjects, a one-year course in Russian which became the working language for all students.

The University has already sent off five batches of graduates; 2,335 young men and women have already received diplomas, and another 579 will receive them this year. The University of Peoples' Friendship has fully justified its name. This is not just my opinion, but also the opinion of many observers abroad. Let me quote some foreign comment.

"I am very happy to pay a visit to this great institution where friendship in the international field is nursed with such devotion. Students drawn from all over the world find a rare opportunity of not only getting advanced training in higher sciences and technology, but in the process emerge as strong links for international understanding and friendship. Great force for peace and friendship."

This statement was made by India's Minister for External Affairs Swaran Singh.

And here are the words of the eminent British scientist John Bernal:

"It has been a great inspiration to me to visit the Lumumba Friendship University. After travelling over much of the world it is a pleasure to meet all together and working in harmony the young men and women, who are going out to build a new world of peace."

The members of a parliamentary delegation from Costa Rica had this to say:

"We were able to assess the feeling of unity and the scope of the work being done at the University for the benefit of all the people on our planet. Comparing Friendship University with other modern universities, we must say that this was a discovery for us. This new university of culture and friendship is developing successfully."

After ten years of work, we can justifiably say that we have passed our major test. The University has become a large centre for the training of highly skilled specialists for the developing countries. Already working in various branches of science, industry and agriculture in their native countries are 593 of our graduates from Latin America, 451 from Africa, 317 from the Arab East, and 518 from Asia.

There are 3,092 students from 84 different countries currently enrolled in the six main departments (engineering; physics, mathematics and natural sciences; medicine; agriculture; history and philology; economics and law).

Since the developing countries need specialists with a broad training, we have made it our aim to prepare our students to work in the most different branches of their chosen fields. The medical faculty, for example, not only provides training in therapeutics and surgery, but also in the organisation of public health services and epidemiology. The graduates of our agricultural faculty are not only highly qualified agronomists, but have a sound background knowledge of veterinary medicine, animal husbandry and farm mechanisation.

A good deal of attention is also given to developing teaching skills in the students themselves; the skills they need in order to train national specialists in their own countries. Many of our graduates have devoted themselves to teaching. For example, Kante Kabine heads the Mathematics Chair at the Kenakri Polytechnic Institute (Guinea); Segun Odunuga is head of the Russian Language Department at Ibadan University (Nigeria); Krishna Reddi is head of the Mathematics Chair at the Colimatore Institute of Technology (India); and Sanchez Vargas is Dean of the Physics and Mathematics Department of the University of Los Andes (Colombia).

The specific problems involved in training specialists for Asia, Africa and Latin America required that we add to the teaching syllabus a number of special courses and provide special textbooks for these courses. Our University chairs have published textbooks on such subjects as tropical forestry, agriculture and livestock breeding; tropical infectious and other diseases; the problems of economics and law in developing countries; architecture for tropical countries; and others. So far, in these first ten years of the University's existence, the academic staff of the University have published 1,427 different textbooks and other teaching materials. These are now part of our well-stocked library (over 420,000 volumes), which receives all newly published literature in the University's fields of interest and subscribes to over 1,000 Soviet and foreign scientific periodicals.

The University conducts intensive research into problems related to the development of Asian, African and Latin American countries. Here are just a few examples: the mining and geology chairs study the geology, magmatic formations and problems involved in mining processes in Africa and the Hindustan Peninsula; the Humanities Department conducts research into the socio-economic problems of the developing countries; and the law department concerns itself with problems of the formation of national state and legal systems.

Research in these and other important fields is also done by our post-graduate students. The University has already produced 170 Candidates of Science in various fields. The work done by first-degree students on terminal and final examination projects not only helps them to master the fundamentals of their subject but also to make an individual contribution to it.

Through the joint efforts of the staff and the students, a friendly and hard-working community has grown up at the University. Our decision to institute student self-government turned out to be a good one. The students of each faculty elect a student council for their respective faculty, and the chairmen of these councils represent the students on our highest governing body—the University Council.

There are also the student hostel councils, the women's council, the journalists' club, the debating society, etc.

From the very beginning the University has had various types of student organisations. These include the student associations (zemlyachestvo) which are composed of students from the same country. There are now 80 of these associations in the University, each of which is run according to rules and regulations drawn up by the students themselves, and has its own structure and elected administrative bodies.

These associations take part in discussing and deciding basic questions relating to the University's activities. Occasionally they invite representatives of the administrative and academic staff to their meetings. The administration in its turn holds meetings of the associations' representatives to pass on information and discuss important questions concerning the development of the University.

The student organisations are always represented at student scientific conferences, meetings and sports competitions. They recommend their members for taking part in the work of various social organisations, set up national amateur art groups and guide their activities.

In this way students take a most active part in all aspects of University life.

Over its ten years of existence the University has won itself a high reputation abroad. This can be seen both from the 7,000-8,000 applications which arrive each year from young people of different countries and from the University's extensive contacts with foreign universities, government bodies and social organisations.

JAPAN TIMES  
2 April 1971

## Lumumba U. in Moscow Said Producing Revolutionaries

By ROGER LEDDINGTON

MOSCOW (AP) — The arrest of 20 following terrorists in Mexico recently revealed a clandestine aspect of Soviet "cooperation" with developing countries — the production of young revolutionaries at Moscow's Patrice Lumumba Friendship University.

With the announcement that the arrested terrorists had studied at Lumumba, the subsequent recall of Mexico's ambassador from Moscow and the expulsion of five Soviet Embassy officials from Mexico City there seemed to be little doubt the Mexican Government believed that the Kremlin had played a major role in the creation of the terrorist group, the Revolutionary Action Movement (MIR).

Although North Korea allegedly served as the guerrilla warfare training ground for the Mexican recruits, it was at Lumumba, on the outskirts of Moscow that the Mexicans got their ideological education.

Created in 1960 as the Peoples' Friendship University, the institution was founded by the Soviet Government "in compliance with the Leninist principle of rendering disinterested assistance to the peoples of the liberated countries."

In 1962 the name was changed to the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University in honor of the Congolese Premier "who sacrificed his life in the struggle for his country's freedom and independence."

Last year, when the university celebrated its 10th anniversary and revealed the latest student statistics, 3,092 foreign students were attending Lumumba, representing 84 countries, 75 per cent of them were under 26 years of age.

Latin America contributed the largest number of students, 864. Africa followed with 845.

Arabs accounted for 770 and Asians for 524.

Mexico was fourth on the individual list with 109 students, outnumbered only by India with 210, Chile with 186, and Syria with 143.

Notably in a country that constantly espouses female equality, the Soviets permitted only 447 women — out of the 3,092 students — to attend Lumumba.

In its first decade the university has graduated 2,335 men and women. Latin Americans led the list of ordinary graduates with 593, but was at the bottom of the post-graduate list with only 15, indicating an emphasis by Latin American students on basic education and training. Soviet students, who make up a small minority of the student body, led the post-graduate list at 145.

No information was available on the Latin Americans' particular study fields.

In many underdeveloped countries the students are selected by the local Communist party or the local branch of the Soviet "friendship society." Then the Soviet Union takes over — local governments rarely provide scholarships. The students are brought to Moscow free of charge, housed and educated free, and returned home free.

While here they receive monthly stipends from the Soviets ranging from about 80 to 100 rubles (\$72 to \$90). On that they are expected to feed and to clothe themselves and to provide whatever entertainment they can find in the capital city.

In a society where the average monthly per capita income is 121 rubles (\$109) and where both parents in a household usually work, many students privately complain that they find it difficult to adequately live on their stipends.

The university's hard-cover 1970 prospectus reads like any

American or European college catalogue with a few difference.

According to it, the university offers instruction in seven different faculties or departments: natural sciences and mathematics, engineering, medicine, agriculture, preparatory Russian history-philology, and economics-law.

All foreign students, unless they speak Russian fluently, spend their first year studying the language. All instruction and books are in Russian.

In all but the last two faculties, the course titles indicate the students get basically the same education as their Western counterparts.

The difference — and the university's probable role in the recent events in Mexico — begin to appear in the economics-law and history-philology studies.

In the first, in addition to the usual legal and economic instruction, there is an emphasis on the "modern bourgeois political economy."

From there the students proceed to courses such as international law 19: "History of Political Thought" which stresses the study of "revolutionary and national liberation movements."

Among the compulsory courses in the law department is "problems of the general theory of state and law" which covers "peaceful and nonpeaceful ways of transition to socialism."

Under another compulsory course, law students are educated in the "ways and methods of colonialism liquidation," the "legal character of armed struggle against colonialism," and "liquidation of imperialist bases on the territory of developing nations."

In the history faculty, in addition to stress on the methods of teaching children and adults ("training of will, character and conscientious disciplines"),

the students are offered a course in "the history of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America."

That course requires 414 study hours. The department's Russian language studies requires 434 hours.

The history faculty's course catalogue is replete with studies such as "the breakup of the colonial system of imperialism, development of the international working-class and Communist movement, movement for peace and friendship between the peoples for peaceful co-existence and abolition of a new world war."

Other than the compulsory law courses the university's prospectus gives no hint of guerrilla warfare training.

But as Mexican officials and diplomats revealed earlier, practical application of the 20 Mexicans' Soviet education was made in North Korea.

A pamphlet published by the university last year concluded with:

"The celebration of the tenth anniversary reaffirms the recognition of the university as a center of training for first-class experts for the liberated countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America."

## THE UNIVERSITY IN FIGURES

● There are 3,092 students from 84 foreign countries currently enrolled in the University. These include 447 women students. In addition, 969 young Soviet men and women also attend the University.

● The University has 82 chairs and 864 teachers representing 149 fields of knowledge.

● The teaching staff includes 84 professors with doctoral degrees and 388 assistant professors with Candidate of Science degrees.

● 150 teachers of Russian are taking special courses offered by the Advanced Training Department, and 25 engineers, from Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Arab East are raising their qualifications in the UN courses at the University.

● The University has 112 special study rooms and 151 laboratories and workshops.

● The students receive practical training at 210 industrial and agricultural enterprises, research institutes, clinics and museums, located in 35 Soviet cities.

● The academic staff of the University has written and published 60 monographs and textbooks and over 2,300 articles which have appeared in Soviet and foreign periodicals. The University has completed 150 research projects for various enterprises and organizations.

● At present, 225 young scientists (145 Soviet and 80 foreign) are doing post-graduate work at the University.

● The University has signed agreements on co-operation with many institutions of higher learning in the developing countries, including the Technical University in Oruro and the Tomas Frias University in Potosi (Bolivia), the Gorakhpur University (India), the Central University of Las Villas in Santa Clara (Cuba), and the University of Khartoum (Sudan).

● In 1965, the Patrice Lumumba University was accepted as a member of the International Association of Universities.

● Nearly 1,200 students, post-graduates and teachers are active members of the University's Sports Club, through which they engage in a total of 20 different kinds of sport.

CPYRGHT

WASHINGTON POST  
12 March 1970

# Lumumba University Rounds Out a Decade

CPYRGHT

By Donald Armour

Reuters

MOSCOW — Patrice Lumumba University, which is grooming Asian, African and Latin American students for a place in the "third world," has produced 2,335 graduates in its first decade, just ended.

The university, which acquired its present name a year after it was founded, following the death of the first Congolese leader, Patrice Lumumba, is geared to specific requirements of developing countries.

The six faculties — of engineering, sciences, medicine, agriculture, history and philology, economics and law — reflect a marked emphasis on science rather than the arts.

The departments connected with geology and mining em-

phasize special prospecting problems in India and Africa, while the medical faculty conducts research into tropical diseases.

The largest contingent of the university's roll of 3,092 foreign students comes from Latin America, numbering 951, followed by Africa with 834, Arab countries with 770 and Asia with 524.

Individual countries with the largest representation include Chile (186), India (210), and Syria (143). More than 75 per cent of the students are under 26 years of age. Women number only 447.

The university collaborates with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World Health Organization (WHO).

Most courses last four years, or five years in the case of medicine, and all studies are preceded by at least one year's training in Russian — the teaching language.

Marxism-Leninism is theoretically not a compulsory subject as it is at other Soviet universities, and in fact students from other Communist countries, including Cuba and China, are not admitted to the Patrice Lumumba University. Nor are Japanese students, since Japan is considered an industrialized state and not a developing country.

The university has not been free from internal strife, sometimes involving pro-Chinese elements among the students. The government newspaper Izvestia reported after he and others distributed pamphlets received from the

Chinese embassy here.

Tensions between Africans, and some Russian citizens led to serious trouble six years ago.

On Dec. 18, 1963, hundreds of African students fought their way to Moscow's Red Square over police barricades, demanding an inquiry into the death of a Ghanaian student, whom the Soviet authorities said had died from exposure to cold while he was drunk. The Africans said Russians had beaten him to death for going out with a white girl.

ties decided to immortalize the name of our Prime Minister, we were delighted, all of us, not just the Congolese, but the people of the other young nations that used to be oppressed. There is no doubt that the hope of the third-world countries was that this place would serve as a sanctuary for the development of lofty thought, and not as a den for weaving the most deceitful kind of plots.

On the eve of the 24th Congress of the Soviet CP, we should hope that the Soviet authorities will give some consideration to this question and cast some light on the real role assigned the Lumumba University. The fact is that it is becoming increasingly clear that an evil campaign is being run from the place named for our national hero, and that he is sometimes alleged to have held philosophical concepts he never endorsed in his life. Of course, it would not be inappropriate right now to remind the world that the first Congolese prime minister never in all his political life opted for any of the ideologies that divide the world today.

Citizen Christophe Ngbenye, a former rebellion leader, testified to Lumumba's nationalism, when he stated recently at Kampala that General Mobutu had made the Congo what Lumumba had wanted it to be. On its side, the great French daily Le Monde, in a special issue devoted to General Mobutu's imminent visit to France, points up the similarities between the political thinking of our head of state and those of the Congo's national hero. These are two important voices which we cannot ignore unless we want to give currency to the unhealthy factions that threaten to blacken the reputation of Patrice Emery Lumumba.

From now on, the great institution set up in the name of Lumumba in the Soviet capital, if it is to be worthy of its high inspiration and serve the countries of the third world, must teach our future cadres the concepts of nationalism as he understood them, instead of orienting them toward goals that might well bring shame upon the noble heritage of the hero of our once-oppressed countries. The nationalism of young nations, although each of us has its own special kind, finds its common denominator in our quest for our intrinsic, primordial values. This is nothing more or less than a return to our own authentic sources, and General Mobutu is the champion in that quest today.

LE PROGRES, Kinshasa  
24 March 1971

**LUMUMBA UNIVERSITY: HOTBED OF SUBVERSION?**

Last March 15th, the Attorney General of Mexico, Sanchez Vergae, announced that the Mexican police had uncovered a communist plot and arrested 19 terrorists who had holed up in their den, and that the police were hunting the other suspects listed as fugitives. The Attorney General also announced that the group had come back via East Germany and the USSR after a training course in terrorist sabotage and guerrilla tactics in North Korea.

According to the Mexican Attorney General's office, some of the terrorists apparently had been given scholarships at the Patrice Lumumba University under Soviet-Mexican cultural exchange programs. They admitted that they had not only received training in politics, but that the purpose of this training could have been to teach them to commit other crimes.

It was against this background that they stole money estimated at the equivalent of more than 40,000 zaire from a Mexican bank. They allegedly admitted that they intended to go on stealing from banks and financial institutions in Mexico City and elsewhere throughout the country. The government also claims to have captured large quantities of weapons and other propaganda materials.

On 17 March 1971, the Mexican government recalled its ambassador from Moscow for consultations. Apparently the plot was organized with the collaboration of some Soviet citizens. In this connection, the official French radio and TV announced in its news broadcasts last week that five members of the Soviet embassy staff in Mexico had been asked to leave Mexico. It was also pointed out that recently a great many Mexicans, Latin Americans, and Africans have been going to the USSR. Unwilling to head the list of countries that harbor terrorist movements, this great power allegedly uses North Korea as a cover for training revolutionaries to operate in non-communist countries.

The Mexican daily El Sol has directly accused the USSR of involvement in the plot, charging that scholarship students at Lumumba University are indeed engaged in revolutionary activities, and that it is an established fact that scholarships granted under this cultural exchange program are used for other purposes. This is no secret to anybody.

As for reaction in Congo, the obvious point is that people here are very much offended at this ignoble use of the name of their national hero. Back in 1961, when the Soviet authori-

EL MERCURIO, Chile  
2 September 1970

KUNAKOV FILE (VI): LUMUMBA UNIVERSITY IN MOSCOW

A visit to the Soviet Union, and enrollment in Lumumba University in Moscow, which was especially created for the youth of underdeveloped countries, constitute two of the greatest incentives devised by the Embassy and the Communist Party to attract adherents and future collaborators in their intelligence services.

According to the Kunakov File, there are, in the Soviet Embassy, detailed lists of all Chileans who have received grants to study in Moscow since 1960, including their names, addresses and other items. According to the File, the following grants were awarded for the years in question: six in 1960; 12 in 1961; 12 in 1962; eight in 1963; 42 in 1964; 47 in 1965; 49 in 1966; 31 in 1967; 32 in 1968; and 25 in 1969. About the middle of last year, Kunakov drew up a list of 25 graduates of Lumumba; and, on the basis of this tabulation, of the total number involved, three graduated in philology; five in engineering; four in medicine; four in physics; three in chemistry; three in economics; two in agronomy; one in international law; and one in history. A good many of them are working at the University of Chile, some with the INDAP [Instituto de Desarrollo Agropecuario; Agriculture-Livestock Development Institute], two on the Central Committee of the Communist Party, one at the Soviet-Chilean Institute, and another at the State Technical University.

On the initiative of the Soviet-Chilean Institute, a Center for Former Students, and one of Parents and Guardians of students now in Moscow were formed. The parents are involved in collecting funds and favors for the youths, and the graduates are urged to remain united in association with the Institute. This does not always happen, and the File notes (in July 1969) that "a delegation of former graduates appeared at the Embassy a few days ago, expressing criticism for the Soviet-Chilean Institute's failure to do anything to help them validate their professional degrees. Kazakov, who spoke to them, quoted them as saying that in view of the Institute's attitude, they were holding their meetings at the East German-Chilean Cultural Institute. This provoked Kazakov's indignation, and he requested that they return again to the Institute."

Candidates for Lumumba are selected by the Institute and at the Embassy, apparently on the basis of merit, but in reality according to the status of their sponsors in the Communist Party, or their influence at the Embassy. According to an

evaluation made by Kazakov (File, 23 September 1968), "the chief danger at the Institute is the interference of 'alien' individuals in the selection of candidates for Lumumba University; if this should happen, the political intervention of the U.S.S.R. in Latin America would be seriously jeopardized."

LE PROGRES, Kinshasa  
24 March 1971

CPYRGHT

## Université Lumumba : foyer de la subversion ?

Le 15 mars dernier, le procureur général de Mexique, Sanchez Vergara, a annoncé que la police de Mexico avait déjoué un complot communiste et arrêté 19 terroristes qui s'étaient retirés dans leur repaire et qu'elle recherche les autres suspects portés disparus. Le procureur général a d'autre part précisé que le groupe était revenu par la RDA et l'URSS après un entraînement de sabotage terroriste et de tactique de guérilla en Corée du Nord.

Selon les informations recueillies auprès du procureur général mexicain, il semble que quelques-uns de ces terroristes auraient reçu des bourses à l'Université Patrice Lumumba, d'après le programme d'échanges culturels soviéto-mexicains. Ils ont, en fait, avoué qu'ils n'ont pas seulement reçu l'entraînement dans le cadre politique, mais que le but de cet entraînement pouvait leur permettre de perpétrer d'autres méfaits.

C'est dans ce cadre qu'ils ont volé une somme évaluée à plus de 40.000 zaires d'une banque mexicaine. Ils auraient précisé à cet effet que leur but était de continuer à voler dans des banques et sociétés financières, tant à Mexico que dans d'autres villes du pays. D'autre part, le gouvernement aurait capturé beaucoup d'armes et autres matériels de propagande.

Le 17 mars courant, le Gouvernement mexicain a rappelé son ambassadeur à Moscou pour consultation. Il semble que le complot était organisé

avec la collaboration de certains Soviétiques. A ce propos, dans ses émissions de la semaine dernière, l'Office de la radio télévision française annonçait que cinq membres de l'ambassade soviétique à Mexico ont été invités à quitter le territoire mexicain. On fait remarquer par ailleurs que dernièrement beaucoup de Mexicains, de Latino-Américains, voire des Africains se sont rendus en URSS. Par crainte de se montrer en tête d'affiche des pays qui entretiennent des mouvements terroristes, cette grande puissance se couvre de la présence de la Corée du Nord pour l'entraînement des révolutionnaires destinés à jouer leur rôle dans des pays non communistes.

Le journal mexicain, El Sol, a accusé l'URSS en affirmant que les activités révolutionnaires sont menées par des boursiers de l'Université Lumumba et qu'il est bien établi que ces bourses données dans le cadre de programme d'échanges culturels sont utilisées à d'autres fins. Ce n'est un secret pour personne.

Pour ce qui est de l'opinion congolaise, on ne peut manquer de souligner qu'elle est obscurcie par un emploi si abusif du nom de son héros national. En effet, en 1961 quand les autorités soviétiques décidèrent d'éterniser le nom de notre Premier ministre, cela faisait la joie, non seulement du peuple congolais, mais même des jeunes Nations anticolonialistes opprimées. Il ne fait aucun doute que l'espoir des

pays du tiers monde était que ce lieu serve de sanctuaire du développement de haute pensée et non d'un repaire où doivent se tramer le dessèls les plus sournols.

A la veille du XXIV<sup>me</sup> congrès du PC soviétique, nous souhaiterions que les autorités soviétiques se penchent sur cette question afin de tirer au clair le rôle imparté à l'université Lumumba. En effet, il s'avère de plus en plus qu'une mauvaise campagne est menée à l'endroit de notre héros national à qui on attribue parfois des conceptions philosophiques qu'il ne nourrissait pas de son vivant. Certes, il ne serait pas mal venu de souligner actuellement aux yeux du monde que le premier Premier ministre congolais ne s'était jamais prononcé dans sa vie politique pour les idéologies qui divisent aujourd'hui le monde.

Le citoyen Christophe Ngbenye, ancien leader de la rébellion a témoigné du nationalisme de Lumumba, en déclarant dernièrement à Kampala que le général Mobutu a fait du Congo ce que Lumumba voulait qu'il soit. De son côté, le grand journal français, le « Monde », dans le numéro spécial consacré à la prochaine visite du général Mobutu en France rappelle les similitudes de la pensée politique de notre chef de l'Etat avec celles du héros national congolais. Ce sont là deux témoignages importants que nous ne pouvons négliger en faisant valoir par contre des intentions malsaines qui risquent de noircir la réputation de Patrice Emery Lumumba.

"The second request was from a candidate who indicated in his autobiography that he had twice failed in his attempt to enroll in the University of Chile.

"The third, from still another candidate, contained a certificate of secondary studies containing two incompletes, entered in red, indicating that this individual had succeeded in passing his examinations with an average mark.

"Whereupon Silva Gimma told Mrs. Millas that all those pre-selected were either Communist Party militants, or sponsored by 'benefactors.' When he asked me who was in charge of holding the meetings of the board of directors, I told him: 'You, Mr. Chairman.' He ordered the secretary to call the board for a meeting on Monday, the 14th, at 1700 hours, and asked her if she would mind if he took the documents. He later took off with all the documents, declaring the pre-selection invalid, and requested that the documentation on all the other candidates be sent to his residence.

"In view of these events, Adriana Millas called the Central Committee of the Communist Party, asking to speak with Oscar Diaz Iturrieta, the national head of the Institutes. He replied that he was on leave, and she then asked 'Mrs. Virginia,' who is Diaz Iturrieta's secretary, to come to the Institute. The latter vehemently refused to do so, suggesting that Mrs. Millas solve the problem herself. This involved locating Segovia (the Communist Party's charge at the Institute) by telephone in Arica, and she subsequently succeeded in contacting Fernando Garcia, the acting Secretary General, who was at the Astor Theater. Garcia authorized the transmittal of the documentation to Silva Gimma, and the convocation of the meeting on Monday."

The preceding account offers a very good example of the decisive role played by the Communist Party in the granting of scholarships, and in the administration of the Institute. Some other instances of political intervention, among many, are the following:

Carmen Marsellesa Pereira Pena refused the grant she had obtained to enroll in the School of Medicine at Lumumba University. To replace her the Chilean Communist Party, in a letter dated 5 August 1969, sent through the Institute, suggested a Communist Youth organization militant, Alicia Mujica Romero. The note was submitted to the Soviet Ambassador on the date indicated.

There is a notation in the Kunakov File as follows: "On Friday, the 7th (of March 1969), Baltra telephoned the Institute and asked me why 'his candidates', that is, the individuals he had recommended, were not even pre-selected. He complained of the fact that even the applicant that he had submitted, a relative of Senator Hugo Miranda, had not been pre-selected. I told Baltra that the selection had been made by a

The Kunakov File recounts an interesting episode in the process of pre-selecting candidates for Lumumba:

"At about 1730 hours on Friday (11 April 1969), Enrique Silva Cimma called me to ask whether the meeting called by the Secretary General for the previous day had been held; this was a meeting at which he was going to approve the pre-selection of scholarship candidates. I told him that this meeting had, in fact, taken place; to which he replied that he had been given a message on Wednesday afternoon which, on account of a previous commitment, made it impossible for him to attend the meeting. I informed him that, at that very moment, the Secretary General was about to send off a letter apologizing for the length of time this pre-selection had taken, and containing, as an enclosure, a list of those who had been pre-selected. The meeting had been held on Thursday, the 10th, because the diplomatic pouch had to go out on Monday or Tuesday, and the documentation on the pre-selected individuals had to be sent. Otherwise, they would have to go in the May pouch, which would put Chile's candidate s beyond the deadline for application (1 May 1969).

"Silva Cimma asked me about 'his participation in the matter of the grants,' saying that he was supposed to be familiar with the background of the candidates. I told him that even I had been surprised at the haste in which the meeting had been held, which had forced me to rush in preparing a report on the activities; and that, in any event, the request of the pre-selected individuals were at the Institute awaiting withdrawal, some time or other to the Embassy. At this, he informed me that he would be at the Institute in 30 minutes, to look at the documents.

"Shortly thereafter, V. Kazakov arrived in search of the folder containing the documentation on the pre-selected individuals. I told him what the situation was, and he suggested that, as soon as Silva Cimma arrived at the Institute, I tell him that I had been left out of the pre-selection process, and that the one responsible for the documents right now was the wife of Deputy Orlando Millas, who was a secretary at the Institute. Silva Cimma arrived at 1930 hours, and I promptly followed Kazakov's advice. At this, he summoned Mrs. Millas, and demanded the documents of her.

"The first autobiography that he read was a request submitted by a militant from the Communist Youth organization of

the North, who introduced his application as follows: 'I have been informed by my comrades in the Party that you are responsible for the distribution of the scholarships to Lumumba University...!'

EL MERCURIO, Chile  
2 September 1970

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# Archivo Kunakov (VI)

## La Universidad Lumumba de Moscú

Investigación y relato de J. Domínguez K.

Un viaje a la Unión Soviética y el ingreso a la Universidad Lumumba de Moscú, creada especialmente para jóvenes de los países subdesarrollados, constituyen dos de los mayores incentivos esgrimidos por la Embajada y el PC para atraer a los muchachos y captar adherentes y futuros colaboradores en sus servicios de información.

Según el Archivo de Kunakov, en la Embajada soviética existen listas detalladas de todos los chileros becados en Moscú desde 1960, incluyendo nombres, direcciones y otras referencias. De acuerdo al Archivo en los años respectivos se concedieron las siguientes becas: 6 en 1960; 12 en 1961; 12 en 1962; 8 en 1963; 42 en 1964; 47 en 1965; 49 en 1966; 31 en 1967; 32 en 1968 y 25 en 1969. A mediados del año pasado Kunakov confeccionó una lista de 25 egresados de la Lumumba; según ella, de este total había 3 egresados en filología, 5 en ingeniería, 4 en medicina, 4 en física, 3 en química, 3 en economía, dos en agronomía; uno en derecho internacional y uno en historia. Entre ellos, una buena parte trabajan en la Universidad de Chile, varios en INDAP, dos en el Comité Central del PC, uno en el Instituto Chileno - Soviético y otro en la Universidad Técnica del Estado.

Por iniciativa del Instituto Chileno - Soviético se constituyó un Centro de Ex Alumnos y un Centro de Padres y Apoderados de los estudiantes actualmente en Moscú. Los padres se preocupan de recolectar fondos y obsequios para los muchachos y los egresados son estimulados a mantenerse unidos en torno al Instituto. Esto no siempre se logra, y el Archivo señala (en julio de 1969) que "una delegación de antiguos egresados se presentó hace algunos días en la Embajada y formuló críticas contra el Instituto Chileno - Soviético, que no ha hecho nada para ayudarlos a validar sus títulos profesionales. Kazakov, que habló con ellos, manifestó que le habían informado que en vista de la actitud del Instituto estaban reuniéndose en el local del Instituto Cultural Chileno - RDA (Alemania Comunista). Esto provocó indignación en Kazakov, quien les solicitó que se acercaran nuevamente al Instituto".

Los candidatos a la Lumumba...

de Moscú

tituto y en la Embajada, en apariencias por méritos, pero en realidad según la calidad de los padrinos que tengan en el PC o las influencias que se mueven en la Embajada. Según una apreciación de Kazakov (Archivo 23-IX-68) "el peligro principal en el Instituto es la intervención de personas "extrañas" en la selección de postulantes a la Universidad Lumumba; si esto sucediera, se pondría en serias dificultades la intromisión política de la URSS en América latina".

En el Archivo Kunakov se relata un interesante episodio del proceso de preselección de candidatos a la Lumumba:

"El viernes 11 (abril 1969) alrededor de las 17:30 horas me llamó Enrique Silva Cimma para consultar si se había realizado la reunión convocada por el secretario general para el día anterior, en la cual se iba a aprobar la preselección de los postulantes a becas. Le informé que efectivamente se había realizado esta reunión, a lo que él replicó que se le había dejado un mensaje en la tarde del miércoles, lo que impidió, por razones de compromisos anteriores, concurrir a esta reunión. Le informé que el secretario general le estaba despachando en ese mismo momento una carta con excusas por la premura del tiempo con que se había realizado esta preselección y en la cual se le adjuntaba una lista de los preseleccionados. La reunión se había realizado el jueves 10, debido a que el lunes o martes salía la valija diplomática, y debían enviarse los documentos de los preseleccionados, caso contrario irían en la valija del mes de mayo, lo que significaba que las solicitudes de Chile quedaban fuera de plazo de entrega (1.º de mayo 1969). Silva Cimma me consultó que "cuál era su participación en el asunto de las becas" y que él debía conocer los antecedentes de los postulantes. Le dije que incluso a mí me habían

sorprendido con la premura de hacer la reunión, lo que me obligó a preparar aceleradamente un informe sobre las actividades; que en todo caso las solicitudes de los preseleccionados estaban en el Instituto esperando que de un momento a otro las retiraran de la Embajada. Ante esto me comunicó que en treinta minutos

los llevaría al Instituto para ver los documentos.

Poco rato después llegó V. Kazakov a buscar el paquete con los documentos de los preseleccionados; le informé de la situación y me recomendó que apenas Silva Cimma llegara al Instituto le dijera que se me había excluido de la realización de la preselección y que la responsable de los documentos en este momento era la esposa del diputado Orlando Millas, secretaria del Instituto. Silva Cimma llegó a las 19:30 y de inmediato seguí el consejo de Kazakov; ante esto llamó a la señora Millas y le exigí los documentos.

La primera autobiografía que leyo fue de una solicitud presentada por una militante de las JJCC del Norte, que encabezaba su presentación de la siguiente manera: "Me he informado por intermedio de los compañeros del Partido que ustedes tienen a su cargo la distribución de las becas a la Universidad Lumumba...".

La segunda solicitud era de un postulante que en su autobiografía indicaba que en dos oportunidades había fracasado en sus intentos para ingresar a la Universidad de Chile.

La tercera, de otro postulante, contenía un certificado de estudios secundarios con dos notas insuficientes señaladas con rojo e indicando que esa persona había logrado aprobar sus exámenes por promedio.

Ante esto, Silva Cimma le dijo a la señora Millas que todos los preseleccionados eran o militantes del partido comunista o favorecidos por "compadres". Me preguntó que quién

disponía la realización de reuniones de directorio, le dije "usted, señor presidente". Le ordenó a la secretaria citar al Directorio para el lunes 14 a las 17 horas y le preguntó si tenía algún inconveniente para que él se llevara los documentos. Posteriormente se llevó todos los documentos, declarando nula la preselección y solicitando el envío a su domicilio de los documentos de todos los otros postulantes.

Ante estos hechos, Adriana Millas llamó al Comité Central del PC, solicitando hablar con Oscar Díaz Iturrieta, encargado nacional de los Institutos. Se le contestó que estaba de vacaciones; solicitó entonces a la "señora Virginia", que es secretaria de Díaz Iturrieta, que viniera al Instituto. Esta última se negó rotundamente, recomendándole a la señora Millas que ella solucionara el pro-

team consisting of Segovia, Ubeda and Garcia; and that their choices had later been protested by the President, Mr. Silva Cimma. Baltra gave me his private telephone number, so that Segovia could call him that very day and give him a full explanation. He also remarked that 'an overly legalistic criterion' had evidently been applied in the pre-selection. Later, Segovia tried to have Fernando Garcia explain to Baltra that the one who had been responsible for the failure of his candidates to be pre-selected was 'his friend and protector, Silva Cimma.'

The following entry on this topic appears subsequently in the File: "When Segovia inquired of Air France the number of passengers arriving from Moscow, he was told that there were 27, instead of 26. Later investigations proved that the 27th ticket belonged to Manuel Bachelet Pizarro, the brother-in-law of Radical Senator Hugo Miranda. Bachelet, who resided at 2093 Los Araucanos, in Santiago, had not been pre-selected, and, when the pre-selections were announced, withdrew his application. Senator Baltra requested information from the Institute, pointing out the feasibility of a grant for Bachelet Pizarro, in view of his status as Senator Miranda's brother-in-law. The negotiations to secure this grant were carried out by Senator Baltra with the Soviet Ambassador in Santiago."

"On 17 June 1969, Lumumba University in Moscow sent the list of those selected to Santiago. According to the File: "Of the 26 names sent by Lumumba, 24 were those of individuals who had been pre-selected by the Institute, and two for grants offered by the Soviet Embassy. The latter scholarships went to Gilberto Cepeda Contreras and Luis Monardes Jogo; the former apparently received his grant as a result of the intercession of former Senator Baltazar Castro."

At Moscow, the academic achievement of the Chileans has been less than satisfactory. At a meeting with Kunakov, on 22 January 1969, at the Soviet Embassy, First Secretary Dimitriy Pastujov cited this matter in detail. The File reports: "A report was received by the Embassy on the unfortunate performance of the Chilean scholarship holders at Lumumba. Among other things, Santiago had been officially informed of the expulsion of Nelson Olave, in February 1968, 'on account of drunkenness.' The individual in question had postponed his return to Chile

several times, but, since this situation had gone on too long, and Olave's behavior was bad, it was decided to expel him. The Embassy was notified of this decision. Pastujov officially reported to the Institute that the number of scholarships to Lumumba University for 1969 had been cut to 20, owing to the poor performance of the Chilean students. He added that, at the present time, over 200 Chileans were taking courses there, and that, of this number, about 120 were academically unfit.

In the University's classification of academic achievement, the Chileans were in next-to-last place."

they traveled individually to East Berlin, where they exchanged their Mexican passports for false North Korean passports. They regrouped in Moscow, where they visited for ten days before flying to Pyongyang on a Soviet Aeroflot plane. Next came six months of training in guerrilla tactics, radiotelegraphy, judo and use of weapons. Retracing their steps through Moscow and East Berlin, the youthful firebrands returned to Mexico and, during the next year, with another \$16,000 supplied by North Korea, recruited 40 more like-minded revolutionaries to make similar trips to Pyongyang.

The movement, which only really got off the ground last August, turned out to be short-lived. On Dec. 19, six MAR members allegedly assaulted a bank messenger and snatched a strongbox containing \$84,000 in U.S. currency. The raid put the police on their tracks. The break in the case finally came when a MAR member named Francisco Parades

Ruiz was arrested on a vagrancy charge March 1 and police found a phony passport on him. Under interrogation, Parades Ruiz reportedly informed on the others in exchange for immunity. With his information, police soon arrested 19 more MAR members on a wide variety of charges.

**Soviet Involvement.** The youths readily admitted that they had received guerrilla training in North Korea. "No easy *coup d' état* was planned," said Gómez, "but a long struggle, guerrilla warfare and armed confrontation." At first, the Mexican government cautiously avoided implicating the Soviet Union and put full blame on the North Koreans with whom Mexico has no diplomatic relations. But when it came to light that no less than 50 Mexicans had crisscrossed the Soviet Union on North Korean passports, the Mexican government reacted angrily, expelling five top-ranking Russian diplomats and recalling its own ambassador from Mos-

cow. Western intelligence said that the diplomats had been directly involved with MAR's activities. As police stepped up the search for 28 other members of the ill-fated movement, the Soviet embassy issued a statement proclaiming its "strict observance of the principle of nonintervention in the acts of each country." But few Mexicans could accept that profession of innocence.

The episode may mean a considerable setback for Soviet foreign policy in Latin America. In the last two decades, Moscow has established diplomatic relations with every South American country except Paraguay, and assiduously cultivated a *Via Pacifica* policy emphasizing cultural exchange programs and trade agreements as a means to peaceful expansion and influence. The first repercussions came from Costa Rica, which postponed negotiations for a Soviet embassy in San José. It would have been the first for the Russians in Central America.

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Segovia (encargado del PC en el Instituto) por teléfono en Arica, y luego se consiguió ubicar a Fernando García, secretario general interino, quien se encontraba en el Teatro Astor. García autorizó el envío de la documentación a Silva Cimma y la realización de la reunión el lunes".

La relación precedente ilustra muy bien el papel decisivo que juega el PC en el otorgamiento de becas y en la dirección del Instituto. Otros casos de intervención política, entre muchos, son los siguientes:

—Carmen Marsellesa Pereira Peña renunció a la beca obtenida para ingresar a la Facultad de Medicina de la U. Lumumba. En su reemplazo el PCCH, en comunicación de 5-VIII-69 propuso por intermedio del Instituto a la militante de la Juventud Comunista Alicia Mujica Romero. La nota fue entregada al Embajador soviético en la fecha indicada.

—En el Archivo Kunakov se anota: "El viernes 7 (marzo 1969) Baltra llamó por teléfono al Instituto y me consultó sobre los motivos de que sus candidatos, o sea, las personas recomendadas por él, ni siquiera fueron preseleccionadas. Protestó por el hecho de que incluso el candidato presentado por él, pariente del senador Hugo Miranda, no fue preseleccionado. Le informé a Baltra que la selección la había realizado un equipo integrado por Segovia, Ubeda y García, que posteriormente esta selección fue objetada por el presidente señor Silva Cimma,

Baltra me dio su teléfono particular con el objeto de que Segovia lo llamara ese mismo día y le diera amplias explicaciones; expresó además que al parecer se había adoptado un criterio demasiado legalista en la preselección". Posteriormente Segovia estaba tratando de lograr que Fernando García le explicara a Baltra que el responsable de la no preselección de sus recomendados era su "amigo" y compadre Silva Cimma".

Sobre este problema, en el Archivo aparece posteriormente la siguiente nota: "Segovia al solicitar a Air France el número de pasajes llegados desde Moscú, se informó que en vez de 26 pasajes, había 27. En averiguaciones posteriores se confirmó que el pasaje número 27 correspondía a Eduardo Manuel Bachelet Pizarro, cuñado del senador radical Hugo Miranda. Bachelet, con domicilio en Santiago, Los Araucanos 2093, no había sido preseleccionado y luego de publicarse la preselección retiró sus documentos. El senador Baltra solicitó informaciones al Instituto manifestando la conveniencia de una beca para Bachelet Pizarro, por su calidad de cuñado del senador Miranda. La gestión para obtener esta beca fue realizada por el senador Baltra ante el Embajador soviético en Santiago".

—El 17 de junio de 1969 la Universidad Lumumba de Moscú envió a Santiago la lista de los seleccionados. Según el Archivo "de los 26 nombres enviados por la Lumumba, 24 corresponden a preseleccionados

por el Instituto y dos de ellos a becas otorgadas por la Embajada soviética. Estas becas corresponden a Gilberto Cepeda Contreras y Luis Monardes Jorjé; al parecer el primero recibió la beca por gestiones realizadas por el ex senador Balazar Castro".

En Moscú el rendimiento académico de los chilenos es menor que desgracia. En una reunión con Kunakov, el 22 de enero de 1969 en la Embajada soviética, el Primer Secretario Dimitri Pastujov se refirió detalladamente a este problema. Expresa el Archivo: "En la Embajada se recibió un informe sobre el triste papel que están haciendo los becados chilenos en la Lumumba. Entre otras cosas se informó oficialmente a Santiago sobre la expulsión "por ebriedad" de Nelson Olave, en febrero de 1968. El afectado había postergado varias veces su retorno a Chile, pero como esta situación se prolongó demasiado, y Olave tenía mala conducta, se resolvió su expulsión. La decisión fue comunicada a la Embajada. Pastujov informó oficialmente al Instituto que el número de becas a la U. Lumumba para 1969 fue rebajada a 20 por el mal rendimiento de los estudiantes chilenos. Agregó que en la actualidad más de 200 chilenos siguen cursos allí, de los cuales alrededor de 120 son académicos incapaces. Los chilenos figuran en el penúltimo lugar en la clasificación de la Universidad sobre rendimiento académico".

TIME

19 April 1971

MEXICO

Troubles on the Vía Pacifica

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Political one-upmanship in Mexico frequently comes in the guise of a comic book. All factions can and do compete to produce the cleverest and most convincing interpretation of national events. Last week a new comic hit the stands. On the cover was Miss Liberty in all her Grecian-gowned glory, about to be done in by sinister men armed with rifles and long Turkish knives. Were those the Russian and North Korean flags over their heads? They most certainly were. This unabashedly patriotic comic, the handiwork of a wealthy, middle-aged illustrator named José G. Cruz, spins out in cartoons, photographs and cryptic Calogue what many Mexicans are talking about these days: the arrest of 20 young revolutionaries.

who traveled to North Korea for guerrilla training and returned home to cause the severest strain in Mexican-Soviet relations since Leon Trotsky sought asylum in Mexico in 1937.

**2 de Octubre.** Even without the comic embellishments, which probably exaggerate the Soviet role in the affair, the story is a remarkable account of international intrigue. As pieced together by TIME correspondents from various sources, it all began in the dormitory of Patrice Lumumba People's Friendship University in Moscow. The time was October 1968. Upset by the bloody university riots in Mexico City that month, which claimed at least 34 lives, six Mexican students studying at Lumumba University on Soviet scholarships got to-

gether and decided to form a clandestine organization. They named it *Movimiento de Acción Revolucionaria* (MAR) and called the guerrilla unit the *2 de Octubre*, the date of the massacre. Fabricio Gómez Souza, one of the students, made contact with the North Korean embassy in Moscow and arranged to visit Pyongyang. There he received the North Koreans' assurance that they would give the Mexican students political and military training. Back in Moscow, he was handed \$10,000 by the North Korean embassy to finance the students' travels.

Gómez then returned to Mexico, where he recruited several more aspiring guerrillas. In order to avoid suspicion by Western intelligence agencies,

BALTIMORE SUN  
28 March 1971

CPYRGHT

## Suspicious Raised By Soviet-Bolivia Cultural Exchange

by ROBERT A. ERLANDSON  
Sun Staff Correspondent

La Paz, Bolivia—A purported long-range Soviet plot to introduce North Korean-trained Mexican guerrillas into Mexico apparently is being repeated here in Bolivia.

Some sources are convinced that Moscow had guerrilla training in mind when it signed a recent cultural exchange agreement to offer scholarships to eight Bolivian students yearly in undergraduate and postgraduate work at Moscow's Patrice Lumumba University, in addition to other scholarships at other Soviet institutions and an exchange of professorships.

According to reports here, the Russians selected 10 leftist Mexican students to attend the university in 1963 on four-year scholarships. After graduation reports said, they were sent by way of East Germany to North Korea, on North Korean passports, for an intensive six-month course in guerrilla warfare.

Subsequently, the reports con-

tinued, another 10 students followed the same route and joined their colleagues in establishing guerrilla training and recruiting centers in the Mexican hinterlands.

When the Mexican government discovered the plot earlier this month, it expelled five Soviet diplomats, including the man who reportedly recruited the first students.

The Russians have been carrying on a cultural and commercial offensive throughout Latin America for several years, sending delegations and top entertainment attractions to convince the various governments of the sincerity of their purposes in aiding underdeveloped nations.

### Prelude To Election

This was particularly evident in Chile last year as a prelude to the September election which saw a Marxist, Salvador Allende, emerge as president.

Bolivia, like other Latin American countries caught up in the current wave of nationalism, appears to be turning to Russia

and East European countries in a deliberate effort to rid itself of any taint of United States domination. This has certainly been the case with Chile and Peru.

There has been no official reaction here yet to the Mexican affair. But it must be assumed that all Latin American governments, especially those which already have guerrilla problems, will take second looks at any agreements they might have with Russia. It may well set back the Soviet efforts in Latin America for several years.

### Five Agreements

The Bolivian program includes five agreements, three commercial accords, one for scientific co-operation and the latest, signed February 25 in Moscow and reaffirmed here two weeks ago, the cultural exchange agreement.

Under the cultural accord, university degrees will be mutually recognized in the two countries and the Soviet Union will extend scholarships to Bolivian students for unlimited

technical and scientific studies in Russia in areas needed for Bolivian development.

It also provides for full cultural exchange on an academic level, with exchange visits between Bolivian and Russian professors. The Bolivian academic community is markedly leftist and the student organizations are led by Havana-Peking oriented students.

All the agreements with Bolivia contain provision for mutual recognition of sovereignty, independence and non-intervention in domestic affairs. So, presumably, did the one with Mexico.

THE CURRENT WEEKLY, India  
10 April 1971

CPYRGHT

# SOVIET PLOT Against 2 Govts.

A 'CURRENT' Special

**O**N March 15, it was announced that the Police had smashed a plot against the Mexican Government and arrested 19 terrorists at "Guerrilla Academies" and various secret hideouts. On March 16 the Government of Ceylon declared a state of emergency as a precautionary measure against a coup by the People's Liberation Front.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
31 March 1971

CPYRGHT

# Guerrilla plot in Mexico linked to Soviet cultural institute

By Conrad Manley  
Special to The Christian Science Monitor  
Mexico City

With the arrest and arraignment of 19 Mexican urban guerrillas reportedly trained in the Soviet Union and North Korea, the spotlight here is on the Mexican-Russian Institute for Cultural Exchange which granted them scholarships in Moscow.

The Institute, which functions with the financial assistance and under the direction of the Soviet Embassy, recruited 50 Mexican students between 1968 and 1970 to study at the Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow.

## Equipment seized

From Moscow, through arrangements with the North Korean Embassy, they allegedly went in three groups to Pyongyang for political indoctrination, training in the use of weapons and explosives, and strategy and tactics of urban and rural guerrillas in courses of six months to one year.

The 19 guerrillas were captured with military weapons, uniforms, short-wave radios, quantities of Communist propaganda, and other materials and were charged with "planning to impose on Mexico a Marxist-Leninist regime." Others members of the guerrilla teams are still being sought by Mexican authorities.

Attorney General Julio Sánchez Vargas reported that confessions by members of the band not only confirmed their travels and training abroad but also implicated them in an \$84,000 robbery of a bank messenger here last December and in the accidental killing of one of their fellow guerrillas during target practice in the state of Michoacán.

## Scholarships arranged

The Mexican-Russian Institute, headed by Adelina Zendejas Gómez, had, as of last fall, arranged scholarships for 150 Mexican students who now are at the Patrice Lumumba University.

The institute also functions here as both a language training school and a cultural center in which Russian books and periodicals are available and events such as film showings, lectures, theatrical and chess tournaments, and the like are held regularly. Membership is estimated at 2,300 members who pay dues of only 80 cents monthly.

The Soviet Embassy's control of the cultural center is exercised by its cultural attaché, Boris N. Voskoboinikov, who was in Santiago, Chile, as a student for six months in 1965 and who has been active here among members of the Mexican Communist Youth.

He is assisted by Konstantin N. Verzhbitsky, assistant cultural and sports attaché, who devotes much time to youth and university groups here and in Veracruz, Guadalajara, Morelia, and other provincial cities of Mexico.

## Expulsions recalled

The present minister counselor of the Russian Embassy in Mexico, Dmitri A. Diakonov, who previously served as its press attaché, was expelled from Argentina in 1958 and from Brazil in 1963 for allegedly intervening, as an agent of the Soviet secret police, the KGB, in internal affairs of both countries.

Although a cultural agreement between Mexico and the Soviet Union, signed in October, 1968, calls for a mutual exchange of students, the traffic has all been one way. This situation was blamed by Mr. Voskoboinikov in September on the Mexican Government, which, he said, "will not award any scholarships" for Russians to study in Mexico.

## Tour of Europe

A group affiliated with the institute, the Latin American Institute of Cultural Student and Teacher Interchange (ILICEM from its initials in Spanish), organized in 1970, has sponsored for Mexican participants a 52-day tour of Europe, including the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Austria for the bargain price of \$1,360.

Mexicans and resident foreigners here are intensely interested as to whether, in its trials of the Marxist-Leninist urban guerrillas, the Mexican Government will implicate even more the Mexican-Russian Institute for Cultural Exchange.

If it is demonstrated that the binational center is actively involved in arranging for guerrilla training of Mexican citizens, closing of the institute and expulsion of the Soviet diplomats might be the minimal re-

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May 1971

THE SOVIET SECURITY CONFERENCE OFFENSIVE

Two international conferences scheduled for May and June will include as major discussion topics on their agendas, variants of the concept of European security and the matter of a conference on European security (CES). They are the World Peace Assembly, meeting 13-16 May in Budapest and the 25th Congress of the Socialist International, meeting 25-27 May in Helsinki. The Soviets can be expected to take every possible propaganda advantage they can from these two meetings. One they will run from behind-the-scenes and the other they will try to manipulate.

Soviet Propaganda Offensive

The Soviet campaign to bring about, as soon as possible, a conference on European security is going ahead at two levels: -- governmental and public. At both levels, the Soviet propaganda offensive is calculated to divide the U.S. and its European allies by nurturing European suspicions about U.S. commitments in Western Europe and convincing West Europeans that America is the only stumbling block to the convening of a CES. At the same time, the USSR seeks to induce the people of Western Europe to pressure their governments into acceding to the Soviet request for a CES.

On the government level, Leonid Brezhnev told the recent 24th Party Congress that the majority of European countries had come out in favor of a CES and that preparations for it were moving along. However, this is far from true. While the majority of European countries express agreement in principle, several are also adamant in their insistence on a satisfactory Berlin solution and on an informal and flexible exploratory phase as preconditions to any preparations for a conference dealing with European security. Finland, too, is successfully resisting Warsaw Pact pressure to speed up preparations for a CES. Faced with these obstacles, the Soviets have now shifted their main focus of effort to the unofficial level while they continue to try to apply diplomatic pressure and to vocalize at the government level.

At the unofficial level, the Soviets are operating on the theory that if the electorate is swayed, so will be the parliament. At this level, Soviet propaganda is designed to sway public opinion through the tactic of getting various professional, youth, labor, or peace organizations to go on record in favor of a CES thereby bringing pressure to bear

on West European governments to show some forward movement. Their aim, of course, is to ultimately make it appear that the initiative for a CES --- whatever form it takes --- comes as much from the people of Western Europe as from Moscow.

#### World Peace Assembly

At the end of last year, the International Institute for Peace held a conference in Vienna which was billed by Pravda as an attempt "to mobilize public opinion in the direction of a European security conference". The actual sponsor of the conference was the World Peace Council (WPC) and its chief organizer was Maurice Lambilliotte, chairman of the Belgian Council of Peace (affiliate of the WPC) and the Belgian-Soviet Friendship Society. It was at this conference that plans were laid for a "Congress of the European Peoples on Security and Cooperation".

Some 65 delegates attended the Vienna conference; the majority represented the WPC and other Communist-front organizations. A series of reports was delivered on the subject of European commercial, technical, and scientific exchanges and on the main political aspects of European security. These papers are now being incorporated by the secretariat of the WPC into a "Charter of European Security" which will be the basic working document for the plenary congress that the WPC hopes to convene sometime during 1971 or 1972.

This month, the WPC is holding a World Peace Assembly in Budapest to which all member organizations have been invited along with various groups of sympathizers and representatives from large numbers of Communist-front organizations. A special committee will be concerned with European security and the plenary congress project. In the Warsaw Pact countries and in some West European countries, national committees are already at work preparing for the congress. Additional committees will be set up during the assembly.

The Belgian national committee, headed by Lambilliotte, is to play the key role in organizing a "committee of distinguished personalities in public life" to sponsor the congress, so as to give it the appearance of being held in response to the demands of West Europeans of varied political persuasions and from all sectors of society. Participants will be drawn from trade unions, women, youth, and professional organizations.

Out of the plenary congress is to come a Charter of European Security and Cooperation. Congress participants will form standing committees throughout Europe dedicated to influencing public opinion to bring pressure on West European governments to accede to Moscow's call for an imminent conference on European security. The aim, of course, is to make it appear that the initiative for a CES comes from the West as well as from Moscow.

Socialist Opinion on CES

In January this year, Britain's "shadow Defense Minister", George Thomson, told a meeting of the Bureau of the Socialist International in London that if the Soviet Union was "acting in good faith in demanding a European security conference leading to progress and detente, then Berlin is a reasonable test of that good faith." Mr. Thomson felt that a major breakthrough or a major setback in East-West relations could be imminent and that Berlin was the crucial litmus test. (A reprint of the text of Mr. Thomson's address published in Socialist Affairs is attached.)

Finland Resists Moscow's Pressuring

The government of Finland has quite clearly committed itself to being the cautious broker in the eventual convening of a conference on European security. In all proposals made since May 1969 when Finland formally offered to sponsor an East-West security conference, up to the most recent offer to host a "multilateral gathering of ambassadors" preparatory to a CES, Finland has been careful to maintain its neutrality and not to side with either East or West.

The Finnish government is, however, being almost crudely pressured by the Warsaw Pact to hurry matters along to the extent of calling immediately for an ambassadorial gathering with or without America and some of her West European allies. Finland has been firm in resisting this pressure. The only exception came after the issuance of the December 1970 NATO communique in which that body deferred on the Finnish proposal for a multilateral gathering pending additional progress at the bilateral level and on Berlin. To the embarrassment of his government, Foreign Minister Leskinen then told a meeting of the Social Democratic Parliamentary Group that NATO was "escalating the conditions stipulated by the West" and suggested that preparations for a CES should begin even if some countries were unable to accept the Finnish invitation. Prime Minister Karjalainen almost immediately slapped Leskinen's wrist by telling a television audience that Finland most

certainly would not host a "rump" conference on European security.

Official Warsaw Pact pressuring began with a visit to Helsinki in late January by Hungarian Prime Minister Fock who told a press conference that Finland should issue invitations for ambassadorial level talks on CES even though the U.S. and some West Europeans might not attend. Three days later, Prime Minister Karjalainen again publicly rejected the idea of beginning such discussions before they were acceptable to all the states involved. By March, Foreign Minister Leskinen, too, was publicly rejecting any speed-up in CES preparations. While on a three day visit to Austria, Leskinen told a press conference that to attempt to speed up preparations for a CES "would be like hitting one's head against the wall" and said that bilateral talks should be continued.

A hint that Finland will be subjected to further Warsaw Pact pressures has just come from Poland. Jozef Ozga-Michalski, who is both vice president of the Polish Peasant Party and chairman of foreign relations in the Polish parliament, has publicly criticized the U.S. for its "braking role" in CES preparatory work. Speaking at a 17 March press conference in Warsaw, Ozga-Michalski said that the sponsors of CES wanted a universal gathering, but that if one country consistently vetoed conference preparations, then the possibility of proceeding with an empty chair at the meeting table should be considered. Just the week before, Warsaw government leaders had been visited by Soviet ambassador-at-large and specialist at "peacekeeping", Lev Isaakovich Mendelevich. It is therefore speculated that this newest "empty chair" concept was born in Moscow and that Mendelevich brought orders for its public appearance with him to Warsaw.

SOCIALIST AFFAIRS, London  
February 1971

## SOCIALISTS AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

### Progress on Berlin is the Key

GEORGE THOMSON

Britain's Shadow Defence Minister sets out the attitude of the British Labour Party to the proposal for a conference on European security. He feels that a major breakthrough or a major setback in East-West relations could be imminent, and specifies the Berlin issue as the crucial litmus test.

The British Labour Party regards the key to world peace as still lying in the heart of Europe. There are, of course, important north-south problems. There are also urgent international dangers in the Middle East. Nevertheless, the danger of international conflict from either north-south problems or Middle East tensions is the danger of conflict by accident. The heart of the balance of power on which the peace of the world depends today is still in Europe and is the balance between the Atlantic Alliance on the one side and the Warsaw Pact Alliance on the other. It is against that background that we in the British Labour Party approach these problems.

My view is that we are probably at the beginning of a very critical period in the relationship between Eastern and Western Europe. In one way I believe that we could be on the verge of a major breakthrough in East-West relations. On the other hand, if the breakthrough is not achieved, then I think we must face the fact that we will probably find ourselves conscious of a very sharp setback. The prospects of a European Security Conference have been considerably increased over the last few months. By this I mean the prospects of a European security conference which has been properly prepared, which has the right sort of attendance and which has an agenda that will enable it to do serious business. This kind of European security conference, which is, I believe, now a possibility, is of course a long way from the original proposal of the Soviet Bloc, which was much more a propaganda manoeuvre than a proposal for making a real and constructive contribution to European détente.

Why has this change come about? Why are there these possibilities either of breakthrough or of setback? The major new event in the European field has been the *Ostpolitik* pursued by the German Chancellor, Willy Brandt, and by the Government led by the German Social Democratic Party. We in Britain have watched with both anxiety and admiration the progress that Willy Brandt has made in his negotiations with the Soviet Union, with Poland and indeed with other Eastern European countries. He has signed treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland, subject to ratification, and this has of course transformed the possibilities in East-West relations in Europe.

This is because the heart of the European problem remains the German problem. No one needs to be reminded of the very deep suspicion which has existed through the whole post-war period in Poland and the Soviet Union of German motives and German policies. Often these suspicions have been deliberately fanned and exaggerated by the communists for political purposes. Nevertheless it remains a fact that underneath the political provocation there was a very real hard core of fear and suspicion. It is the eroding of that fear and suspicion which is the remarkable achievement of Willy Brandt and of the present Federal German Government.

We must be conscious also, as socialists, not only of the constructive nature of the work that Brandt and his Government have undertaken in the field of East-West relations, but also of the great political risk that he has taken in so doing. He is, after all,

the leader of a coalition government with an extremely narrow majority.

Because of this background, it is important to record that Willy Brandt now needs and deserves some positive sign of response from the Soviet Union and from the Eastern Bloc. It is in this sense that I believe that on the one hand there is the possibility of a major breakthrough. Yet on the other hand, if the breakthrough does not come, the very fact that Brandt has gone as far as he has and that hopes have been raised in the way that they have, could lead to quite a significant and sad setback. Certainly my own impression of the German political scene is that Willy Brandt is under very substantial pressure at the moment in his own country.

The position that Willy Brandt has taken, which the British Labour Party has very strongly supported, is that we have now come to a stage where progress in relation to the problem of Berlin is a reasonable and necessary pre-requisite to making progress in the direction of a European security conference.

Perhaps I could explain why we attach such vital importance to progress on Berlin at the present time. First of all, it is important in human terms that the people of Berlin should have much freer movement and that there should be altogether much easier access. All the parties of the International should be conscious of the general duty that the socialist movement has to preserve human liberty inside Berlin. Secondly, I believe it is perfectly proper to say that if the Soviet Union is really acting in good faith in demanding a European security conference leading to progress and

détente, then Berlin is a reasonable test of that good faith.

Finally, from the point of view of Britain and the other West Berlin powers (to say nothing of the point of view of the Soviet Union), if there is to be progress towards East-West détente it is very important indeed that the four-power responsibilities in relation to Berlin are reasserted and safeguarded. In the first place, it is important to Britain, as a Western power guaranteeing liberty in Berlin, that the progress of the *Ostpolitik* is not of such a nature that Britain, France and the United States end up with continued responsibilities in West Berlin but with their rights to fulfil these responsibilities undermined by whatever agreement might be reached. Equally, there is a good deal of evidence that the Soviet Union is not anxious for its share of the Four Power responsibility for Berlin to be undermined in favour of East Germany.

I would now like to consider the question of a European security conference itself—what it ought to seek to achieve and what would be the problems facing it. First of all, I would emphasise the very noticeable improvement which has taken place in regard to the communist conditions for a European security conference. Eighteen months ago it was, by no means clear that the communists would not once again seek to use a European security conference to try to drive a wedge between the European allies within NATO and the United States and Canada. Now it has been, I believe, established beyond doubt that Canada and the United States would be members of such a conference without question from the beginning.

Secondly, there was a very great reluctance on the part of the Eastern Bloc even to consider the question of mutual force reductions being a part of the agenda of a European security conference. Although the communist position is not as clear on this as it is on the membership of the conference, I think there are some signs of movement on the Eastern side.

And finally, there has been the idea of the conference leading to the establishment of some kind of permanent machinery. To begin with, this idea was greeted with great scepticism by the communist side. Once again there have been signs of movement here.

As the British Labour Party sees it, the purposes of a European security conference would be three-fold. First of all, taking the easiest aspect, which the communist side has always emphasized, it would no doubt be useful to discuss at a general European conference the means of improving the momentum of exchanges in the technical, social and economic fields. These go on at the moment; they can always benefit from an extra impetus. But this part of the conference would be largely declaratory. Real progress in East-West exchanges in the technical and social fields is bound to be achieved on a bi-lateral basis rather than multi-laterally. Indeed, if one tried to set up multi-lateral machinery for this purpose I think you would retard the pace of progress rather than speed it up.

Secondly, there is the question of the conference leading to some continuing machinery. This is something in which we in the British Labour Party have been very interested for a considerable time. Indeed, it was Michael Stewart, as our Foreign Secretary, who can claim to have taken a leading part in trying to promote this idea within the Atlantic Alliance. What we envisage is the emergence of permanent East-West machinery on the political plane that would match the European Economic Commission (which is an East-West forum in Geneva) on the economic plane. We would not think of this as any dramatic breakthrough. Nevertheless, the establishment of continuing machinery would make a constructive contribution, and would help to enable those countries in Eastern Europe who have a different emphasis on various problems from that of the Soviet Union to be given the maximum opportunity to develop that difference of emphasis and to enable Europe generally to talk about its problems with a greater sense of continuity.

Finally, there is the main question of promoting security; that is, the problem of producing some kind of reduction of armaments inside Europe. The NATO countries have been putting forward proposals for balanced force reductions for a considerable time now, with until very recently a totally negative response from the communist side. We ought not to conceal the very substantial difficulties involved in making a reality of mutual force reductions. The Warsaw Pact

countries have an overwhelming preponderance of conventional forces as against those deployed by the NATO countries. And therefore the key formula in terms of mutual force reductions which we must always keep in mind is the concept of what I would call equality of security. By this I mean that it is not enough to take arithmetically the same number of forces from each side. You have to take forces from each side in a way which at any stage in the process leaves security in as good a state as it was before the process began. And this may very well mean an asymmetrical reduction in forces—a different volume of force reduction on the Warsaw Pact side as compared with reductions on the NATO side. Simply to put it that way underlines the very considerable difficulties involved in making progress.

The final question is whether, in fact, the Soviet Union and its allies are now really serious in wanting to make progress or whether they still simply see a European security conference as a method of making people forget as quickly as possible the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia and of helping to legitimise the status quo in Europe. I believe myself that there are cautious grounds for believing that the Soviet Bloc may mean some kind of business in this field. First of all, the Soviet Union itself obviously has an interest in arrangements on its Western flank that safeguard whatever might develop on its Eastern flank, where it has the longest and most disputed frontier in the world with China.

Secondly, I would guess from what contacts I have these days with the communist side that probably there is an increasing awareness of the political risks that Brandt has taken in Germany and of the risk that the *Ostpolitik* might go under if it is not given some concessions which demonstrate its success to public opinion inside Germany. Thirdly, there are the differences within the Eastern Bloc to which I have referred. These probably encourage progress rather than discourage it. Finally, there is the fact that the Soviet Union is engaged in the SALT talks with the United States. Although these talks have now gone on for some time without visible progress, what is significant is that they have continued despite a number of events in various parts of the world

CPYRGHT

which might easily have led either side in the talks to have broken them off. There have been crises between the Soviet Union and the US over the Middle East; the SALT talks have gone on. There has been the fact that the Soviet Union appeared to behave provocatively near the shores of Cuba; the SALT talks have gone on. One can draw from this the conclusion that both sides in the SALT talks are talking seriously. This fact has large implications both for the future of Western Europe and for the prospects of a European security conference.

*\* This article, exclusive to SOCIALIST AFFAIRS, is based on an address which George Thomson gave to the January 19 meeting of the Bureau of the Socialist International in London.*

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Frankfurt  
12 February 1971

VARIED REACTION IN SCANDINAVIA TO IDEA OF EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

The attitude of the Scandinavian countries to the plan of a European security conference is varied, however it is basically pervadingly positive. Finland has shown the strongest commitment. In May of 1969, building on the stimulus of the Budapest Meeting of the Warsaw Pact, Finland had declared in a memorandum to the states of Europe, including both parts of Germany, and to the United States and Canada, that Helsinki was prepared for the role of host to such a security conference.

There followed thorough international soundings by Finnish special ambassador Enckell. Last July President Kekkonen, who travels at least once a year to the Soviet Union, went together with his then new Prime Minister Karjalainen and his Minister of Foreign Affairs Leskinen to Moscow, and immediately thereafter to the United States.

The topic of the discussions with the Soviet Leadership and then, on the basis of this experience, with President Nixon, was the security conference. The Social-Democratic Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs Leskinen, who in recent years has had especially good relations with Moscow Party Chief Brezhnev, made extremely optimistic temporary prognoses on the basis of the Washington discussions as to the beginning of a preliminary conference. However, he had to revise these prognoses several times before they became outdated anyway by succeeding events.

The second Finnish memorandum, addressed to the same international circle as before, followed at the end of November, and contained an invitation to consultations of diverse embassies in Helsinki with the Finnish Foreign Ministry. However, these consultations were not yet to mean a commitment of the participating countries to the security conference.

The caution of the NATO states with respect to the hardening of the Soviet position in Berlin and the generally observed cooling-off of relations between the Big Powers caused Finland to become cautious in the last few weeks.

During the whole time since the first Finnish initiative, Helsinki was careful not to be labeled a mere servant of Soviet interests, for that very thing would be most damaging to Finland's goal of giving Helsinki the neutral position of Geneva, and thereby giving the country universal security, through a great international conference or a series of successful meetings.

In December Leskinen hinted that a preparatory conference could also be called without full attendance of the participating countries. That Soviet wishes aimed in this direction have foundered on Helsinki in spite of Leskinen's indulgence, was recently made clear by Prime Minister Karjalainen when he stated that the conference could only succeed on the basis of the consent of all appropriate countries, and Finland would make no reductions in the circle of participants.

The conference is too important for Finland's neutrality for Helsinki to be a party to a one-sided propaganda event. Finland continues to hope for the occurrence of a comprehensive conference, but is already showing a certain amount of skepticism, at least as far as the date is concerned.

Soviet Defense Minister Grechko's ears probably tingled from Karjalainen's speech; he was in Finland right on the heels of the Hungarian government head Fock; before that, in the beginning of December, Grechko was in Sweden. The Soviet Union is continually attempting to encourage the neutral countries into undertaking initiatives for the conference.

But although Sweden is by all means in favor of the conference, and has frequently expressed its agreement -- Stockholm also declared itself "of course" immediately ready for the ambassador-level consultations in Helsinki -- it does not like to be pushed to the forefront by the Soviet Union.

Stockholm's attitude is, as usual, cautiously pragmatic. The Swedes praised the plan last March during the visit of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Smirnov in Stockholm, in June during the trip of Prime Minister Palme to Moscow, and now again to Grechko; but at the same time they point to the decidedly affected countries, and among these especially to the Big Powers, on whom finally depends the realization of the security conference, they said.

The NATO country Denmark is even more cautious. Copenhagen itself traditionally follows a policy of reduced tensions with Eastern Europe, as does neutral Stockholm. After the war, Denmark was for a long time the only NATO country which had intensive relations with Poland, especially during the governing period of the Social-Democrat Krag. At that time Copenhagen rendered good service to Bonn in Warsaw, which had lasting effects.

Baunsgaard's government welcomes the plan of the conference, but does not thereby forsake the common ground of NATO agreements. Denmark, which sees itself as especially vulnerable to Eastern wooing, was on its guard against hurrying forward in its answer to the second Finnish memorandum: The result of the memorandum, they said, would "naturally depend on the reaction in the many countries which are mutually responsible for the solution of the

fundamental European security problems." Copenhagen itself has a "fundamentally positive" attitude, it was vaguely stated.

For a long time all the Scandinavian countries have made the participation of America and detailed preparation conditions of the conference. Likewise, all Scandinavian countries are agreed that the German Ost-Politik with the treaties of Moscow and Warsaw has furthered a reduction in tensions and has improved the preconditions for the conference.

It is the logical consequence of this evaluation, that the necessity of a countermove by the other side becomes clearer and clearer to the Scandinavian politicians. Norway, like Denmark a NATO member, has recently outlined its stand unambiguously.

The Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Winiewicz was told in Oslo that there was a clear connection between Bonn's treaties with Moscow and Warsaw, the Berlin question, and the security conference. For the improvement of the East-West relationship a Berlin settlement is mandatory, they said. Progress in the Berlin negotiations is accordingly a precondition for the security conference.

A visit to Norway and Sweden by the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Manescu, in Winiewicz's footsteps, and which undoubtedly would have had the same purpose, was cancelled, possibly because of a Romanian ambassadors' meeting taking place in Bucharest. Perhaps a discussion on this point was not agreeable at the moment to Manescu, who is open to realistic differentiations.

The strategic situation of Norway, the weak neighbor of a Big Power which at any time could turn one of its extensive maneuvers into something serious, forces Oslo to be keen-of-vision. The Norwegians test the changes of international constellations for possible effects on their security. Norway is also dependent on NATO, leans on it, and would by no means like to see it perceptibly weakened or disappear without a functional defense.

Oslo carries out a policy of reducing tensions by trying to realize and expand collaboration in practical realms, as in economics or with technical cooperation. But Oslo considers as illusionary the view that the security conference would automatically lead to the concrete practical collaboration which Norway wishes to have with every country. Norway regards the conference plan with an open mind, but skeptically.

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Frankfurt  
12 February 1971

## Unterschiedliche Beurteilung in Skandinavien

Finnland am stärksten interessiert / Von Claus Gennrich, Stockholm

Die Haltung der skandinavischen Länder zum Plan einer europäischen Sicherheitskonferenz ist unterschiedlich, jedoch im Grundzug durchgehend positiv. Am stärksten hat sich Finnland dafür engagiert. Im Mai 1969, aufbauend auf die Anregung der Budapester Tagung des Warschauer Paktes, hatte Finnland in einem Memorandum an die Staaten Europas einschließlich beider Teile Deutschlands sowie an die Vereinigten Staaten und Kanada erklärt, Helsinki sei zur Rolle des Gastgebers einer Sicherheitskonferenz bereit.

Es folgten eingehende internationale Sondierungen des finnischen Sonderbotschafters Enckell. Im vergangenen Juli reiste Präsident Kekkonen, der sich alljährlich mindestens einmal in die Sowjetunion begibt, zusammen mit seinem damals neuen Ministerpräsidenten Karjalainen und Außenminister Leskinen nach Moskau und unmittelbar anschließend in die Vereinigten Staaten.

Das Thema der Besprechungen mit der sowjetischen Führung und auf dieser Erfahrungsgrundlage dann mit Präsident Nixon war die Sicherheitskonferenz. Der sozialdemokratische finnische Außenminister Leskinen, der in den letzten Jahren besonders gute Beziehungen zum Moskauer Parteichef Breschnew unterhält, machte an Hand der Washingtoner Besprechungen außerordentlich optimistische zeitliche Prognosen über den Beginn einer Vorkonferenz, die er allerdings mehrfach revidieren mußte, ehe sie durch die Wirklichkeit ohnehin überholt wurden.

Ende November folgte das zweite finnische Memorandum an den gleichen internationalen Adressatenkreis mit der Aufforderung zu Konsultationen der diversen Botschaften in Helsinki mit dem finnischen Außenministerium. Diese Konsultationen sollten allerdings noch keine Festlegung der beteiligten Länder auf die Sicherheitskonferenz bedeuten.

Die Vorsicht der Nato-Staaten im Zusammenhang mit der Verhärtung der sowjetischen Position in Berlin und der allgemein zu beobachtenden Abkühlung des Verhältnisses zwischen den Großmächten veranlaßte Finnland in den letzten Wochen zur Zurückhaltung. Während der ganzen Zeit seit der ersten finnischen Initiative achtet Helsinki sorgsam darauf, nicht als Handlanger sowjetischer Interessen abgestempelt zu werden, weil gerade das Finnlands Ziel am meisten schaden müßte, durch eine große internationale Konferenz oder durch eine Serie erfolgreicher Zusammenkünfte Helsinki den neutralen Rang von Genf und damit dem Land eine allseitige Sicherung zu geben.

Leskinen ließ im Dezember durchblicken, daß eine Vorbereitungskonferenz auch ohne Vorberedung der nordischen Länder einberufen werden könne. Das

die in diese Richtung ziellenden sowjetischen Wünsche trotz Leskinens Nachegeblichkeit an Helsinki scheitern, machte Ministerpräsident Karjalainen dieser Tage klar, als er sagte, die Konferenz könne nur auf der Grundlage des Einvernehmens aller zuständigen Länder glücken, und Finnland mache vom Teilnehmerkreis keine Abstriche.

Für Finnlands Neutralität ist die Konferenz zu wichtig, als daß Helsinki sich zu einer einseitigen Propagandaveranstaltung hergeben könnte. Finnland hofft weiter auf das Zustandekommen einer umfassenden Konferenz, zeigt aber bereits, zumindest was den Zeitpunkt betrifft, eine gewisse Skepsis.

Dem sowjetischen Verteidigungsminister Gretschkow dürften von Karjalainens Rede die Ohren geklungen haben; auf den Fersen des ungarischen Regierungschefs Fock war er gerade in Finnland; davor, Anfang Dezember, war Gretschkow in Schweden. Die Sowjetunion sucht die neutralen Länder ständig zu Initiativen für die Konferenz zu ermuntern.

Doch obwohl Schweden dem Konferenzplan durchaus geneigt ist und seine Zustimmung häufig geäußert hat — auch zu den Botschafterkonsultationen in Helsinki hat Stockholm sich „selbstverständlich“ sofort bereit erklärt —, läßt es sich nicht gern von der Sowjetunion vorschicken.

Stockholms Haltung ist, wie meistens, vorsichtig pragmatisch. Die Schweden lobten im letzten März beim Besuch des stellvertretenden sowjetischen Außenministers Smirnow in Stockholm, im Juni während der Reise des Ministerpräsidenten Palme nach Moskau und jetzt wieder Gretschkow gegenüber das Vorhaben; doch sie verwiesen gleichzeitig auf die entscheidend betroffenen Länder und dabei besonders auf die Großmächte, von denen das Zustandekommen der Sicherheitskonferenz schließlich abhängt.

Noch vorsichtiger ist das Nato-Land Dänemark. Kopenhagen führt selbst, ebenso wie das neutrale Stockholm, traditionell eine Politik der Entspannung gegenüber Osteuropa. Nach dem Krieg war Dänemark lange das einzige Nato-Land, das intensiven Umgang mit Polen hatte, besonders während der Regierungszeit des Sozialdemokraten Krag; damals leistete Kopenhagen Bonn gute Dienste in Warschau, die nachgewirkt haben.

Die Regierung Baunsgaard begrüßt den Plan zur Konferenz, verläßt aber dabei nicht den gemeinsamen Boden der Nato-Übereinkünfte. Dänemark, das sich besonders östlichen Liebeswerben ausgesetzt sieht, hat sich bei der Antwort auf das zweite finnische Memorandum vor dem Vorpreschen gehütet: Das Ergebnis der Verhandlungen wird lediglich von der Reaktion in den vielen

Ländern abhängen, die für die Lösung der fundamentalen europäischen Sicherheitsprobleme mitverantwortlich sind". Kopenhagen selbst verhalte sich, hieß es vage, „grundsätzlich positiv“.

Alle skandinavischen Länder stellen seit langem die Bedingungen der Teilnahme Amerikas und einer detaillierten Vorbereitung. Ebenso sind sich alle skandinavischen Länder darin einig, daß die deutsche Ost-Politik mit den Verträgen von Moskau und Warschau die Entspannung gefördert und die Voraussetzungen für die Konferenz verbessert habe.

Es liegt in der Folgerichtigkeit dieser Bewertung, daß den skandinavischen Politikern jetzt die Notwendigkeit des Gegenzuges der anderen Seite immer deutlicher wird. Das wie Dänemark der Nato angehörende Norwegen hat seine Haltung dieser Tage unzweideutig profiliert.

Der stellvertretende polnische Außenminister Winiewicz bekam in Oslo zu hören, es bestehe ein klarer Zusammenhang zwischen den Verträgen von Bonn mit Moskau und Warschau, der Berlin-Frage und der Sicherheitskonferenz. Für die Besserung des Ost-West-Verhältnisses sei nun eine Berlin-Regelung unerlässlich. Fortschritte in den Berlin-Verhandlungen seien demgemäß eine Voraussetzung für die Sicherheitskonferenz.

Ein an Winiewicz anknüpfender Besuch des rumänischen Außenministers Manescu in Norwegen und Schweden, der ohne Zweifel dem gleichen Thema gegolten hätte, fiel aus, möglicherweise wegen eines in Bukarest stattfindenden rumänischen Botschaftertreffens; vielleicht war Manescu, der realistischen Differenzierungen gegenüber aufgeschlossen ist, eine Unterhaltung über diesen Punkt im Augenblick nicht angenehm.

Die strategische Lage Norwegens, des schwachen Nachbarn einer Großmacht, die jederzeit aus einem ihrer umfassenden Manöver ernst machen könnte, zwingt Oslo zur Scharfsichtigkeit. Die Norweger prüfen Veränderungen internationaler Konstellationen auf mögliche Folgen ihrer Sicherheit. Norwegen ist auf die Nato angewiesen, stützt sich auf sie und möchte sie keinesfalls spürbar geschwächt oder ohne funktionsfähigen Einsatz schwinden sehen.

Oslo betreibt Entspannungspolitik, indem es Zusammenarbeit auf praktischen Gebieten wie in der Wirtschaft oder bei technischer Kooperation zu verwirklichen und zu vertiefen sucht. Doch hält Oslo die Ansicht für eine Illusion, daß die Sicherheitskonferenz automatisch zu konkreter praktischer Zusammenarbeit führen werde, die Norwegen mit jedem Land wünscht. Norwegen betrachtet den Konferenzplan aufgeschlos-

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#### YUGOSLAVIA HOPES TO BENEFIT FROM EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

From the beginning Yugoslavia agreed with the Soviet project of a European security conference, although it did not deceive itself about the underlying intentions. It certainly played a role here that Tito did not want to take a stand against the Eastern Bloc on such a plan, especially since several Western countries were not verbally in favor of the idea. However, it is more important that an all-European security conference fit into the conception of Yugoslavian foreign policy, of course only under certain preconditions.

Belgrade is not interested in a security conference which leads a sleepy life in the fog of nonbinding chatter or which only serves as a podium for Soviet propaganda. The diplomatic euphemism for this is that one should not remain on the declaratory field. Yugoslavia much rather intends concrete tasks for a security conference: It should further the military reduction of tensions in Europe.

By this Belgrade has in mind above all that the Big Powers reduce their military presence on the continent as well as put an end to military demonstrations of power in and around Europe, and that maneuvers, especially those in border territories and in notoriously crisis-prone regions, become rarer. The increased military security gained by this benefits the independence of all European countries according to the view here.

In Yugoslavia's opinion, the security conference must give each European state new guarantees for the inviolability of its borders, and reject bloc doctrines of all sorts which attempt to pass over sovereignty. Even if not exclusively so, Belgrade here has primarily the Brezhnev doctrine in mind. This is connected with the fact that Yugoslavia does not want the security conference to be a round of discussions by the Big Powers or by both blocs, whereby the small states would only be the trimmings.

The result of the conference, or of a series of conferences, should not solidify the bloc structures, but should loosen them up. The bloc members should receive more political elbow room. It is sure that Belgrade is thinking of its bloc-weary neighbors Romania and Italy here, even if it does not openly say so. For the European countries which do not belong to any bloc, especially for itself, Yugoslavia hopes for greater influence in Europe from the conference.

The Yugoslavian diplomats are not considering preconditions for the security conference. But they are clear about the fact that there is no chance for the conference before a Berlin settlement. In this sense Belgrade speaks of "context" or "parallelism," and avoids the word "condition."

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## Jugoslawien wünscht Ergebnisse

Von JOHANN GEORG REISSMÜLLER, Belgrad

Jugoslawien hat dem sowjetischen Projekt einer europäischen Sicherheitskonferenz vom Beginn an zugestimmt, obwohl es sich über die dahinterstehenden Absichten nicht täuscht. Dabei spielt gewiß eine Rolle, daß sich Tito nicht gerade über ein solches Vorhaben mit dem Ostblock anlegen wollte, zumal auch mehrere westliche Länder sich nicht verbal für die Idee erwärmten. Wichtiger aber ist, daß eine gesamt-europäische Sicherheitskonferenz ins Konzept der jugoslawischen Außenpolitik paßt, allerdings nur unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen.

Belgrad ist nicht an einer Sicherheitskonferenz interessiert, die in Nebelschwaden unverbindlichen Geredes dahindämmert, oder nur der sowjetischen Propaganda als Tribüne dient. Man dürfe nicht auf dem deklaratorischen Feld bleiben, heißt die diplomatische Umschreibung dafür. Vielmehr denkt Jugoslawien einer Sicherheitskonferenz konkrete Aufgaben zu: Sie soll die militärische Entspannung in Europa voranbringen.

Dazu gehört nach Ansicht Belgrads vor allem, daß die Großmächte ihre militärische Präsenz auf dem Kontinent vermindern sowie militärische Machtdemonstrationen in und um Europa unterlassen und daß Manöver, besonders solche in Grenzgebieten und in notorischen Krisenregionen, seltener werden. Die daraus gewonnene vermehrte militärische Sicherheit kommt nach hiesiger Auffassung der Unabhän-

gigkeit aller europäischen Länder zugute.

Aus jugoslawischer Sicht muß die Sicherheitskonferenz jedem europäischen Staat neue Garantien für die Unverletzbarkeit seiner Grenzen geben und Blockdoktrinen aller Art, welche die Souveränität zu überspielen suchen, verwerfen. Dabei hat Belgrad vor allem, wenn auch nicht ausschließlich, die Breschnew-Doktrin im Auge. Damit hängt zusammen: Jugoslawien wünscht sich eine Sicherheitskonferenz nicht als Gesprächsrunde der Großmächte oder der beiden Blöcke, wobei dann die kleineren Staaten nur Verzierung abgäben.

Das Ergebnis der Konferenz oder einer Serie von Konferenzen soll die Blockstrukturen nicht verfestigen, sondern aufweichen. Die Blockmitglieder sollen mehr politischen Spielraum bekommen. Es ist sicher, daß Belgrad dabei besonders an seine blockmüden Nachbarn Rumänien und Italien denkt, wenn es auch nicht offen davon spricht. Für die keinem Block zugehörenden europäischen Länder, vor allem für sich selbst, erhofft sich Jugoslawien von der Konferenz größeren Einfluß in Europa.

Vorbedingungen für die Sicherheitskonferenz läßt die jugoslawische Diplomatie nicht gelten. Jedoch ist sie sich darüber im klaren, daß vor einer Berlin-Regelung das Konferenzprojekt keine Chancen hat. In diesem Sinn spricht Belgrad, das Wort „Bedingung“ vermeidend, von „Zusammenhang“ oder „Parallelismus“.

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### ENGLAND SKEPTICAL AND CAUTIOUS REGARDING EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

As a topic of British foreign policy, the European security conference and the calling of the Geneva Conference on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, whose permanent chairmanship is shared by the British and Soviet Ministers of Foreign Affairs, have had already for years in common that they give the opportunity for ritualistic affirmations.

Since in both cases it is, or should be, a question of striving for peace, the reaction is always positive, at least in principle, and is only dependent to a minor extent on the party color of the British government in power at the time. Between the view of the present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, and that of his socialist predecessor, Stewart, no difference on the issue of a European security conference can be discovered, even with a magnifier.

When one strips the official answer of its rhetorical flourishes and formulas and reduces it to its pragmatic essence, the precondition of British assent is the guarantee, if not absolute then at least convincingly tested, that Moscow cannot use such a conference purely for propagandist purposes.

The exclusion of the United States from a European security conference, originally hoped for by Moscow but in the meantime dropped, was not only undebatable for London, but a certain sign for how much skepticism and caution the Soviet plan was to be treated with.

There was complete agreement in the London conversations between the West German Minister for Foreign Affairs Scheel and Sir Alec Douglas-Home that a European security conference can only become a topic for serious preliminary deliberations when Moscow has presented proof of the validity of its intentions on the Berlin question.

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## England skeptisch und vorsichtig

Von HEINZ HÖPFL, London

Als Thema der britischen Außenpolitik hat die europäische Sicherheitskonferenz mit der Einberufung der Genfer Konferenz über Vietnam, Laos und Kambodscha, in deren permanenten Vorsitz sich der britische und der sowjetische Außenminister teilen, nun schon seit Jahren gemeinsam, daß sie Gelegenheit zu rituellen Beteuerungen geben.

Die Reaktion ist, da es sich in beiden Fällen um Friedensbemühungen handelt oder handeln soll, immer positiv, zumindest im Prinzip, und nur in geringfügigem Maße von der Parteifarbe der jeweiligen britischen Regierung abhängig. Zwischen der Auffassung des jetzigen Außenministers, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, und der seines sozialistischen Vorgängers, Stewart, läßt sich auch mit der Lupe kein Unterschied in der Frage einer europäischen Sicherheitskonferenz entdecken.

Wenn man die offizielle Antwort ihrer rhetorischen Floskeln und Formeln

entkleidet und auf ihren pragmatischen Kern reduziert, ist die Vorbedingung einer britischen Zusage die wenn nicht absolute, so doch überzeugend geprüfte Gewähr, daß Moskau eine solche Konferenz nicht zu bloßen Propagandazwecken mißbrauchen kann.

Der ursprünglich von Moskau erhoffte, inzwischen fallengelassene Ausschluß der Vereinigten Staaten von einer europäischen Sicherheitskonferenz war für London nicht nur undiskutabel, sondern ein sicheres Zeichen dafür, mit welcher Skepsis und Vorsicht der sowjetische Plan zu behandeln war.

In den Londoner Gesprächen hat es zwischen Bundesaußenminister Scheel und Sir Alec Douglas-Home volle Übereinstimmung darüber gegeben, daß eine europäische Sicherheitskonferenz erst dann überhaupt Gegenstand von ernsthaften Vorüberlegungen werden kann, wenn Moskau in der Berlin-Frage den Beweis der Echtheit seiner Absichten geliefert hat.

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## ITALY FAVORS EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE AFTER BERLIN SETTLEMENT

Italy adheres to the standpoint of the NATO declaration of 4 December 1970 on the question of the European security conference. Rome makes the solution of the Berlin question and a reduction of tensions in the Mediterranean a precondition of the conference. To be sure, the Mediterranean occurs in the NATO declaration only in subsidiary clauses. But Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Moro expressed himself clearly in front of the NATO Council.

To be sure it is freely admitted also in Italian circles that the concept "reduction of tensions in the Mediterranean" allows for various interpretations. For example, is the removal of the Soviet Russian fleet from this sea involved here? No one will expect that. Basically therefore, also for Italy, everything depends on the Berlin question as a precondition of the conference. If there should be an agreement on Berlin, the Italians would also agree to a security conference. As long as this does not occur, the Italians are not ready for multilateral discussions on preparations for the European security conference. They recently stated this to Finnish President Kekkonen, who advocated such conversations.

As in so many other points, Italy seems to be very close to the German Federal Government on this issue also. But there is one difference. Rome is more anxious for a conference than Bonn is; the reason for this lies in Italian domestic politics.

At times this conference-eager attitude threatened to bring Rome in conflict with the three big Western allies, especially the United States and France. The Italian concept of the conference was first developed in 1969 by the then Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nenni, the leader of the socialists.

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## Italien denkt an das Mittelmeer

Von JOSEF SCHMITZ VAN VORST, Rom

In der Frage der europäischen Sicherheitskonferenz hält Italien an dem Standpunkt der Nato-Erklärung vom 4. Dezember 1970 fest. Rom macht die Lösung der Berlin-Frage und die Entspannung im Mittelmeer zur Vorbedingung der Konferenz. Das Mittelmeer kommt zwar in der Nato-Erklärung nur verklausuliert vor. Der italienische Außenminister Moro hat sich jedoch vor dem Nato-Rat deutlich geäußert.

Auch in italienischen Kreisen wird freilich zugegeben, daß der Begriff „Entspannung im Mittelmeer“ verschiedene Auslegungen zulasse. Gehört beispielsweise die Entfernung der sowjet-russischen Flotte aus diesem Meer dazu? Das wird niemand erwarten. Im Grunde laufe daher auch für Italien alles auf die Berlin-Frage als Vorbedingung der Konferenz hinaus. Kommt es über Berlin zu einer Einigung, würden auch die

stimmen. Solange sie ausbleibt, sind die Italiener nicht zu multilateralen Gesprächen zur Vorbereitung der europäischen Sicherheitskonferenz bereit. Dies haben sie noch vor kurzem dem finnischen Staatspräsidenten Kekkonen erklärt, der solche Gespräche anregte.

Wie in so vielen anderen scheint Italien damit auch in dieser Frage dem Standpunkt der deutschen Bundesregierung sehr nahe zu stehen. Es gibt aber einen Unterschied. Rom ist konferenzfreudiger als Bonn; der Grund dafür liegt in der italienischen Innenpolitik.

Zeitweise drohte diese konferenzfreundliche Haltung Rom in Gegensatz zu den drei großen westlichen Verbündeten, insbesondere zu den Vereinigten Staaten und Frankreich, zu bringen. Das italienische Konferenzkonzept ist 1969 zuerst von dem damaligen italienischen Außenminister, dem Sozialisten Giovanni Leone, aufgestellt worden.

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FOR FRANCE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE A WAY TO STRENGTHEN ITS OWN POSITION

France favors an all-European security conference. After long initial hesitation, Paris regards it as a means to strengthen its own role in Eastern politics. Since his trip to the Soviet Union, President Pompidou has repeatedly declared that the "multilateral preparation of a European security conference" could now "move into an active phase."

Pompidou rejects a legal package deal linking the conference to a prior Berlin settlement. Just as France does not want to give up its role as occupation power in Berlin and thus wants to keep the last lever of a right to participate in discussions on all-German issues, thus the German question remains the central issue in considerations regarding a security conference.

Pompidou would like to continue de Gaulle's Eastern policies. They involve the establishment of bilateral contacts with the Soviet Union and the East European states, with the goal of dissolving the "blocs" in favor of a reduction of tensions in Europe. In domestic affairs Pompidou thus obligates the French Communist Party to support his foreign policy.

In the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs there is neither any haste nor any special enthusiasm for the idea of a conference, so urgently demanded above all by Moscow. A mammoth meeting for the sole purpose of presenting the Soviet Union with a contractual sealing of the status quo in Europe is considered senseless.

The minimal demand would have to be the free traffic of people between both parts of Europe, the possibility "of cultural and intellectual penetration."

But Pompidou has also declared -- most recently in his press conference of 21 January -- that the conference would make little sense without progress in Berlin and without successes in Chancellor Brandt's "Ostpolitik." In the preparatory work the French have so far proceeded from the idea of a meeting of ambassadors from both sides in Helsinki. But recently one notices a definite reduction in Soviet pressure.

In Paris one thinks it is possible to exclude the United States and Canada from participation. European security would be guaranteed by the atomic parity of both world powers, it is thought. In spite of their rejection of bloc politics, French experts admit that a reduction of troops for the sole benefit of the Soviet Union would mean a threat to European security.

It is however significant that Brandt's "Ostpolitik" overshadows all planning. Should the ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties occur after a prior settlement of the Berlin question, it is said in Paris, then the all-European security conference would have no objective. Meanwhile, one is silent about the connection of this whole complex to the fact that the success of Brandt's "Ostpolitik" on Berlin is dependent on the will of the Big Four.

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## Für Paris ein Mittel zur Stärkung der eigenen Politik

Von JAN REIFENBERG, Paris

Frankreich befürwortet eine gesamt-europäische Sicherheitskonferenz. Nach langem anfänglichem Zögern betrachtet Paris sie als Mittel zur Verstärkung der eigenen Rolle in der Ostpolitik. Staatspräsident Pompidou hat seit seiner Reise in die Sowjetunion wiederholt erklärt, die „multilaterale Vorbereitung einer europäischen Sicherheitskonferenz“ könne jetzt „in eine aktive Phase übergehen“.

Pompidou lehnt ein juristisches Junktim zwischen der Konferenz und einer vorherigen Berlin-Regelung ab. Wie Frankreich in Berlin einmal seine Rolle als Besatzungsmacht nicht aufgeben und damit den letzten Hebel des Mitspracherechts in gesamtdeutschen Fragen behalten will, so bleibt auch bei den Erwägungen bezüglich einer Sicherheitskonferenz die deutsche Frage der Mittelpunkt.

Pompidou möchte die Ostpolitik de Gaulles fortsetzen. Sie beinhaltet die Herstellung bilateraler Kontakte zur Sowjetunion und den osteuropäischen Staaten mit dem Ziel, die „Blöcke“ zugunsten europäischer Entspannung aufzulösen. Innenpolitisch verpflichtet Pompidou auf diese Weise auch die KPF für seine Außenpolitik.

Im französischen Außenministerium herrscht weder Eile noch sonderliche Begeisterung gegenüber dem zunächst von Moskau dringend geforderten Konferenzvorhaben. Eine Riesenzusammenkunft zum alleinigen Zweck, der Sowjetunion die vertragliche Besiegelung des Status quo in Europa zu liefern, gilt als sinnlos.

Mindestforderung müßte der freie

Verkehr von Menschen zwischen beiden Teilen Europas, die Möglichkeit „der kulturellen und ideellen Durchdringung“ bleiben.

Aber auch Pompidou hat — zuletzt in seiner Pressekonferenz vom 21. Januar — erklärt, ohne Fortschritte in Berlin und ohne Erfolge der Ostpolitik Bundeskanzler Brandts habe die Konferenz wenig Sinn. In den Vorbereitungsarbeiten ist von französischer Seite bisher von einem Botschaftertreffen beider Seiten in Helsinki ausgegangen worden. Aber in letzter Zeit stellt man merkliches Nachlassen des sowjetischen Drängens fest.

In Paris hält man es für möglich, die Vereinigten Staaten und Kanada von der Teilnahme auszuschließen. Die Sicherheit Europas werde durch das Atomgleichgewicht der beiden Weltmächte garantiert. Trotz der Ablehnung von Blockpolitik geben französische Fachleute zu, daß eine Truppenverminderung zu einseitigen Gunsten der Sowjetunion Gefährdung europäischer Sicherheit bedeutet.

Entscheidend ist jedoch, daß die Ostpolitik Brandts alle Planungen überschattet. Sollte es zur Ratifizierung des Moskauer und Warschauer Vertrages nach vorheriger Regelung der Berlin-Frage kommen, heißt es in Paris, so werde die gesamteuropäische Sicherheitskonferenz gegenstandslos. Man schweigt sich indessen über den Zusammenhang dieses Komplexes mit der Tatsache aus, daß der Erfolg von Brandts Ostpolitik über Berlin vom Willen der vier Mächte abhängt.

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## Détente, a two-way street

Champagne and chandeliers were laid on in Warsaw this week for the signing by West German Chancellor Willy Brandt and Polish Premier Jozef Cyrankiewicz of a treaty intended to open the way for normalization of the two countries' relations. But Berlin remained the central issue in the question of how far and how fast East-West détente in Europe can progress.

The future of Berlin was also a major issue at the conference of the Warsaw Pact powers which ended last Wednesday and of the meeting of the Nato Council in Brussels on Thursday and Friday.

The Nato ministers made it clear that they regarded the "satisfactory conclusion" of the Big Four talks and the favourable progress of "other

ongoing talks" as a necessary preliminary to Western agreement to a European security conference.

A communiqué issued after the Warsaw Pact meeting, in East Berlin itself, made it clear that Soviet Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev had imposed his policy on the recalcitrant East German leader, Walter Ulbricht. It failed to support Mr. Ulbricht's long-standing demand for de jure recognition of his government by Bonn and reiterated Mr. Brezhnev's recent reference to a Berlin settlement which would correspond to the "requirements of the population of West Berlin." But it added that there was "no reason" to delay the convening of a conference on European security.

The whole future course of détente in Europe may depend on the decisions taken by the Warsaw Pact leaders. The ball is decidedly in their court, for West German Chancellor Willy Brandt has for his part done everything possible to create improved relations with Eastern Europe.

He signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which in effect condemns his country to the status of a second-class military power. He made the pilgrimage to Erfurt to meet the prime minister of a state whose existence until then Bonn had assiduously ignored. And he went to Moscow, and has just gone to Warsaw, to sign treaties that sanction boundaries which previous West German governments had refused to recognize—except in exchange for the East's acceptance of German reunification.

There are several reasons for thinking that Mr. Brandt may not have paid as high a price as appears at first glance. He succeeded in avoiding the de jure recognition sought by East Germany that would make the separation of Germany definitive, and his recognition of the Oder-Neisse line was made in the name of the Federal Republic, not that of an eventually reunified Germany. In addition, East Germany continues to be kept out of the various bodies of the United Nations and these treaties have thrown wide the door to trade with Eastern Europe.

Despite all this, it remains true that so far it has been Bonn that has been making all the concessions, and now it is up to Moscow and its allies to decide how far they are willing to go in exchange.

### Package deal

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Minister Walter Scheel has stated

By ANDRÉ FONTAINE

that these various agreements—the Non-Proliferation Treaty, "normalization" treaties with Moscow and Warsaw and eventually Prague, the modus vivendi to be negotiated with East Germany, and the Big Four settlement—will not be submitted separately to the Bundestag for ratification.

On the contrary, they intend to present them as a package deal, which means that if any one clause is not accepted the whole of Mr. Brandt's Ostpolitik will be jeopardized.

The Socialist-Liberal coalition has yet to define the limits

beyond which it would have to admit that its policy had failed. Since this is a question of interpretation, the government may be tempted to accept a pro forma arrangement on Berlin rather than admit a failure which could lead to its downfall.

This was certainly Moscow's hope. And it has undoubtedly been the fear in Washington and other Western capitals. But recent declarations by official West German spokesmen have unequivocally stated that a Berlin settlement is the sine qua non for any implementation of their Ostpolitik.

But why Berlin? As last week's slowdown on West Berlin access roads or recent disruptions of air traffic once again revealed, the Soviets and their East German allies have used access to West Berlin as a means of exerting pressure on the Western allies. Although these tactics may have been a good source of foreign currency, they have backfired politically by making Berlin a symbol of the Cold War and by restoring Western solidarity at the very

falling apart.

The presence of American, British and French forces in West Berlin is based on the very general terms of the 1944-1945 agreements which have since been disputed by the Soviets. What is needed, therefore, is a binding settlement which would prevent the East Germans from closing road traffic and the Russians from disrupting air traffic on the pretext of military manoeuvres.

To the extent that the declared aim of Soviet policy is to make the status quo definitive, Moscow cannot deny that West Berlin's attachment to the Western system is an integral part of that status quo. Official Soviet recognition of this fact is little enough to expect in exchange for agreement on frontiers and the division of Germany.

Too often in the past twenty years the Russians have tried to rid themselves of this Western outpost by resorting to blockade or even the threat of a world war. It would be a fatal mistake for the West not to insist on such a settlement.

After all, the West succeeded in holding on to Berlin even under the worst stresses of the Cold War and there is no reason why it should run the risk of losing it in a time of détente.

General de Gaulle understood this better than any one else. It is clear from his memoirs that, to the end of his life, he was convinced that he was right to have stood firm against Nikita Khrushchev's blusterings. Prime Minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas and Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann have made it abundantly clear that they are following the path that De Gaulle set out.

The East Germans, however,

cherished dream of making a reunified Berlin their capital. This means that they will do their best to keep Soviet concessions to a minimum. History shows, however, that when it comes to the crunch the Soviets usually manage to resign themselves to the necessary compromise, especially when it can be made at the expense of one of their allies.

### Assurances in order

The Western allies, on the other hand, could well afford to give certain assurances in exchange, especially since the West Germans have shown themselves to be rather high-handed with the statutes of West Berlin by holding Bundestag sessions or electing their president there.

What matters is that they are uncompromising on the question of free access and Soviet responsibility for guaranteeing it. It would be too easy for the Russians, once sovereignty over access routes had been given to East Germany, to merely wash their hands of the whole affair whenever a new incident cropped up.

Mr. Brezhnev, meanwhile, held out some hope for an improvement in the Berlin situation in his speech delivered ten days ago in Armenia. According to him, all that is needed is a show of goodwill by all interested parties, and that they work out solutions which satisfy the needs of West Berlin's inhabitants while at the same time respecting the rightful interests and sovereignty of East Germany.

It would take an inveterate optimist to conclude from this that the Soviets are ready to pay the price of détente. If Mr. Brezhnev is serious about respecting the hopes of the West Berliners, he has only to consult their voting record over the past twenty years. The candidates of the East German Communist Party, who are authorized in West Berlin, have never obtained more than a handful of votes, while the vast majority have always gone to the parties firmly attached to Western democracy.

It would be too much to hope, two years after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, that Mr. Brezhnev

will tear down the infamous Berlin Wall.

But the West can at least demand of the man who has raised the division of the world to an absolute principle that he carry his reasoning to its logical conclusion, that is, that he accept certain facts unfavourable to Moscow.

Bonn, London, Paris and Washington must make it clear to him that, unless he does so, the diplomatic triumph of last summer's Bonn-Moscow treaty, which he prides himself on, may well prove to be illusory.

Détente can never be a one-way street. Otherwise, instead of slowly breaking down the barriers that separate the two Europes, it could tempt the temporary victor to exploit his advantage and the loser to prepare his revenge.

ANDRÉ FONTAINE

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## LA DÉTENTE ET LE VERROU BERLINOIS

### I. — Le « préalable » occidental

Par JEAN SCHWÆBEL

L'Allemagne de l'Ouest fait d'un accord sur Berlin, non seulement la condition d'une conférence sur la sécurité européenne, mais encore celle de la ratification des trois accords les plus importants que le gouvernement Brandt ait signés depuis qu'il est au pouvoir : a) l'accord sur la limitation des armements nucléaires, par lequel la République fédérale s'oblige à ne construire ni posséder aucune sorte de ces armements ; b) l'accord germano-russe du 12 août 1970 ; c) le récent accord germano-polonais du 7 décembre dernier, portant essentiellement sur la frontière Oder-Neisse. Elle estime, en effet, qu'après avoir manifesté tant de bonne volonté, et consenti tant de concessions aux Russes et aux Polonais, elle a droit désormais à quelques contreparties, avant d'aller plus avant dans sa politique à l'Est.

Ces contreparties ont été définies avec les Américains, les Britanniques et les Français, solidement responsables, avec les Soviétiques, du statut de Berlin. Les Trois Grands de l'Ouest demandent des garanties sur trois points essentiels — qu'on appelle les trois Z, en allemand : *Zugang*, le libre accès à Berlin-Ouest par la route et le rail pour les personnes et les marchandises en provenance de l'Allemagne de l'Ouest ; *Zutritt*, la libre entrée à Berlin-Est des Berlinoises de l'Ouest, qui ne peuvent en aucune manière y pénétrer aujourd'hui ; *Zuordnung*, la confirmation des liens économiques, financiers et politiques de Berlin-Ouest avec la République fédérale.

Le chancelier Brandt sait parfaitement qu'en l'absence de telles contreparties, il n'est pas question d'envisager la ratification par le Bundestag des accords qui ont été

signés. Ses propres alliés les libéraux, ne les voteraient pas. Et très vite, la situation de son gouvernement de coalition pourrait devenir difficile sous les coups de boutoir des chrétiens-démocrates, enhardis et renforcés par l'insuccès de sa politique orientale.

Les Trois Grands ne manifestent pas seulement leur constant souci d'être solidaires de la République fédérale, leur partenaire au sein de l'alliance atlantique, et d'obtenir de l'U.R.S.S. le plein respect des droits qu'ils retirent des accords conclus à la fin de la guerre, notamment à Potsdam. Ils sont également convaincus qu'on ne saurait aller plus avant dans la voie de la normalisation des rapports inter-européens — par la reconnaissance d'un *statu quo* idéologique et territorial en Europe, aussi favorable à l'U.R.S.S. qu'il est contraire en fait au droit des peuples de dis-

poser d'eux-mêmes — à moins que l'U.R.S.S. ne donne enfin des preuves indubitables de sa bonne foi et de sa volonté de paix. Ce qui n'est, selon les Américains et la plupart de leurs alliés, aujourd'hui, le cas dans aucun domaine, ni en Europe, ni au Proche-Orient, ni en Indochine, ni dans le domaine des armements nucléaires.

Aux yeux des Occidentaux, l'heure a donc sonné pour l'U.R.S.S. de mettre fin à la menace permanente qu'elle fait peser sur la prospérité et l'existence même de Berlin-Ouest, en demandant ou en permettant à la République démocratique allemande d'interrompre, à sa convenance et sous des prétextes parfaitement arbitraires et vexatoires, le trafic sur les routes et les voies ferrées entre l'Allemagne de l'Ouest et Berlin-Ouest. Certes, ces interruptions n'interviennent

désormais que lorsque les dirigeants et les partis de Bonn tiennent des réunions à Berlin-Ouest, ou poursuivent une activité politique que la R.D.A. estime contraire au statut de cette ville, qu'elle considère comme une entité séparée de l'Allemagne de l'Ouest. Elles n'en paraissent pas moins injustifiées aux Occidentaux et, de toute façon, rien ne garantit les Berlinoises de l'Ouest qu'elles ne se multiplieront pas.

Les Occidentaux sont cependant désarmés devant ces interruptions. S'ils interviennent, en effet, pour tenter de rétablir le trafic, ils trouveront sur leur chemin les troupes soviétiques, qui, comme l'a dit en son temps Khrouchtchev, dans une phrase célèbre, « ne sont pas là pour jouer aux billes », et dont la puissance et le nombre surpassent de beaucoup ceux des forces alliées. L'équilibre ne pourrait être rétabli que sur le plan nucléaire... Or, il n'est évidemment pas question d'en arriver là, puisque c'est précisément pour éviter un affrontement nucléaire, catastrophique pour les uns comme pour les autres, que les Etats-Unis et l'U.R.S.S. s'appliquent, depuis l'affaire de Cuba, à prendre les moyens et à multiplier les précautions pour l'éviter. Et telle a été précisément l'origine de la détente Est-Ouest.

Pourtant, les alliés ne peuvent absolument pas se désintéresser du sort des Berlinoises de l'Ouest, ni permettre, pour quelque raison que ce soit, leur étranglement progressif par les Soviétiques et les Allemands de l'Est. Il se peut que ces derniers ne nourrissent nullement cette intention. C'est même très probable, car les risques d'une telle opération seraient incalculables. Mais cette certitude n'est pas absolue. En conséquence, les Occidentaux, qui garantissent la sécurité de Berlin-Ouest, sont obligés de prendre les précautions militaires indispensables avec l'accord de l'OTAN. De fait, les menaces qui ont pesé sur Berlin-Ouest ont alimenté la guerre froide plus que toute autre raison. Elles se sont certes atténuées au cours des dernières années, elles n'en subsistent pas moins.

### Une victoire à la Pyrrhus

Les alliés sont restés longtemps marqués par le blocus de Berlin, en 1948, lorsque les Soviétiques et les Allemands de l'Est n'avaient qu'un but en tête, semblait-il, celui de s'approprier Berlin-Ouest après avoir étouffé économiquement la ville. Dix ans après, en 1958, les Occidentaux n'ont vu, tout naturellement, dans les propositions de M. Khrouchtchev, qui réclamait la ville libre et l'abolition de son statut quadri-

partite, qu'un chantage et un piège destiné à se refermer sur les Berlinoises de l'Ouest.

Cette fois, pourtant, Berlin-Ouest n'était l'objet d'aucun blocus et les menaces de M. Khrouchtchev étaient d'autant plus violentes qu'elles visaient des situations hautement improbables, sinon totalement exclues, à savoir une attaque alliée contre la R.D.A. ou les troupes soviétiques. Jamais, en effet, les Occidentaux n'ont envisagé une telle attaque, impliquant l'acceptation du risque nucléaire, sauf au cas où les Soviétiques prendraient des mesures mettant véritablement en danger l'existence de Berlin-Ouest, ce dont M. Khrouchtchev s'est bien gardé. D'ailleurs, après la crise de Cuba, Moscou a mis fin à sa campagne de menaces et les alliés en ont tiré la conclusion que leur fermeté avait été payante. N'avaient-ils pas une fois de plus sauvé la liberté des Berlinoises et remporté ainsi une victoire diplomatique ?

Victoire à la Pyrrhus en vérité, puisque leur « fermeté » avait abouti à l'érection du mur de Berlin. Or ce mur, qui a mis fin à l'évasion systématique des Allemands de l'Est vers l'Ouest, dont se mourait la R.D.A., a rendu complète et durable la division de l'Allemagne.

En vérité, M. Khrouchtchev ne désirait alors obtenir ni l'étranglement ni l'absorption de Berlin-Ouest par la R.D.A. Il était beaucoup trop réaliste pour imaginer que l'Ouest pourrait accepter une telle capitulation, conduisant fatalement au développement du neutralisme allemand, à l'isolationnisme américain et à l'hégémonie soviétique sur toute l'Europe. Ce qu'il recherchait avant tout, c'était la neutralisation de Berlin-Ouest, devenue une menace insupportable pour la République démocratique allemande et pour le camp socialiste dans son ensemble.

Que représentait, en effet, Berlin à cette époque pour les Soviétiques, sinon à la fois une tête de pont alliée et un foyer d'intrigues atlantiques au cœur même de l'une de leurs possessions les plus précieuses, une vitrine de la prospérité occidentale et un tremplin de la propagande américaine, avec ses journaux, ses postes de radio, un centre de sabotage et d'espionnage essayant ses agents dans les territoires communistes, un appât enfin et surtout une cité-refuge facile à atteindre pour les milliers d'Allemands de l'Est désireux de s'évader du régime cellulaire de M. Ulbricht ?

Les Soviétiques cherchaient donc tous les moyens d'arracher de leur camp ce foyer d'insécurité et de cauteriser l'abcès qui entretenait dans le corps de la R.D.A. une fièvre pernicieuse

rendant vains les efforts que Moscou déployait pour consolider le régime de M. Ulbricht. Aussi longtemps, en effet, que les Allemands de l'Est parviendraient à fuir un pays qui leur paraît une prison, aussi longtemps que la R.D.A. perdrait chaque année les plus éminents de ses cadres culturels et scientifiques, et les meilleurs éléments de sa jeunesse, aussi longtemps, enfin, que la population de l'Allemagne de l'Est pourrait conserver l'espoir d'un prochain renversement de situation en faveur de l'Occident, il était interdit aux Soviétiques d'espérer que le régime communiste de M. Ulbricht puisse durer et même se consolider, sans un soutien massif de l'U.R.S.S. dans tous les domaines et de tous les instants. On conçoit que l'U.R.S.S., à mesure que sa puissance nucléaire se développait, ait eu de plus en plus de mal à supporter une situation qui lui était si défavorable.

Aussi longtemps, cependant, que les Etats-Unis disposèrent seuls de bombes atomiques, puis d'une supériorité écrasante dans le domaine des « véhicules », les Soviétiques ne bougèrent pas. Le jour, cependant, où l'U.R.S.S. parvint, sur le plan technique et scientifique, à rejoindre les U.S.A. et même à les dépasser dans le domaine des fusées, elle décida de ne pas tolérer plus longtemps ce que son infériorité nucléaire l'avait contrainte de supporter jusqu'alors.

L'offensive diplomatique sur Berlin, déclenchée par les Soviétiques fin novembre 1958, a donc été avant tout la conséquence du changement du rapport de forces intervenu dans le monde au cours des dix années précédentes. Elle a mis au grand jour la situation difficile dans laquelle les Alliés se trouvent à Berlin où, pour des raisons géographiques, l'équilibre des forces est foncièrement à leur désavantage.

C'est ce que M. Khrouchtchev prit bien soin de souligner lui-même à plusieurs reprises, notamment le 15 janvier 1960, en déclarant qu'« entre les Etats socialistes et les Etats capitalistes le rapport des puissances venait d'être renversé, et que c'était là le fait fondamental ».

Exploitant ce nouveau rapport de forces, M. Khrouchtchev offrait alors aux Occidentaux de modifier le statut quadripartite de Berlin-Ouest, de telle sorte que cette ville ne constitue plus une base de subversion anti-communiste, et ne soit plus une porte d'évasion pour les Allemands de l'Est. « Tant que les troupes d'occupation américaines, françaises et britanniques demeureront à Berlin », le 13 juillet 1962, elles joueront le rôle d'excitatrices et feront monter la température

dans les relations entre les Etats ».

Les Soviétiques réclameront donc, pour Berlin-Ouest, un statut de ville libre démilitarisée. En 1961, ils proposèrent que l'ONU se portât garante de ce statut. M. Gromyko ajouta, devant la seizième assemblée des Nations unies, que « le gouvernement soviétique est prêt à accepter comme garants du statut de la ville libre des contingents de troupes des pays neutralistes ou des forces de l'ONU ». En 1962, peu avant la crise de Cuba, M. Krouchtchev fera de nouvelles concessions. Il va même se déclarer prêt à accepter le maintien de troupes alliées « à la condition que les troupes soviétiques soient aussi partiellement représentées à Berlin-Ouest ».

Quant au libre accès à Berlin-Ouest, M. Ulbricht devait proposer, en avril 1962, qu'il soit garanti par un comité d'arbitrage quadripartite, ou par un organisme chargé de faire respecter la circulation pacifique entre Berlin-Ouest et l'Allemagne fédérale, étant entendu que la R.D.A., totalement maîtresse des voies de communication et souveraine sur les territoires qu'elles empruntent, en assurerait seule l'administration.

Toutes ces propositions est-allemandes et soviétiques n'ont été faites qu'une fois commise l'irréparable, c'est-à-dire la construction du mur de Berlin. Il est intéressant, toutefois, de les rappeler aujourd'hui, car la situation n'a guère évolué depuis lors en ce qui concerne les objectifs de l'U.R.S.S. En 1961, le camp socialiste a atteint son objectif essentiel et le plus urgent, le verrouillage de la porte par laquelle les Allemands de l'Est s'évadaient de leur prison. L'U.R.S.S. a sauvé la République démocratique allemande de l'effondrement et permis son futur essor économique. En revanche, elle ne peut empêcher que Berlin constitue, au cœur de la R.D.A., un avant-poste de la République fédérale, qui rend très difficile la consolidation définitive de la R.D.A.

La pression matérielle et morale que Moscou est toujours en mesure d'exercer sur les Berlinoises de l'Ouest et leurs alliés — en maintenant l'étanchéité d'un « mur » qui continue de séparer les membres de milliers de familles, et en coupant de temps en temps les communications de Berlin-Ouest, — lui a conservé toutefois une arme précieuse, sinon irremplaçable, pour limiter le danger que présente cette enclave occidentale dans le camp socialiste et pour rappeler en permanence les risques d'un retour à la guerre froide. Elle ne saurait donc renoncer aisément à ces armes.

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May 1971

INSIDE THE 24TH CPSU CONGRESS

General

The much advertised 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held from 30 March to 9 April 1971, produced few surprises and in substance and style followed predictable lines. Colorless and conservative like the CPSU's foremost representative, Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, the Congress produced hundreds of thousands of words, but very few believable promises of action.

From foreign affairs to domestic economic and political difficulties to the Soviet role in the world Communist movement, little or no change for the better is in prospect. Brezhnev, whose domination of the Congress from beginning to end signified a step closer to Stalin-like one-man rule for the Soviet Union, struck a pose of moderation in foreign policy despite the recent events in Mexico and Ceylon pointing to a widespread Soviet subversion program. He painted a glowing but false picture of Soviet economic progress while offering little in terms of solutions to the many well-known difficulties afflicting the economy. He brushed by the insistent expressions of domestic ideological, intellectual, and minority discontent, and maintained the fiction of greater unity in the international Communist movement despite the still reverberating shock of the invasion of Czechoslovakia less than three years ago.

For outsiders, for whom most of the proceedings of the Congress have little relevance, some of the results may nevertheless have more than casual interest. First of all, in a country that has suffered under the despotism of Stalin and the caprices of Khrushchev, what do the changes in power alignments within the present leadership mean? Secondly, why do the people of a large country like the USSR, with vast material resources and a talented, energetic people, continue to live in semi-feudal backwardness after more than a half century of socialism? And finally, what are the relations of the Soviet leadership with the worldwide conspiracy consisting of the leaders of about 70 indigenous Communist parties whose common objective is the overthrow of their own governments?

Brezhnev Dominates the Leadership

For some months before the Congress, outside observers had noticed the growing pre-eminence of Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in the 11-man Politburo which wields the power in the Soviet Union. The naming of a new Politburo as one of the last items of business at the 24th Party Congress, confirmed the earlier signs. All 11 former members were re-elected, but in the initial announcement of the new leadership\*, Brezhnev was listed first and as having been elected "unanimously" while all others were described merely as being "elected." His chief rival, Premier Alexei Kosygin, was downgraded to third position in the hierarchy after President Podgorny. At the last Congress in 1966, Kosygin was listed second and Podgorny third. Speculation about the possibility that the energetic, ambitious, and relatively young Shelepin, former KGB secret police chief, might present a challenge for one of the top jobs, was also settled when he fell to 11th place. Now the Politburo was expanded to 15 by the addition of four new members, at least three of whom (and probably the fourth as well) are Brezhnev men. Thus, the evidence is compelling that Brezhnev has taken a large step toward re-instituting a one-man totalitarianism at the expense of the more innocuous "collective leadership," with consequent ominous possibilities for the Soviet people if not the world. The evolution to one-man dictatorship seems an inevitable tendency in the Soviet system: Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, and now Brezhnev.

Pre-Congress speculation about the return of Stalinism is only partially confirmed. Brezhnev in his major address clearly condemned a return to the "cult of personality," while at the same time reiterating his intolerance of divergencies from monolithic unity whether in literature or in Party politics.

However, the likelihood is that Brezhnev's power play will mean the reassertion of one-man totalitarianism. Unlike any autocratic system in the non-communist world, it uses a highly developed, pervasive police and Party apparatus to control every essential aspect of the private life of its subject citizens.

\* In the printed listing, the Politburo members were listed alphabetically, following previous custom.

While it has been observed that there was no "purge" of the top leadership in that all remain in the Politburo, some observers suggest that the Politburo was kept intact for the present to preserve the appearance of unity, but that the present composition is a temporary phenomenon and the coming months will very likely see some, like Shelepin, purged.

What seems more clear is that there will be a purge within the lower reaches of the Party. Brezhnev announced that an "exchange of Party cards" would be initiated. This means nothing less than a purge. The only reason given was that Party cards were last issued 17 years ago. The reasonable assumption is that Brezhnev (like all previous one-man leaders) will use the Party card exchange as a pretext for getting rid of enemies, non-supporters, and Khrushchev adherents. Brezhnev's call for a purge was received with an understandable lack of enthusiasm by subsequent speakers at the Congress. No one knows where the ax will fall.

#### The Economic Problem

The 24th Party Congress was assembled a year later than it should have been according to Party statutes. The main reason for the long postponement is commonly acknowledged to have been the leadership's failure to agree on how to solve the economic problems faced by the Soviet Union. These problems are well known: an economy slowed down to the point of stagnation, overcentralization of authority stifling local initiative, Party interference conflicting with the advice of economic experts and management personnel, the unresolved allocation of priorities to the various sectors of the whole economy, the traditional lack of consumer goods (which has never had a very high priority in Soviet economic planning), and finally the alarming scientific-technological gap.

The first important fact is that the Congress offered solutions to none of these problems (though some observers suggest that the military-industrial complex did not get as big a share as it had demanded). Instead of attacking the problems at the root by resolute reform measures, the Congress proposed minor patchwork changes calculated to make some small improvement.

It would be a mistake to judge the achievements of the Soviet economy on the basis of the array of statistics paraded

by Brezhnev in his "accountability report" and by Kosygin in his economic report. From Stalin's day to the present, Soviet statistics have been notoriously unreliable as indices to actual performance. Also, Brezhnev's claims of fulfillment of various aspects of the previous five-year plan conveniently failed to mention that the targets had been lowered at least twice in the course of the five-year period. Thus, at the very least, the statistical measure of Soviet economic achievement has to be treated with great caution.

In the Soviet Union and in the free world press, much has been made of the Congress promise to provide more consumer goods and welfare benefits to the population at large. While similar promises have been made traditionally at Party Congresses, this time they seem to have been advanced with more seriousness. In addition to wage raises and various welfare benefits, the basis for this new appraisal is Brezhnev's announcement that the growth rate in Group B goods (consumer goods) would now advance at a slightly greater rate than Group A goods (producer goods, i.e. heavy industrial products). Thus, production of Group A goods would increase 41-45% during the next five-year plan and Group B goods by 44-48%. In the first place, one can be skeptical about the promise being kept. Second, if it is kept, it is doubtful that the increase will be sufficient to make any noticeable difference to the consumer. Third, the critical test of how seriously these promises are meant lies in the allocation of available investment resources to achieve the promised gains. In this respect, Brezhnev promised nothing but simply asserted that the means must be found in greater efficiency and harder work. It is doubtful that a skeptical and apathetic labor force will muster the enthusiasm to fulfill Brezhnev's promises. Finally, it should be emphasized that during the next five years, industrial output will still account for 74% and consumer goods for only 26% of total production.

#### What is Wrong with the Soviet Economic System?

The 24th Party Congress launched the Soviet Union's 9th five-year plan. It seems incredible that after forty years of five-year plans, the best that the leader of a vast country, rich in natural and human resources, could offer a long suffering population was mere promises of material goods to fulfill their basic needs and some modest comforts of life. Many important failings contribute to this state of affairs, such as a scientific-technological gap, the primitive nature of modern management techniques, the apathy of the labor force, etc., but the central problem is a political one. The iron law of

Soviet-style Communism is that political power is exercised exclusively and totally by an elitist Party, led by a handful of top leaders (the Politburo) and ultimately by one man. This means that the Party will not share power with any other organized group, much less another political party. It lives in perpetual fear of any competing center of power and political ideas. This law naturally has led to a centralization of economic power as well. Free world observers have long recognized the dangers of overcentralization of economic decision-making, and in the early sixties, the Soviets seemed to have acknowledged it as well when a plan of reform was launched, known as the "Liberian plan" after the name of the Soviet economist most closely associated with developing the reform\*. Essential elements of the plan were decentralization of economic decision-making (greater regional and local autonomy), a program of work incentives involving monetary rewards for profitability of enterprises, and a limited play for free market forces, greater worker participation in management, and the more rational use of economic experts and practicing factory managers rather than Party bureaucrats for decision-making. High hopes were entertained (and rightly so) that the Liberman plan would go a long way to increasing Soviet productivity. But the Liberman plan met with so much Party obstructionism that it seems to have been allowed to become a dead letter, with only lip service paid to it. The reason: fear by the Party leadership and the rank-and-file that somehow their loss of control of the economy would next result in a challenge to their political control. Thus, they preferred the safe and conservative political course of close, centralized control of economic decisions with its inevitable concomitant of gradual economic sclerosis.

Observers at the Congress differ on whether the reform program has been dropped, is continuing in modified form, or whether it is the subject of dispute within the Politburo (as some other economic matters also seem to be). But both Brezhnev and Kosygin emphasized the importance of centralization in their speeches and equivocated on specific elements of the reform program. Whatever the ultimate fate of the Grand Reform, it is clear that the evil of political centralization of economic decisions will remain for the foreseeable future.

\* Attached is a thorough account of the origins and current status of the plan from the leading German newspaper, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.

Is There an International Communist Conspiracy?

In his speech before the Congress, Brezhnev strove to paint a picture of monolithic unity in the world Communist movement (WCM), while being forced to admit that pieces of the monolith had crumbled away --- he named such prominent Communists as Roger Garaudy of France, Ernst Fischer of Austria, and Teodoro Petkoff of Venezuela as examples, without acknowledging the fact that their disaffection represents a much larger segment of international Communism.

Soviet pressure on Communist leaders present at the Congress succeeded in suppressing or muting the criticism that some leaders have been unable to avoid on other occasions in the interest of maintaining some popular base of support in their own countries\*.

Yet, spokesmen of some parties --- among them the Italian, French, Belgian, Spanish, and Japanese --- reiterated what has come to be known as their "independence" of Soviet dictates by invoking the principle that relations with the CPSU must be governed by respect for the sovereignty of parties and noninterference in their affairs.

What, if anything, has changed in the nature of the international Communist movement? Since the blatant conspiracy embodied in Lenin's and Stalin's infamous Comintern, the style has certainly changed. In modern times the Communist assault on the non-Communist world is plotted and expressed in international conferences sponsored by the Soviet Union. But defections from the movement have become more common. Prominent leaders of mass parties express criticism of the Soviet Union. Splinter parties of various shades of Marxism proliferate. Why?

The fact is that Soviet leadership of the WCM has suffered four blows since Stalin's death: Khrushchev's revelation in 1956 (vividly reaffirmed in the book Khrushchev Remembers) that world Communism was controlled and directed by a megalomaniac;

\* It is significant that parties which have eliminated from their ranks leaders who persist in criticizing the Soviet Union stand in danger of losing membership and even becoming dwarf parties, as in the case of the Austrian and Venezuelan CP's. This consideration is not lost on leaders of larger parties.

the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956; the schism with Communist China in the early sixties; and most recently, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, which, like a specter, haunted the proceedings of the Congress, along with the ghost of the Brezhnev Doctrine\*\*.

These successive shocks to the rank-and-file adherents of the various Communist parties have not only caused defections by prominent Communists like Garaudy, Fischer, and Petkoff, they have put the majority faction of some parties into opposition to the CPSU, as in the case of the Spanish and Australian parties. They have also gradually forced some free world Communist party leaders to cease "explaining" and apologizing for these Soviet "mistakes" and to acknowledge the reality of Soviet power politics within the WCM. To do otherwise, these leaders know, would so alienate their rank-and-file supporters as to undermine beyond recovery whatever local popular support they enjoy.

Today, despite Brezhnev's protestations to the contrary, international Communist support of the Soviet Union has seriously eroded and Soviet ideological prestige (the free support of Communists for the CPSU) has sunk to its lowest point ever. However, now as before, free world Communist leaders and their parties owe their continued existence to Soviet financial support. It is questionable whether a single CP could continue to function politically in any significant way without this financial support. Criticism of the Soviet Union is voiced by these leaders only as an appeal to continued support from their disillusioned rank-and-file adherents. Meanwhile, as long as they express their basic solidarity with the Soviet Union (as all did at the Congress, without exception, despite the admission of some "divergencies" in views), the Soviet Union will continue their subsidization of these leaders and expect them to continue to act, as they always have, as arms of Soviet foreign policy. This aspect of what is often called the international Communist conspiracy has not changed.

Thus, despite the emptiness of the Soviet claim to ideological leadership of world Communism, leaders of some 70 Communist

\*\* Apparently the notoriety given the Brezhnev Doctrine in the free world has been unwelcome to the Soviets; Brezhnev and his free world Communist comrades at the Congress avoided the key expression signaling the Doctrine: "the common internationalist duty" of Communists.

parties (plus about 30 pro-Soviet non-Communist parties or groups) gathered at the Congress to pay homage to the CPSU, as the major world center of political subversion. It is curious that so many countries of the free world seem undisturbed and accept as some sort of natural phenomenon the fact that their local Communist parties openly pledge allegiance to an alien power and pay obeisance to the outrageous doctrine that the Soviet Union will openly support their efforts to overthrow their governments by one means or another, violently or peacefully.

NEW YORK TIMES  
31 March 1971

# Excerpts From Brezhnev's Report to the 24th Soviet Communist Party Congress

*Following, as distributed in English by Tass, the official Soviet press agency, are excerpts from the report presented to the 24th Soviet Communist party Congress at its opening yesterday in Moscow by Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the party:*

## The Soviet Bloc

The past five-year period has seen a considerable contribution to the treasure house of the collective experience of the fraternal countries and parties, and has advanced the development and strengthening of the world socialist system. In the last five years the economic potential of the socialist states has increased substantially, the political foundations of socialism have been strengthened, the people's living standards have been raised, and culture and science have been further developed.

Some difficulties and complications have continued to appear in the socialist world, and this has also had an effect on the development of relations between individual states and the Soviet Union. However, this has not changed the dominant trend of strengthening friendship and cohesion of the socialist countries. On the whole, our cooperation with the fraternal countries has been successfully developing and strengthening in every sphere.

This cooperation, enriching us with each other's experience, has enabled us jointly to work on the fundamental problems of socialist and Communist construction, to find the most rational forms of economic relations, collectively to lay down a common line in foreign affairs, and to exchange opinions on questions relating to work in the sphere of ideology and culture.

The period under review was marked by important successes in coordinating the foreign-policy activity of the fraternal parties and states. The most important international problems and events in this period were considered collectively by representatives of the socialist countries on various levels.

The Warsaw Treaty Organization has been and continues to be the main center for coordinating the foreign-policy activity of the fraternal countries. The Warsaw Treaty countries displayed the initiative of putting forward a full-scale program for strengthening peace in Europe, which is based on the demand that the inviolability of the existing state borders should be secured.

The Warsaw Treaty countries can also undoubtedly count among their political assets the fact that the plans which had existed within NATO to give the militarists in the Federal Republic of Germany access to nuclear weapons have not been realized.

Joint efforts by the socialist states have also made it possible to achieve substantial progress in solving a task of such importance for stabilizing the situation in Europe as the strengthening of the international positions of the German Democratic Republic. The so-called Hallstein Doctrine has been defeated. The G.D.R. has already been recognized by 27 states. And this process is bound to continue.

## Cuba

Over these years the Central Committee has devoted constant attention to strengthening cooperation with the Republic of Cuba and the Communist party of Cuba. As a result of joint efforts, considerable successes have been achieved in developing Soviet-Cuban relations. The peoples of the Soviet Union and of Cuba are comrades in arms in a common struggle, and their friendship is firm.

## Communist China

It will be recalled that the Chinese leaders have put forward an ideological-political platform of their own which is incompatible with Leninism on the key questions of international life and the world Communist movement and have demanded that we should abandon the line of the 20th Congress and the program of the Soviet Communist party. They unfolded an intensive and hostile

propagand campaign against our party and country, made territorial claims on the Soviet Union and in the spring and summer of 1969 brought things to the point of armed incidents along the border.

Our party has resolutely opposed the attempts to distort the Marxist-Leninist teaching and to split the international Communist movement and the ranks of

the fighters against imperialism. Displaying restraint and refusing to be provoked, the C.P.S.U. and the Soviet Government have done their utmost to bring about a normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China.

In the last 18 months, as a result of the initiative displayed on our part, there have been signs of some normalization in relations between the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. A meeting of the heads of government of the two countries took place in September, 1969, and this was followed by negotiations in Peking between Government delegations on a settlement of the border issues. These negotiations are going forward slowly, and it goes without saying that their favorable completion calls for a constructive attitude not only of one side.

An exchange of ambassadors took place between the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. at the end of last year. After a considerable interval, trade agreements have been signed and trade has somewhat increased. These are useful steps. We are prepared to continue to act in this direction.

But on the other hand, comrades, we cannot, of course, fail to see that the anti-Soviet line in China's propaganda and policy is being continued, and that the ninth congress of the Chinese Communist party has laid down this line, which is hostile to the Soviet Union, in its decisions.

We resolutely reject the slanderous inventions concerning the policy of our party and our state which are being spread from Peking and instilled into the minds of the Chinese people. It is the more absurd and harmful to sow dissent between China and the U.S.S.R., considering that this is taking place in a situation in which the imperialists have been stepping up their aggressive actions against the freedom-loving peoples. More than ever before the situation demands cohesion and joint action by all the anti-imperialist, revolutionary forces, instead of fanning hostility between the U.S.S.R. and China.

We shall never forsake the national interests of the Soviet state. The C.P.S.U. will continue tirelessly to work for the cohesion of the socialist countries and the world Communist movement on a Marxist-Leninist basis.

At the same time our party and the Soviet Government are deeply convinced that an improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China would be in line with the fundamental long-term interests of both countries, the interests of socialism, the freedom of the peoples and stronger peace. That is why we are prepared in every way to help not only to normalize relations but also to restore neighborliness and friendship between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China and we express the confidence that this will eventually be achieved.

Such is our principled stand. We have repeatedly stated it, are firmly committed to it, and are backing it up in practice.

## Czechoslovakia

The various remaining internal anti-socialist forces [in Czechoslovakia] may, in certain conditions, become active and even mount direct counterrevolutionary action in the hope of support from outside, from imperialism, which, for its part, is always prepared to form blocks with such forces.

The danger of right-wing revisionism, which seeks, on the pretext of improving socialism, to destroy the revolutionary essence of Marxism-Leninism and paves the way for the penetration of bourgeois ideology, has been fully brought out in this connection.

The Czechoslovak events showed very well how important it is constantly to strengthen the party's leading role in socialist society, steadily to improve the forms and methods of party leadership and to display a creative Marxist-Leninist approach to the solution of pressing problems of socialist development.

It was quite clear to us that this was not only an attempt on the part of imperialism and its accomplices to overthrow the socialist system in Czechoslovakia. It was an attempt to strike in this way at the positions of socialism in Europe as a whole and to create favorable conditions for a subsequent onslaught against the socialist world by the most aggressive forces of imperialism.

In view of the appeals by party and state leaders, Communists and working people of Czechoslovakia, and considering the danger posed to the socialist gains in that country, we and the fraternal Socialist countries then jointly took the decision to render international assistance to Czechoslovakia in defense of socialism. In the extraordinary conditions created by the forces of imperialism and counterrevolution, we

were bound to do so by our class duty, loyalty to socialist internationalism and the concern for the interests of our states and the future of socialism and peace in Europe.

## The War in Indochina

The continuing U.S. aggression against the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos is the main atrocity committed by the modern colonialists; it is the stamp of ignominy on the United States.

It is hard to keep a calm tone when speaking about the atrocities committed by the interventionists, who are armed to the teeth. Hundreds of thousands of tons of napalm have literally scorched into wasteland whole areas of South Vietnam. Almost 1.5 million Vietnamese have been poisoned, and many have died as a result of the use of chemical weapons.

## Chile

Great changes have been taking place in a number of Latin-American countries. The victory of the popular-unity forces in Chile was a most important event. There, for the first time in the history of the continent, the people have secured, by constitutional means, the installation of a government they want and trust.

This has incensed domestic reaction and Yankee imperialism, which seek to deprive the Chilean people of their gains. However, the people of Chile are fully determined to advance along their chosen path. The working people of other Latin-American countries have come out in support of Chile's progressive line. The Governments of Peru and Bolivia are fighting against enslavement by the U.S. monopolies.

## Southeast Asia

Anyone capable of taking a realistic view of things must realize that neither direct armed intervention nor torpedoing of negotiations nor even the ever wider use of mercenaries will break down the Vietnamese people's determination to become master of its own country.

The so-called "Vietnamization" of the war—that is, the plan to have Vietnamese kill Vietnamese in Washington's interests—and the extension of the aggression to Cambodia and Laos—none of this will get the U.S.A. out of the bog of its dirty war in Indochina or wash away the shame heaped on that country by those who started and are continuing the aggression.

The Soviet Union resolutely demands an end to the imperialist aggression against the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. Our country has been and will be an active champion of the just cause of the heroic peoples of Indochina.

## The Middle East

The crisis which has arisen as a result of Israel's attack on the U.A.R., Syria and Jordan has been one of the most intense in the development of international relations over the past period.

Together with the fraternal socialist countries we did everything necessary to stop and condemn the aggressor. Our country has helped to restore the defense potential of the Arab states which were subjected to invasion, the U.A.R. and Syria in the first place, with whom our cooperation has been growing stronger from year to year.

The Soviet Union will continue its firm support of its Arab friends. Our country is prepared to join other powers, who are permanent members of the Security Council, in providing international guarantees for a political settlement in the Middle East.

## West Germany and Berlin

Throughout the whole postwar period, we, like our allies and friends, have proceeded from the fact that lasting peace in Europe rests above all on the inviolability of the borders of European States. Now the treaties of the Soviet Union and Poland with the F.R.G. have confirmed with full certainty the inviolability of borders, including those between the G.D.R. and the F.R.G., and the western border of the Polish state.

There is a sharp demarcation of political forces in West Germany over the ratification of these treaties. One would assume that realistic-minded circles in Bonn, and also in some other Western capitals, are aware of this simple truth: Delay over ratification would produce a fresh crisis of confidence over the whole of the F.R.G.'s policy and would worsen the political climate in Europe and the prospects for easing international tensions.

As for the Soviet Union, it is prepared to meet the commitments it has undertaken with the conclusion of the Soviet-West German treaty. We are prepared to cover our part of the way toward normalization and improvement of relations between the F.R.G. and the socialist part of Europe, provided, of course, the other side acts in accordance with the letter and spirit of the treaty.

An improvement of the situation in Europe as a whole could be served by the convocation of an all-European conference. This is now being backed by a majority of the European states. Preparations for it is being carried into the plane of practical politics.

If the U.S.A., France and Britain proceed, as we have done, from respect for the Allied agreements which determine the special status of West Berlin, from respect for the sovereign rights of the G.D.R. as an independent social-

ist state, the current [Berlin] negotiations could be successfully completed to the mutual advantage of all the parties concerned, including the West Berlin population itself.

Another pressing task is establishment of equitable relations between the G.D.R. and the F.R.G., based on the generally accepted rules of international law, and also admission of both these states to the United Nations.

## Talks on Strategic Arms

We are engaged in negotiations with the U.S.A. on a limitation of strategic armaments. Their favorable outcome would make it possible to avoid another round in the missile arms race and to release considerable resources for constructive purposes. We are seeking to have the negotiations produce positive results.

## The Policy of the U.S.

We cannot pass over the aggressive U.S. actions in various parts of the world. In the recent period the U.S. Administration has taken a more rigid stance on a number of international issues, including some which have a bearing on the interests of the Soviet Union.

We proceed from the assumption that it is possible to improve relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. Our principled line with respect to the capitalist countries, including the U.S.A., is consistently and fully to practice the principles of peaceful coexistence, to develop mutually advantageous ties and to cooperate with states prepared to do so in strengthening peace, making our relations with them as stable as possible.

## Soviet Foreign Policy

The C.P.S.U. regards the following as the basic concrete tasks of this struggle in the present situation:

[1]

To eliminate the hotbeds of war in Southeast Asia and in the Middle East and to promote a political settlement in these areas on the basis of respect

for the legitimate rights of states and peoples subjected to aggression.

To give an immediate and firm rebuff to any acts of aggression and international arbitrariness. For this, full use must also be made of the possibilities of the United Nations.

Repudiation of the threat or use of force in settling outstanding issues must become a law of international life. For its part, the Soviet Union invites the countries which accept this approach to conclude appropriate bilateral or regional treaties.

[2]

To proceed from the final recognition of the territorial changes that took place in Europe as a result of the Second World War. To bring about a radical turn toward a détente and peace on this Continent. To insure the convocation and success of an all-European conference.

To do everything to insure collective security in Europe. We reaffirm the readiness expressed jointly by the participants in the defensive Warsaw Treaty to have a simultaneous annulment of this treaty and of the North Atlantic Alliance, or—as a first step—dismantling of their military organizations.

[3]

To conclude treaties putting a ban on nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons.

To work for an end to the testing of nuclear weapons, including underground tests, by everyone and everywhere.

To promote the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world.

We stand for the nuclear disarmament of all states in possession of nuclear weapons and for the convocation for these purposes of a conference of the five nuclear powers—the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., the P.R.C., France and Britain.

[4]

To invigorate the struggle to halt the

race in all types of weapons. We favor the convocation of a world conference to consider disarmament questions to their full extent.

We stand for the dismantling of foreign military bases. We stand for a reduction of armed forces and armaments in areas where the military confrontation is especially dangerous, above all in Central Europe.

We consider it advisable to work out measures reducing the probability of accidental outbreak or deliberate fabrication of armed incidents and their development into international crises, into war.

The Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate agreements on reducing military expenditure, above all by the major powers.

[5]

The U.N. decisions on the abolition of the remaining colonial regimes must be fully carried out. Manifestations of racism and apartheid must be universally condemned and boycotted.

[6]

The Soviet Union is prepared to deepen relations of mutually advantageous cooperation in every sphere with states which for their part seek to do so. Our country is prepared to participate together with the other states concerned in settling problems like the conservation of the environment, development of power and other natural resources, development of transport and communications, prevention and eradication of the most dangerous and widespread diseases, and the exploration and development of outer space and the world ocean.

And we declare that, while consistently pursuing its policy of peace and friendship among nations, the Soviet Union will continue to conduct a resolute struggle against imperialism and firmly to rebuff the evil designs and subversions of aggressors. As in the past, we shall give undeviating support to the peoples' struggle for democracy, national liberation and socialism.

TIME

19 April 1971

CPYRGHT

## SOVIET UNION And Then There Was One

"Slava, slava [glory, glory]," echoed the cheers in Moscow's cavernous Palace of Congresses last week. The words ironically hark back to an anthem of another day that celebrated the power of the czars. As 4,963 Communist Party delegates rose in a standing ovation, General Secretary Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, 64, clasped his hands together like a prizefighter. The 24th Soviet Party Congress was nearly over, and the outpouring of praise for Brezhnev was by all odds the closest that the Soviet Union has come to the adulation of a single ruler since the collective leadership overthrew Nikita Khrushchev in 1964. In more practical terms of power, Brezhnev also emerged with a tighter hold on the levers of Soviet authority. As the Congress went through the motions of electing a new Central Committee and Politburo, they chose mainly Brezhnev men.

**Unkind Cut.** By contrast, Premier Aleksei Kosygin, who shared equal glory with Brezhnev at the last Party Congress in 1966, was cast in a lesser light, although he remains in a powerful position. In the new order of precedence in the Politburo, which was expanded by four members to 15, Kosygin dropped to No. 3, after aging President Nikolai Podgorny, 68, whose post is largely ceremonial. In an unkind cut for any politician, Kosygin's three-hour speech was carried only in edited excerpts on radio and television. Worse still, as he was speaking, Soviet TV was carrying a rebroadcast of Brezhnev's remarks from the day before.

It also fell to Kosygin to fill in the disillusioning details of the ninth Five-Year Plan, which Brezhnev had expounded in glowing generalities at the start of the Congress. Where Brezhnev, for instance, had announced a grandiose family-allowance plan for everyone earning less than \$55 a month—which means one-sixth of the population—Kosygin brought the glummer news that the plan would not take effect until 1974. Even then, the value of free medical care and education would be added in calculating income. That would considerably reduce the number of Soviet citizens who stand to benefit.

"Metal Eaters." Similarly, Kosygin's dry statistics stripped much of the gloss from Brezhnev's promise that Russian consumer needs would be "more fully met." It will take until 1975 before 64% of Soviet families have refriger-

ators (compared with 32% today) and 72% have television sets and washing machines. That would be a considerable improvement, even if all goes according to plan—which has not happened in the past. But it still means that four years from now, more than a quarter of all families will still be without such appliances.

Moreover, the vaunted shift of production and resources to consumer goods, proclaimed by Brezhnev, turned out to be more apparent than real. Kosygin's figures revealed that such production is to increase between 44% and 48% over the next five years. But at the same time, the production of heavy industry—the "metal eaters," as Khrushchev used to say—will rise by almost the same amount. A considerable part of heavy-industry output goes to a defense establishment, which is roughly the same size as America's. Since the Soviet gross national product is only half as large as that of the U.S., the burden of defense is twice as great.

**Elusive Goal.** The real catch, however, came in Kosygin's disclosure that 95% of the increase in consumer-goods output is expected to come from "increased and more efficient labor production." Labor productivity, which currently averages only half that of U.S. workers, has always been an elusive goal for the Soviet economic planners. At the 1966 Congress, Brezhnev sought to solve the problem by demanding harder work, better discipline and an end to drunkenness. Now the Soviet rulers have dropped such exhortation in favor of incentives—the promise of more consumer goods. But the new incentives, unaccompanied by economic reform, are no more likely to increase productivity than Brezhnev's previous strictures.

The low level of Soviet output is due largely to an overcentralized and hugely inefficient planning system. The most promising Soviet reforms to date were the so-called Libermann reforms of the mid-1960s in which profit and market forces were allowed to play a role in judging the performance of industrial enterprises. At the time, Kosygin endorsed the reforms. In his speech last week, he pronounced the end of such "erroneous conceptions that substitute market regulation for the guiding role of state centralized planning."

**Packed Politburo.** In essence, the 24th Congress endorsed the leadership's present policies, which represented primarily

a triumph of the status quo, or of "monolithic unity," as *Pravda* put it. It empowered Brezhnev to "cleanse" the party by expelling members, a device that would enable him to favor his backers. All present Politburo members retained their seats, but their order of seniority was changed, except for Brezhnev and Party Ideologue Mikhail Suslov, who remained No. 4. Dmitry Poliansky (*TIME* cover, March 29) rose from ninth to eighth position behind Kirill Mazurov, who advanced one step to No. 7. Genady Voronov, Premier of the Russian Republic, dropped from fifth to tenth place. Aleksandr Shelepin, former head of the KGB secret police, slipped from the seventh to the eleventh spot, a clear-cut downgrading for a man who used to be one of the most powerful individuals in the Soviet Union.

The new men elected to an enlarged Politburo were Viktor Grishin, 57, Moscow party chief; Dinmukhamed Kunayev, 59, Kazakhstan party chief; Vladimir Shcherbitsky, 53, chairman of the council of ministers of the Ukraine, and Fedor Kulakov, 53, a party secretary and specialist in agriculture. All are Brezhnev protégés. By packing the Politburo, just as Stalin did in 1952, Brezhnev henceforth will be able to dominate it more easily. The collective leadership, which last year had begun to show signs of strain, appeared to be yielding ground to Brezhnev's drive toward undisputed pre-eminence.

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WASHINGTON POST  
31 March 1971

# Brezhnev Sets No New Line

## Chides U.S., China While Urging Peace

By Anthony Astrachan  
Washington Post Foreign Service  
MOSCOW, March 30—

Soviet Party leader Leonid Brezhnev called "elimination of the hotbeds of war in Southeast Asia and the Middle East" the first task in international affairs today, but he offered no concrete suggestions for the resolution of either crisis.

Nor did he suggest any new departures on Berlin and the strategic arms talks. Solution of those two major problems had been thought to depend on the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which Brezhnev opened today.

Brezhnev attacked both Red China and the United States on ideological grounds while expressing guarded optimism that relations could be improved with both. His bitterest words were not for America as a state but for America as the generator of imperialism.

The party leader dealt with relations between socialist states by coming down squarely for both "general regularities" and the "historical specifics of each country" in building socialism. He thus justified both the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia (a country that turned its back on the general regularities) and Soviet backing for economic reform in Hungary (a country that is exploiting its specifics).

Brezhnev's report as general secretary of the central committee took 6½ hours to deliver, not counting intermissions. He spoke to 4,963 delegates and enough guests to fill the 6,000-seat Palace of Congresses in the Kremlin.

Soviet television carried the entire speech, which met Moscow observers' expectations of an emphasis on peace, prosperity and stability. The first part dealt with virtually all aspects of the world scene, where Brezhnev saw the Soviet international position as "even stronger" than it was at the time of the 23rd Party Congress, five years ago.

On the Middle East, Brezhnev said the Soviet Union is prepared to join other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council "in providing international guarantees for a political settlement in the Middle East."

This elevated previous Soviet expressions of interest in a peace-keeping role to the summit level. Observers here believe Moscow is anxious to guarantee its presence in the area if events compel it to abandon its primary policy of controlled tension in the Middle East.

Brezhnev said once a political settlement is reached, further steps for military detente in the area could be considered with an eye to converting the Mediterranean into a "sea of peace and friendly cooperation."

He emphasized that the Soviet Union has "helped to restore the defense potential of the Arab states which were subjected to invasion," particularly Egypt and Syria, and he promised that the U.S.S.R. would continue "its firm support of its Arab friends."

He criticized those "who are instigating the Israeli extremists" and "the role of U.S. imperialism and of international Zionism as an instrument of aggressive imperialist circles."

### Southeast Asia

On Southeast Asia, Brezhnev repeated previous Soviet endorsement of Hanoi and Vietcong proposals for ending

brought the American people "no victorious laurels, but tens of thousands of funeral wreaths."

He called Vietnamization a "plan to have Vietnamese kill Vietnamese in Washington's interests." Brezhnev said neither Vietnamization nor the invasions of Cambodia and Laos would "get the U.S.A. out of the bog of its dirty war in Indochina or wash away the shame heaped on that country by those who started and are continuing the aggression."

The tone and language were typical of Brezhnev's remarks about imperialism.

He also said U.S. imperialism "seeks to dominate everywhere, interferes in the affairs of other peoples, high-handedly tramples on their legitimate rights and sovereignty, and seeks by force, bribery and economic penetration to impose its will on states and whole areas of the world."

"The imperialists are prepared to commit any crime in their efforts to preserve or restore their domination," Brezhnev added. "The continuing U.S. aggression against the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos is the main atrocity committed by the modern colonialists; it is the stamp of ingominy on the United States."

### European Problems

On European problems, Brezhnev praised West Germany's treaties with Poland and the U.S.S.R. He said their confirmation of the inviolability of borders was basic to lasting peace in Europe.

Delay in their ratification, he said, "would produce a fresh crisis of confidence over the whole of (West Germany's) policy." He thus appeared to

ignore the link that West German Chancellor Willy Brandt has insisted on between Soviet concessions on Berlin and ratification.

Brezhnev took a similar approach to the Communist-proposed European security conference, to which the West has made Berlin the key.

He then proceeded directly to the subject of West Berlin, showing the "was perfectly

aware of the link. Settlement of the Berlin problem, he said, depended on American, French and British "respect for the allied agreements which determine the special status of West Berlin" and their equal respect for the sovereign rights of East Germany.

If the Western allies took such an approach, he said, "the current negotiations could be successfully completed to the mutual advantage of all the parties concerned, including the West Berlin population itself."

### Berlin Solution

This passage appeared to justify observers abroad who said yesterday that a solution to the Berlin problem was still a year away.

On the Strategic Arms Limitation talks, Brezhnev said simply that a favorable outcome would make it possible "to avoid another round in the missile race and to release considerable resources for constructive purposes. We seek to have the negotiations produce positive results."

He added that such talks can be productive only "if equal consideration is given to both parties' security interests and if no one seeks to obtain unilateral advantages."

The Soviets insist that American planes based in Europe and capable of reaching Soviet territory are strategic weapons, and that American attempts to classify them as tactical arms are attempts at unilateral advantage.

Brezhnev moved from SALT to Soviet-American relations in general, noting that an improvement in them would be in the interests of both peoples and of stronger peace.

"We cannot, however, pass over the U.S. aggressive actions in various parts of the world," he added. "In the recent period, the U.S. administration has taken a more rigid stance on a number of international issues, including some which have a bearing on the interests of the Soviet Union."

Brezhnev then said, "We proceed from the assumption that the U.S. is able to improve

relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A."

This was part of Soviet devotion to peaceful coexistence, he added, "but let no one try to talk to us in terms of ultimatums and strength."

Brezhnev made plain that the doctrine of peaceful coexistence, based on the assumption that the war between socialist and capitalist states is not inevitable, was at the heart of the Sino-Soviet quarrel.

#### Chinese Quarrel

He reviewed both the polemical and the flesh-and-blood battles of the past five years as proceeding from the Chinese demand that the U.S.S.R. abandon "the line of the 20th Congress." Peaceful coexistence was proclaimed there. The reference stood out because the 20th Congress in 1956 was also the occasion for Nikita Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin, which Brezhnev is not likely to repeat.

He said the Soviet party and state had succeeded by their restraint and initiative in improving relations with China in recent months. He cited an exchange of ambassadors and the signing of a trade agreement.

But the "anti-Soviet line in China's propaganda and policy is being continued," Brezhnev noted. He said the Soviets resolutely reject Chinese slanders, deplore the sowing of dissent between the two countries, and "shall never forsake the national interests of the Soviet state."

Brezhnev's claim to be an ideologist, so far as foreign policy is concerned, was most apparent in his remarks on the socialist states, where he made no startling innovations.

#### Preventing War

He said socialism had

"proved its great viability in the historical contest with capitalism" and deserved full credit for preventing another world war.

He acknowledged that "some difficulties and complications have continued to appear in the socialist world," but insisted that the "friendship and cohesion" of the socialist countries has grown stronger in the past five years.

He drew his ideogram about socialist relations neatly around the Soviet Union's relations with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania, its most troublesome allies; "It is impossible to build socialism without basing oneself on general regularities or taking account of the concrete historical specifics of each country."

Brezhnev dwelt at length on the accomplishments of Comecon, the Eastern European common market, and called for its further integration. The countries to whose historical specifics he gave the most attention were Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Of Poland, he said, "We note with deep satisfaction that the difficulties which arose in fraternal Poland have been overcome." This was simultaneously an endorsement of Polish Party leader Edward Gierek and a challenge to him to keep Polish worker and consumer dissatisfactions under control, lest he make a liar out of the Soviet leader.

#### Czech Invasion

On Czechoslovakia, Brezhnev repeated the now-standard line: he blamed "rightwing revisionism" for opening the country to "the penetration of bourgeois ideology" under the

pretext of improving socialism. Imperialism was ready to follow and destroy socialism in Czechoslovakia, so Czech leaders appealed to the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies "to render international assistance to Czechoslovakia in defense of socialism."

Their success was proved by the fact that the Czechoslovak party is now preparing for its 14th Congress, "which we are sure will be a new and important stage in strengthening the positions of socialism in Czechoslovakia."

Brezhnev concluded his foreign policy remarks by listing "concrete tasks."

First was elimination of war in Southeast Asia and the Middle East by a political settlement based on respect "for the legitimate rights of states and peoples subject to aggression." Then came rebuffs to aggression, through the United Nations and by other means; repudiation of the threat or actual use of force in settling outstanding issues.

Second, Brezhnev grouped European detente, including the possibility of the simultaneous annulment of the Warsaw Pact and NATO treaties or dismantling of their military organizations—old Communist offers.

Third, he listed treaties banning nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons, an end to nuclear tests and the establishment of nuclear-free zones.

He called in passing for a conference of the five nuclear powers—the Soviet Union, the United States, China, France and Britain—to arrange the nuclear disarmament of all states.

The idea is an old one but has not been emphasized re-

cently.

Fourth, Brezhnev grouped new efforts to halt the arms race, including a world disarmament conference; the dismantling of all foreign military bases; measures "to reduce the probability of accidental outbreak of agreements on reducing military expenditures, particularly by major powers."

Fifth, he numbered abolition of colonial regimes and boycott of racism and apartheid.

#### Natural Resources

Sixth was international agreements on conservation of the environment, development of power and other natural resources, development of transport and communications, prevention and eradication of disease and the exploration and development of outer space and the oceans.

Most of these proposals seemed to Moscow observers to be pieties for which Brezhnev did not offer even the generalities with which he dealt with other matters.

The party leader summed up:

"Of course, in international affairs not everything depends on us or our friends alone. We have not advanced in every sphere as fast as we should like toward the goals we set ourselves. A number of important acts have yet to be brought to completion, and their importance will become fully evident later. But the overall balance is obvious: Great results have been achieved in these five years. Our country's international position has become even stronger, its prestige has been enhanced, and the Soviet people's peaceful endeavor has reliable protection."

CPYRGHT

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BALTIMORE SUN  
31 March 1971

## Brezhnev Steers Soviet Party Down The Middle Of The Road

### Offers 24th Congress Little New Save For Pitch To Consumer

By DEAN MILLS  
Moscow Bureau of The Sun  
Moscow, March 30—Leonid I.

Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist party leader, addressed the 24th congress of the party today with a six-hour speech that was remarkable largely for its precisely middle-of-the-road position on almost all issues.

He devoted a major portion of his foreign policy remarks to a six-point proposal outlining the Soviet plan for reducing international tensions—including a ban on all nuclear testing and a conference of the five nuclear powers to discuss total nuclear disarmament.

These proposals have already been made at various times over the past few years by Soviet leadership. And since such suggestions have previously drawn little response outside the Communist bloc, most Western analysts considered them of little more than rhetorical significance.

#### Televised Live

The speech, all of it televised live for the first time, contained no surprises and differed little in substance from the keynote address that Mr. Brezhnev made to the last party congress five years ago.

The 64-year-old general secretary, wearing glasses and frequently stopping to clear his throat at the podium in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses, promised both more guns and butter.

He attacked Stalinists and neo-Stalinists, bitterly assailed China and the United States while holding out the hope of more peaceful coexistence with them, and criticized both the liberals and the hard-liners in the arts.

#### A New Brezhnev

It was in the area of the economy, as expected, that his address gave the biggest suggestion of a new Brezhnev. Although he promised economic traditionalists that "high growth rates in heavy industry fully retain their importance" Mr. Brezhnev aimed most of his economic remarks at the consumer.

"The party believes above all," he said at one point, "that a fuller satisfaction of the material and cultural requirements of the people is the highest goal of social production under socialism."

Historical conditions, he said, have long limited the government's means for raising the living standard. "Now they have greatly increased."

#### 'Better And More Goods'

Better and more consumer goods and services, he added, are now also crucial to the development of the economy as a whole—a nod to those economists who long have argued that the worker must be tempted more by Soviet goods before he will increase his productivity.

He commiserated with consumers on the limited number of seats in restaurants and the low quality of the food in some of them. He called for more careful studies of consumer demand and more pressure on selfish executives to solve the shortage of everyday household goods.

But in another section of the speech, he praised the present increased emphasis on centralized planning. It is precisely rigid planning at the center, some liberal Soviet economists argue, that makes the Soviet supply system unresponsive to consumer demand.

#### No Longer Important

The issue of Stalinism, he argued in effect, is simply no longer relevant. The party and people are better off, he argued, for overcoming "the consequences of the personality cult

rors." "Personality cult" is the catch phrase used to describe Stalinism, "subjectivism" to indicate the Khrushchev era.

He attacked both those writers who insist on dwelling on Stalinism and those who attempt "to whitewash" past phenomena which the party has subjected to emphatic and principled criticism.

In an apparent attack on Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the Soviet novelist who last year won the Nobel prize, he said: "If a writer slanders Soviet reality and helps our ideological adversaries in their fight against socialism, he deserves only one thing—public scorn."

#### Improved Relations With U.S.

He said it is possible to improve relations with the United States and also reiterated Soviet wishes for "positive results" from the strategic-arms limitation talks with the United States.

He blamed the Chinese for the slow progress of the 18-month-old Sino-Soviet border talks and attacked Peking's anti-Soviet polemics as "slandorous inventions."

But he also said that the Soviet party and government believe in an eventual reconciliation. "We are prepared in every way," he concluded, "not only to normalize relations but also to restore neighborliness and friendship between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, and we express the confidence that this will be eventually achieved."

He warned West Germany that any further delay in ratifying the Moscow-Bonn nonaggression pact would mean "a fresh crisis of confidence" over West German policy.

But he offered no hope of Soviet movement on the issue which has stalled ratification—Soviet assurances on West German rights in West Berlin, something Bonn insists upon before ratification.

Mr. Brezhnev spoke again of the need for higher economic

integration in the Communist bloc, a familiar Soviet theme. He also praised the effects of the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, arguing that the troops, responding to the invitation of party, government and people, had saved the country from a bourgeois counter-revolution.

Mr. Brezhnev also had brief praise for the new Polish party leader, Edward Gierek, for normalizing conditions in Poland.

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## 24th Congress

In retrospect it is plain that the puppet show known as the 24th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party had one major objective: to demonstrate stability, unity and continuity in the Soviet leadership and its policies. There were neither dramatic changes in the party line nor sensational alterations in the Kremlin leadership. Those who wrote the script and prepared the stage directions aimed at the dulllest possible meeting. They succeeded completely. In the process, of course, they again exposed as illusion any notion that a Soviet party congress is actually a democratic forum for the expression of the popular will.

Older people tend to be conservative and to fear change, traits shared by the group of elderly gentlemen headed by Leonid I. Brezhnev who rule the Soviet Union. Looking abroad these past five years since the 23d Congress, they have seen ruling parties and leaders give way to their opponents in Britain and the United States, de Gaulle replaced by Pompidou in France, and a mammoth political explosion and purge convulsing China. The present Soviet gerontocrats wanted to present an image at the other extreme, as though Soviet society were immune to the forces making political conflict elsewhere.

But the Soviet Union enjoys no such immunity. The clash of rival ambitions, the struggle over division of the national income, the competition between the military-industrial complex and the representatives of domestic needs, and the demands of oppressed groups for greater power over their own destinies are as sharp in Moscow as in Washington. It apparently did not occur to the Kremlin stage managers that the decision not to ventilate

these and other conflicts can be viewed as a sign of weakness rather than strength.

Even from the bland and relatively uninformative proceedings of the 24th Party Congress, it is evident that a high price had to be paid for the outward show of unanimity displayed there. One part of the price was the compromised nature of the policies expounded by Brezhnev, compromises which fully satisfied neither the consumers to whom so much verbal obeisance was paid nor the heavy-industry and defense oligarchs whose most ambitious demands were somewhat curbed. Another part of the price was the limited rejuvenation of the aged Soviet leadership accomplished by this Congress. The Politburo has now been expanded to fifteen, but it still includes not a single person born in the past half century, while all the key figures in the Kremlin leadership are men born well before World War I.

If only because of the laws of biology, the personnel arrangements adopted at this Congress must soon be eroded. And the policy compromises enunciated there seem likely to be no more stable than the constellation of individuals who produced them. A new generation of Soviet citizens with new ideas and new demands stands in the wings clamoring for admission to the highest level of Kremlin authority.

The Congress decision to conduct an exchange of party membership cards opens the way to a potential purge, though it is still not clear how extensive a "cleansing" of the party ranks is planned. This decision has given Mr. Brezhnev a club to hold over the heads of those who may wish to challenge the rapidly growing cult of Brezhnev's personality. Implicitly, of course, the decision also indicates that the Congress image of unanimity was simply another Potemkin Village.

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
12 April 1971

## Lackluster congress

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# Soviets 'hold the line'

By Charlotte Saikowski  
Staff correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

Moscow

It was 10 days that did not shake the world.

Or even the Soviet Union.

Stability rather than change, continuity rather than originality, caution rather than dynamism, was the hallmark of the recent 24th party congress. In politics, in foreign policy, in the economy, the leadership

seemed to say: We are basically satisfied with what we have done and will go on doing more of it.

Sober and disciplined, the congress dwelt heavily on the themes of improving relations abroad and boosting living standards at home. Significantly, however, some of the nation's most burning and controversial problems—political dissent among the intelligentsia, agitating minorities, apathetic youth—were swept under the carpet, without mention.

Party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev noted

that the Soviet Union is under the age of 30. Yet ideologically the Communist elite offered Soviet young people only a tired, familiar collection of slogans and exhortations.

### Little interest shown

Characteristically, the congress sparked little interest among uninvolved, ordinary Soviet citizens, inured over many years to the routine, dry "debates" that take place at a party gathering. Several Russians whom this correspondent questioned did not

bers — nor even all the names of the old for better relations with Communist China. warned not to dredge up the dark past. On the other hand, in what seemed a slight concession to the liberals, ultraconservative neo-Stalinist writers also were chastised.

"Why bother?" one Russian commented wryly. It was left largely to the East European allies and local Soviet officials to deliver the ideological slaps at Peking.

In capsule form, here is a box score of the 10-day congress based on its lengthy reports, speeches, and windup resolution:

**The political front.** Mr. Brezhnev's present exposure at the congress and the softening of his power in an augmented 15-man Politburo caused the main ripples of interest here. The changes do not portend new policies. Nor do they violently rock the political boat. The four new Politburo members come from the top leadership, and no new men took their old positions.

#### What shifts mean

Expansion of the Politburo may be a blowing up of the balloon before letting it out again. At the congress the leadership possibly did not want to create a climate of uncertainty by dramatic changes. But certain members of the old 11-man Politburo could be dropped later on.

The shifts seemed at least partly designed to please the national minorities. One of the new Politburo members is a Kazakh, the other a Ukrainian.

**Foreign policy.** The tone was conciliatory and moderate. Statements on disarmament, although not new, enhanced the Soviet Union's "peace" image. Considerable attention was given to relations with the "United States, with implications the Kremlin is puzzled by President Nixon's policies. Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko summed up Moscow's self-pleased view of its position as a world power when he declared:

"Today no question of any degree of significance would be decided without, or in defiance of, the Soviet Union."

The leadership also reiterated its desire

Communist movement. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was justified. Only a handful of dissenting voices, including the Romanians, Italians, and Japanese, spoke out for parties' right to pursue a course independent of Moscow. The growing "unity" of the international movement was reaffirmed. Such sins of the Communist catechism as right and left "revisionism," "anti-Sovietism," and "nationalism" were denounced.

Closer economic integration of the East European countries also was called for.

**Economy.** Paramount stress was on the need for more consumer goods and a better life. But heavy industry and defense will continue to get priority, and there will be no concessions on economic dogma to overcome the nation's technological backwardness. The modest reform of 1965 is to be continued, and a green light is given to the formation of large industrial "amalgamations" or mergers. Workers will be spurred by both "material" and "moral" incentives.

**Stalin.** His name did not come up. A few references to the "personality cult" were carefully balanced with allusions to equally scorned "subjectivist tendencies" (Khrushchev), indicating the tyrannical Stalinist period will not be put under the scrutiny of serious scholarship. Heartening for the Soviet people, however, are also the implications that there will be no return to the extreme reactionism of the Stalin years.

**Literature and art.** The guidelines are orthodox and conformist but, in Soviet terms, middle of the road. Officially disgraced writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn was not mentioned, but creative artists were

The old shibboleths of "socialist realism" and "party content" stand.

**Party affairs.** Approval was given to holding party congresses once every five instead of every four years so as to coincide with the nation's five-a-year-plan periods. There is to be an exchange of party membership cards (the first in 17 years), presumably to weed out ineffective members.

Primary party organizations are given the right of control over the work of scientific, educational, cultural, and medical institutions, thus tightening the party's watch over the intelligentsia. Party supervision of ministries and other state bodies also is to be enhanced.

After many months of preparations and sloganeering, the 24th congress itself (March 30-April 9) seemed anticlimactic. Mostly it was another occasion for the party's faithful bureaucrats in the provinces to visit the big capital, hobnob with each other, thump their chests, and have a good time. With more than 5,000 delegates and foreign observers in town, it was hardly possible for anyone else to get a ticket to a theater or concert.

The congress also gave smiling Young Pioneers, fleet folk dancers, and graceful gymnasts an opportunity to show off their stuff. And the world's champion weightlifter, Vasily Alexeyev, in honor of the congress and before an audience of delegates, set his 31st world record by lifting a 233.5-kilogram barbell (514.77 lbs).

After all that, it's back to work.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
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CPYRGHT

# Brezhnev lands top billing

By Charlotte Saikowski  
Staff correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

Moscow

A new L.I.B. movement?

Not "liberation," mind you.

Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev.

As factory workers, farmers, local party officials, and republic leaders day after day address the 24th party congress, a significant trend is noticed here. The jowly Soviet party leader is mentioned far more often than he was at the 23rd congress in 1966. And, in contrast to the previous congress, there is even personal, folksy praise of him.

Political observers view this phenomenon as the closest thing to a "personality cult" since the flamboyant days of Nikita S. Khrushchev.

Over the past year and a half, of course, Mr. Brezhnev has gained markedly in exposure and prominence, and the outward evidence suggests he has solidified his control at the top. But until now there has been relatively little personal praise for him in the central press.

However, the accounts of the congress speeches in Pravda and Izvestia give Soviet people at large the impression Mr. Brezhnev has more stature and hence add to the overall evidence of his ascendancy.

Most noticeable are the bits of praise from ordinary workers and party officials at the local level.

A milkmaid from the Dawn of Peace Collective Farm in Orel Province, for instance, told the 5,000 delegates in the Palace of Congresses:

"I won't hide the fact that tears of joy and pride came to my eyes when Leonid Ilyich, himself a former frontline soldier who went through the flames of war, told in his report so warmly and sincerely of the labor exploits of soldiers at the front."

The party head of Gorky Province related how Mr. Brezhnev had twice visited the area, chatted with working people, and given "much valuable advice." Leningrad's boss complimented his "responsiveness" and readiness to give practical help. And the leader of Krasnodar Territory said how

right the Central Committee was when "on the initiative of L. I. Brezhnev" it worked out land-reclamation measures.

Even important republic leaders are commending the burly Politburo member.

Kazakhstan's first secretary, Dinmukhamed A. Kunayev, mentioned Mr. Brezhnev only twice in 1966 (according to official accounts). This year he mentioned his name four times and in one instance referred to his "skill in unifying collective and directing the efforts of the entire Central Committee for the fruitful work of our party and people."

Azerbaijan is another case in point. Five years ago the party leader mentioned Mr. Brezhnev once. The new party secretary, Geidar A. Aliyev, mentions his name five times.

"In all the work done by the Central Committee an enormous role belongs to... Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, who by his indefatigable activity and constant concern about the good of the people has won universal love and respect," Mr. Aliyev declared.

## Name given eight times

The leaders of Latvia and Lithuania credited Mr. Brezhnev for taking the initiative in measures designed to pull up the nation's lagging farm front. The first secretary of Kirgizia eulogized his "simplicity and humanity." And the head of Uzbekistan noted his helpful visits to the earthquake-torn city of Tashkent.

Records have been set by the leader of the Komsomol and the party head of Novosibirsk Province, each of whom referred to Mr. Brezhnev eight times. The U.S.S.R. minister of ferrous metallurgy and the leaders of Latvia and Tadzhikistan each gave him seven mentions.

And one final statistic: five years ago Defense Minister Rodion Y. Malinovsky mentioned Mr. Brezhnev once. At this congress, Defense Minister Andrei A. Grechko mentioned his name three times.

One cautions against concluding that a full-fledged "cult" is being built around Mr. Brezhnev as it was around Mr. Khrushchev (a Stalin-type "cult" is out of the question). It is possible the Politburo has decided that the general secretary of the party, whoever he is, should be accorded the attention and prestige befitting the office.

## Other figures overtaken

The congress in 1966 followed the Khrushchev period, when the leadership was consciously trying to erase the "one-man" image that attached to the party. It was

natural that Mr. Brezhnev not be accorded special attention.

But the "numbers game" in this case seems to reinforce the already discernible trend. Mr. Brezhnev has clearly overtaken other Soviet leaders as the dominant figure in the Kremlin. He has been visible at state as well as party functions, even though he has only a nominal government post.

Last year a two-volume edition of his "collected works" was published. And on New Year's Eve the general secretary broke precedent and addressed the nation over radio and television to wish them a happy new year.

Another precedent was broken when Mr. Brezhnev's report to the congress was televised live in its entirety. And over the weekend Pravda on Page 1 carried a photograph of a smiling Politburo "triumvirate" surrounded by smiling female delegates. One had her arm linked around Leonid Ilyich's.

In Soviet terms, it does seem to be a L.I.B. movement.

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NEW YORK TIMES  
10 April 1971

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## A Kosygin Decline Is Seen in Listings

By HEDRICK SMITH  
Special to The New York Times  
WASHINGTON, April 9

The new listing of the Soviet leadership was viewed by specialists here as reflecting a major rise in the power of Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Communist party General Secretary, and a blow to the prestige of Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin.

The fact that Mr. Kosygin was listed as third in the hierarchical rankings of the Politburo, behind Mr. Brezhnev and Nikolai V. Podgorny, the chief of state, was regarded by American officials and academic specialists on Soviet affairs as a sharp public slight to the Soviet Premier by Mr. Brezhnev.

For the present, however, Mr. Kosygin is still believed to wield more power than Mr. Podgorny.

Some academic and government specialists here suggested that in the months ahead, however, Mr. Kosygin might step down as Premier, possibly after presenting the new Soviet five-year plan to the next meeting of the Supreme Soviet — the Soviet Parliament — which is expected to be held late next summer.

At the 23d Communist party

Congress in 1966, Mr. Kosygin was listed as second after Mr. Brezhnev. In the numbers of nominations to the Supreme Soviet and other symbolic measurements of standing in the party hierarchy, Mr. Kosygin has also consistently been the second-ranking figure in the Soviet regime, although some lists based on state diplomatic protocol have put him behind Mr. Podgorny, the chief of state.

In late December, 1969, and early 1970, American officials detected evidence that Mr. Brezhnev was challenging Mr. Kosygin's primary responsibilities in the economic sphere and even once took the unusual step of addressing the Council of Ministers, normally Mr. Kosygin's exclusive domain.

During the present congress, some analysts noted that several of Mr. Kosygin's ministries were attacked by Communist party officials close to Mr. Brezhnev for their economic policies.

Moreover, Mr. Kosygin's renewed emphasis in his economic report to the congress on continuing to use profitability as an important yardstick of the success of Soviet economic enterprises was not echoed by other speakers.

Indeed, some ranking party

figures criticized the economic reforms of 1966, of which Mr. Kosygin had been the primary patron.

American officials found it difficult tonight to assess the policy significance of Mr. Brezhnev's increased power and Mr. Kosygin's slippage.

Analysts here regard Mr. Brezhnev's congress speeches as more demonstratively pro-consumer than Mr. Kosygin's, which is generally a reversal of their previous positions.

Mr. Brezhnev was also regarded as more clear-cut about wanting to reduce Soviet defense expenditures than Mr. Kosygin. Generally, American officials expect little change in Soviet policies as a result of the shifts in the leadership rankings.

Mr. Podgorny's improved position was interpreted as a by-product of Mr. Kosygin's slippage, rather than marking any significant gain in power.

Two other changes in the Politburo rankings attracted attention here because they indicated a decline in influence of two Politburo independents who have reportedly been at odds with Mr. Brezhnev on occasion.

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NEW YORK TIMES  
11 April 1971

## Brezhnev Officially Listed Ahead of Soviet Politburo

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN  
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, April 10—The Soviet Union indicated today that Leonid I. Brezhnev, whose pre-eminence in the Kremlin leadership was underscored at the just-completed 24th Communist party Congress, has now risen officially above his fellow Politburo members—apparently as the undisputed leader of the country.

A formal report on the first pages of all newspapers about

yesterday's Central Committee meeting noted as a separate item Mr. Brezhnev's re-election as General Secretary of the party and listed it ahead of the election of the Politburo and Secretariat.

Since the Politburo has traditionally been regarded as the most important party organ, the placing of the party's General Secretary above it signified a further and perhaps de-

cisive widening of Mr. Brezhnev's personal power and prestige.

Not since Nikita S. Khrushchev's days of leadership has one man so dominated the party hierarchy as Mr. Brezhnev appears to do now.

### Revision of 1966 Listings

By comparison, in 1966, at the close of the 23d party congress, the election of the Politburo and Secretariat was listed ahead of Mr. Brezhnev's election as General Secretary.

In the formal report and Mr. Brezhnev's election as General Secretary was placed further down with the list of party secretaries.

The new listing, Western diplomats said, could have far-reaching consequences for both domestic and foreign policy. It might indicate that the Soviet Union's experiment with collective leadership in the wake of Khrushchev's ouster is ending, and a Brezhnev era beginning.

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The make-up of the Politburo—enlarged yesterday from 11 to 15 members—and of the expanded Central Committee seems to bear out Mr. Brezhnev's growing political power, since many of his close supporters were added. It can be expected that Mr. Brezhnev's ideas and policies can now be carried out with a minimum of debate since he seems to control the organs of power.

The exact duties of the General Secretary have never been detailed in public. The title was used by Stalin from 1922 until 1952, when he adopted the title First Secretary. Mr. Khrushchev used the term First Secretary and Mr. Brezhnev changed it back to General Secretary at the 23d congress.

Mr. Brezhnev has no Government or state posts comparable to his party rank. But in recent months, drawing upon his pre-eminence in the leadership, he has taken a more active role in economic affairs at home and in talks with such foreign leaders as President Pompidou of France. Such functions had previously been shared by Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin and President Nikolai V. Podgorny. Some diplomats believe that in coming months Mr. Brezhnev may decide to deal directly

with Western leaders, something he has usually left to others.

But some diplomats cautioned against drawing premature conclusions. They said it would be better to watch developments in Soviet policy in coming months to see if Mr. Brezhnev does seem to act more independently.

#### Exchange of Party Cards

Among things to watch, they said, would be whether the exchange of party membership cards is carried out as Mr. Brezhnev suggested in his main report to the Congress. He said that such an exchange—which amounts to a pretext for a purge of some party members—had not taken place in 17 years. If it does take place, presumably party officials thought less than enthusiastic with Mr. Brezhnev's policies could lose their jobs.

The formal announcement on the results of yesterday's meeting of the newly chosen Central Committee, began as follows:

"On April 9, 1971, a plenum of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party, chosen by the 24th Congress of the Communist party, was held.

"The plenum unanimously elected comrade Brezhnev, L.I., as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Sov-

iet party.

"The plenum elected the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist party as follows."

It then listed in alphabetical order the 15 members, headed by Mr. Brezhnev, and six candidate members. The report went on to list the ten members of the Secretariat, headed also by Mr. Brezhnev.

#### Podgorny Listed Second

In his concluding speech to the congress yesterday, Mr. Brezhnev also listed the new party line-up, headed by himself. He mentioned the names apparently in order of their importance, but although Mr. Podgorny was placed second ahead of Mr. Kosygin, Western Diplomats regarded this listing as simply in conformity with protocol.

The full text of Mr. Brezhnev's speech as printed in the press today differed from the way he listed the names yesterday. The printed version listed all leadership posts alphabetically after Mr. Brezhnev as General Secretary. This was in keeping with the effort to show that the Politburo were equal members—after Mr. Brezhnev.

Most western diplomats here predicted that the 15-man Polit-

buro would be reduced in coming months to 12 or 11 members. The belief was that the three Politburo members listed last by Mr. Brezhnev yesterday might be dropped.

They are Pyotr Y. Shelest, the Ukrainian party leader; Genady I. Voronov, the head of the Russian federation, and Aleksandr N. Shelepin, the trade-union leader.

#### Received Lavish Praise

Mr. Brezhnev's rise has been discerned for the last year and has often been commented on in diplomatic circles here. He has seemed eager to assert his leadership, although so far there has been little of the kind of adulation that was given either Stalin or Mr. Khrushchev in the media.

But at the 24th Congress, Mr. Brezhnev received lavish praise that the new leaders who succeeded Mr. Khrushchev were supposedly opposed to.

The congress ended yesterday, and the press was printing the final resolutions: it passed, giving endorsement to the policies of eased world tensions and a higher standard of living outlined by Mr. Brezhnev in his main report and elaborated upon by Mr. Kosygin in his economic report.

CPYRGHT

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10 April 1971

CPYRGHT

## SOVIET SHUFFLES PARTY LEADERSHIP BUT TEAM IS SAME

Brezhnev, Listing Politburo,  
Puts Kosygin in 3d Place,  
After the President

### 4 MEN WIN PROMOTION

Changes Are Interpreted as  
Reflecting Party Chief's

Kremlin Press

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, April 9—Leonid I.

Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist party leader, today announced a shuffle in the Kremlin hierarchy that left the same men in power and seemed to enhance his pre-eminence in the leadership.

In his concluding speech to the 24th Congress of the party, Mr. Brezhnev stressed the unity and cohesion of his regime by disclosing that all the 25 men who held top Politburo or secretariat posts before the congress were "re-elected" by the newly chosen Central Committee. He said no new faces had been introduced into the select body of men who direct the lives of the 14.5 million Communist

party members and 241 million citizens of the Soviet Union.

In 1966, in the announcement of the Politburo chosen at the end of the 23d Congress, Premier Alexsei N. Kosygin was in second place, just ahead of President Nikolai V. Podgorny. In recent years the order has been reversed, presumably for protocol reasons, and today Mr. Kosygin's name was listed third.

#### Doubts in Washington

In the opinion of analysts here, there seems to be no doubt that Mr. Kosygin, who is 67 years old, has more responsibilities than the 68-year-old titular chief of state. [In Washington officials and expert analysts regarded the listing as reflecting a major increase in

Mr. Brezhnev's power and a blow to the prestige of Mr. Kosygin.]

With regard to Mr. Kosygin's role, he gave the economic report to the congress while Mr. Podgorny, who delivered a speech to the 23rd Congress, did not speak. He was chairman of the opening session.

The only apparent change in the Politburo was the promotion of four men to full Politburo status. Three of them, Dinmukhamed A. Kunayev, Vladimir V. Shcherbitsky and Viktor V. Grishin, had been candidate Politburo members. The fourth, Fyodor D. Kulakov, is a party secretary in charge of agriculture.

The promotions enlarged the

Politburo to 15 members from 11 and seemed to provide Mr. Brezhnev with even more political power and maneuverability since all but Mr. Grishin, are thought to be protégés of the party chief. Mr. Grishin, the Moscow party leader, is believed to owe his promotion to that post in 1967 to Mr. Brezhnev.

No important changes had been expected and Soviet sources had said that there would be no major surprises. That was attributed to Mr. Brezhnev's desire to present a united front both to the Soviet people and to the rest of the world. The emphasis throughout the ten-day congress was on stability and continuity.

Before a national television audience, Mr. Brezhnev told the 5,000 delegates that the Central Committee elections had been held in "an atmosphere of unity and cohesion."

His face showing no emotion, he announced that "Comrade Brezhnev" had been re-elected General Secretary. That led to a standing ovation, which he acknowledged by clutching his hands and moving them up and down.

He then listed the other

Politburo members in this order:

President Podgorny, Premier Kosygin, Mikhail A. Suslov, Andrei P. Kirilenko, Arvid Y. Pelshe, First Deputy Premier

Kirill T. Mazurov, First Deputy Premier Dmitry S. Polyansky, Pyotr Y. Shelest, Gennady I. Voronov and Aleksandr N. Shelepin, and then Mr. Grishin, Mr. Kunayev, Mr. Shcherbitsky and Mr. Kulakov.

Mr. Suslov, the senior Politburo member and the party's chief ideologist, is in fourth place, followed by Mr. Kirilenko, who acts as General Secretary in Mr. Brezhnev's absence and is regarded as a possible successor.

Attention was focused on Mr. Voronov's drop from fifth place to 10th, and Mr. Shelepin's from seventh to 11th. Mr. Voronov, the head of the Russian Federation, and Mr. Shelepin, the trade-union leader, have not received much publicity in recent months.

Some diplomats speculated that Mr. Shelepin, the youngest member of the Politburo, who was elevated by Mr. Brezhnev in 1967 and whose star has been falling, might be ousted because he was mentioned last.

Later Tass, the Soviet press

agency, in distributing the text of Mr. Brezhnev's concluding remarks, put the list in alphabetical order.

The Congress was notable for its lack of controversy and for Mr. Brezhnev's apparent desire to stress Moscow's middle-of-the-road policies in both domestic and foreign affairs.

Western diplomats, remarking that the party line-up should not be regarded as immutable, said they would not be surprised if some members were dropped in the next few months. At 15 members the Politburo is the largest it has been since 1960, when the body, then known as the Presidium, had 14.

Under the Soviet system the Politburo is the main policy-making body. Mr. Brezhnev said in his main report that it met once a week to discuss pressing matters, and Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko told the congress that the Politburo was supreme on foreign policy.

The secretariat of the Politburo, Mr. Brezhnev said, meets daily and acts as its operational wing, putting decisions into effect and checking on personnel and compliance.

The Central Committee, legally the main party body between congresses, usually meets about two or three times a year to confirm decisions

already made.

The average age of the Politburo members fell from 63 to 61 since all of the new members are in their fifties. Their designation widened the representation of non-Russian nationalities.

Mr. Kunayev, head of the Kazakh party organization, worked under Mr. Brezhnev when he was its head in the nineteen fifties. Mr. Shcherbitsky, head of the Ukrainian Government, also worked under Mr. Brezhnev. He and the party leader, Mr. Shelest, are the Ukrainian members.

Six men remain candidate members of the Politburo: Yuri A. Andropov, head of the secret police; Dmitry F. Ustinov, in charge of defense industries; Pyotr N. Demichev, director of ideological and cultural matters; Sharaf R. Rashidov, head of the Uzbek party; Pyotr M. Masherov, head of the Byelorussian party, and Vasily P. Mzhavanadze, head of the Georgian party.

There was no change in the number of party secretaries, but the Central Committee was enlarged to 390 from 360. Among those named are Anatoly F. Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, previously a candidate member.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
12 April 1971

## Hail, Caesar

CPYRGHT

The Russian people have a new czar, which is what they seem to prefer. They always come back to one-man rule after their periodic experiments in collective leadership.

Publication of the names of the new Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party seems to make it fairly clear that Leonid Brezhnev is now "top man" in Moscow, at least as much as Nikita Khrushchev was in his day. For the sake of the long-suffering Russian people we must hope it stops at that and doesn't go on to be a second Stalinist reign.

What it means for the outside world is what we of the outside world most want

a question mark. There is nothing in the published record of the 24th party congress in Moscow which throws any conclusive light on whether Czar Leonid I will be more, or less, aggressive in the process of building a new Russian colonial empire. We will just have to wait and see whether operating policies change.

The main meaning appears to be for the Russian people themselves. Most that has been said on the public record at the Congress, and most that can be read by the Kremlinologists from the changes in the lineup of the Central Committee, suggests a major preoccupation with domestic Russian problems and a victory in facing them by the orthodox over the reformers.

The committee has grown in numbers from 11 to 15 but the average age has gone down only from 63 to 61. This is not any "new generation" taking over in Moscow.

And the new names are those of senior politicians or technicians. So this is not a Pope John throwing open the windows to "let in some fresh air," and speeding the old orthodox cardinals to clear the way for new ideas.

There is another reminiscent overtone. In Britain, back when Harold Wilson was getting ready to make his bid for the prime ministry, there was much talk of "reform." Mr. Wilson pushed that aside and talked of building a new and better Britain on research and technology. There were to be whole new industries built along new lines. There would be such a blossoming of a new Britain that it wouldn't be worth while reforming the old. It was an easy excuse for ducking reform.

The 24th congress of Mr. Brezhnev was heavy with the same theorizing. Mr. Kosygin, who steps down from number

two to number three in the hierarchy, was the reformer. He wanted to change the old system to make it work. He is demoted. So, too, are most of the others known to be in favor of real reform.

Podgorny, who steps into number-two place, is a champion of orthodoxy, not reform. And the new team puts its emphasis, just as Harold Wilson did, on the prospect that research and technology will open the door to prosperity without the need for reform.

It sounds like rationalization for avoiding doing those things which the Russian people want, and need, or an improvement in their standard of living. It sounds and looks like the "establishment" forming a defensive square against the changes which Russia needs, but which can perhaps only come now at the price of an end to the dictatorship of Russia by its present ruling class.

The "old guard" never surrenders.

The Russian people are obviously going to have to live on under a conservative orthodoxy for yet a while.

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## Praise Is Lavished on Brezhnev by Delegates to Communist Party Congress

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, April 2 — Leonid

I. Brezhnev's pre-eminence in the Kremlin has been dramatically underscored in recent days by an apparent campaign at the 24th Congress of the Soviet Communist party to build up his image as the nation's leading public figure.

Not since the days of Nikita S. Khrushchev has a Soviet leader received the praise being lavished on Mr. Brezhnev by the majority of speakers. One Western diplomat said that he believed it came close to being "a cult of Brezhnev."

The laudatory remarks are not universal. Some top officials, such as Pyotr Y. Shelest, a Politburo member who heads the Ukrainian party organization, seem to mention Mr. Brezhnev's name only in passing. And Dinmukhamed A. Ku-

mayev, head of the Kazakhstan party organization, said that in recent years "the style of the Central Committee and of its Politburo has been characterized by collective leadership."

No Longer Just 'Comrade'

Most others have used the vocabulary that was virtually absent from the 23d Congress, in 1966, the first at which Mr. Brezhnev was head of the party after Mr. Khrushchev's ouster in 1964.

For the Soviet public, attuned to nuances in language used to describe a leader, the praise for Mr. Brezhnev undoubtedly indicated his continued elevation above his fellow Politburo members.

In 1966, when Mr. Brezhnev was mentioned, it was usually in rather modest terms as "Comrade Brezhnev." This year things are different.

Yegor P. Proskurin, a steel worker from Zaporozhe, said,

"It is hard to describe the profound emotion with which I and all the participants of the congress heard the wonderful report of General Secretary Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev."

Geidar A. Aliyev, First Secretary of the Azerbaijan party organization, who was appointed to his job in 1969, said that "in all the work carried on by the Central Committee of the party, an enormous role is played by the General Secretary, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, who by his tireless activity and continual work on the behalf of the people, has gained general love and respect."

'Dear Leonid Ilyich'

Grigory V. Romanov, head of the Leningrad regional organization since last year, said that he could always get help and advice "from the Central Committee, the Politburo and from

General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev personally."

A woman worker said that she had great admiration for "Dear Leonid Ilyich," and Rashid M. Rashidov, head of the Uzbekistan party organization, noted that Mr. Brezhnev had visited his area three times and was personally responsible for directing the rebuilding of Tashkent after the 1967 earthquake.

Since all the speeches are presumed to be screened by the Central Committee apparatus, which Mr. Brezhnev heads, the flowery references are not likely to be accidental.

Many Western diplomats believe that the praise represents a natural course of events, since Mr. Brezhnev has been the party leader for more than six years. They also think that a decision was made early last year to take steps to enhance

his reputation around the country and abroad. The effort, it is presumed, also reflects his growing power base in the party and in the Government machinery.

#### Signs He Was Outvoted

Mr. Brezhnev, in his report opening the congress Tuesday, was rather modest, stressing the need for party democracy and asserting that the ruling Politburo met every week to discuss

matters.

There are indirect signs that he has been outvoted by others in the 11-man Politburo and that a dispute over economic priorities may have been responsible for the decision last July to postpone the party congress from last year.

In his report Mr. Brezhnev seemed defensive about the decision, outlined in the new five-year plan, to increase the rate of growth of light industry

faster than that of heavy industry. Traditionally the Soviet Union has given preference to heavy industry.

It is presumed that the Soviet military men have argued for continued high defense spending to match American military outlays.

That view was stated indirectly by the Defense Minister, Marshal Andrei A. Grechko, in a speech to the congress today. He repeated his warning that

the United States and the Atlantic alliance were spending large amounts on the latest arms and were plotting aggressive actions against the Soviet Union.

He said that voices could still be heard in the United States calling for a policy of talking with the Soviet Union from "a position of strength." That, he indicated, makes it imperative for the Soviet Union to improve its defenses.

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# RUSSIA'S BOSS

WHEN the postponed Twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union opens in the modern glass and steel Palace of Congresses in the Kremlin on Tuesday, the seal will be formally set on the emergence of Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, Secretary-General of the Party, as the most powerful man in Russia and the recognised successor of Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev.

Brezhnev's rise has been less spectacular than that of his famous predecessors; he is a more cautious and less colourful man. He has built his power on the shrewd manipulation of Kremlin politics and the party machine, rather than on any spectacular achievements or original political ideas.

When he took over as First Secretary of the Communist Party after the sacking of Khrushchev, in October 1964, he was *primus inter pares* in a collective leadership that looked unlikely to hold together for long: few Kremlin watchers then expected Brezhnev himself to last for more than a couple of years at the top. In the event the leadership has proved remarkably stable and, although Brezhnev has neither the prestige nor probably the authority of Khrushchev at the height of his powers, he has not only survived in office during the past six and a half years, but has clearly emerged as the leading man and Russia's chief spokesman in world affairs.

## His doctrine

As such he must take chief responsibility at home for the success or failure of Soviet industry and agriculture, for the outcome of the struggle over the rehabilitation of Stalin, and for the treatment of Soviet intellectuals. Abroad he must take the blame or credit for the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the interventionist doctrine, which in the West has been labelled with his name; for Russia's role in the Middle East war and the subsequent re-establishment of the Soviet position in Egypt; for the emergence of the Soviet Union as a major naval power with its eye on the Indian Ocean; for the SALT talks on nuclear rockets with the United States, the continued dispute with China and, most recently, the new treaty of friendship with West Germany.

Brezhnev is 65. He was born and educated in Dnepropetrovsk in the Ukraine. He was thus a child at the time of the Revolution and was only 18 when Lenin died. After working for a time in agriculture he went back to his home town to graduate as an engineer from the Institute of Metallurgy. It was not until 1931 that he joined the party and began slowly to work his way up inside the provincial apparatus, becoming secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk district party committee in 1939. During the Second World War he served as a colonel, doing political work first in the Caucasus with the

Eighteenth Airborne Army, and then in the Ukraine. It was there on his home ground after the war that he embarked seriously on his rise through the ranks of the party professionals under the wing of Khrushchev, then the boss of the Ukraine.

His big step up came in October 1952 when, on the eve of Stalin's death, he became a candidate member of the suddenly enlarged Party Presidium, which replaced the smaller Politburo, though he lost this rank when the Presidium was reduced by Stalin's heirs. Then, in 1954, Khrushchev put him in a position of great responsibility and trust: he made him his man-on-the-spot charged to carry out the highly controversial Virgin Lands Campaign in Kazakhstan. He became a full member of the Presidium after Khrushchev had shattered the opposition, the so-called anti-Party group (Malenkov, Molotov, etc.), in 1957.

In this and other struggles surrounding Khrushchev, Brezhnev was found to be taking a characteristically non-committal position, a centrist attitude of balance or compromise, though usually right of centre. He was shrewdly manoeuvring for the second place to Khrushchev against powerful rivals, and he had achieved this, after a number of ups and downs, by the eve of Khrushchev's fall.

The post-Khrushchev collective leadership, which has changed very little since 1964, was a bridge between the old Brezhnev's generation, or still last Party Congress five years ago, and the younger generation, now headed by

ot State, is a year or two older with the same sort of career background, but is known to be capable of thinking on experimental lines. Kosygin, the Prime Minister and head of Government, is two years older and has concentrated all his life on industry, economics and management. The younger men, in their early fifties, e.g. Sholepin and Polyansky, are even further removed than Brezhnev himself from the original impetus of the revolution. They are career politicians in the Soviet manner.

Although there have been some faint signs of an emerging 'cult of personality' concerning Brezhnev during recent months, he is still not a vivid public figure and little is known of his private life. He is married with a son and a daughter, but his wife is rarely seen in public. Those who have had professional dealings with him, such as ambassadors, say that he gives an impression of authority and confidence and of having carefully studied his brief. He smokes incessantly, is good humoured and tries to put visitors at their ease. He does not live in the Kremlin, but in a flat outside its walls.

Brezhnev is obviously a man of great staying power and toughness, but the stability of his own position is now tied up with the stability of almost the whole top leadership. Since Khrushchev there have been only three retirements from the Politburo and none from the Party Central Committee at all since the last Party Congress five years ago.

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Such stability suggests two things. First, in spite of acute disagreements, an absence of irreconcilable differences of opinion at the top. Second, that the balance of forces at the top is so fine that no one leader can be removed or become too dominant without starting an avalanche.

Brezhnev has both contributed to and benefited from this general stability. His name has been generally associated with traditional party orthodoxy, but he has proved time and again by his actions that he is a centrist—which in the present Soviet political conditions means something right of centre.

Until about the end of 1969 he steadily let the 'neo-Stalinist' backlash against Khrushchev's pell-mell liberalisation prevail. De-Stalinisation was halted. This period included the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial and the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Encouraged by this, the conservatives became even bolder and launched a campaign to rehabilitate Stalin fully. Their efforts rose to a climax with the ninetieth anniversary of Stalin's birth, which fell in December 1969.

But this marked something of a turning-point. On the anniversary day *Pravda* contented itself with a rather brief article repeating the criticisms of Stalin's cult of personality which had been formalised by the twentieth Party Congress in 1956. There

were rumours at the time that a longer and complimentary article on Stalin was scratched at the last moment. In any case, the bust of Stalin was not erected on his grave at the time and was quietly installed only much later, in the following summer.

## Under fire

The whole episode coincided with a period when first serious signs of trouble for Brezhnev surfaced. On 15 December 1969 he made a long and highly depressing report at a Central Committee plenum on the economic state of the country. It looked almost like a confession of personal failure but in fact Brezhnev was making sure that the whole party and the Government should be held responsible for the failures. In the following February Gennadi Voronov, a senior member of the Politburo and Premier of the Russian Federation, made a scathing attack on shortcomings in the agricultural field. Since Brezhnev has made agricultural policy his speciality, this looked like an indirect attack on him.

Four months later, at an election meeting in Moscow, Brezhnev delivered a considered statement of the line he was determined to follow. In it he outlined the future outlook on economic matters, committing himself to three major proposi-

tions: an increase of agricultural investment under the new plan; the continuing priority of heavy industry; the convening of a party congress, the twenty-fourth, in 1970.

Very soon, however, it was clear that he was under heavy fire. At two hurriedly assembled plenums of the Central Committee his agricultural investment policy was criticised and it was decided to postpone the party congress to March 1971. This was undoubtedly a defeat for the neo-Stalinists. In retrospect, the period between the July plenum and the publication of the directives for the new Five-Year Plan in mid-February 1971 may be seen as the time when Brezhnev showed his special gift for compromise. On the most hard-core question of all, the issue of priorities for heavy industries, he yielded. For the first time consumer goods were given priority over heavy industry. Even though the margin of priority was very small (a 44-48 per cent share of production for the consumer industries as against 41-45 per cent for heavy industry), it was a revolutionary departure from established orthodoxy. At the same time it was decided to increase the allocation of resources for investment in agriculture.

This compromise has important implications for Brezhnev. It ensured his political survival. At the same time, it showed him

freeing himself from the grip of the orthodox lobby to which above all he owed his position. It could only mean a marked accretion of strength to the more flexible, liberal elements in the party at the expense of the neo-Stalinists and the Army. The events in Poland in December 1970 almost certainly played a part in this Soviet political drama behind the scenes.

If any political style has emerged under Brezhnev it is one of a painfully achieved consensus within the party and higher Government ranks, based on bargaining behind the scenes. The increased limelight focused upon him by the Soviet publicity media does not mean a step towards personal ascendancy à la Stalin or even Khrushchev. With all his strength, Brezhnev is still dependent for survival upon the balance of forces and the maintenance of collective leadership. He cannot be called a neo-Stalinist. Rather he is innately conservative, in the classical sense of the term; one who is disposed to maintain and preserve the existing order of things—whether at home or in the world at large. Whether his conservatism derives from a fear of change or a strong belief in the rightness of existing order is perhaps of less relevance.

Dev Murarka

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THE SUNDAY STAR  
11 April 1971

## INTERPRETIVE REPORT

# New Politburo: Stagnation or Stalling

By HENRY S. BRADSHAW  
LEAF BLANK WHITE

HONG KONG—In the Kremlin world of rewritten history and un-persons, it was a curious episode.

The most powerful man in the Soviet Union, Leonid I. Brezhnev, announced the names of the men who would sit with him on the Communist party Politburo, which runs the country.

He listed them in the order of their importance as he rated them: Himself first as party general secretary, Premier Alexei N. Kosygin, President Nikolai V. Podgorniy, and eight others.

But the next morning, when the 23rd Soviet Communist Party Congress had ended, *Pravda* listed all 11 Politburo members in alphabetical order. There was no public record of Brezhnev's hierarchical ranking.

### Repeat Performance

On Friday, exactly five years after that issue of *Pravda*, the 24th Congress closed with Brezhnev again announcing new Politburo members.

The self-perpetuating leadership of the party, which told the 4,949 delegates in the at-

tributed in the Kremlin what had been decided for them, kept those 11 Politburo names, and added four.

Perhaps the most important news from Moscow this week-end is that there is no news.

Instead of surprises, the congress produced more signs of the stagnation that long has afflicted the aging, unimaginative leadership of the Soviet Union.

But Brezhnev, who managed to wring increased personal adulation out of the congress, did do a little juggling. Then the curious episode of 1966 was repeated, making the whole thing even

## Tactic?

more curious.

Again, Brezhnev listed the new Politburo—when the delegates supposedly had elected, but in fact had been foisted on them—in his own hierarchical ranking.

### Quick Pencil Needed

Yet several hours later, the official news agency Tass distributed what it said was a text of Brezhnev's speech—with the list rearranged into alphabetical order. Only radio

quick pencils or good memories could know that something had changed.

For Brezhnev's new pecking order was different from his 1966 one.

The most significant change was a reversal of the positions of Kosygin, who slipped to No. 3, and Podgorny, now No. 2. The party's Politburo makes decision for and issues orders to the Soviet government which it runs.

The initial reaction of many Moscow observers was that Podgorny was up, at the expense of Kosygin.

But it is possible that the determinant factor was Kosygin's decline, to Podgorny's benefit.

For the past year there have been numerous signs of Kosygin's declining importance in the face of a grab for new prestige by Brezhnev.

#### Retirement Planned?

There was reason to think — although it was never clear — that Kosygin planned to retire last summer, but he stayed on after a leadership crisis that temporarily checked Brezhnev's growing personality cult. Now Kosygin, a weary and apparently disheartened 67-years old this year, may soon be dropping out.

Podgorny is 68, hardly a good age to try to be moving up on the 64-year-old Brezhnev. He has already lost once to him.

When Nikita S. Khrushchev was party boss and premier, Frol R. Kozlov was for a time the No. 2 man. Kozlov got there by pushing Brezhnev out of the party Secretariat in 1960 and into the weaker job of Soviet president.

But Kozlov fell out with Khrushchev and suffered a stroke. In 1963, Khrushchev brought Brezhnev and Podgorny into the Secretariat as rivals for the No. 2 spot.

Brezhnev, who then dropped the presidency, won and took over the party leadership on Khrushchev's ouster in 1964.

#### Follows Pattern

Brezhnev then ousted Podgorny from the Secretariat, giving him the presidency in 1965 — as Kozlov had done to him.

Podgorny's move up to No. 2 now raises the possibility that he is coming back to rival Brezhnev. Without a Secretariat job to go with his Politburo position, however, he cannot be a strong rival.

What seems more likely is that Podgorny is a focal point of party forces that do not want Brezhnev to become too

personally powerful. There are many such forces.

Brezhnev's listing dropped two actual or potential opponents, Gennady I. Voronov and Alexander N. Shelepin, from the middle of his 1960 ranking to Nos. 10 and 11.

The rearranged list put the five youngest of the original 11 politburo members at the bottom, emphasizing that the top six average almost 68 years old. The next five average almost 58.

The best bet at the moment to succeed Kosygin as premier, although any outsider's bet is risky, is Kiril T. Mazurov, 57, who moved up on Brezhnev's list from No. 8 to No. 7.

#### Three Tied to Brezhnev

Three of the four new Politburo members are men whose careers have been tied to Brezhnev. The fourth, listed No. 12, is Moscow party boss Victor V. Grishin, a relatively independent figure.

It is not unusual for the Politburo to grow as large as 15 members. It did so briefly in 1957 and again in 1966, under Khrushchev (when it was called the Presidium). But the key point then was "briefly."

Khrushchev then began cutting out people he did not like. The natural suspicion now is

that Brezhnev will seek to do the same.

In fact, the logical implication of Friday's announcement is that Brezhnev—for all his apparent power and personal prominence—was not strong enough to banish his opponents or detractors from the Politburo. So he packed in some more supporters as a temporary tactic.

Student of Soviet affairs, in Moscow and elsewhere, used to say a year or two ago that the 24th party congress would clarify some of the obvious leadership conflicts in the Kremlin. Changes were expected, in open conflict or quiet knifing.

They have not come. Yet.

The natural reaction on a wrong prediction or interpretation of this sort is to insist that it will yet come — that more than old age will force leadership changes.

The results of the 24th party congress can be interpreted as meaning there is more stability — or more stagnation — in the Kremlin than had appeared to be the case.

But they can also be viewed as simply a delay, probably not for the full five-year term of the new Politburo, in a still-inevitable shakeup.

CPYRGHT

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CPYRGHT

## Sketches of Four New Politburo Members

Fyodor D. Kulakov

Agricultural specialist of the Soviet leadership, was brought into the ruling elite upon the ouster of Nikita S. Khrushchev in 1964 . . . promotion directly to full Politburo member without going through intermediate rank of candidate-member is viewed as sign of priority now being given to improvement of agriculture, historically the weakest link of Soviet economy . . . born in 1918 into Russian peasant family in sugar-beet producing region of Central Russia . . . worked in sugar refinery before World War II

through ranks of agricultural officialdom in Central Russian farming province of Penza . . . Governor of province from 1930 to 1955 . . . while Deputy Agriculture Minister of the Russian Republic, he was graduated, in 1957, from agricultural correspondence college . . . in 1960 he was appointed party chief of Stavropol Province, a key farming region of northern Caucasus . . . upon ouster of Mr. Khrushchev, was moved to Central Committee apparatus as head of Agricultural Department and raised to national party secretary for agriculture in 1965.

Dinnukhamed A. Kunayev  
First representative of

Moslem Central Asia among full Politburo members since an Uzbek served on Mr. Khrushchev's Politburo (then called Presidium) from 1957 to 1961 . . . son of an office worker . . . 59 years old . . . trained as a mining engineer, he worked before World War II in big copper-mining complex of Balkhash and in lead-zinc center of Leninogorsk, both in mineral-rich Kazakhstan . . . moved into republic leadership in 1942 as a deputy premier in charge of mining industry, serving for a decade . . . interest in metals research led to his appointment as president of Kazakhstan Academy of Sciences . . . resumed rise in political hierarchy in 1955 when he was made chairman

of Kazakhstan while Leonid I. Brezhnev was republic's party chief . . . was himself appointed head of Kazakhstan party in 1960, but lost post two years later when Mr. Khrushchev sought scapegoat for poor performance of virgin lands program . . . after two years as Premier was returned to head of Republic's party upon removal of Mr. Khrushchev from leadership of Soviet Union . . . candidate member of Politburo since 1966 . . . visited United States in 1960 as part of delegation of regional government leaders.

### Viktor V. Grishin

Former head of Soviet Union's trade unions, was raised to prestigious post of Moscow city party leader in 1967 . . . served 10 years as candidate member of Politburo before present promotion to full member . . . a well-groomed man, he began his career as a land surveyor in 1932 at age of 18 . . . five years later he followed in his father's footsteps as a railroad engineer, in locomotive roundhouse at Seppukhove, south of Moscow . . . rising in the local party hierarchy, he was

picked to head the party's machinery industry department of Moscow Province in 1950 . . . two years later he was appointed second secretary of Moscow Province under Mr. Khrushchov, then first secretary . . . as chairman of trade unions from 1958 to 1967, he traveled widely abroad to international congresses, visiting Finland and Italy . . . he was appointed Moscow city party leader by Mr. Brezhnev, succeeding Nikolai G. Yegorychev, who was dismissed over differences with the leadership on Middle East policy.

### Vladimir V. Shcherbitsky

Premier of the Ukraine, which thus becomes the only republic outside the Russian Republic to have two top officials in full membership of the Politburo . . . 53 years old . . . a World War II veteran, he served in Red Army for five years after having been graduated from chemical engineering college in 1941 . . . after war he went to work in coke-chemical plant at Dneprodzerzhinsk, industrial city in Ukraine's Dnepropetrovsk Province . . . province was then headed by Mr. Brezhnev as party leader, and Mr. Shcherbitsky's career is believed to have been in-

fluenced by this early association with Mr. Brezhnev . . . under Brezhnev's aegis, Mr. Shcherbitsky became second secretary of Dneprodzerzhinsk city party in 1948 . . . over following decade he rose through provincial party hierarchy to become province's first secretary from 1955 to 1957 . . . under Mr. Khrushchev's national leadership, he was made a party secretary of the Ukraine, then headed by Nikolai V. Podgorny as first secretary . . . became Premier of the Ukraine in 1961 and has held post since then except during period of differences with Mr. Khrushchev, who sent him back to Dnepropetrovsk Province from 1963-64.

## The Politburo Membership at the 23rd and 24th CPSU Congresses

### 1966

Brezhnev  
Kosygin  
Podgorny  
Suslov  
Voronov  
Kirilenko  
Shelepin  
Mazurov  
Polyansky  
Shelest  
Pelshe

### 1971

Brezhnev  
Podgorny  
Kosygin  
Suslov  
Kirilenko  
Pelshe  
Mazurov  
Polyansky  
Shelest  
Voronov  
Shelepin  
Grishin  
Kunayev  
Shcherbitsky  
Kulakov

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THE GUARDIAN  
6 April 1971

CPYRGHT

# Signs of instability in the Kremlin

By VICTOR ZORZA

There was what could have sounded, to the uninstructed listener, as a moment of high drama during the voting at the party congress in Moscow yesterday. Who, the chairman asked, was against the resolution approving Mr Brezhnev's report?

The proceedings were being broadcast live by Moscow Radio. For a split second, Mr Brezhnev's fate seemed to hang in the balance. But not one of the 5,000 delegates raised his hand. The chairman answered his own question. Nobody was against, he said. Nor were there any abstentions. He had already asked them if they were in favour, and they had all dutifully raised their hands. The resolution approving the Central Committee's report, he announced, had been carried unanimously. Anybody who wanted to vote against could have done so — if he had dared.

But the unanimous vote at Soviet party congresses has never provided a true reflection of the leadership infighting which usually goes on behind the scenes. At the twentieth party congress, many delegates, both among the leaders and among the rank and file, were bitterly opposed to Mr Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin — but no one voted against it.

At the last congress that preceded Mr Khrushchev's fall, his policies were bitterly resented by party officials who were later to be so delighted by his departure from office — but, at the congress, they had dutifully and unanimously voted in approval of his policies. The clues to what is happening at the twenty-fourth congress are to be found not in the formal vote but between the lines of the speeches.

Signs of the differences between Mr Brezhnev and the conservative wing of the party, which became apparent in the speeches made by various regional party leaders before the Congress, appear to have been borne out by the proceedings in Moscow. The Ukrainian party spokesman, who has become one of the chief spokesmen of the anti-Brezhnev faction, showed in his pre-

Congress speech an aggressively defensive attitude on foreign affairs which was in marked contrast to the moderate view of the world scene which Mr Brezhnev has taken at the Congress. There were similar differences of emphasis on home affairs too.

In his speech at the congress, however, Mr Shelest made no mention of foreign affairs — which could be interpreted to mean that he did not wish to make his disapproval of the Brezhnev line too obvious and that he therefore preferred to remain silent on the subject — although, as the leader of the largest party organisation in the Soviet Union, he might have been expected at least to mention foreign affairs.

In his pre-congress speech, Mr Shelest had shown his disapproval of Mr Brezhnev by mentioning his name only once, and perfunctorily at that. The pro-Brezhnev regional leaders had, in their pre-congress speeches, referred to Mr Brezhnev frequently and often fulsomely. At the congress Mr Shelest had to toe the line by referring to Mr Brezhnev several times. But again, these references to Brezhnev were cool by comparison with the tributes paid to the General Secretary by other speakers.

Mr Brezhnev's speeches of recent years, said the Moscow party secretary, Mr Grishin, were "a great contribution to the Marxist-Leninist teaching." It was necessary, said the Kazakhstan party secretary, to stress particularly Brezhnev's ability to unite the leadership "collective" and to direct the efforts of the whole Central Committee to ensure that the party worked successfully.

The leaders of the Leningrad and Belorussian party organisations added tributes to what the Politburo and Comrade Brezhnev "personally" had done to bring about the country's successes. These were the first speakers to address the congress after Mr Brezhnev had spoken, and between them they represented

the biggest party organisation. Yet only Mr Shelest refrained from joining the chorus. His restraint is a crude yardstick but it is the best we have — and it is consistent with his known conservative attitude.

It is unlikely that Mr Shelest, a member of the Politburo, would go out on a limb in this way if he did not have some powerful support in the party leadership. It might well be that at least some of the other Politburo members, who have not spoken at the Congress, share his views.

Mr Brezhnev, in winding up the "debate" yesterday, said that the proceedings showed that the party was "more united than ever." He made the same claim in his winding up speech at the last congress. But two of the principal speakers at that congress, the party secretaries for Moscow and Leningrad, who had indicated at the time that they distrusted Mr Brezhnev's leadership, are no longer in their posts.

The Moscow party secretary, Mr Yegorychev, was dismissed at the time of the Middle East crisis of 1967, amid indications that he had been a member of a leadership faction which wanted the Kremlin to take a tougher, possibly warlike, attitude to Israel and the United States. The Leningrad party secretary, Mr Tolstikov, well known for his conservative inclinations, was shunted off to Peking as Ambassador during the pre-congress manoeuvrings.

Mr Brezhnev's attempt to keep the balance between the conservatives and the reformers may have been successful so far, but the praise for his leadership at the congress is not necessarily an indication of his strength. Sudden bursts of such praise in previous leadership struggles were an indication of instability in the Kremlin. In the case of Mr Khrushchev, they were an attempt to build up his position in response to a challenge to his leadership. It looks as if the praise of Brezhnev from some — and the lack of such praise from others — carries the same

Today, the Congress is to hear a speech by Mr Kosygin on the Five-Year Plan.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

3 April 1971

# Brezhnev plays up role of party

Moscow

By Charlotte Salkowski  
Staff correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

The party's watchdog role in Soviet life, especially the economy, appears to be stiffening.

An important theme of General Secretary Leonid T. Brezhnev's marathon report to the 24th congress this week is that party control at various levels should be reinforced.

An accompanying motif is that the quality of party ranks must be improved. The loafers, the braggarts, the hangers-on should be weeded out.

Mr. Brezhnev indicated that the congress will be asked to revise present rules governing the party's right of control over administrative work. Party organs at factories and farms already have this right, but, he said, it should extend to party organizations in research, educational, cultural, and medical institutions.

Further, Mr. Brezhnev said, party bodies should supervise the administrative activity of central and local Soviet and economic institutions, including the ministries.

## Prerogatives guarded

It is not unusual, of course, that the role of the party should be stressed at a party congress. Moreover, the party already is the dominant influence in every sphere of Soviet life.

But Mr. Brezhnev's report indicates that there is to be no move toward a greater separation of party and state or toward less party interference in economic management. The leadership is not about to abdicate any prerogatives and indeed is jealously guarding them.

The report also points to concern about the growing independence and outspokenness of Soviet scholars and scientists, as reflected in the activities of physicist Andrei D. Sakharov. Hence the desire to tighten party supervision of research institutes and the intellectual community.

## Pruning of roster broached

With a view to making the party a more disciplined and effective vehicle of leadership, efforts also are under way to curb its growth and remove undesirable members.

In this connection, Mr. Brezhnev suggested that Communists be issued new membership cards. This has not been done for 17 years, he said, and the period for which they were intended has expired.

Although he did not elaborate, such a move presumably would be aimed at dropping party members who are not pulling their weight or who, as Mr. Brezhnev himself complained, rush around busily only for effect. The party secretary said such an exchange of cards should not be carried out "formally," indicating the party would take a good hard look at each Communist's record.

Already more stringent criteria are being applied to would-be joiners. Mr. Brezhnev said the number of persons admitted to the party has declined somewhat. Whereas between the 22nd and 23rd congresses an average 760,000 persons were admitted annually as candidate members of the party, this figure fell to 600,000 annually in the period since the 23rd congress.

The Soviet leader reported that the party now numbers about 14.4 million members, of which roughly 13.8 million are full members. This compares with a total party membership of about 12.4 million in 1966.

Another interesting note in Mr. Brezhnev's report on party affairs was his disclosure that the ruling Politburo meets "regularly" once a week and that the Secretariat also convenes weekly. His reason for saying this presumably was to demonstrate the "democratic" nature of party life.

Political observers note that at the last congress, in 1966, which followed the Khrushchev era, it was suggested that party life should be democratized. The leadership thus may have felt on the defensive in this matter.

## Balance toward Stalin

On the ideological front, Mr. Brezhnev laid down hard-line injunctions to party workers just as he had to writers, artists, and the broad cultural intelligentsia. But he held to an ostensibly balanced line on Stalin. Without mentioning the dictator's name, he intimated the party would tolerate neither those people who belittle the achievements of the Stalin years nor the dogmatists who would like to resurrect the reactionism of that period.

Elimination of the consequences of the "cult of personality" (Stalin) as well as of "subjectivist mistakes" (Khrushchev), said Mr. Brezhnev, has had a favorable effect on the nation's political life. "We were and remain faithful to the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and never will retreat on ideological questions," he told the gathering, to stirring applause.

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NEW YORK TIMES  
12 April 1971

# Heavy Industry Still Favored in the Soviet Economy

## Consumer Products Believed Relegated to Lesser Level

By HARRY SCHWARTZ

There is more rhetoric than reality to the much advertised pro-consumer bias of the Ninth Soviet Five-Year Plan for 1971-1975. Western analysts believe. Heavy industry is still No. 1 in the Soviet economy.

Most significant, these observers suggest, is the fact that Soviet 1975 goals for such key commodities as steel and oil exceed the highest United States production to date. Continued slackness in the American economy in the early nineteen-seventies might combine with rapid, planned Soviet production growth to narrow substantially the traditional United States economic lead.

Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin indicated in his speech last Tuesday that Soviet economic plans envisage no slighting of his country's military prowess. Examination of the new five-year plan confirms this view and indicates that the Soviet Union will have abundant resources with which to continue the buildup of rocket, warplane, naval, radar and other modern weapons strength, whose past growth has so radically changed the world balance of power.

Western attention to the pro-consumer emphasis claimed for the new plan was heightened by the emphasis the Communist party's General Secretary, Leonid I. Brezhnev, gave to this area in his major speech opening this month's 24th Soviet

Communist party Congress.

Mr. Brezhnev himself announced such goodies as a raise in the minimum wage to 70 rubles (about \$77) a month, the beginning of a Soviet poverty program geared to help families with less than 50 rubles (about \$55) a month income per family member, and an ambitious program Mr. Brezhnev said would seek to "satisfy" the Soviet market for television sets, refrigerators and similar household durable goods.

He criticized Soviet officials who regard consumer goods shortages and shoddy products as inevitable under Soviet rule and said such an attitude "is not acceptable under current conditions." Mr. Brezhnev declared that an end has come to the era when Soviet citizens "consciously accepted extreme privations, when they were prepared to be contented with bare necessities, when they did not consider it their right to demand various luxuries."

Western analysts don't deny that the new five-year plan's goals are somewhat more considerate of consumers than earlier. But they point out that heavy industry is still slated to receive the largest single allotment of capital investment. Moreover, all Soviet light industry is scheduled to receive only 8.7 billion rubles out of the almost 500 billion rubles Moscow plans to invest during 1971-75. And all food-processing industries together have been assigned only 14 billion rubles investment.

What impresses many Western observers is the ambitious nature of many of the heavy industry goals that have been softpedaled in the discussion of the new plan.

A decade ago, when he was in power, Nikita S. Khrushchev derided Soviet "steel eaters," i.e. high officials, who insisted on pushing steel production to maximum levels at any cost. But now there has been almost no special discussion of the fact that the Soviet plan envisages raising steel output from last year's 116 million metric tons to 142 million to 150 million tons by 1975.

Even the lower limit of the 1975 Soviet goal is higher than the amount of steel the United States has ever produced in a year, and very much higher than the less than 120 million metric tons of steel the United States turned out in 1970.

Similarly, the 1975 oil production goal of 480 million to 500 million metric tons represents almost a 50 per cent jump over the 1970 level and exceeds substantially the highest production the United States has ever achieved in any year.

Impressive, too, is the projected leap in Soviet electricity output from 740 billion kilowatt-hours last year to 1,030 billion to 1,070 billion kwh. in 1975.

In this case the 1975 Soviet goal is still well below recent American output, but the future electric power outlook for the United States is clouded. This is because construction of new power plants in this country is becoming extremely difficult in the face of persistent objections raised on ecological grounds. No similar concern about safeguarding the environment is evident in the Soviet Union. There is no organized group of Soviet conservationists acting as a force influencing power-plant and other construction.

Western observers note, moreover, that a far larger

proportion of Soviet steel, oil, electricity and other resources is used for heavy industrial production than is true in this country. There is no Soviet analogue, for example, to the large amount of steel used in automobile construction here and the enormous amount of petroleum used to power and lubricate the roughly 100 million motor vehicles in the United States.

By 1975, for example, the Soviet Union is scheduled to produce much more steel than the United States ever has in any one year. But Soviet automobile production—for a nation that will then have about 260 million people—is scheduled to be only near the one-million mark. The United States, with a population of about 205 million, produces about eight million automobiles a year.

Soviet economic plans, of course, are not necessarily realized and actual Soviet output in 1975 may or may not reach the desired levels. Soviet leaders these last two weeks have pointed out that there will be difficulties in the present five-year plan period because of the slow growth of the labor supply and because of the need to achieve greatly increased productivity.

Nevertheless, all past experience indicates that a considerable fraction—if not all—of the desired output increases should be attained by the Soviet economy by 1975. If so, the low living standards of the Soviet people should be improved although they will still be below most East and West European levels. But Soviet heavy industry and military capabilities in 1975 are likely to be even more serious competitors of the United States than at any time in the past.

NEW YORK TIMES  
4 April 1971

## Soviet Union: The Party Line Is: More Goodies for Consumers

MOSCOW—The time has now come, Leonid I. Brezhnev told the world last week, for the Soviet Union to meet the needs not only of its marshals but also of its mothers, to produce not only enough nuclear missiles but also enough beefsteaks, midskirts and automobiles to put an end to shortages and shoddy goods.

The average Russian, watching Mr. Brezhnev's nationally televised six-hour speech at the opening session of the 24th Soviet party Congress, could be excused for being skeptical about the General Secretary's words. He has heard them before. It has become an accepted convention at party Congresses for Soviet leaders to decry the failures of the past and to promise a brighter future for all.

### Man for All Seasons

In his address, Mr. Brezhnev, like Nikita S. Khrushchev before him, was a man for all seasons. He was more revolutionary than Chairman Mao Tse-tung, more peaceful-coexistence-minded than President Tito. He spoke of the New Soviet Man while calling for crackdowns on drunks and swindlers. He talked of modernizing the administration of the country and doing away with things that waste time, and then opened a 10-day Congress that not only bores people to tears but also wastes untold millions of rubles worth of television and newspaper space.

Skepticism aside, Mr. Brezhnev did succeed in leaving an impression—if only among foreigners—that this time things might actually

though heavy industry still accounts for nearly 75 per cent of Soviet production, there is room now for some optimism by the consumer.

Raising the standard of living, Mr. Brezhnev said, "is the supreme aim of the party's economic policy." If in the past "our possibilities were limited," he added, things have now improved, and the party can "raise the question of improving the life of the people."

### Need for a Change

There is undisputed need here for a change for the better. The Soviet people have suffered for so long from long lines, shortages of commodities and poor-quality merchandise that many have become cynical about the system and do as little work as possible. They recognize that there is not much to do with their money beyond specific spending for basic necessities, and this, in turn, has created a severe morale problem that the leadership now seems determined to correct.

Up to now, the Soviet Union has been limited by its inability to provide both "guns and butter." The simple answer is that it has endeavored to maintain nuclear parity with—or even superiority over—the United States, although its Gross National Product is thought to be only about half of the American trillion-dollar one. But there are also ideological and psychological aspects involved. Some officials in the leadership, despite their belief that they are working for the people, have done little of any real value for them. Mr. Brezhnev was quite eloquent on that point:

"We have many years of heroic history behind us, comrades, when millions of Communists and nonparty people consciously accepted privations and hardships, were content with the bare essentials and denied themselves the right to demand any special amenities."

### Reflects on Attitude

"This could not but reflect on their attitude toward the production of consumer goods, toward their quality and range. But that which was explicable and natural in the past, when other

tasks, other undertakings, stood in the forefront, is unacceptable in the present conditions.

"And if some comrades tend to overlook this, the party is entitled to regard their attitude as stemming from either a failure to understand the substance of its policy, oriented to a steady rise of the living standard, or as an attempt to vindicate their own inactivity."

Implicit in what Mr. Brezhnev said about consumer goods was an assumption that the world situation would not call for a dramatic shift in Soviet allocations to the military sector, which already receives substantial sums.

Mr. Brezhnev's remarks on foreign policy seemed to reflect a desire for eased tensions in the world, even if he had nothing new to say on how to achieve this. Regarding the world's two main trouble spots—the Middle East and South-east Asia—he merely reiterated well-known Soviet positions.

### Prestige Increases

As the Congress enters its final week, there is a perceptible increase in Mr. Brezhnev's personal prestige, enhanced by his role as party General Secretary at a party Congress and by the lavish praise heaped on him by seven out of 10 of the speakers. It was the kind of praise given Mr. Khrushchev, although Mr. Brezhnev is thought to command less personal power than his predecessor.

The rest of the 11-man Politburo was present for the Congress, and there were no advance signs of any imminent changes, even though some of its members are more than eligible for retirement. The Kremlin seems desirous of maintaining a sense of continuity about its policies and, therefore, is reluctant to change faces or programs, although the emphasis on consumer goods seemed at least a tonal difference.

The 23d party Congress in 1966 was marked by a flurry of excitement over Communist China, which had publicized its decision to reject an invitation to attend. China was again absent last week, and the rhetoric surrounding China is now a well-worn record. The Rumanians and the North Vietnamese remained neutral, while the Russians and their closer Communist friends attacked the Mao regime.

WASHINGTON POST  
 7 April 1971

# Soviets' Economic Plan Rejects Decentralization

By Anthony Astrachan  
 Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, April 6—Soviet

Premier Kosygin announced a new five-year plan today that rejected decentralization but emphasized improved standards of living.

In a four-hour address to the 24th Soviet Communist Party Congress, Kosygin gave supremacy to central planning.

He said that production incentives should be tied to overfulfillment of plan targets and not—as they might be in a decentralized economy—to factory efficiency or market response.

The economic reform begun by the Soviet Union in 1965, gradually abandoned and formally dropped today, envisaged enterprises as being able to shape material incentives themselves out of their own profits and efficiency.

Tass excerpts from his speech to the closed session gave expected emphasis to Soviet intentions to improve living standards and increase production of consumer goods.

There is no doubt that the new plan tells the Soviet defense forces and the "metal eaters" of heavy industry that their growth must be controlled (though not stopped) to allow for consumer needs. Moscow observers still thought these points even more significant for the health of the Soviet economy:

- Basic decisions on crucial questions of resource allocation remain unmade. Neither the draft directives, nor Communist Party leader Brezhnev a week ago nor Kosygin today revealed investment plans for heavy industry or housing, for instance. Previous draft directives included them. Kosygin said the new plan would be completed no later than Aug.

- The scientific and technological revolution has replaced reform as the rhetorical panacea for the many ailments of the Soviet economy.

- Agriculture has become a higher priority investment area than ever before even though it produces the lowest return on the investment ruble of any sector of the Soviet economy.

- There is still little reason to expect that the Soviets will meet plan goals for investment or output more fully in the new period than in the past one.

- Brezhnev has replaced Kosygin as the dominant economic policy maker. This was generally known from Brezhnev's primary role in the December, 1969, and July, 1970, plenums of the central committee on economic discipline and agriculture. It was demonstrated more clearly than ever at the congress: Brezhnev gave significant policy leads on innovation and the scientific revolution while Tass quoted less on these subjects from Kosygin, although outsiders had thought them Kosygin's specialties.

## Living Standard

Much of Kosygin's report on improved living standards, social welfare and consumer goods merely repeated the contents of the draft directives.

"Never before," he said, "have such vast monetary and material resources been allocated for the development of agriculture and branches connected with the manufacture of goods for the population as in the current five-year period."

There was one new pledge in Kosygin's description of the rise in living standards: the Soviet Union will have universal secondary education by 1975. The old target date was

1970, but Brezhnev said last week that only 80 per cent of pupils finishing the 8th grade now go on to receive secondary education (generally ending at the 10th grade). The Soviet press has said that eight-year education is far from universal, especially in rural areas.

Aggregate real incomes will go up 72 billion rubles in the new five year plan, 30 per cent above the 1970 level. The minimum wage will go up to 70 rubles (\$77 at the official rate) a month.

Kosygin cited a vast array of statistics to bolster the claim to rising living standards. He pledged that by 1975, fabric output would increase by 19-24 per cent; that meat, fish, egg and vegetable sales would rise 40-60 per cent; that the number of refrigerators per 100 families would double from 32 to 64.

He also said "the stability of retail prices will be strictly maintained" and that some prices might even go down while the flood of consumer goods rises.

On the economic reform, Kosygin seemed torn between reluctance to acknowledge the death of a policy with which he had been identified and his duty to the central committee's new economic policies.

Officially, the reform still exists, like many other outgrown Soviet policies, and Kosygin paid more lip service than Brezhnev to its continuation.

## Public Recognition

"We see the initiative of enterprises increasing in the new conditions," he said. "The economic reform is not a single act. It is a process of improving economic management, designed to secure maximum use of all the advantages of the socialist mode of

production."

But he had to make public recognition of the death of reform:

"Centralized planning is the main and determinative area. Commodity-money relations can and must be applied to strengthen planned guidance of the national economy and impel the initiative of enterprises . . . operating on a profit-and-loss basis . . . We reject all the erroneous conceptions that substitute market regulation for the guiding role of state centralized planning."

The scientific and technological revolution is presumably expected to do all the things for the Soviet economy that the reform failed (or was not allowed) to do.

In this effort, the Soviet Union will establish "large production amalgamations" that would put research, development and production under one management. This is intended to overcome the traditional reluctance of Soviet managers to stop production long enough to put a more efficient technique to work or to improve product quality.

Brezhnev gave considerable emphasis and authority to this idea. His remarks on the merging of research institutions with production enterprises resumably ended a long Soviet theoretical controversy over whether big amalgamations were a good thing.

Brezhnev also told Soviet planners to move away from their traditional emphasis on gross quantities of production as the main criteria of success. Instead he told them to devise plans that would reward "factories that run after innovation" and quality producers.

THE ECONOMIST  
10 April 1971

CPYRGHT

*Russia*

## Not by economics alone

From now on the congresses of the Soviet communist party are to be held every five years, not four. The decision was taken this week at the party's 24th congress in Moscow as if to emphasise that the main function of what is still, in theory, the supreme demonstration of the party's rule is to endorse the draft of the five-year plan. The two will now coincide, but the change is a mere formality. Economics is already the staple food of the congress. True, it was only this Tuesday that Mr Kosygin took the rostrum to elaborate on the political objectives of the new five-year plan. But in the preceding six days of debate economics was the main topic. Each delegate spent the bulk of his time describing the performance of his republic or region, neatly balancing the achievements with the shortcomings.

The conclusion to be drawn from this economic debate, or rather from the series of monologues, is that Russia will not proceed any farther with its managerial reform. At the last party congress, in 1966, more reliance on profits and greater powers for managers had been hailed as a cure for Soviet economic ills. Now that sort of reform has been treated, at best, as something that has been achieved—and done with. The accent on this occasion was on the "scientific revolution" and on the computer. The stress was particularly strong in the speech of Mr Pyotr Shelest, the Ukrainian party boss reputed to be a spokesman of the hardliners. Automated control is of special importance, he argued, and went on to reveal that the Soviet authorities intend soon to introduce a national system of central management directed by computers.

Mr Brezhnev himself delivered a balanced report, which reconciled conflicting views. Shades of emphasis therefore emerged only in other speeches. Some praised the collective nature of the leadership; others underlined Mr Brezhnev's central part in collective rule. Mr Shelest thundered that "one cannot tolerate isolated instances of ideological negligence" and Mr Masherov, the Byelorussian, suggested that any departure from the line led "to direct apostasy and to crossing over to the camp of counter-revolution"; other speakers were more discreet on the ideological issue. Yet even the divergences have by now become routine. It was easy to forecast that the North Vietnamese and North Koreans would not join in the chorus of vituperation against China. It was equally possible to guess in advance that the Rumanian, Yugoslav and Italian delegates would stress the diversity of "roads to socialism," while others, like Mr Kadar, the Hungarian, and the Polish leader, Mr Gierek, would speak of the "leading role" of the Soviet communist party.

The absence of a genuine debate does not mean the absence of politics. Marxists used to dream of a future society without politics in which the "administration of things" would replace the "government of people." Russia is miles away from such a goal. But the political implications of economic decisions have been discussed and bargained about before the congress started, or behind its screen. A reshuffle at the top could still reveal that, while the congress was presenting a facade of unity, the leaders were fighting it out to a decision.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT  
5 April 1971

# RUSSIA'S NEW 5-YEAR PLAN: CRUCIAL TEST FOR RED SYSTEM

Some bone-crushing problems face the Kremlin at the start of the 24th Party Congress. At the top of the list is the vexing issue of guns vs. butter.

Reported from  
WORLD CAPITALS

The new five-year plan now being set in motion by the Soviet Union is seen by Western analysts as a crucial challenge for the Communist system.

A main purpose of the 24th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party convening in Moscow on March 30 is formal ratification of the plan already decreed by the Kremlin.

In the economic program for the next five years, the Russian people are promised swifter progress toward realization of hopes which have remained largely unfulfilled in more than half a century of Red rule.

It is not the first time that big pledges have been made. But growing pressures are giving the latest plan a critical character.

These pressures are generated by increasing discontent in a population whose living standards still are far behind those in any other industrialized nation. The 24th Congress, in fact, was postponed a full year to give Soviet leaders time to chart a course that would help to appease Russia's restive consumers.

**Price of 1966 decision.** Discontent is a price the Kremlin is paying for the major decision approved by the 23rd Congress in 1966, which was to concentrate on the development of defense industries.

As it turned out, the decision was essential to Russia's continuing drive toward its goal of world domination.

It enabled the Soviet Union to rearm the Arab states after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and gain new influence in the Middle East; to beef up defenses along the border with China; to intervene with armed might in Czechoslovakia; and to begin a drive toward the Indian Ocean.

Most importantly, the decision helped Russia to overcome an enormous U.S. lead and achieve parity in the nuclear-weapons race. But all of this meant that production of consumer goods fell short of intended quotas, weaknesses in agriculture went uncorrected and technological development lagged.

Now, for the first time in the history of Soviet five-year planning, the new directives provide for a higher rate of growth in production of consumer goods than in heavy industry.

Nevertheless, heavy industry—including weapons and hardware for space exploration—still will account for more than 70 per cent of the country's total industrial output.

One Western expert commented:


"The new five-year plan does not change the outlook for the Soviet consumer significantly. Remember that Russia starts from very low levels. With only slightly higher growth rates for consumer goods than for heavy industry—as called for in the 1971-75 plan—it would take decades for Russia to catch up with living conditions in Western Europe."

Most analysts outside the Communist sphere question whether new targets will be met. They note that targets set in the 1966-70 plan had to be scaled down as unrealistic and that even with lowered goals there were major shortfalls. Goals unreached included those for electrical energy, gas, steel,


## BY 1975: HOW RUSSIANS CLAIM THEY'LL NARROW U.S. ECONOMIC LEAD

If Russia meets the targets set in its latest five-year plan, the rate of increase of its output will exceed that of the U.S. in seven out of nine major industries.


### STEEL (million tons)



### ELECTRIC POWER (million kilowatt-hours)



### CEMENT (million tons)



coal, rolled metal, fertilizers, chemical fibers, plastics, tractors, farm machinery, trucks and passenger cars.

Pay increases called for in the new plan are not regarded by Western economists as particularly impressive: Average pay of Soviet industrial workers and office personnel is scheduled to rise by about 4 per cent a year. Income of farm workers is to be boosted by around 6 per cent a year to reduce somewhat the disparity between urban and rural earnings.

Relatively low levels of Russian pay are taken into account by authorities in the West. The average wage in Soviet industry last year was equivalent to about \$135 a month at the official exchange rate. The average factory worker in the United States earned that much in a week, but, of course, he paid more for housing, for medical care and in direct taxes.

The Soviet leaders are projecting a tremendous gain in production of automobiles. The target is output of more than 1.2 million passenger cars in 1975, compared with 344,000 last year. Under the new five-year plan, 800,000 of these cars are to be offered for sale to the Soviet population in 1975—compared with only 124,000 in 1970.

Russians are eager to begin enjoying the auto age. But even the dramatic rise in production now envisioned will not come close to satisfying the demands of a population expected to exceed 250 million in 1975. Moreover, the average Russian must work 7,907 hours to earn the purchase price of a medium-sized car—approximately 10 times what his American counterpart must put in for the same purpose.

**Computer gap.** Economic deficiencies of the Communist system are pointed up, Western observers say, not only by the chronic shortage of consumer goods and recurrent shortages of meat and other food, but by the Soviet technological lag—particularly in development of computers, looked upon as symbols of a nation's real progress.

In the computer field, the gap between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. is huge—more than 70,000 in America, about 5,000 in Russia.

The new plan proposes a major improvement in food supplies, calling for an increase of 20 per cent in farm production. The Kremlin is aiming at an annual grain crop averaging 195 million tons in the next five years, as against an average of less than 170 million tons in recent years. Western specialists are skeptical on prospects for transformation

of Soviet agriculture from a weak spot in the economic picture to a strong one. Says one authority:

"Crop yields in Russia still are shockingly low by Western standards. The Soviet Union still employs more than 30 per cent of its labor force in agriculture and is unable to feed its population adequately. In the United States and other Western countries, 5 to 10 per cent of the labor force is generally enough to achieve self-sufficiency in basic foodstuffs and even pile up food surpluses."

**Housing** is one of Russia's most vexing problems. A proposed program of accelerated construction is intended to permit about 12 million people each year to move into better homes or apartments. But even this would only alleviate the housing problem—not provide a solution.

**Modernization pledged.** The new five-year plan is the first to promise real modernization of Soviet management techniques. But it addresses the problem only in general terms.

Under the existing system of rigid central rule, little room is left for managerial initiative.

Failures of the system have become more strongly evident as production and distribution have become more complex. A European economist observed recently:

"The large volume of shoddy and unsalable merchandise piling up in Russia each year shows how badly the Soviet system is tuned to the people's needs. The economy suffers from a tremendous amount of faulty planning, waste and mismanagement."

In theory, reforms intended to bring flexibility and decentralization in planning and management have been applied to more than 80 per cent of all industrial enterprises. But in practice, according to close students of the Soviet economy, the grip of the central planners in Moscow has been loosened very little. The rigid pricing system, for instance, remains unchanged.

The 1968 crisis in Czechoslovakia resulted, Western experts say, in de-emphasis of Soviet managerial reforms. And in the words of an East European economist:

"The events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 apparently convinced the Soviet leaders that management and profit reforms aimed at greater decentralization can easily provoke uncontrollable political reactions—and Soviet leaders hate to take political risks."

"The Czechoslovak experience has made it clear that greater economic freedom is almost bound to produce pres-

sure for greater political freedom as well."

**Inflation feared.** Soviet planners, say those who keep watch from the West, also fear that reforms which mean profit sharing, wage incentives and price flexibility would fuel inflation.

Inflationary pressures have been rising in Russia in recent years, though in the Soviet Union, unlike the West, they are more often evidenced in shortages of consumer goods and in black-market operations than in higher official prices.

Fear of runaway inflation is deep-rooted in the Soviet Union. A Western analyst commented:

"Soviet leaders appear to realize that open and serious inflation on top of all the other troubles they have might shake the whole system to its foundations and cause chaos."

The Russians themselves point to Yugoslavia's experience with a highly decentralized "Socialist market economy" as a "warning example." The Yugoslavs have been unable to control inflation effectively and were forced recently to devalue their currency, because wages, prices and imports were all getting out of hand.

As a Swiss expert views it, the trend in Russia is back toward central planning, with emphasis on managerial discipline rather than greater profitability.

Among European specialists on Soviet affairs, there is a consensus on this:

Whatever concessions are made to the consumer, the present leadership in the Kremlin will do nothing to impede the build-up of military power or weaken the iron control of the Communist Party.

Michel Tatu, a commentator for the French newspaper "Le Monde" and a close observer of the Soviet political system, puts it this way:

"There is a popular assumption that the economy is the central issue for the Soviet leadership. That is untrue. What is of overriding importance for them is the preservation of the system, the retention of power in their own hands and the steady build-up of military strength."

**"Guns and butter."** From a Japanese specialist on Soviet policy comes this comment:

"Since Khrushchev's ouster, Russia's collective leadership has attempted to provide both guns and butter."

"Announced aims have always been clear: higher living standards and adequate armament. But achieving them has always been difficult. The end result has been that the military always gets what it wants and the consumer gets shortchanged."

"The new five-year economic develop-

ment plan indicates a change in priorities in this traditional dual policy, but it is not certain that any change will be significant."

The Japanese expert went on:

"Difficulty in fulfilling the dual objectives is a major reason for Soviet interest in the strategic-arms-limitation talks. Life would undoubtedly be easier for Soviet leaders if they could provide more butter and fewer guns."

A Swiss economist predicts:


"Under the new five-year plan the So-

viet economy will continue to struggle along, with its many bottlenecks, its waste and inefficiency, leaving most problems unsolved."


For the Soviet leaders, analysts say, the real test is this:

Can they assure enough economic progress to keep a lid on mounting pressures for a better life at home, while pursuing a costly, aggressively expansionist policy aimed at establishing Soviet power and influence throughout the world?


### CRUDE OIL (million tons)




### NATURAL GAS (trillion cubic feet)




### COAL (million tons)




### PAPER (million tons)



### AUTOMOBILES



### TRUCKS AND BUSES



Source: 1970, official figures; 1975, U.S. estimates by USN&WR Economic Unit, U.S.S.R. projections from Soviet Economic Plan for 1975

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Frankfurt  
31 March 1971

### CENTRALIZED PLANNING CONTINUED IN MOSCOW

Reforms of the economic system - they are the topic of discussions in almost all countries of communist observance. Inadequate supplies, non-fulfilment of long-standing promises to improve living conditions time and again rekindle the hope that reforms of the present system could lead to increased productivity: especially by the creation of production incentives which seem to help the Western economies achieve their successes. What about these reforms; how far do they go; can they lead to a fundamental change which could possibly transcend the economic realm? Is this what they would have to do? In a series of articles, our correspondents and editors describe and critically examine such "economic reforms" in the various countries of the Soviet bloc. The series starts with the Soviet Union and Poland. The present meeting of the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union shows in a particularly drastic way the extent to which the question of economic reforms affects the ideological and political foundations.

The directives for the new five-year plan of the Soviet Union provide for the completion of the economic reforms which began in 1965. Their stipulations are to form the basis for both short-term and long-range policies. The reform is described in a special chapter of the comprehensive document and is about to be extended to include all enterprises and service installations except those which are beyond economic-political considerations because of their strategic importance.

The adoption of this particular reform model whose main advocate is Prime Minister Kosygin shows that, after a long-lasting, arduous tug-of-war, the Kremlin has agreed on a compromise solution for the planning system and the stimulation of production. Central direction of the economy is to be continued, though in a looser and more rationalized form. Planning methods are to be refined by consultation and cooperation with the enterprises, but they will not be decentralized. There will be less interference and direction from above; but these will not be entirely eliminated. Managers of local enterprises are given some latitude in making their own decisions, but only as far as the execution of administratively-determined obligatory plans are concerned. Effective production, technological progress, and increased efficiency (work productivity), quality, and reduced costs are to be stimulated by prices,

profits, and special bonuses, all of this, however, under tighter party and labor union supervision. This system, a combination of state planning and initiative of the individual enterprise, included, up to the end of 1970, most enterprises, i.e., 43 percent of the industrial capacity and 95 percent of industrial profits.

#### Earnings Capacity and Profits

The discussion of economic reforms goes back almost ten years. On 9 September 1962, the sensational article by the Charkov economic theoretician E. Libermann appeared in Pravda under the meaningful title "Plan, Profit, and Bonus" which throughout the Eastern bloc was considered the green light for economic reforms. This started intra-party arguments about the role of profit-earning capacity in the framework of Soviet state economics. Instead of a centralized planning system, the main spring of production was to be the desire on the part of enterprises and their individual workers to make profits. He proposed that planners take heed of consumer demand, especially in the area of consumer goods, by applying an appropriately calculated pricing system. This was the point in time when the Kremlin leadership group attempted to overcome its industrial and agricultural difficulties by a division of the party apparatus which was quickly brought to an end. Economic administrative offices were to be set up at all levels of the party organization, except at the lowest echelon; Bureaus for Industrial Direction and Bureaus for Agricultural Direction were to be formed in the Presidiums of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Central Committee. This is why the discussion of Libermann's thesis by the press, which continued for about three months, seemed so opportune. By the way, contrary to what was then and later asserted in the West, Libermann had by no means proposed some kind of free market economy or even envisioned a convergence from East to West. At most, he supported a loosening of bureaucratic tutelage in state planning matters and wanted to transfer, to a certain extent, the rational handling of technical economic matters to the managers on the spot.

It appears that the reform ideas did not at once succeed against the bureaucrats. The defenders of the old centralist methods gained the upper hand in the press, at least. There were many indications that the most vehement defenders of the reform lost influence and were removed from key positions. However, two years later - still under Khrushchev - discussion of the reform proposals flared up again. On 17 August 1964, an article by Academy member Trapesnikov appeared in Pravda, which initiated a series of practical experiments. A Moscow clothing factory and a shoe factory in Gorki changed their production toward complete dependence on customer orders. Pravda encouraged other branches to do likewise. Immediately after Khrushchev's

fall, the new Prime Minister Kosygin publicly came out in favor of increased self-initiative and independence of the individual enterprises and recommended "direct relationships" between suppliers and customers. Throughout the Soviet press, defenders of the "Liebermann system" spoke up and complained about the still existing petty tutelage by the order-issuing apparatus of the state planning authorities.

While a number of professors - added to the above mentioned must be such economic theoreticians as J. Birman and W. Belkin - publicly supported the new principles, economic functionaries in party and state obstructed as much as possible the execution of these reforms. They quoted party leaders, the incompatibility of a market economy with the ideas of Marxist classicists. Over decades, the hierarchic organization was so used to the Stalinist method of transmitting orders, that it viewed any kind of decentralization a loss of power and authority.

On the other hand, many enterprise managers were also used to obey, and initiative and responsibility on their part meant little to them. While the reformers, e.g. in *Isvestia*, wrote of the supremacy of economic laws, the opponents emphasized the supremacy of ideology and praised the value of the so-called moral drive as against material incentives. They warned, e.g. in *Pravda*, of egoism which is alien to socialism, of private interests at the expense of the community. They clung to the Stalinist principle of "orders plus enthusiasm." It took until September 1965 before the Central Committee, after listening to Prime Minister Kosygin, ended the controversy and decided on economic reforms, although far-reaching concessions were made over the opposition from a sizable group of people.

### Reality Is Different

The defenders of the compromise solution, then reached, insisted that an orientation toward consumer needs could endanger the legitimate priorities of the state's needs; capital formation, means of production, armaments, space research. This is how they justified a continuation of the domineering role of central planning and the rejection of the concept of a "socialist market economy," as it existed in several East European countries. In theory, the number of plan figures for each enterprise was reduced considerably. In reality, however, to this day, many industrial ministries often do not conform to regulations; likewise, they often change established production quotas on their own accord. Increased enterprise independence is limited by dependence on deliveries, absence of investment goods, and inadequate raw material supplies. The Soviet Union sticks to the traditional principle of quota fulfillment. Not profits, but the fulfillment of the plan is rewarded.

The economic reform required a completely new system of wholesale prices, since in many instances, present prices, which date back to 1965, no longer corresponded to present production costs. For this reason, many industry sectors operated with little profit or even losses. This was particularly true for the coal mining industry whose annual losses were recorded as 17 percent of invested capital, while enterprises of the light or food industries realized profits of from 25 to 35 percent. Almost one-fifth of all Soviet enterprises, especially petroleum and gas production, operated in the red. The economically unfounded "profitability" of individual articles led to unhealthy equilibrium displacements, while "unprofitable" products disappeared from production altogether, causing painful market gaps. Since 1967, 717 new pricelists are in existence which guarantee average profits of from 15 to 20 percent. They enabled each enterprise to go on to the new planning and incentive system. In line with this, wholesale prices for coal rose by 78 percent, for petroleum by 130 percent, for iron ore by 127 percent, while they dropped considerably for several other products, such as radio and electronic equipment, computer technology, etc. Retail prices for consumer goods will not rise, it was expressly stated.

#### Like Independent Princes

In the meantime, more and more complaints are coming in that, as a result of the economic reforms, the local industrial managers behave "like independent princes" and disregard ministerial instructions at their own volition. Their decision-making powers are, however, limited by binding quotas. A frequent complaint is the difficulty to control wage levels and to prevent inflationary tendencies. The newspaper Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya complained that wage increases in some enterprises have passed all reasonable limits, to the extent that state direction of the economy is being undermined. The lack of labor apparently tempts managers to engage in a competition between wages and social amenities. In 1969, about 200 enterprises of Moscow province increased wages without a corresponding increase in productivity. Naturally, they were criticized and warned. Bonuses do not act as incentives either, if given as a special reward, to certain labor categories, without a corresponding contribution by labor. There are stories of enterprises which have not reached their goal for years, whose leading employees, nevertheless, cash in on bonuses constantly.

Since the number of their employees is no longer fixed by official planning, enterprise managers have more latitude, and an effective manager can lower expenses materially by cutting down on the number of workers, with equal wage payments, and increased productivity. Resulting profits benefit the bonus funds.

If the new five-year plan provides for a continuation and termination of the economic reform, this is an indication of how much the change-over has been delayed in the Soviet industry. Originally, this process was to be completed by 1968. Recently published directives expect the reform to stimulate production, increase efficiency, but no basic change in the socialist economic system is anticipated.

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Frankfurt  
31 March 1971

CPYRGHT

## WIRTSCHAFTLICHE REFORMVERSUCHE IM OSTBLOCK

### Es bleibt in Moskau beim zentralen Planen

Die sowjetische Wirtschaftsreform ist ein Kompromiß / Von Hermann Pörzgen

Reformen im Wirtschaftssystem — fast in allen Ländern kommunistischer Observanz ist von ihnen die Rede. Die Unzulänglichkeiten der Versorgung, das Ausbleiben der seit langem versprochenen Verbesserung der Lebensverhältnisse beleben immer wieder die Hoffnung, daß Abwandlungen des gegenwärtigen Systems zu größerer Produktivität führen könnten: Vor allem durch Schaffung von Produktionsanreizen, wie sie die Wirtschaft der westlichen Welt zu ihrem Erfolg zu verhelfen scheinen. Wie ist es mit diesen Reformen; wie weit gehen sie; können sie zu einer grundlegenden, vielleicht über den wirtschaftlichen Bereich hinausgehenden Veränderung führen? Müssen sie das vielleicht zwangsläufig? „Wirtschaftsreformen“ in den verschiedenen Ländern des Ostblocks werden in einer Reihe von Artikeln unserer Korrespondenten und Redakteure dargestellt und kritisch untersucht. Sie beginnt mit der Sowjetunion und Polen. Die gegenwärtige Tagung des XXIV. Kongresses der Kommunistischen Partei der Sowjetunion bringt besonders deutlich zum Bewußtsein, wie sehr die Frage der Wirtschaftsreformen an die ideologischen und politischen Grundfesten rührt.

Die Direktiven für den neuen Fünfjahresplan der Sowjetunion sehen den Abschluß der 1965 begonnenen Wirtschaftsreform vor. Ihre Bestimmungen sollen sowohl für die nächsten Jahre wie auch auf lange Sicht als Grundlinien gelten. Die Reform wird in einem besonderen Kapitel des umfangreichen Dokuments beschrieben und soll jetzt auf alle noch nicht erfaßten Betriebe und Dienstleistungseinrichtungen ausgedehnt werden, soweit sie nicht wegen strategischer Wichtigkeit jedem wirtschaftspolitischen Kalkül entzogen sind.

Die ausdrückliche Festlegung auf dieses Reformmodell, das in Ministerpräsident Kossygin seinen wichtigsten Für-

sprecher fand, zeigt, daß man sich im Kreml nach langem, mühseligem Tauschen auf eine Kompromißlösung im System der Planung und Stimulierung der Produktion geeinigt hat. Das zentrale Dirigieren der Wirtschaft soll aufgelockert und rationalisiert, aber doch beibehalten bleiben. Die Planmethoden sollen durch Befragung und Mitwirkung der Betriebe verfeinert, aber nicht dezentralisiert, das Hineinreden und Steuern von oben soll eingeschränkt, aber nicht ganz aufgegeben werden. Die örtlichen Betriebsleiter erhalten einen gewissen Spielraum für eigene Entscheidungen, aber nur zur Durchführung der administrativ festgesetzten obligatorischen Pläne. Die Effektivität der Produktion, der technische Fortschritt und die höhere Leistung (Arbeitsproduktivität), Qualität und Kostensenkung sollen durch Preis, Gewinn und Prämien angespornt werden, aber das alles unter verschärfter Kontrolle durch die Partei und die Gewerkschaftsorganisationen. Dieses System, eine Kombination von staatlicher Planung und betrieblicher Eigeninitiative, hat bis Ende 1970 den größten Teil der Unternehmen erfaßt, die 43 Prozent der Industriekapazität und 95 Prozent des Industriegewinns repräsentieren.

#### Rentabilität und Profit

Die Diskussion um die Wirtschaftsreform reicht nahezu zehn Jahre zurück. Am 9. September 1962 erschien in der „Prawda“ der aufsehenerregende Artikel des Charkower Wirtschaftstheoretikers E. Liberman unter den vielsagenden Überschrift „Plan, Gewinn und Prämie“, der im ganzen Ostblock als grünes Licht für eine ökonomische Reformbewegung aufgefaßt wurde. Von hier datieren die innerparteilichen Auseinandersetzungen über die Rolle von Rentabilität und Profit im Rahmen der sowjetischen Staatswirtschaft. Anstelle des zentralistischen Planungssystems sollte das Gewinnstreben der Unterneh-

men und der einzelnen Arbeitskräfte zur Haupttriebfeder der Produktion gemacht werden. Durch ein richtig kalkuliertes Preissystem müsse die Verbrauchernachfrage, besonders bei Konsumgütern, in die Planung einbezogen sein. Es ist der Zeitpunkt, in dem das Führungsgremium des Kreml versucht, durch eine bald wieder rückgängig gemachte Zweispaltung des Parteiapparates den Schwierigkeiten der Industrie und Landwirtschaft beizukommen; auf allen Stufen des Parteiapparates mit Ausnahme der untersten sollten wirtschaftliche Verwaltungsstellen entstehen, bei den Präsidien des Zentralkomitees der KPdSU und des Zentralkomitees der Unionsrepubliken „Büros zur Leitung der Industrie“ und „Büros zur Leitung der Landwirtschaft“ gebildet werden. Deshalb schienen die Pressediskussion der Libermanschen Thesen gerade am Platz, die etwa drei Monate anhielt. Liberman hatte im übrigen keineswegs, wie man im Westen damals und später behauptete, eine Art freier Marktwirtschaft angeregt oder gar eine Konvergenz von Ost nach West ins Auge gefaßt. Er trat allenfalls für eine Milderung der bürokratischen Bevormundung in der staatlichen Planung ein und wollte in gewissem Umfang den Managern an Ort und Stelle die rationelle Handhabung marktwirtschaftlicher Hebel übertragen.

Es sieht so aus, als hätte sich die Reformidee gegen die Bürokratie nicht gleich durchgesetzt. In der Presse jedenfalls gewannen die Verteidiger des alten zentralistischen Verfahrens die Oberhand. Manche Anzeichen wiesen darauf hin, daß die vehementesten Verfechter der Reform an Einfluß verloren und aus Schlüsselstellungen entfernt wurden. Zwei Jahre später, noch unter Chruschtschow, lebte die Diskussion der Reformvorschläge allerdings wieder auf. Am 17. August 1964 erschien in der „Prawda“ ein Artikel des Akademikergliedes Trapesnikow, der eine Reihe praktischer

## Die Praxis ist anders

Experimente einleitete. Eine Moskauer Konfektionsfabrik und eine Schuhfabrik in Gorki gingen dazu über, ihre Herstellung ganz nach den Aufträgen der Abnehmer zu orientieren. Die „Prawda“ ermunterte auch andere Branchen zu diesem Verfahren. Gleich nach dem Sturz Chruschtschows unterstützte der neue Ministerpräsident Kossygin öffentlich die Verstärkung der Eigeninitiative und Selbständigkeit der Betriebe und empfahl „direkte Beziehungen“ zwischen Lieferanten und Kunden. Überall meldeten sich in den sowjetischen Blättern die Verteidiger des „Liberalsystems“ zu Wort und beschwerten sich über die noch immer bestehende kleinliche Bevormundung durch die Befehlsmaschinerie der staatlichen Planbehörden.

Während sich eine Reihe von Professoren — zu den Genannten kamen vor allem noch Wirtschaftstheoretiker, wie J. Birman und W. Belkin — öffentlich für die neuen Grundsätze stark machten, legten die Wirtschaftsfunktionäre in Partei und Staat der Verwirklichung der Reformen die stärksten Hindernisse in den Weg. Sie beriefen sich auf die Führung der Partei, auf die Unvereinbarkeit von marktwirtschaftlichem Denken mit dem Gedankengut der Klassiker des Marxismus. Der hierarchisch aufgebaute Apparat hatte sich in Jahrzehnten so sehr an die stalinistische Befehlsübermittlung gewöhnt, daß er jede Dezentralisierung als Machteinbuße und Autoritätsverlust ansah.

Auf der anderen Seite hatten auch viele Betriebsleiter sich an das Gehorchen gewöhnt und legten gar keinen Wert auf eigene Initiative und Verantwortung. Während die Reformer, etwa in der „Iswestija“, vom Primat der Wirtschaftsgesetze schrieben, betonten die Gegner den Primat der Ideologie und machten gegenüber den materiellen Anreizen den Wert des sogenannten moralischen Ansporns geltend. Sie warnten, in der „Prawda“, zum Beispiel, vor einem dem Sozialismus feindlichen Egoismus, vor Privatinteressen auf Kosten der Gemeinschaft. Sie klammerten sich an den stalinistischen Grundsatz „Kommando plus Enthusiasmus“. Es dauerte bis September 1963, ehe das Zentralkomitee, nach Anhörung des Ministerpräsidenten Kossygin, dem Meinungsstreit ein Ende bereite und die Wirtschaftsreform beschloß, wenngleich mit weitgehenden Zugeständnissen gegen den Widerstand einer erheblichen Gruppe.

Die Verfechter der damals herbeigeführten Kompromißlösung machen geltend, daß die Orientierung auf Verbraucherbedürfnisse die legitimen Prioritäten des Staatsbedarfes gefährden könnten: Kapitalbildung, Produktionsmittel, Rüstung, Raumforschung. Damit rechtfertigten sie das Festhalten an der überwiegenden Rolle der zentralen Planung und die Ablehnung der in manchen osteuropäischen Staaten verbreiteten Konzeption einer „sozialistischen Marktwirtschaft“. Theoretisch wurde die Zahl der Plankennziffern für jeden Betrieb wesentlich reduziert. Aber in der Praxis halten sich bis heute die Industrieministerien häufig nicht an die Vorschriften; ebenso ändern sie oft eigenmächtig die schon festgelegten Produktionsauflagen wieder ab. Die größere Selbständigkeit der Betriebe ist eingeeengt durch die Abhängigkeit von Lieferungen, das Ausbleiben von Investitionsgütern, das schlechte Funktionieren der Materialversorgung. Die Sowjetunion bleibt dem traditionellen Prinzip der Soll-Erfüllung. Prämiert wird nicht der Gewinn, sondern die Erfüllung des Plans.

Die Wirtschaftsreform erforderte ein völlig neues System der Großhandelspreise, da die bisherigen, von 1955 stammenden den gegenwärtigen Produktionskosten vielfach nicht mehr entsprachen. Aus diesem Grunde arbeiteten ganze Industriebranchen wenig rentabel oder sogar vom Planansatz her mit Verlust. Das galt vor allem für den Kohlenbergbau, dessen Verluste mit siebzehn Prozent des Anlagekapitals jährlich zu Buche schlugen, während die Betriebe der Leicht- oder Nahrungsmittelindustrie 25 bis 35 Prozent Übergewinn erzielten. Fast ein Fünftel aller sowjetischen Betriebe, besonders der Erdöl- und Gasförderung, arbeitete mit roten Zahlen. Die wirtschaftlich unbegründete „Rentabilität“ einzelner Artikel führte zu ungesunden Schwerpunktverlagerungen, während „unrentable“ Erzeugnisse aus der Produktion einfach verschwanden, wodurch empfindliche Marktlücken entstanden. Seit 1967 gelten jetzt 717 neue Preislisten, die eine mittlere Rentabilität von 15 bis 20 Prozent gewährleisten. Sie ermöglichen jedem Betrieb den Übergang zum neuen System der Planung und des Ansporns. Dabei erhöhten sich die Großhandelspreise für Kohle um 78 Prozent, für Erdöl um 130 Prozent, für Eisenerz um 127 Prozent, während sie für manche anderen Produkte, etwa Radio- und elektrotechnische Geräte, Rechentechnik und so weiter stark gesenkt wurden. Die Einzelhandelspreise für Gebrauchsgüter, so wird ausdrücklich versichert, steigen dadurch nicht an.

## Wie unabhängige Fürsten

Inzwischen werden immer mehr Beschwerden laut, daß die örtlichen Industriemanager sich im Zuge der Wirtschaftsreform „wie unabhängige Fürsten“ benehmen und eigenmächtig Weisungen der Ministerien unterlaufen. Ihre Entscheidungsbefugnisse sind jedoch durch verbindliche Auflagen eingeschränkt. Eine häufige Klage bezieht sich auf die Schwierigkeit, das Lohnniveau unter Kontrolle zu halten und inflationäre Tendenzen zu verhüten. Die Zeitung „Sozialistischeskaja Industrija“ beschwerte sich darüber, daß die Lohnaufstockung in einigen Werken alle vernünftigen Grenzen übersteige, so daß die staatliche Lenkung der Wirtschaft untergraben werde. Der Mangel an Arbeitskräften verführe offensichtlich die Manager zu einem Wettbewerb mit Löhnen und sozialen Einrichtungen. 1969 erhöhten etwa zweihundert Betriebe der Provinz Moskau die Löhne, ohne daß ihre Arbeitsproduktivität entsprechend gestiegen wäre. Selbstverständlich wurden sie kritisiert und verwahrt. Auch Prämierungen winken nicht als Ansporn, wenn sie ohne entsprechende Leistung, bloß als Sonderzulage, für bestimmte Mitarbeiterkategorien erfolgen. So hört man von Betrieben, die seit Jahren ihr Soll nicht erreichen, deren leitende Angestellte aber trotzdem ständig Prämien kassieren.

Erweiterten Spielraum gab der Betriebsführung der Verzicht auf die behördliche Planung der Beschäftigtenzahl, so daß ein tüchtiger Manager durch Einsparung von Arbeitskraft bei gleicher Lohnsumme und wachsender Produktivität Unkosten erheblich senken kann. Die erzielten Gewinne kommen weitgehend dem Prämienfonds zugute.

Wenn der neue Fünfjahresplan die Weiterführung und Beendigung der Wirtschaftsreform vorsieht, so zeigt das, wie sehr sich die Umstellung in der sowjetischen Industrie verzögert hat. Ursprünglich sollte dieser Prozeß schon 1968 beendet sein. Die jetzt veröffentlichten Direktiven versprechen sich von der Reform eine Intensivierung der Produktion und Steigerung der Effektivität, aber keinen grundsätzlichen Wandel des sozialistischen Wirtschaftssystems.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
10 April 1971

CPYRGHT

# Absent Peking shadows Red parley

Hong Kong

By Henry S. Hayward  
Staff correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

The absent Communist China giant casts its long shadow over the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, meeting in Moscow.

With all the other major Communist parties represented at the purely in the Soviet capital, the question is why Communist China — the largest Communist power on the globe — flatly refuses to attend the ideological conclave of followers of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin.

It's not that mainland China would not have been welcomed by the host country and many of the other attending delegations.

And it's not that Peking wasn't invited to attend.

Indications are that Moscow carefully sounded out Chinese leaders to see if there were any prospect of their accepting an invitation to come to the congress which opened March 30.

The reply apparently was negative, so no formal invitation was extended. Even so, if Peking had suddenly changed its mind, its representatives doubtless would have been accepted in Moscow at any stage.

## Relations still strained

Why does the People's Republic of China boycott the big Communist "family" get-together?

The consensus of observers here is that Peking's aloofness stems from the same factors that caused Chairman Mao Tse-tung's government to abstain from the previous Soviet Communist Party Congress — the 23rd — convened on March 29, 1966.

At that time, the Chinese Communists complained openly that the Soviet Union had "vilified" their country and had indulged in all manner of "anti-Chinese activities."

"In these circumstances," said a published letter from Peking to Moscow on March 23, 1966, "how can the Chinese Communist Party, which you look upon as an enemy, be expected to attend your congress?"

## Refusal quite explicit

The letter went on to make a number of scathing indictments about Soviet conduct. It concluded with a flat refusal to attend.

"We would like to inform you explicitly that, since you have gone so far, the Chinese Communist Party, as a serious Marxist-Leninist party, cannot send its delegation to attend this congress of yours."

The current absence is as good a yardstick as any to indicate that the gulf between the two great Communist powers has not yet been bridged.

In 1971, as in 1966, the Chinese do not feel that relations between the two nations have improved to the point, where they can attend an international conference staged under Soviet aegis.

Originally, the differences between Peking and Moscow were mostly ideological. The dispute was over which Communist nation was carrying out the true teachings of Marx and Lenin.

## Border talks fruitless

But that dispute was greatly exacerbated by Chinese-Soviet border clashes early in 1969, along with China's reintroduction of its claims for redress of the so-called "unequal treaties" imposed by Czarist Russia.

Ever since Oct. 20, 1969, the two countries have been holding talks to settle the border dispute—and thus far, no progress is apparent.

And while the propaganda outbursts between China and the Soviet Union have had their periods of relative quiescence, the bitter, stinging polemics seldom are abandoned for long.

As recently as early March of this year, Moscow broadcasts accused the Chinese leaders of weakening their country militarily by refusal to cooperate with the Soviet Union and the socialist community.

By the middle of March, Peking was replying in stridently critical terms. Soviet leaders were attacked by name. "The Soviet revisionist renegades," Peking said in one of its milder passages, "are the worst enemies of the workers—wolves in sheep's clothing."

## Agreed to disagree?

The atmosphere, in short, was definitely not one in which one side says, "Please come to my party" and the other side replies, "I'd be delighted."

Indeed, for China to have agreed to attend the Moscow meeting might have worried the Kremlin more than a refusal. Then the likelihood would have been that Peking was determined to carry its verbal warfare right into the rival homeland—and have it out with all the neighbors on hand.

Under the circumstances, both disputants doubtless felt it was better for China to stay home and allow more time to pass before trying to confer in public.

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
13 April 1971

# European Reds still in Stalinist shadow

By Eric Bourne  
Special correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

Vienna

## Italians go further

Though re-Stalinization did not emerge from the Soviet party congress, the shadows of Stalinism remain.

That is the view of four leading Communist parties, and some smaller, ones, that reject the Soviet party as a model and its decisions as guidelines binding for the whole Communist movement. (They nonetheless remain well disposed toward the Soviets.)

The Soviet claim to Communist sovereignty was contested at the congress by leaders of the ruling Romanian and Yugoslav parties and of the Italian and French parties, which are the only big vote winners in the West.

They had heard Soviet party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev rule out any further rehabilitation of Stalin. The period of the "personal cult," he said, was irreversibly a thing of the past.

It had also been sufficiently analyzed and, moreover, overcome, and so, Mr. Brezhnev said, there was no call to examine it further. It is this view, of course, that divides the Soviet party and its Communist critics.

In Moscow, the latter asserted sovereignty for all Communist states and parties and their right to individual "roads to socialism." They insisted that refusal to accept such diversity damages and splits the Communist movement.

They named no names.

But everyone knew they had in mind Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, and Poland last December.

The Romanians and the Yugoslavs, whose parties have reasons not to aggravate Moscow, have muted but not withdrawn original protests at intervention in Prague.

The French and Italians, however, still openly deny Russia's "internationalist" right to intervene against erring parties, that is, differing from the Soviet "model," as the Czechs.

The Italians, the only Western party with some prospect of participating in government, go much further.

They argue the whole case on the necessity for basic changes in Soviet party practice and attitudes — which clearly would involve reform of the Soviet system itself — if further crises of the Czech or Polish type are to be averted.

Since Czechoslovakia, they have made it increasingly clear that, where Italy is concerned, they reject not only the Soviet example of "socialism" but that of Eastern Europe as well—especially in the light of "normalization in Czechoslovakia."

The Italian Communist Party view is that, even where reform is begun in an East-bloc state, it is hamstrung by Russia's insistence on conformity with its own pattern of unequivocal party controls.

## System still questioned

The Italian party, however, has questioned the Soviet system and style ever since former leader Palmiro Togliatti was scolded by Moscow for proposing an overhaul after the "de-Stalinization" congress of 1956.

In its view, the more recent crises in Czechoslovakia and Poland arose from the "Stalinist conception of the organization of society."

The Italian party approves the post-Gomulka leadership in Poland. But asserts because of this old "Stalinist" conception, the new men are "doubly preoccupied": that on one hand they have sympathy with the December demands for democracy and legality; yet, on the other, they are anxious lest developments go beyond permissible limits.

In other words, said an article in the Italian party's theoretical journal "Rinascita" on the eve of the Soviet congress, they are afraid of "another Czechoslovakia" should the "renewal movement" threaten the old Soviet-style party system.

## Reexamination urged

There are differences between Prague '68 and Warsaw '71, *Rinascita* wrote, but each originated from "a crisis of that particular manner of conceiving and exercising power which, for brevity, we can define as 'Stalinism.'"

The Italians are convinced that in time the parties involved must reconsider their attitudes toward Czechoslovakia and the Poles' their own reactions to unrest earlier in 1968.

The Italian party, in fact, wants a searching reexamination of all the "bitter truths" of past Communist experience. As *Rinascita's* writer said, Czechoslovakia and Poland showed that there still had been no progress

but, on the contrary, stagnation and those "disturbing examples of regression."

## Italians hold no hope

The journal emphasized that it was "talking about socialist democracy." With Russia as well as contemporary Czechoslovakia clearly in mind, it added:

"It is on that basis that we cannot understand anxieties about the cultural debate, the fear of abolition of censorship, the way in which news is managed."

But the recent 24th party congress encourages no hope for the Italians or for reform-minded East Europeans that the Kremlin's lifting of the dogmatic shadows of Stalinism is any nearer, at this stage anyway, than when Mr. Togliatti first advocated it.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
31 March 1971

CPYRGHT

# Kremlin tightens up its East Europe spokes

By Paul Wohl

Written for The Christian Science Monitor

Quietly, methodically the Kremlin has begun to attach the spokes more tightly to the hub of the wheel.

An unprecedented number of Warsaw Pact meetings have been held between January and March. High military leaders and technocrats have visited East European capitals. Bilateral commissions have been activated.

Soviet ambassadors in Eastern Europe, mostly diplomats by training or former high party officials like onetime Politburo member Averki Aristov in Warsaw have been replaced by younger party men with experience in political intelligence and state security.

Moscow's efforts to harness the East European Communist countries more closely to the Soviet chariot go in several directions:

1. The Soviets want to be absolutely certain the East Europeans will not be out of step if it comes to a European security conference to which party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev again referred in his opening speech at the 24th party congress.
2. Upsets similar to the one set off by recent Polish labor unrest are to be prevented by closer collaboration between Soviet and East European party and security agencies.

3. The morale of East European armed forces is to be strengthened. The officer corps is to be quickened politically and the equipment modernized.

4. By activating the East Europeans, Moscow may hope to influence East Germany in favor of a more conciliatory approach to the Berlin problem.

This is believed to have been the objective of the Bucharest meeting of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers in the second week of February. The official purpose of this meeting, according to Tass, was to speed up the approach of a European security

conference, but most of the communiqué was taken up by an unprecedentedly strong pledge of support for the Communist regime in East Germany.

Since the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers have time and again come out for a European security conference, the real reason for the Bucharest meeting seems to have been the announcement of "all-sided support" for East Germany and its demand for full diplomatic recognition, a support that in this form had been withheld at the Warsaw Pact summit in East Berlin in December.

The connection between a European security conference and an agreement on the status of West Berlin is generally admitted by the Soviet and East European radio and press. But the East Germans have not budged very much: Bonn's concessions have so far seemed inadequate to get them to move enough for the Western allies.

What the Soviets can and will do to get the East Germans to be less intransigent is not known, but there is evidence that Moscow leaves no stone unturned to convince the East German regime that it will not be let down by its Communist allies.

A Warsaw Pact defense-ministers conference in the first days of March solemnly proclaimed the military cohesion of the bloc. Polish First Secretary Edward Gierek and Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz in recent speeches be-

strict commands have sounded the same note.

As if all this were not enough, the Warsaw Pact's chiefs of staff met in Budapest from March 15 to 19 for "strengthening the pact's military efficiency."

While this was going on, Soviet commissions headed by high planning officials and technocrats sought to enlist East European assistance in opening up raw-material resources in the U.S.S.R. Judging by the communiqués, some progress in this direction has been made.

Another indication of tighter ties between Moscow and the other Warsaw Pact countries is the frequency of articles by East European leaders in the Soviet press. Such articles always have appeared, but recently they have come out at shorter intervals. And in them, the emphasis on the political, military, and economic community of the bloc countries has become stronger.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
30 March 1971

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## The absent faces

Amid the impressive gathering of foreign Communist leaders for the Soviet Communist Party's 24th congress the absence of certain well-known faces shows up starkly.

Chief among the absentees are the Chinese. The fact that they rejected the Soviet invitation outright shows that the breach between Moscow and Peking is still wide open despite the surface restoration of "correct" diplomatic relations and some revival of trade contacts.

Peking's recent reopening of the propaganda war with a fierce attack on "Soviet revisionist renegades" almost certainly was intended to embarrass the Soviet leadership on the eve of the conference.

While the Chinese turned down the Soviet invitation, North Vietnam's Number One Communist, Le Duan, accepted. Significantly on his way to Moscow he stopped off in Peking to confer with Chinese Premier Chou En-lai.

Le Duan's decision to go to the Soviet Union is in line with North Vietnam's policy of maintaining good relations with both Moscow and Peking for Hanoi looks to both Communist giants for support for its war effort.

His presence at the 24th congress, as well as that of Romanian President and

party leader Nicolae Ceausescu, who also hews to a neutralist posture in the Sino-Soviet quarrel, might serve to moderate any references to China made by Soviet leaders during the congress.

Another prominent absentee from the Kremlin is Yugoslavia's doughty President, Marshal Josip Broz Tito. The Soviet leaders would have liked nothing better than to have him attend as a sign of unity among the European Communist countries. In fact Soviet party leader Leonid Brezhnev is said to have sent a personal message to Marshal Tito urging him to go to Moscow. But the Soviet crackdown on Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, is still too recent a memory for the Yugoslavs, and Marshal Tito will not take any action that looks like condoning that intervention by armed force against a friendly state trying to find its own form of Communist expression.

Surely nothing could more clearly underscore the Yugoslav leader's independence than his five-day visit to Italy and his audience with Pope Paul VI on the very eve of the Kremlin gathering. More than anything else the absentees point up the divisions and stresses now pulling at the Communist world.

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2 April 1971

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## Romanian, Italian Reds Appeal For Diversity at Moscow Parley

By Anthony Astrachan  
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, April 1 — Romania and the Italian Communist Party disagreed with the Soviet Union today on how to handle differences between Communist countries and parties.

Speaking at the 24th Soviet Communist Party Congress, their leaders affirmed their basic solidarity with Moscow but demonstrated the essential

nature of the semantics on which Communist unity rests. President Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania and Enrico Berlinguer, number two leader of the Italian Communist Party, clearly regretted the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and opposed the possibility of Soviet intervention in their internal affairs.

Czechoslovak party leader

identified himself completely with Soviet party leader Brezhnev's views on relations among Communists. Husak mentioned the appeal supposedly issued by some Czechoslovak personalities for Soviet "help" in 1968, although his name is conspicuous by its absence from all versions of the appeal.

ence to the "general laws" by

which socialism is supposed to be built in all countries but went on at length about diversity of problems which could affect socialist construction in different countries. On Tuesday, Brezhnev gave both the general and the specific emphatically equal weight. For a speaker to emphasize the "general laws" of socialism usually means he is justifying the "general laws" of Czechoslovakia. "Considering this diversity,"

Ceausescu said, "differences of opinion may emerge between parties as to the work of building Socialism or as to some international events. The way to solve them is to discuss them between parties and between leaders, in a spirit of confidence and mutual respect."

In those words Ceausescu rejected the Soviet stand on Czechoslovakia and defended Romania's right to oppose it. "Our party declares itself against any interference in the internal affairs of other parties, which leads to the weakening of their unity and of their capacity to fight against the class enemy," he continued.

He said correct Socialist international relations were based on "voluntary cooperation in the spirit of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and Socialist internationalism, the observance of independence and national sovereignty, equal rights and non-interference in internal affairs, comradely mutual help and reciprocal advantage."

Ceausescu joined in the chorus of opposition to imperialism and support for the "Vietnamese people." He was moderate in his one mention of the Middle East and vigorous in his defense of Romania's rights to relations with non-Communist states.

Berlinguer, the Italian party leader, said his party's solicited them, too.

He said again, "Those who are really prepared to reach agreement with us on questions demanding solution will always find the Soviet Union a serious partner with a sense of responsibility."

On China itself, Gromyko put the ball in Peking's court. He said that Brezhnev's speech showed clearly "what positive consequences improved Soviet-Chinese relations could have for the peoples of the Soviet Union and China."

"It depends on the leaders of China, on the Chinese side, in what direction the relations between the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China will develop," he said.

[Another speaker at today's session was Nobel Prize-winning novelist Mikhail Sholokhov, who berated "renegades and revisionists" and the "vicious raving of our ideological adversaries," Reuter reported.

[But Sholokhov, 66, who is a senior figure in the literary establishment, made no mention of novelist Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who came under heavy official attacks after winning the 1970 Nobel award.

[Earlier, the minister of ferrous metallurgy told the congress that the Soviet Union has outstripped the United States in production of pig iron and narrowed to only six per cent the gap in steel output. The minister said investment in the Soviet steel industry will be increased during 1971-75, largely by modernizing existing plants and also by building new ones.

[Last year the Soviet Union produced 116 million tons of steel and 85.9 million tons of pig iron.]

solidarity with the Soviet party "doesn't mean we identify ourselves with the choices that every other Socialist country and in general every Communist party has made or is now making within the limits of its own responsibility. It means a basic solidarity with a country like yours, with all the other Socialist countries."

The Italian party's internationalism, Berlinguer added, "is based on recognition of the full independence of every country and every Communist party, and leaves room as it has already and as it will do for moments and motives of disagreement and difference."

This was an admission that the Italian party will continue to allow some things the Soviets would call "pluralism," but without which the party might win fewer votes in Italy.

Then he added, "That does not weaken our solidarity and commitment in the struggle for the great common objectives. It is necessary to reject every attempt to make us renounce or weaken our internationalist duties in the world Communist revolutionary

movement; we have fought and will always fight every manifestations of anti-Sovietism."

This was a reminder that the Italian party expelled the radical, sometimes pro-Chinese faction gathered around the Journal il Manifesto — an action endorsed by Pravda and probably done at Soviet insistence.

#### Husak's Gratitude

Husak said that in 1968, "anti-Socialist forces in our society, jointly with the right — opportunist and revisionist forces in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, with the all-round support of international reaction, tried to overthrow the Socialist system in Czechoslovakia." This, he said, "would have threatened the positions of Socialism in Europe and would have changed the results of the Second World War."

Husak expressed gratitude to the Soviet Union "for responding to the appeal for help" that the Czechoslovak party now officially insists was the reason for the invasion.

Moscow observers were not sure whether this was the first time Husak had endorsed the appeal. Most experts believe that Husak in 1968 opposed the invasion.

Tass quoted Hungarian party leader Janos Kadar as saying that Hungary favored unity and cooperation with all Socialist countries but opposed "anti-Soviet trends." He rejected "nationalistic, revisionist and other anti-Marxist views," specifically citing "the splitting activity of the Chinese leaders (which) our party has resolutely condemned."

Romanian and Italian sources made Ceausescu's and Berlinguer's remarks available beyond Tass' excerpts.

Soviet speakers at today's session continued their claims to scientific and economic success and their affirmations that the peoples of the Soviet Union live in mutual fraternal prosperity.

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BALTIMORE SUN  
2 April 1971

## Romania Disrupts Parley Unity

By DEAN MILLS  
Moscow Bureau of The Sun  
Moscow, April 1 — Nicolae

Ceausescu, Romanian Communist party leader, stubbornly defended national independence among Communist states today, in an address that shattered some of the unanimity of the 24th Soviet party congress.

Mr. Ceausescu was supported, not surprisingly, by the assistant general secretary of the Italian party, the largest in the West and one of the most independent. Enrico Berlinguer said the Italians are for "basic solidarity" with the Soviet Union.

But he added, according to Italian sources:

"Our internationalism is based on the recognition of the complete independence of each country and each party and leaves room, as has happened in the past and still happens, for

... disagreement and divergences."

But another of the East bloc party chiefs, Gustav Husak, of Czechoslovakia, provided counterpoint with a warm endorsement of the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of his country.

Mr. Husak even told the 5,000 delegates in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses that the invasion

came at Czechoslovak invitation — a position he long was believed to have opposed.

### Would Weaken Movement

Mr. Ceausescu's comments on the international movement, reported by Romanian sources, flew pointedly in the face of those made Tuesday by Leonid I. Brezhnev, Soviet party leader, in his keynote speech.

The Romanian, who consistently has defended his nation's independent status within the bloc, reportedly said that interference by one party in the affairs of another would only weaken the Communist movement.

The summary of his speech published by Tass, the official Soviet news agency, was not as tough. But it, too, showed a markedly stronger emphasis on independence than that in other East bloc speeches.

### "Comradely Mutual Aid"

Tass quoted him as endorsing "socialist internationalism, respect of independence and national sovereignty, equality and noninterference in domestic affairs as well as comradely mutual aid and mutual profits."

Tass also quoted him as saying "Romania, in its international activity, makes special stress

on broadening all-round contacts with all Socialist countries." The remark is broad enough to include China, which has been the target of bitter attacks by other East European leaders.

His remarks were not totally unexpected in light of his long history of steering a clearly independent course in foreign affairs. But the Romanians have shown more willingness to strengthen co-operation within the Socialist camp within the last few months, and he could have been expected to tone down his public signs of disagreement.

### Husak Attacks China

Mr. Husak's comments, like those of Poland's Edward Gierek and East Germany's Walter Ulbricht yesterday and Janos Kadar of Hungary and Todor Zhivkov of Bulgaria today, largely reflected the Brezhnev speech. He called for increased unity within the bloc and attacked China.

"Anti-Socialist forces" joined with "right opportunist and revisionist forces" within the Czechoslovak Communist party, Mr. Husak said, tried to overthrow the Socialist system in 1968-1969. Only "timely internationalist help" from the Warsaw Pact countries averted the danger, he argued.

NEW YORK TIMES  
CPYRGHT 2 April 1971

CPYRGHT

## 2 Foreign Parties Stress Independence in Moscow

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN  
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, April 1 — President Nicolae Ceausescu of Rumania told the Soviet Communist party's 24th Congress today that his country would continue to follow an independent course even if this brought it into conflict with Soviet policies.

In a speech heard by nearly 5,000 Soviet party members and more than 100 foreign delegations, he criticized efforts to impose unity on the movement and lectured Soviet leaders against taking wrong measures to patch up "present difficulties and misunderstandings" among Communists.

Deputy General Secretary of the Italian Communist party, the largest in Western Europe, affirmed his party's independence of the Soviet Union on such issues as the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Their speeches were the sharpest divergences so far from the carefully fostered at-

gress, which ended its third day of discussion and is expected to continue for a week more.

In contrast to Mr. Ceausescu's reiteration of Rumania's friendly but independent line, every other Eastern European leader who has spoken has pledged his country's full-scale Moscow.

CPYRGHT

Only Walter Ulbricht, the East German leader, refrained from direct attacks on Communist China, which is the Soviet Union's main Communist rival and is unrepresented at the congress.

Mr. Ceausescu, who has carefully improved relations with the Chinese in all spheres in recent years, remained neutral on the subject of China, as expected, but he seemed to rebuke both Moscow and Peking for engagement in polemics.

He reiterated his view that because of different economic, social and historic circum-

stances, differences of opinion may emerge in the movement and that the only way to resolve them should be by discussion "in a spirit confidence and mutual respect."

In recent years Rumania's relations with Moscow and the other Warsaw Pact countries have been strained by her refusal to join wholeheartedly in Soviet-sponsored plans. But Mr. Ceausescu has assiduously avoided letting the relations deteriorate to the point where a break was possible.

In his speech he hailed certain improvements in relations but implicitly repeated his criticism of the action against the Czechoslovaks, carried out by

the Soviet Union, East Germany, Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary.

Calling on Soviet and other Communist leaders to observe the independence and national sovereignty of all countries and not to interfere in their internal affairs, he said: "This is, in our view, the safe way to overcome the present difficulties and misunderstandings, to rebuild and strengthen the cooperation and unity of the socialist countries."

"Disregarding these principle in any way can only make more complicated the successful resolution of the complex problems pertaining to socialist construction," he went on: "It can

only harm the relations among the socialist countries, among the Communist and workers' parties."

The Rumanian view ran directly counter to Moscow's ideological position, outlined both by Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet party leader, in his main report on Tuesday and by Pyotr M. Masherov, the Byelorussian leader, in his speech yesterday. It also diverged from those of leaders like Janos Kadar of Hungary, who denounced "nationalist, revisionist and other anti-Marxist views that have been manifested in our ranks."

In Communist jargon, Rumania is often accused of acting in a "nationalist" way

WASHINGTON POST

8 April 1971

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## More Speakers Urge Sovereign Red Parties

MOSCOW, April 7 (UPI)—

Delegations from Japan, Chile and Belgium told the Soviet Union's 24th Communist Party Congress today that every Communist Party must be sovereign and independent and not be ruled from any particular center.

This brought to seven the number of speakers opposing the comments of the Belorussian party leader, Pyotr Masherov, who a week ago scorned any deviation from the Soviet model of Communist structure.

Those who spoke against them earlier were Romanian party leader Nicolae Ceausescu, Italian deputy leader

Enrico Berlinguer, Yugoslav delegation leader Mjalko Todorovich, and Spanish party leader Dolores Ibarruri.

Masherov, an alternate member of the ruling Soviet politburo, had attacked Communist China as a "particularly repulsive" example of revisionism from the left and also heaped scorn on "rightists" who "talk of pluralism and numerous national models of socialism."

He presumably was referring to Yugoslavia and to such "reformist" nonruling parties as the Italian, Belgian and British. In Chile, the party is included in a coalition supporting President Salvadore

Allende, a Marxist.

The strongest plea today against monolithic leadership came from Tomio Nishitsawa, leader of the Japanese delegation.

"Relations between parties must be based on respect of the independence of each party and noninterference in one another's affairs," he said.

"If principles of party relationships based on mutual respect for independence are observed, divergencies can be reconciled and common action against the common imperialist enemy be worked out."

Marc Drumaux, leader of the Belgian delegation, and Ernán del Canto, a leader of Chile's Socialist Party, made

similar appeals.

"In the international Communist movement there are several leading centers and solidarity of all the parties can be achieved only by independence of each party," del Canto said.

"Ready-made prescriptions and copyrighted schemes are not useful in the international Communist movement," Drumaux said.

The foreign leaders spoke during intervals between six Soviet regional leaders who lauded guidelines for the new five-year economic plan introduced yesterday by Premier Alexei N. Kosygin.

The congress, which opened March 30, may end Friday.

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May 1971

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: SHOWCASE OF SOVIET COLONIALISM

Two months after the 24th Congress of the CPSU heard many foreign delegates plead for Party sovereignty the CPSU's reply will, in effect, become visible in Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak Communist Party (CZCP) convenes its long-delayed congress, falsely called the 14th, on 25 May. The original, legitimate 14th Party Congress was held at Prague-Vysocany on 22 August 1968 as the Soviet tanks were putting an end to a free Czechoslovak Party. In contrast, security preparations for this 1971 14th Congress may include interning as many as 2,000 persons for up to six months. The Czech border has been declared closed to individual tourists for the month of May.

More than two years after the brutal Warsaw Pact invasion and the last free CZCP Congress, ominous signs point to an accelerating pace of Sovietization as the Congress date approaches:

--Party Chief Husak set the tone for this captive Congress by abjectly assuring the CPSU Congress that the invasion saved his country from civil war and counter-revolution. This is the central theme of a December 1970 CPCZ Central Committee document\* which asserted that "...thousands of communists..." begged fraternal parties to come to their aid against the Dubcek regime in 1968. Not one of the thousands has ever been named. There has even been speculation that such an invitation to the Warsaw Pact powers was, in fact, written and signed in late 1970! "Lessons" was a necessity for the Soviet Union, not only to legitimize their own claim that their armies were invited into Prague in 1968 to save socialism, but to "prove" to critical European CPs that their disapproval of the "intervention" is both anti-Soviet and incorrect.

--Soviet troops remain in Czechoslovakia and their departure is not even discussed. The "Lessons" indirectly supports the occupation by rejecting the "...abstract concept of the sovereignty of a socialist state..." Recent

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\*"Lessons Drawn From Critical Developments in the Party and Society After the 13th CPCZ Congress"

oblique justifications for the troops' presence include Premier Strougal's dire prediction that destroying revisionism may take years, and the Party's ceaseless warning against dangers from rightwingers. The Soviet Union has almost complete control of the Czech party-government; 600,000 have been purged from the Party and thousands have lost their jobs and influence. Despite these facts, Soviet fear of infection from liberal remnants of the Prague Spring, probably heightened by recent disastrous Polish riots, remains almost paranoid and Moscow continually inveighs against the familiar bogies of counterrevolutionaries, western capitalists, internationalists and "Trotskyites."

-- A back to-the-1950's atmosphere is growing. Despite Husak's repeated denials of impending political trials, at least three have been held this year and more are expected. The 1971 model differs from the political trials of the 1950's in that they now have been provided a "legal" basis. Those convicted have been charged under laws which loosely defined crimes against the state, and can therefore be loosely interpreted. The convicted include General Prchlik whose major crime seems to have been his criticism of the Soviet domination of the 6-nation Warsaw Pact, sixteen "students charged with spreading hostile propaganda" and forming "anti-state groups," and a TV commentator who wrote, but did not publish, an offensive book.

--Pro-Moscow hardliners have achieved more top Party positions at the expense of relative moderates and may capture more at the Congress.

--Rewriting history, a favorite Soviet device, is used to make facts fit "internationalist" Czech politics, i.e., Soviet-dictated politics. Some, like Party Chief Husak who said in 1968 that he would stand with Dubcek or leave with him but who actually succeeded him, are now pictured as having been consistently pro-Moscow throughout the "rightist" period. Some opportunists like Premier Strougal, rewrite their own history: immediately after the Soviet invasion he wrote to President Svoboda, then captive in Moscow, of the unshakeable unity of forces under the 14th Prague-Visocany Congress's newly elected Central Committee. By September 1969 he was describing the Vysocany Congress as long planned by the right wingers, illegal, and its acts invalid. Now he calls Vysocany illegal because there was no prior call to convene it!

To celebrate the 50th anniversary of its founding, CPCZ published seven theses covering Party achievements since 1921. Which a cavalier disregard for facts, history is rewritten on every page. The theses criticize the Novotny regime but only vaguely allude to the Stalinist-era excesses of the 50's, a subject they doubtless feel is better left alone now that they are again conducting trials.

The most infamous re-writing of history concerns the 20-21 August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact troops led by the Soviet Union, which is said to have been suggested by the Czechoslovaks: "Since the rightist part of the Party leadership [the Dubcek leadership is meant] did not want to adopt any measures which would thwart the counter-revolutionary coup, and avert civil war, members of the party, of the Central Committee, of the government, and of the National Assembly turned to the leadership of the fraternal parties and the governments of our allies, with the request that at this historically grave moment they should grant the Czechoslovak people internationalist assistance in the defense of socialism..." [emphasis added].

A thoroughly purged and docile CPCZ will represent Soviet interests at the forthcoming Congress but very few Czechoslovak interests. The Party lacks support at all levels. Workers in whose name Communism was established are generally apathetic. Students whose wide support gave Dubcek reformers their first popular base are almost totally anti-Party. Intellectuals whose talents the country badly needs have been routed by purges, firings, and resignations. Regardless of who wins the top Party posts at the Congress, the Czech people lose. The movement back to the Stalinist 50's seems irreversible.

Here for all the world -- and especially the Communist world -- to see, is the living example of what Russian imperialism, calling itself Soviet Communism, will do to a "fraternal" country in which it has a virtually free hand. All major European Communist parties have denounced the 1968 invasion. Only the weak, Soviet-dominated Austrian Party has reversed its stand and now embraces the Soviet "normalization" of Czechoslovakia. Some, like the Italian Communist Party, continue to attack the present CPCZ course. All are reacting to the essence of the Brezhnev Doctrine, formalized by the Czech-Soviet treaty, which sweeps away the principle of non-interference in the affairs of another Party --- a principle to which the CPSU had once given lip service. What no Parties and

only a few members can face is the realization that the Czech tragedy (or the Hungarian tragedy of '56) is not a mere miscalculation, a temporary aberration, but a fundamental and inevitable consequence of the Soviet Communist system which cannot relinquish authority or permit diversity in any sphere because to do so would mean ultimate loss of its own power.

NEW YORK TIMES  
22 December 1970

CPYRGHT

## Vast Purge Is Shattering Framework of Czech Life

The following dispatch is based on information that has reached The New York Times from Prague:

A purge is devastating the political, intellectual, cultural, social and economic life of Czechoslovakia. The purge, taking the form of dismissal from key jobs, is still under way.

Its effects are so far reaching that the buoyancy and hope so evident less than three years ago seem to have disappeared, and intellectuals, now condemned to manual labor or unemployment, appear deeply demoralized.

Well-informed Czechoslovaks say that for lack of "politically reliable persons," scientific and academic institutions are in effect being dismantled, university departments depleted of professors, clinics deprived of scarce specialists and factories despoiled of their most competent creative and executive personnel.

The employment purge comes in addition to the losses of highly qualified persons in all fields caused by emigration, until the Government gradually stopped issuing exit visas to politically "unreliable" people.

Prague, one of the world's most active centers of artistic creation even before the brief burgeoning of freedom in 1968, has become barren. Its creative minds are turned inward, writing novels, essays and plays for their desk drawers or for circulation in manuscript among trusted friends.

"The assault on intellectual and cultural life goes far beyond anything that the Germans tried to do to us," one victim said in recalling another occupation of Czechoslovakia.

The sweeping breadth of the purge is a direct result of the 1968 reforms, for which most of the Czechs and Slovaks proclaimed their enthusiasm openly and voluntarily. It is difficult now to find people of accomplishment who do not benefit from the liberalization and who are willing to say

that they benefitted, which now makes them subject to purge.

The press, radio and television, prime movers of the radical reforms of 1968, have lost most of their staff and all of their freedom—and therefore most of their audience. Journalists have been particularly hard hit by the purge, and the Journalists' Club, once a center of political action, has become a gathering place for the unemployed that is tightly supervised by the secret police.

### Party Membership Shrinks

In the process of undoing the popular reforms and those who made or supported them—that is, the vocal majority of this nation of 14 million—the Czechoslovak Communist party is also in effect dismantling itself as a force capable of action independent of the directions of the Soviet Union. Its membership has shrunk from 1.6 million at the time the reforms got under way to 880,000, according to little-publicized figures from the Central Committee of the party.

The membership figure published at the conclusion of a purge of party members last June was 1.1 million, but during a plenary meeting of the Central Committee this Dec. 10 and 11 it became known that only 880,000 had actually accepted their new party cards. The party branches are still holding 220,000 unclaimed cards. Furthermore, even among cardholders there are reported to be many who have not paid dues since the Soviet-led invasion of Aug. 20, 1968. Voluntary resignations have been numerous, some coming after the withdrawals were repeatedly refused, but their total is not known.

Equally important, according to sources close to the party apparatus, is the sharp qualitative decline in the party's membership. In the Prague area, for example, the average age of members is

57 years, and 55 per cent of the members are more than 60 years old.

The purge commissions, before which each party member had to appear between the fall of 1969 and the summer of this year, were under instructions to proceed mercilessly against intellectuals and to try to persuade as many working-class members as possible to continue membership.

### The Key Question

In many cases, members who replied negatively to the key question—"Do you approve of the armed intervention of the Warsaw Pact authorities?"—found themselves cajoled by the purgers to hide their true attitude from higher party authorities and thus allow the party to continue to carry them on its rolls. More often than not, according to well-placed sources, the members insisted that their opposition be recorded and their membership terminated.

Party membership, according to the sources, is now held in the main by three kinds of people: about opportunists who seek job advancement either as party functionaries or in other positions in which membership is advantageous and old Communist militants who cannot conceive of life outside the party.

Once expelled from the party, a former Communist has no chance of retaining a job in which he has authority over other employees such as the head of a department would have, or in which he can influence the actions of others, as a journalist or professor can. Dismissal or drastic demotion has been nearly automatic.

Inquisition and purge are under way at places of employment, for Communists and non-Communists alike. Under an article of the Labor Code, adopted this year, any employer is free to dismiss anyone whose record suggests that he has acted against "the socialist society."

### Science and Culture Shaken

Although the process of liquidation is still continuing and no statistics are available, it has become clear that scientific, academic and cultural institutions have been ruinously affected. Respected medical specialists, for example, have been dismissed, their training and experience wasted. Specialists in training and have been sent to work as factory

physicians.

Leading economists are working as bookkeepers, scientists in manual jobs, professors as postal clerks and diplomats as minor clerks.

More than 70 professors have been dismissed from Charles University here, and others have gone into exile. What is true at Charles University, one of the world's oldest and the most important in Czechoslovakia, is true at educational institutions throughout the country. And since the commitment to the reforms of 1968 was, especially ardent among the younger academics, authorities are finding it difficult to replace the ousted professors.

Earlier this year, the Education Ministry prohibited the teaching of almost all courses in Marxism because of the absence of "reliable" teachers, particularly in the philosophy departments of universities, high schools and specialized institutes.

Attrition has been highest among philosophers, lawyers, economists and historians, because their disciplines led them to take more advanced positions during 1968, but the inroads of the purges into engineering and physical sciences are also reported to be deep. Students tell of disarray in maintaining scheduled courses and evident inadequacies among many of their new instructors.

The party and Government apparatus has been seriously affected, but the Second De-upper echelons. Employees of the official administrative machinery are normally quick to bend with prevailing political winds for reasons of job security, and in 1968 many bent beyond redemption, particularly in the senior echelons.

### Dubcek Unemployed

The leading example of an unemployed party official is, of course, Alexander Dubcek, the party's leader during the reforms. After dismissal earlier this year as Ambassador to Turkey and expulsion from the party, Mr. Dubcek retired to his Bratislava home to await employment.

He turned down a fund-handling post with the Slovak social-security agency for fear that it might be used to implicate him in possible misappropriation charges. He requested, instead, employment in a factory. His request was refused, and Czechoslovakia's former leader is now awaiting a clerical

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cal job with the state forestry agency in Bratislava.

Ousted intellectuals, who at first found comparatively easy refuge in clerical jobs, were soon dismissed even from these as the purge spread from the primary targets. Many are now at their third or fourth job, each more menial than the preceding. By now it has become impossible for those dismissed to find employment in anything but manual work.

A leading woman publicist who has just been dismissed from her typist's job and whose husband is already working as a laborer, said drily: "I know that before this is over I'll work with a broom and he with a shovel. Then, at last, we'll be the real working class. The ruling class, we always said."

#### Wives Become Breadwinners

Many of the wives of intellectuals have become the only breadwinners, working with a broom. There is no shortage of jobs for cleaning women in factories. There are no unemployment payments, because Czechoslovakia, as a socialist country, recognizes no unemployment. The material misery among intellectuals is great, although few admit it.

Leading writers and scholars are working at the few unskilled jobs available in Prague. Many are digging for a subway; the city is building. A geodesic survey of the Czechoslovak water table also has many intellectuals among those testing how deep one must dig before striking water.

Many who have farm houses, a common situation, have left Prague for the country, where life is cheaper. They work in nearby factories or on farms. But unemployment among Prague intellectuals and former officials is rising to the point where it is considered almost honorable to be refused work.

The old Stalinist greeting between party members, "Cest praci" (Honor to work), has been ironically revived as "Cest anebo praci" (Honor or work). And manual labor has been given a romantic Spanish aura by being called "Don Manuel."

#### Husak's Position Crucial

The makers and chief proponents of Czechoslovakia's lost liberalization take their principal consolation from the fact that there have been no political trials and few Czechs or Slovaks are in jail on political charges. But most see no reason to consider this state necessarily permanent.

It is generally believed that while the party's First Secretary, there will be no political trials because Mr. Husak was himself a victim of such a trial in Stalin's day. But if the Soviet Union wants trials, according to this belief, it will replace Mr. Husak just as it ousted Mr. Dubcek last year and replaced him with Mr. Husak.

Mr. Husak, while evidently still the man Moscow considers best able to run Czechoslovakia, has for some time been under open attack by party leaders even more pro-Soviet than himself. It is assumed here that these leaders are also operating with Soviet approval, presumably to keep Mr. Husak from the illusion of independent power.

The most determined of Mr. Husak's opponents are Antonin Kapek, secretary of the Prague organization, and Alois Indra, Central Committee secretary. At a meeting of the party presidium last month, Mr. Husak was in the minority of a 7-4 vote over an analysis of the events leading up to the Soviet invasion. The following morning Mr. Husak left for Moscow to receive Kremlin assurances of continued confidence.

Mr. Husak received limited Soviet support earlier, this fall when a major campaign to remove him was disclosed through the accidental death of one of the conspirators. Jaroslav Trojan, a member of the presidium of the Federal Assembly, was killed as he drove his car after a drinking session with a Soviet companion. A routine search of his desk disclosed copies of dozens of letters by right-wing party officials addressed to various Soviet leaders and calling for the ouster of Mr. Husak.

The party leader was authorized to dismiss a few of his principal opponents, notably the Czech Interior Minister, Josef Groesser, and the military man in charge of liaison with the Soviet occupation troops, Gen. Otakar Rytar. But after the general's dismissal, Moscow was reported to have sent word that he was to be the last "internationalist" ousted.

"Internationalist" is the term for those who accept the doctrine that the Soviet Union has the right to intervene in a socialist country whenever it says socialism is threatened, such as in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Opponents of Mr. Husak are conducting a campaign to present him as insufficiently internationalist. At a Central Committee meeting this month, Va-

sil Bilak, a strongly pro-Soviet leader, surprisingly disclosed that he had a long-missing document that would identify the genuine internationalists and from which Mr. Husak's name is absent.

The document is the alleged 1968 letter from Czechoslovak leaders to the Soviet Union inviting the Warsaw Pact intervention. The letter was mentioned by Moscow immediately after the invasion but has never been produced nor all its signers disclosed. Mr. Bilak listed about 40 signers, including himself, Mr. Kapek and Mr. Indra.

Whatever the political maneuvering, it is difficult to find in Prague anyone who takes more than a passing interest in what the party says or does—except for those who identify the limited liberty they enjoy with the political survival of Mr. Husak. One of the most significant effects of the events of 1968 has been the final eradication in the popular mind of the lingering aura of rightness and justice over the actions of the Communist party and the Soviet Union that survived even the revelations of the post-Stalin period.

The liberalizations of the spring, which emphasized the wide gulf between the party's rhetoric and its performance, followed by an invasion that was officially called "fraternal assistance," have left the party little credibility among the population.

"The principal delusion that has been destroyed, for Communists and the others," a leading writer said, "is that it is possible to create democracy in friendship with the Soviet Union."

With the intellectual and technological elite systematically removed from public life, Czechoslovaks say, it is difficult to see how the problem of economic stagnation that plagued Czechoslovakia before liberalization can be solved. This pessimism appears to have taken a deep hold among Czechoslovak society and accounts for the open cynicism over the future of the country that is expressed at many levels.

In the 25 years since the end of World War II, Czechoslovakia has gone through many stages of disillusionment, but once-influential Communists say that until August, 1968, at least Communist party members retained the hope that they could find within the system the means of realizing their country's potential. They almost suc-

ceeded in 1968, they say, but after their failure they feel that the initiative has passed entirely from their hands.

The only hope that the makers of the spring of 1968 see now is that a change may occur within the Soviet Union. They say the hope is faint, but many still treasure the New Year's card that Josef Smrkovsky, a leader of the 1968 liberalization who is now stricken with incurable cancer, sent to his friends at the end of 1968. It shows a newborn deer opening its eyes in the forest, and the words are those of a Czech folk song:

*"It will come, the spring,  
it will come,  
"May will come once more."*

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WASHINGTON POST  
11 APRIL 1971

# Czechs Give Little Support to Regime

By Dan Morgan  
Washington Post Foreign Service

PRAGUE—In the Czech version of Shakespeare's "Love's Labor's Lost" recently staged here, the show-stopping passage has been this:

"We are used to shame . . . and sometimes it is even good politics . . ."

The sustained, 10-minute applause that has followed that line indicates the cynicism that Czechs now direct at their political lot, their predicament under occupation, even themselves.

Rude Pravo, the Communist Party paper, has warned that if theater audiences don't stop such outbursts, the curtain will be lowered, the audience will be asked to leave, and money will not be refunded.

"It is like that sarcastic passage in Bertolt Brecht," a Czech said in reference to the warning. "If the govern-

But in Czechoslovakia, even the great Communist dramatist Brecht is being censored. The regime has ordered parts of his "Mother Courage" cut because theater audiences had been reading anti-Russian meanings into some lines.

The leadership, despite continuing efforts at political consolidation, appears to be having little success at "changing the people."

## Underground Leaflets

A Czechoslovak version of the Russian "samizdat" (underground publication) has begun to flourish, churning out leaflets and information sheets in English and other foreign languages on such themes as the current political scene and the ecological consequences of the Czechoslovak-Soviet gas pipeline project.

At a recent trial at which 16 persons, mostly university students, received sentences of one to four years for alleged subversion, their friends standing outside the courtroom gave closed-fist salutes and sang a few words of the "Internationale."

At a Prague student hang-out, a sign on the door declares: "Only persons with identification cards from the healthy new Socialist Students Union will be admitted." But the doorkeeper confesses that he himself does not have such a card and doubts whether many of the guests do, either.

Thousands—probably tens of thousands—of persons have lost their jobs, their membership in the Communist Party and other privileges. They no longer feel they have very much to lose by concealing their real feelings.

The brief period of liberalization in 1968, with its permissiveness, foreign travel, and free press, provided an intermission from the closed society. As a result, re-establishing the former system of control over the population is a slow business.

Party leader Gustav Husak, who has said that he wants to end the period of political quarreling and go to work solving the problems of the country, is doubtless aware of the contempt shown for the present regime.

But it is unclear to what extent he is able to impose his more moderate line on elements still bent on revenge against everyone remotely linked to the 1968 Prague spring. The party congress in May is expected to clarify Husak's position.

There are many signs of

munist Party and other established state organizations.

At one Prague factory, trade union membership has dropped in the last year from 50 per cent to 30 per cent, and only about 10 per cent of the factory hands attend the bimonthly trade union meetings.

"It is hard to explain this," said one worker at the plant. "After all, trade union membership brings fringe benefits ranging from summer excursions to a box of chocolates at Christmas time. There is even some talk of giving union members priority for flats. So the only explanation may be that workers are uninterested in anything to do with our organized civic life."

A young mathematics student in the capital was recently recruited for a career in a major Prague ministry. He was told that he could expect to be in a good executive position within four years, with a possibility of foreign travel as well. But it would have required his joining the Communist Party, and he refused.

## Only Opportunism

"Joining the party should be a positive commitment," he said. "But I searched my soul and realized the only reason for me to join now would be opportunism."

Four months after Poland's workers brought about major political changes in their country, Czechoslovak workers have shown no signs of copying this pattern. The Czech workers in 1968 were a bulwark of support for the embattled liberal leaders well into the following year. Now they seem unpolitical.

Vasil Bilak, considered the number-two man in the Communist Party and a possible hardline successor to Husak, sent out a party directive in February warning that "no one in the factories should use this [post-Polish] situation to provoke dissatisfaction."

From what can be learned here, Czechoslovak factories are peaceful.

On administrator in a factory here said that workers are getting de facto wage increases but no open

a month, though this is not acknowledged by the regime.

"Our workers are in a very privileged position," he said. "The labor shortage is so severe that the hidden wage increases are needed just to keep workers from changing jobs. If the ministry objects to the extra pay we tell them, 'No pay increase, no fulfillment of production quotas.' That keeps them quiet."

He went on to add that though there is a bonus system that is supposed to reward hard work, "No factory director dares apply it for fear of alienating workers who don't qualify. So it's spread around evenly and everybody gets a piece and is satisfied."

The administrator said that the political purges have not touched the factory. "Not one has been fired for political reasons . . . They are just too badly needed."

Last September, Husak announced the opening of a dialogue with all members of society, in and out of the party, about all problems. The dialogue never materialized, and the political trials recently concluded here suggest that Husak is still having difficulty.

None of the top political leaders—not Husak, nor Prime Minister Lubomir Strougal nor President Ludwig Svoboda—was among the "responsible" functionaries who supposedly signed an invitation to the Warsaw Pact armies to invade in 1968.

Last month, the respected correspondent for the Yugoslav news agency Tanjug was expelled from the country.

In an article printed here last month he described his impressions. He said that while a "forcible pacification" has taken place, the masses have no interest "in anything which is not connected with their personal existence."

People, he said, are not opposing. But he added that they are "unwilling to accept serious accusations that everything in which they believed or did two or three years ago was a counter-revolutionary or even treacherous nature."

-BASLER NACHRICHTEN, Basel  
24 February 1971

POLITICAL TRIALS DO OCCUR IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

After the mass arrests in the summer of 1969, which were clearly political, politically-motivated mass trials were also expected in the CSSR -- every arrest, after all, can only end either in court or with the release of the arrested person. Under the pressure of public opinion on the one hand and neo-Stalinists on the other, the party and state leadership chose still another solution: neither trial nor release.

Based on a special law of August 1969, signed by Dubcek, numerous arrested persons remained in detention pending investigation; "suspicion of the police" was enough for that. The majority, above all students and young workers, were then later either released or sentenced in the numerous individual trials to milder punishments than were originally projected. Thus the special law had served its purpose: the masses in time lost their power to resist, the active opposition was isolated, and public opinion was not unnecessarily provoked.

Wearing Down Tactics

It seems as though this cold political calculation will remain the constant tactics of Party chief Husak. During the entire year of 1970, the leading personalities of the opposition -- journalists, artists, and scientists -- were given no peace. Some spent months in detention, like chess grand master Pachman and the journalist Skutina, others remained free, but were questioned again and again, like the journalists Hochman and Nepras, and the writers Havel and Kohout. Other than writer Ota Filip, however, no well-known personality was sentenced, although all -- along with thousands of intellectuals -- lost their position in society and even the possibility of being intellectually active at all, through political purges and extra-judicial measures.

The situation has changed often. In October 1970, for example, the first group trial was prepared of eight well-known supporters of the reform course, who in 1969 wrote the "10 Point Manifesto" and hence had "endangered the Republic," according to the charge. Suddenly, however, the trial was postponed for an indefinite period, and two of the accused were freed. Now one of the accused, the former television commentator Vladimir Skutina, has been sentenced to two years imprisonment. At the same time, a trial is being prepared of a group of young "Trotskyite elements," who wanted to achieve their goals under the slogan "Socialism yes -- bureaucracy no," and who sought the alliance proclaimed in the constitution of the intelligentsia and the workers.

### No Humanitarian Reasons

The tactics of Husak's centralist-oriented supporters are often viewed as actual opposition to neo-Stalinist tendencies. But one may not forget that the centralists are against the return to the old brutal methods not for humanitarian, but for purely tactical reasons. The partial and occasional use of police terror was never removed, and the special law of 1969, proposed by Husak's wing, is clearly a product of the old legal doctrine. In this sense, it is not important whether the trial of Skutina was a concession of the centralists to the ultra-radicals or a demonstration of power in connection with the dangerous movement of the workers in Poland. The repeated beginnings of preparations for a group trial show that the unrestricted legal decree is only being removed conditionally; the potential threat is more energetically effective than the immediate threat.

### The Question Was Wrongly Posed

The case of Vladimir Skutina, seriously ill, who was already sentenced to 16 months in prison in the time of Novotny for "insulting the president," is clearly a political case. Two years are more than enough for verbal offenses. It is not a death sentence, it is true, as would have been possible in the 50's. But should one only talk about and protest political trials if the accused is to be murdered?

The often repeated question: "Will there or will there not be political trials in the CSSR" was completely wrongly posed. There are already these trials, Husak himself has not barred them. The prevailing doctrine is: "no more political trials... in the form of the 50's." The events of recent days prove that the current police and legal officials are doing the same thing as their predecessors -- only without a lot of noise.

BASLER NACHRICHTEN, Basel  
24 February 1971

CPYRGHT

*Nach der Verurteilung Skutinas*

## **Es gibt doch politische Prozesse in der CSSR**

Nach den Massenverhaftungen im Sommer 1969, die eindeutig politische Gründe hatten, erwartete man in der CSSR auch politisch motivierte Massenprozesse — jede Verhaftung kann schliesslich nur vor dem Gericht oder mit der Freilassung des Verhafteten enden. Unter dem Druck der öffentlichen Meinung einerseits und der Neostalinisten andererseits wählte die Partei- und Staatsführung jedoch eine andere Lösung: weder Gericht noch Freilassung.

Aufgrund eines Sondergesetzes vom August 1969, das noch von Dubcek unterzeichnet wurde, blieben zahlreiche Festgenommene in Untersu-

chungshaft; der «polizeilich begründete Verdacht» genügte dafür. Die Mehrheit davon, vor allem Studenten und junge Arbeiter, wurden dann später entweder freigelassen oder in den zahlreichen Einzelprozessen zu milderen Strafen als ursprünglich vorgesehen verurteilt. Damit hatte das Sondergesetz sein Ziel erreicht: Die Massen verloren mit der Zeit ihre Widerstandskraft, die aktive Opposition wurde isoliert und die öffentliche Meinung nicht unnötig provoziert.

CPYRGHT

**Zermürbungstaktik**

Es scheint, als bliebe dieses kalte politische Kalkül die ständige Taktik Parteichef Husaks. Während des ganzen Jahres 1970 liess man den führenden Persönlichkeiten der Opposition — Journalisten, Künstler und Wissenschaftler — keine Ruhe. Einige waren monatelang in Untersuchungshaft, so Schachgrossmeister Pachman und Publizist Skutina, andere blieben frei, wurden jedoch immer wieder verhört, so die Publizisten Hochman und Nepras und die Schriftsteller Havel und Kohout. Ausser dem Schriftsteller Ota Filip wurde aber keine bekannte Persönlichkeit verurteilt, wenn auch alle — zusammen mit Tausenden von Intellektuellen — ihre Stellung in der Gesellschaft und sogar die Möglichkeit, überhaupt intellektuell tätig zu sein, durch politische Säuberungen und aussergerichtliche Massnahmen verloren.

Die Lage hat sich oft geändert. Im Oktober 1970 z. B. wurde der erste Gruppenprozess gegen acht bekannte Anhänger des Reformkurses, die 1969 das «Manifest der 10 Punkte» verfasst und damit laut Anklage die «Republik gefährdet» haben, vorbereitet. Plötzlich wurde das Verfahren jedoch wieder auf unbestimmte Zeit verschoben, und zwei der Angeklagten wurden freigelassen. Jetzt ist einer der Beschuldigten, der ehemalige Fernsehkommentator Vladimir Skutina, zu einer zweijährigen Freiheitsstrafe verurteilt worden. Gleichzeitig bereitet man auch den Prozess gegen eine Gruppe junger «trotzkistischer Elemente» vor, die unter dem Schlagwort «Sozialismus ja — Bürokratismus nein» ihre Ziele verwirklichen wollten und die in der Verfassung proklamierte Verbindung der Intelligenz mit den Arbeitern in den Betrieben suchten.

**Keine menschlichen Gründe**

Die Taktik Husaks zentralistisch orientierten Anhängern wird oft als tatsächliche Bekämpfung der neostalinistischen Tendenzen betrachtet. Man darf aber nicht vergessen, dass die Zentralisten nicht aus menschlichen, sondern aus

rein taktischen Gründen gegen die Rückkehr zu den alten, brutalen Methoden sind. Der teilweise und zeitweilige Einsatz des Polizeiterrors wurde nie abgelehnt, und das Sondergesetz von 1969, das von Husaks Flügel vorgeschlagen worden war, ist eindeutig ein Produkt der alten Rechtsdoktrin. In diesem Sinne ist es nicht wichtig, ob der Prozess gegen Skutina ein Zugeständnis der Zentralisten an die Ultraradikalen oder eine Demonstration der Macht im Zusammenhang mit der gefährlichen Bewegung der Arbeiter in Polen war. Die immer wieder aufgenommenen Vorbereitungen eines Gruppenprozesses zeigen, dass die unbeschränkte Justizwillkür nur bedingt abgelehnt wird: Die potentielle Drohung greift tatkräftiger durch als die unmittelbare.

**Frage wurde falsch gestellt**

Der Fall des schwerkranken Vladimir Skutina, der schon zu Novotnys Zeit wegen «Beleidigung des Präsidenten» zu 16 Monaten Freiheitsentzug verurteilt worden war, ist eindeutig ein politisch-motivierter Fall. Zwei Jahre sind für verbale Delikte mehr als genug. Es ist zwar keine Todesstrafe, wie sie in den fünfziger Jahren möglich gewesen wäre. Aber soll man über politische Prozesse nur sprechen und dagegen protestieren, wenn der Angeklagte ermordet werden soll?

Die oft wiederholte Frage: «Wird es in der CSSR politische Prozesse geben oder nicht?» wurde ganz falsch gestellt. Es gibt die Prozesse bereits, hat sie doch Husak selbst nicht ausgeschlossen. Die geltende Doktrin heisst jedoch: «Keine politischen Prozesse mehr... in der Form der fünfziger Jahre.» Die Geschehnisse der letzten Tage beweisen, dass die gegenwärtigen Polizei- und Justizbehörden das gleiche machen wie ihre Vorgänger — nur ohne grossen Lärm.

Petr Topol

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT NEW YORK TIMES  
2 April 1971**Prague's Political Trials**

Two political trials in Czechoslovakia this month must arouse grave misgivings. They raise the possibility that the most ruthless pro-Moscow elements in Czechoslovakia—those who have been calling for the trial and punishment of all involved in the late, lamented "Prague spring" of 1968—have come out on top in the political infighting surrounding Gustav Husak.

In one of the trials the defendants were a group of young people who had formed a "Revolutionary Socialist party" to combat bureaucracy and agitate for their version of true Socialism. For this "crime," these Czechoslovak members of the worldwide "New Left" were sentenced to prison terms of up to four years. In another trial Gen. Vaclav Prchlik was sentenced to three years in jail by a military tribunal.

To evaluate the importance of the latter miscarriage of justice, it is necessary to recall that General Prchlik

was one of the authentic heroes of the Dubcek era. In mid-December 1967, while President Antonin Novotny's political fate still was uncertain, it was Prchlik who exposed the plans for a military coup by Novotny's supporters. Such a coup, if successful, would have prevented Dubcek from succeeding Novotny. Later, a month before the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Prchlik called publicly for the equality of all Warsaw Pact members, pointed out that nothing in the pact permitted one member-state to station troops on another member-state's territory without the latter's permission, and revealed that the Warsaw Pact's Joint Command consisted only of Soviet officers.

It is apparently for these statements that General Prchlik — who was long ago stripped of his rank and reduced to a manual laborer — has now been sentenced to prison. His real offense, of course, was his patriotism and his love of freedom, both sentiments now frowned upon by the servile regime in Prague.

CPYRGHT

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
1 APRIL 1971

CPYRGHT

# Sentencing of Czech general tied to leadership struggle

By Eric Bourne  
Special correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

Vienna

The case of former Czechoslovak Gen. Vaclav Prehlik, sentenced last week to three years in jail, is linked with the continued struggle between the two groups still contending for the leadership of Czechoslovakia's Communist regime.

The former general, political commissar of the Czechoslovak armed forces during the liberal Dubcek era, went before a court-martial in Pribram March 24 on charges of criticizing Soviet domination of the Warsaw Pact in 1968.

Informed sources say that the supreme military prosecutor at the Pribram garrison near Prague accused the former general of criticizing the pact's organizational structure and of citing facts that, it was alleged, would lead to deterioration of the internal political situation as well as worsening relations with the Soviet Union.

## Conflict simmered

The conflict for Czechoslovak leadership was apparent for some time, though spokesmen in both groups frequently dismissed it.

But its existence was recently confirmed from a uniquely "inside" source, the correspondent of the Yugoslav news agency, Velemir Budimir, who was expelled from Prague in February because of what the authorities termed his "unobjective reporting."

According to Mr. Budimir, the conflict arose last fall at a time when Dr. Gustav Husak, the "moderate" party leader, made a public bid to bridge the big gulf between the leadership and mass popular opinion caused by the liquidation of the 1968 reforms.

With the party purge completed, Dr. Husak suggested that the time had come for more tolerant attitudes and for a "dialogue" with expelled party members and with the still unreconciled writers and other Communist intellectuals.

The proposal aroused strong "conservative" opposition. According to Mr. Budimir, it led to a serious clash between the "extreme leftists and dogmatists" and "Husak's centrist group."

The conflict, Mr. Budimir said, even involved a plot — apparently discovered in time — against Dr. Husak's personal position, shortly before a crucial session of the party committee set for December.

With the party congress, delayed by the invasion, now only two months off, Dr. Husak needs to appear with clear-cut authority and a program of controlled but also conciliatory consolidation that might stir public feeling from its present apolitical apathy.

After the December plenum, the "conservative" pressure was particularly strong in his native Slovakia, where one by one already many of his original supporters had been ousted from the local party leadership.

This year saw a wave of publicity for the so-called "invitation," according to which a group of "honest" party officials requested Soviet help in August, 1968.

## Comeback course

Names were not given. But since it is known that Dr. Husak was not a signatory, the inference — from the praise given those who supposedly were — was intended to embarrass him inside the party.

Lately, however, he has made a comeback. The first sign was an elaborate nationwide radio commentary lauding his "steadfast" role since 1968.

Dr. Husak was presented as one who from the very start was reserved toward the Dubcek radicals and fought them after the invasion to return Czechoslovakia to a "realistic" path.

The Slovak party newspaper Pravda wrote editorially March 15 that in the critical situation of the August invasion the country needed "a decisive word, a resolute man." And this person, the paper went on, was found in Gustav Husak.

The outcome was the resolution on party unity, adopted at that session, which was, however, no more than a temporary compromise between two groups with strongly divergent ideas about how the party should proceed.

Compromise has been evident in the series of recent trials, of which the indictment of former General Prehlik was the third.

## First preinvasion charges

These trials were not "political" in the terms of reference of the Stalinist period. Nor have they involved reform leaders of major political stature, from Alexander Dubcek down, who were all removed from office and now live in private obscurity.

General Prehlik, however, as head of the Army's political department, was an extremely well-known officer. He is thus the

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first high-ranking figure of the reform period to be arraigned--and the first indicted for activities prior to the August, 1968, invasion.

At a press conference shortly before that event, the then general, now 50, not only urged reforms of the Warsaw Pact command structure. He also criticized the tardy withdrawal of Soviet troops who were overstaying an agreed period for pact maneuvers that summer in Czechoslovakia.

#### **Denunciation and dismissal**

He was denounced by the Soviet Army newspaper Red Star. The reform leadership, already under pressure, had to dismiss him as head of the party's department for Army and security.

Later he was expelled from the party and a commission was set up to consider criminal prosecution.

The fact that another 18 months passed before he was tried is believed to have been due to the stand taken by the "Husak group" against the kind of antireform political trials demanded by the hard-liners.

The latter counted some success with this year's three trials so far--against a leading television commentator, a group of student radicals, and now the ex-general. But on each occasion the judgment has been, in all the circumstances, relatively mild, which suggests the "moderates" still are able to prevent excessive sanctions.

After an uncertain six months, in fact, the latter seem now to be girding for a new effort to corral the hard-liners.

Le Monde, Paris  
31 March 1971

Czechoslovakia: New Trials on the Horizon in Prague

According to information coming from Prague, the Czechoslovak authorities plan to arrest, prior to the 14th Congress which will be convened May 25th, several dozens or even several hundreds of the representatives of "socialism with a human face." This measure is intended to put a halt to the opposition which has manifested itself in the distribution of propaganda leaflets, the creation of the clandestine group, the "socialist movement of Czechoslovak citizens". There have also been demonstrations such as on the occasion of the funeral of the author, Jan Prochazka, or on the occasion of sports events.

The repression began in March with action taken against the former Czechoslovak TV commentator, Vladimir Skutina, then against 19 youths, and finally against General Prchlik, former Chief of the Section of Security and of the Defense of the Central Committee.

Another trial is under preparation against 12 generals and colonels among whom are included, General Prochazka, Chief of the Western Military Forces (on the frontier with West Germany) and General Peprny, former Commander of frontier ground forces. All have been accused of "negligence in the service."

Also, there is in preparation action to be taken against Alois Polednak, former Director of cinematography and member of Presidium of the Parliament.

Finally, the party chiefs apparently have decided to arrest for an "undetermined period" representatives of the "Prague Springtime" who today are called "revisionists" or "counter-revolutionaries".

According to some informants, these people will be interned near Jachymov (the uranium mines). Another group will be sent near Lesesice (in central Bohemia) and a third group to the former Sazava pioneer camp.

LE MONDE, Paris

31 March 1971

## Tchécoslovaquie

### DE NOUVEAUX PROCÈS SERAIENT EN PRÉPARATION À PRAGUE

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Selon des informations venues de Prague, les autorités tchécoslovaques auraient l'intention d'arrêter avant le 14<sup>e</sup> congrès — convoqué le 25 mai — quelques dizaines ou même quelques centaines de représentants du « socialisme à visage humain ». Cette mesure viserait à mettre un terme à l'opposition qui se manifeste par la distribution de tracts, la création d'un groupe clandestin, le « mouvement socialiste des citoyens tchécoslovaques ». Il y eut aussi des démonstrations à l'occasion des funérailles de l'écrivain Yan Prochazka, ou des rencontres sportives.

La répression a commencé en mars par les procès intentés à l'ancien commentateur de la T.V. tchécoslovaque, M. Vladimír Skutina, puis à dix-neuf jeunes gens et enfin au général Prochlik, ancien chef de la section de la sécurité et de la défense du comité central.

Un autre procès est en préparation contre douze généraux et colonels, parmi lesquels le général Prochazka, chef du commande-

ment militaire de l'Ouest (frontière avec l'Allemagne fédérale), et le général Peprny, ancien commandant des forces armées frontalières. Tous sont accusés de « négligence dans le service ».

De même est en préparation un procès contre M. Alois Polednak, ancien directeur de la cinématographie et membre du présidium du Parlement.

Enfin, la direction du parti semble décidée à arrêter pour une « période indéterminée » des représentants du « printemps de Prague », qu'on appelle aujourd'hui « révisionnistes » ou « contre-révolutionnaires ».

Selon les mêmes informations, ces personnalités seraient internées près de Jachymov (les mines d'uranium). Un autre groupe serait envoyé près de Lesetice (en Bohême centrale) et un troisième dans un ancien camp de pionniers de Sazada.

THE GUARDIAN, Manchester

9 March 1971

## Czechs keep court vigil

CPYRGHT

BY OUR FOREIGN STAFF

Rudolf Slansky and Jan Slings, whose fathers were hanged in 1952 in the Stalinist purges, joined the group waiting yesterday outside the Prague court where 19 young New Left activists are standing trial. The trial, which is in its third day, started last Monday.

Although it is ostensibly public, admission to the courtroom has been by ticket only in spite of the fact that close relatives of the defendants have reported that many seats reserved for "representatives of the workers," are empty.

The 15 men and four girls, many of whom have been detained for over a year, are accused of subverting the Czechoslovak State by forming the Revolutionary Socialist Party and distributing leaflets against the regime.

Czechoslovak officials claim that the trial is not political but on Friday, the second day of the trial, Jan Frolík, a 23-year-old student at the philosophical faculty of Charles University said that their views (which range from Trotskyism to

Maoism and Titoism) could not be separated from their actions.

He denied that any of their actions were subversive and said that they had never envisaged the restoration of capitalism. "Our criticism was not directed against socialism but only against certain methods and actions."

The trial was almost immediately adjourned when the leading defendant, Petr Uhl, a 29-year-old lecturer, challenged the impartiality of the jury. He wanted to know if they had not sat during the

trumped up purge trials of the fifties, many of whose convicted victims were later rehabilitated. He also asked if they had had contact with the Ministry of Justice before the case and whether their membership in the Communist Party allowed them to be independent. On Friday the president of the court ruled that these "objections exceeded the code of procedure of the court."

One of the defendants, Jan Frolík, then raised the issue of a police informer known as

Cechal, who he said had infiltrated the group in the autumn of 1969 and had taken the leading part as an agent provocateur. The students were planning a memorial celebration for the anniversary of the suicide of Jan Palach in January, 1970. Cechal suggested bringing workers in and was instrumental in distributing a leaflet publicly before the group had decided on its final draft.

In today's hearing Czechoslovak officials insisted that the

trial was not a political one and that the students were being prosecuted for specific criminal acts. The students maintained that they were being tried for their political views.

The morning session was given over to interrogation of Petrusja Sustrova, a 23-year-old former student at Charles University who has been imprisoned for more than a year. She has a 3-year-old son. Spectators said that she had admitted studying banned books, but denied that the group was conspiratorial or anti-Socialist.

DAGENS NYHETER, Stockholm  
2 April 1971

#### PRAGUE IMPRISONS 1300 POLITICIANS

##### "Order Prior to Party Meeting"

About 1300 persons in Czechoslovakia will be imprisoned this spring. The leadership wants those responsible in 1968 out of the way before the Party Congress begins at the end of May. These are the politicians who supported Alexander Dubcek's attempt to effect "a more human socialism."

These statements come from very well-informed sources in Czechoslovakia, writes DN's Vienna-correspondent Lars Ake Berling. Those who gave out the statements have had access to documents from the central leadership.

Detention for "an unspecified time" is being mentioned and it is feared that this is one way of avoiding political trials which attract painful attention. Several political trials have taken place in Prague lately in spite of Party Chief Husak's promises to the contrary.

The list of names are being worked up. The first one will include about 30 names of former top figures. The second one will include 200 names of people who held fairly high posts. The third list includes about 1000 names of people in the party districts around the country.

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DAGENS NYHETER, Stockholm  
2 April 1971

# Prag spärrar in 1300 politiker "Order inför partimöte"

Omkring 1300 personer i Tjeckoslovakien skall spärras in i vår. Ledningen vill ha de ansvariga från 1968 ur vägen inför partikongressen, som skall börja i slutet av maj. Det är politiker som stödde Alexander Dubceks försök att genomföra "en mänskligare socialism".

Uppgifterna kommer från mycket välunderrättade källor i Tjeckoslovakien, skriver DN:s Wienkorrespondent Lars Ake Berling. De som lämnat uppgifterna har fått ta del av dokument från den centrala ledningen. Det har talats om internering

"på obestämd tid", och man fruktar att det är ett sätt att slippa politiska processer som väcker pinsam uppmärksamhet. Det har varit flera politiska processer i Prag på sistone trots partichefen Husaks löfte om motsatsen. Tre namnlistor håller på att

utarbetas. Den första upptar ett 30-tal namn på fd toppfigurer. Den andra upptar 200 namn som hade relativt höga poster. Den tredje listan upptar cirka 1000 namn på folk i partidistriktet runt om i landet.

Se sidan fjorton

DAGENS NYHETER, Stockholm  
2 April 1971

## DUBCEK'S MEN NOT ALLOWED TO CAUSE DISTURBANCE

From Dagens Nyheter's Vienna correspondent Lars Ake Berling VIENNA, Thursday.

Persons who were in a leading position and who took active part in the so-called Prague Spring of 1968 will be interned in plenty of time before the 14th Czechoslovak Party Congress beginning at the end of May. This information has reached Vienna from very well informed sources in Czechoslovakia.

The Prague regime and its allies apparently want to prevent disturbances during the Congress by these men from the time of Alexander Dubcek who are now called "revisionists" and "counter-revolutionaries." According to information, around 1300 persons will be affected by this decision which has been made by the Presidium of the Central Committee.

Three lists of names are being worked out. The first list includes around 30 names of former top figures from the time of the Prague Spring. The second list contains around 200 men who earlier had relatively high posts during this time, and the third finally includes about 100 names of other important Dubcek sympathizers from the party districts around the country.

There is talk of detention for "an unspecified time" and this is an expression which has awakened great fears that there will be a shortcut taken to imprisonment without the painful attention that political trials would attract. But what is more likely is that the detention will last until after the parliamentary elections later this year.

The "counter-revolutionaries" will be quartered in the villages of Jachymov, Lesetice and Sazava in Bohemia. The entire action is strictly secret and the Czechoslovak sources state that there will most certainly be a denial forthcoming from official quarters in Prague.

But those who have given out this information have been given access to documents in which the central government gives directives for making up the lists of those to be interned from the outlying party districts. It is the Czechoslovak Minister of Interior, together with a secretary from the Central Committee, who have been given the task to prepare this whole action. It goes on simultaneously with the Communist Party's preparatory meetings to the Congress of the country's 126 party districts.

A quick change of wind has taken place after the relatively "mild winter" in Prague. During the last few weeks - in spite of earlier and repeated assurances to the contrary from Gustav Husak - there have been several politically tinged trials in Czechoslovakia and still further trials are said to be on the way.

In face of the Party Congress, which will take place seven weeks after the Soviet one, the borders will be closed. No visas will be granted and tourist travel to the West will be entirely stopped.

There is information in Prague which points to extra call-ups of military personnel and to the fact that the police and army have been put on increased alert.

There are also signs that a further wave of purges is imminent. Questionnaires about people's attitudes to anything in connection with the events of 1968 have again been in circulation.

Most sensitive questions have been avoided in Czechoslovakia lately with the excuse of waiting and seeing what results will come out of the Party Congress in Moscow. The waiting is true, but in the midst of this waiting there has also been a feverish activity pointing towards still tighter reins both within the party and outside.

CPYRGHT

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
22 APRIL 1971

# Prague court stops political restitution

By Eric Bourne  
Special correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

Vienna

A Prague decision has reversed the rehabilitation of a former Democrat minister jailed in one of the show trials conducted by the notorious State Court in Czechoslovakia's Stalinist '50's.

The decision was made by the present Supreme Court against 71-year-old Dr. Prokop Drtina, Minister of Justice until the Communist coup of 1948, and one of the more tragic victims of the repressive years which followed.

The case is a further serious setback for the rehabilitation process which was one of the most nationally acclaimed initiatives of the ill-fated 1968 reform movement.

## Many included

The rehabilitation law promised redress for "all unlawfulness and arbitrary illegalities" of the Stalinist period.

The first cases included not only the Communist Party's own victims in eight major political trials between 1949 and 1956, but many officers and ex-ministers whose offense was their wartime service with Western armed forces or with President Eduard Benes' government in London.

Dr. Drtina was among the latter, a member of Dr. Benes' own National Socialist Party and one of his principal counselors during the years in exile.

As Minister of Justice in the Communist-led coalition which followed the first postwar elections he fought hard to uphold the independence of the courts.

Inevitably, this brought him into sharp conflict with Communist efforts to win control of the police and judiciary and in the Cabinet crisis which ended with their successful take-over.

## Suicide attempted

Dr. Drtina sought — unsuccessfully — to end his life, a tragically despairing form of Czechoslovak protest in recent times. In the hospital he was arrested

and then detained until, in 1953, he was sentenced for 15 years. He remained in jail until 1960.

When, early in 1968, the new reform regime promised restitution for all the victims of the "period of deformations," a tide of applications—in many cases posthumously by families—flooded in.

By the time the Russians invaded in August, there were 20,000 appellants in the Czechoslovak lands, 5,000 in Slovakia and numerous servicemen's claims filed with military courts.

The reform law set up advisory legal committees and rehabilitation commissions under judges uncompromised by involvement in the abuses of the 1950's.

## Process slowed

After the invasion, there was no immediate move to revoke the process though inevitably it was slowed down. Despite occupation, the struggle between the reformers and the Russian-backed hard-liners was not resolved until the latter part of 1969, following Alexander Dubcek's dismissal and the start of the full-scale purge of his followers.

Dr. Drtina was awarded redress in this period. Early in 1970, however, the commissions were abolished. The law was amended not only to restrict the possibilities for rehabilitation but, through appointment of other judges, to give the Justice Ministry strict control over future decisions.

## Political clichés

Dr. Drtina's own award was reversed on a prosecutor's appeal under a loophole in procedures that excludes applicants whose original prosecution was regarded — and still is — as permissible "revolutionary legality."

Using the political clichés leveled at the reformers on all fronts of Czechoslovak life, the regime alleges that re-

dress had become an instrument of the "anti-Socialists" and the "right-wing opportunists" and that the courts had been "too liberal."

It is a convenient interpretation which, in effect, allows judgment on the basis of an appellant's political actions before these were, in fact, ruled "punishable."

Dr. Drtina is not precluded from demanding rehearing by an ordinary municipal court. In the meantime, he is said to yet have the pension restored when he was cleared of so-called "treason" 16 years previously.

In the present temper of Prague it is unlikely he can succeed. His experience is more likely to set a precedent.

According to the limited information published in the last two years, fewer than half the original cases have been ruled upon. And even of those adjudicated rehabilitations, 80 percent — according to a recent Bratislava broadcast — now are to be reviewed under the revised procedures.

THE GUARDIAN, Manchester  
1 April 1971

CPYRGHT

# Worried Socialists ask to visit Czechs

BY A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT

A commission of eminent British and American Socialists and Communists has applied for visas to visit Czechoslovakia to examine the Government's claims to have achieved "consolidation on the basis of Socialist democracy."

The team has asked to speak to party leaders as well as to the former leaders, all now purged from the party, Alexander Dubcek, Frantisek Kriegel and Josef Smrkovsky. The commission consists of Professors Christopher Hill and Maurice Dobb, Dr Eric Hobsbaum, Mr Raymond Williams, Mr Lawrence Daly, and Professor Noam Chomsky from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

The commission was drawn together by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, one of whose directors, Mr Ken Coates, said yesterday that they were "particularly worried by the recent outcrop of trials with strong political overtones." They wanted to talk to Mr Dubcek and the others about "the prospects for socialism and democracy in both Western and Eastern Europe."

Whether or not the Czechs provide visas (and the commission is clearly hoping that they will find it hard to refuse men like Maurice Dobb, whose works are standard economic readings in Eastern Europe), their new move does reflect continuing disquiet among Western Socialists about Czechoslovakia.

The recent trials of a television commentator, Vladimir Skutina, of 19 New Left activists, and of the former general, Václav Prchlik, have all been carried out in a very different spirit from the trumped-up Stalinist trials of the 1950s.

In those days a "confession" was enough to lead to a death sentence. The present trials have conformed to normal legal processes with genuine defence

counsel, and the sentences passed have not been the maximum available. But the fact that they have occurred now, although most of the alleged offences took place more than 18 months ago, has aroused anxiety.

The commission's move comes at a difficult moment for the Czechoslovak party which is preparing for its congress. A key question will be who turns up from the Western and other parties which criticised the invasion. It will create awkward decisions of protocol both for the Czechs and the parties concerned.

In January the Czechoslovak Communist Party published its new version of what happened in 1968 when it said that the invading troops came at the "invitation of thousands of honest Czechs and Slovak Communists" to forestall a counter-revolution.

The document was clearly designed to end foreign Communist criticism of the invasion by investing it with some cloak of legality. A month before it was published Mr Vasil Bilak, the secretary of the central committee in charge of relations with foreign parties

said it was "of considerable importance for the fraternal parties abroad." But when it did come out, it was a damp squib.

The French Communist Party paper, "Humanité," commented: "Our position is well known. Nothing leads us to modify it." It added that the document "introduces into the conception of the national sovereignty of the Socialist States elements which do not belong to the principles of the international Communist movement as defined at the June, 1969, conference."

This was a reference to the so-called Brezhnev doctrine which overrode the affirmation

in June, 1969, of non-interference in the internal affairs of other parties by saying that the defence of class interests outweighed national sovereignty.

The Italian paper "Unità" was even tougher. It rejected

the document with the comment: "We do not accept that the sovereignty of a Socialist country can be in contradiction to its 'class and internationalist character.' Sovereignty is an inalienable right." The British Communist Party also said: "Nothing at all in this latest document would justify any change in our party's position."

Dr Husak paid a surprise unofficial visit to Bucharest early in March to see President Ceausescu. In August, 1968, the Rumanian President had described the invasion as "shameful and unjustified." But after the visit Rumanian sources made it clear that there was no change in the country's attitude to the invasion.

It is an unhappy position for the Czech party. Last week Mr Zdenek Horeni, the deputy editor of "Rude Pravo" wrote: "Today it is impossible not to see in the Communist movement a shift in opinion on a number of questions related to the assessment of the year 1968 in Czechoslovakia."

Certainly it is inevitable that as time has gone on, and after heavy pressure from Moscow, the Czech events are not discussed with as much urgency as they were before. But on the key issue of whether the invasion was justified there has been no change.

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WASHINGTON POST

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# Statement by Czech Official Indicates Attack on Church

By Tammy Tanaka  
Religious News Service

NEW YORK — A sharp crackdown against the church in Czechoslovakia was predicted in the near future in an ominous statement issued by the head of the Czech Office for Church Affairs, Karel Hruza.

"Having got rid of the rightist forces in the leadership of both party and government," he declared, "we are now structuring a springboard for an attack upon the reactionary policy of the churches."

His article, "Religion and Ideological Struggle in Czechoslovakia," was not published in his own country, but appeared in a special pamphlet—"Atheism and the Building of Socialism"—in Moscow in late 1970.

Hruza's article and an interpretation of it appears in the April issue of Religion in Communist Dominated Areas (RCDA), a National Council of Churches' publication edited here by Paul B. Anderson and Blahoslav S. Hruby.

The article was translated from the Russian by Father John H. Ryder, S.J., chaplain to Basilian Nuns of St. Marcrina, Sacred Heart Monastery in Astoria, L.I.

## Vatican Sends Delegates

As the article and translation were being prepared for publication here, a Vatican delegation arrived in Prague for talks on church-state relations with Czechoslovak officials, including Hruza.

The church-state talks are expected to deal with the ap-

pointment of bishops to vacant dioceses in Czechoslovakia and with certain strictures now impeding church activity.

"Hruza's name—in English 'Horror'—expresses what the church people feel about him and his manipulation, harassment and persecution of churches during the Stalinist era when he reigned over religious life in Czechoslovakia with an iron fist," the introduction to the RCDA article, said.

Hruza was ousted in January, 1968, when the moderate Alexander Dubcek replaced Antonin Novotny. The churches began to enjoy freedom. But eight months later, after the Dubcek regime was crushed by the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia, Hruza returned to the Office for Church Affairs and began to destroy the gains made by churches.

In his article for Russian consumption only, the Czech official charged the churches—the Vatican and the World Council of Churches in particular—of being in the front ranks in the cold war against Communism, and of engaging in international espionage against the socialist nations.

Commenting on the "strategy" used by religious forces to gain strength in Czechoslovakia, Hruza noted that before 1968 most church men were concerned about gaining an "ideological base" acceptable also to "a certain stratum of the intelligentsia."

"A considerable part of an ideologically and politically

fickle intelligentsia, together with a few confused party members, who held that the church contributed to the humanizing of socialist society, gave their aid in this matter," the Czech official said.

He added, during this period, churchmen did not come out directly with "an antisocialist program," and cited as evidence the Christian-Marxist dialogue of 1967. He also mentioned the international symposium on Christian-Marxist dialogue held despite opposition from the U.S.S.R., Poland and East Germany.

However, after January 1968, international religious bodies directed their effort not only against Marxist philosophy, Hruza said, but towards "Christianizing" atheism and to "formulating political demands with anti-socialist trends."

## Council Accused

He accused the Vatican of sabotaging the Peace Movement of Catholic Clergy in Czechoslovakia led by Dr. J. Plojhar (known in the West as a defrocked priest and collaborator with the Communist regime) and of using Catholic exiles and others for anti-Czechoslovak activities.

Hruza also accused the World Council of Churches of planning to build a "world center" in Prague in order "to conduct easily its ideological fight against the countries under the socialist system."

Under the far more liberal Dubcek regime, the religious press expanded and aided the

"general assault" of the churches and religious societies sympathetic to socialism, the Czech leader said.

"The printing of papers, magazines and books increased," he reported. "For instance, in 1966, the Slovak Catholic papers had a circulation of 42,000; in 1969, 125,000. Correspondingly, the Czech Catholic papers printed 31,000 in 1966, and in 1969, 170,000."

Hruza claimed that "this kind of multiplying the production of church literature was made possible by help from beyond our borders..." He said a million Czech crowns were received from international organizations for the printing of a "catechism."

"Nearly all the churches and religious groups in Czechoslovakia have ideological, theological and political centers of organization abroad," he said. "The international church establishments are hand-in-glove with various imperialistic intelligence services, along with whom they endeavor to utilize religious convictions of the people for their illegal doings."

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May 1971

EAST PAKISTAN: A SINO-SOVIET BATTLEGROUND

Pakistan's general elections in December 1970 resulted in the emergence of two political leaders: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in West Pakistan and Sheik Mujibur Rahman in East Pakistan. Each received electoral support only in his own geographical area; neither had any semblance of a political base in the other's area. Bhutto and Sheik Mujib had been charged by President Yahya Khan to reach an agreement on the form of a new constitution to be presented to a constituent assembly scheduled for 3 March. That assembly was postponed indefinitely by President Yahya on 1 March; it was then obvious that Yahya, Bhutto and Mujib could not reach an agreement. Mujib pressed for a constitution based on a six-point program which would give a high degree of provincial autonomy to East Pakistan and would give the central government the responsibility only for defense and foreign affairs. Bhutto declared his party would boycott the constituent assembly because Mujib was unwilling to compromise and had put West Pakistan in a take it or leave it position. An impasse was reached and the East Pakistanis began seriously talking of independence rather than autonomy. President Yahya tried to mediate the situation, but strikes in provincial government offices, demonstrations and the threat of riots led Yahya to call in troops from West Pakistan to restore order.

On the night of 25-26 March 1971 Sheik Mujib was arrested and taken to prison in West Pakistan, where he has been held on a charge of treason. Violence in East Pakistan ensued and Mujib's followers took up arms to resist the Army troops. However, inadequate arms in the hands of generally untrained and chaotically disorganized Awami League hands have led to a disintegration of effective military resistance to Pakistan Army re-establishing control over at least the major urban areas of East Pakistan. Despite this, Awami League leaders announced the formation of the provisional government of Bangla Dosh on 16 April 1971.

Yahya, meanwhile continued using the Pakistan Army in order to crush the rebellion and maintain the unity of Pakistan. Although Yahya considered his actions an internal affair they have been watched and widely commented on internationally.

Internal affair or not, the Soviet Union decided to tell Pakistan how it should handle the situation. The extent of the Soviet meddling even at the earliest stage of Yahya's police action is surprising. On March 28 an oral message from Premier Kosygin was given to Yahya - and even earlier the Soviet Consul General in East Pakistan conferred with Yahya when he visited Dacca. Then on April 3, Soviet President Podgorny, in a formal message to Pakistan, called on Yahya to stop the bloodshed and repression in East Pakistan. He gratuitously reminded Yahya that Sheik Mujib had received the convincing support of the majority of the people and called for the adoption of methods of peaceful political settlement. The Soviets also used their propaganda outlets in India to tell the government of Pakistan how to handle their affairs; and herein lies the clue to why the Soviets have interfered. The famous Indian leftist weekly Blitz, in its lead story on 13 March stated that what is happening in East Pakistan is no longer an open revolt but a "war of liberation - this is revolution itself".

The official organ of the Communist Party of India, New Age in an editorial on March 21 made the statement that the "people of Bangla Desh are not only making history for their own sake but they are contributing to the cause of the world-wide struggle for freedom, democracy and social progress," typical party jargon for wars of national liberation. Both Blitz and New Age apparently got the official party line from a Soviet press official who commented that the entire concept of Pakistan is artificial, is based on a division created by years of imperialistic domination, and that the idea of an Islamic State is a basically reactionary concept. He added that Islam was a progressive historical force in lifting the Arab peoples out of backwardness in the fifth century but it is unrealistic to think any state can be united on religious grounds today.

As might be expected, the press in Pakistan reacted negatively to the Soviet interference. Musawat, an Urdu paper in Lahore reminded the Soviets that they should have recalled Lenin's principle regarding non-interference in other countries' affairs. It also reminded the Soviets that when Soviet interests were challenged in Hungary and Czechoslovakia the Red Army was quick to invade those sovereign countries. Azad, a leftist Urdu paper also in Lahore said it was ironic that the Soviets should express concern for the arrest of Sheik Mujib after what the Soviets did to Czechoslovakia.

There are some indications that the official position of the Pakistan government is to hold down criticism of the Soviets in the press. There are, of course, the Soviet aid projects in Pakistan to be considered. But it is a fact, now becoming obvious, that the Pakistani cultivation of the Soviet Union has led nowhere and that Pakistan in the name of maintaining Soviet good relations ignored activities in both East and West Pakistan prior to this present crisis. Pakistan, by its permissive attitude, invited Podgorny's interference.

But there were other large powers watching the Pakistan crisis. China, at first, reacted cautiously. The New China News Agency on April 4 reported on events in Pakistan but carefully avoided taking a position either for the Pakistan government or for the Bangla Desh secessionists. The Chinese were in a difficult position - the revolt in East Pakistan was clearly the type of indigenous revolution Peking likes to encourage - on the other hand Peking's support of West Pakistan would cast the Chinese in the role of backing a military regime accused of oppressing poor peasants in the eastern half of the country. But, on April 7, Peking made a tentative move off dead center and delivered a formal written protest to the Indian Foreign Ministry charging India with interfering in Pakistan foreign affairs by supporting the secessionist movement in East Pakistan. Apparently China intended to withhold support to the Bengalis in a "peoples war of liberation."

China's next move came on April 11 with the publication in Peoples Daily of a commentary charging the Indian and Soviet governments with interfering in the internal affairs of Pakistan. The article was signed by "Commentator", usually the pen-name for a ranking foreign policy spokesman: "Anyone who interferes in the internal affairs of other countries in any attempt to achieve one's ulterior aims will never come to a good end". "Commentator" also attacked Podgorny's message to Pakistan: "Judging in association with what the Soviet Union did in Czechoslovakia, it is not hard to see what the Soviet leadership supports, what it opposes, and on whose side after all it stands when it poses as a friend of Pakistan".

With this background of Chinese political activity Premier Chou En-lai, on April 13, sent a message to President Yahya Khan calling for unification of Pakistan and assuring Pakistan that it could count on China's support "should Indian expansionists launch an aggression against Pakistan".

Chou En-lai's message to Pakistanis may be read by many West Pakistani's as a message of support but the consensus of other observers is that Chou's message was primarily political, for barring unforeseen developments the danger of a major Indian-Pakistani confrontation is probably limited.

The London Economist on April 17, summed up the slowly developing Chinese policy towards Pakistan by clearly describing Chinese policy as a reaction to Soviet policies in Southern Asia.

"The remarkable thing about the message that Chou En-lai sent to the Pakistani government this week is not that it took a different line about the fighting in East Bengal from the line the Russians had taken the week before; China likes to show it is different from Russia. What is remarkable is that, when it had to choose between joining in the general sympathy for the Bengali rebels and polishing its friendship with President Yahya's military government, China chose the course of realpolitik. It is evident that China is willing to subordinate everything -- even, for the moment, the claims of ideology -- to the business of establishing itself as a power to be reckoned with in Southern Asia. The contest for influence in the region is fairly on."

Essentially the Chinese have given up an opportunity to support a "people's war of national liberation" and after years of calling the Soviets "revisionists" have themselves become revisionists.

What really is happening in Pakistan and Southern Asia is that the countries of the area are being fawned over by the Soviets and the Chinese; neither power can afford to let the other gain any advantage; both are afraid of being politically outflanked. If the Soviets become the dominant power the Chinese would find themselves hemmed in by Soviet influence on both the north and south if the Chinese win out, then the Soviets will have suffered a major setback in the battle for the third world.

CPYRGHT

WASHINGTON POST  
6 April 1971

CPYRGHT

# Soviets Are Shifting Policy on Pakistan

By Dev Murarka

London Observer

MOSCOW—With Presi-

dent Nikolai Podgorny's open appeal over the weekend to the Pakistani head of government, Gen. Yahya Khan, to stop "the bloodshed and repression" in the country's eastern wing, the Soviet Union has turned a new leaf in its relations with South Asia.

The appeal's tone and contents suggest that Soviet policymakers have decided upon a significant change of direction and emphasis in their policy toward the region. In the process they seem to be prepared to risk the displeasure of the West Pakistani leaders in the near future in the hope that in the long run it will pay them political dividends.

The most surprising part of the appeal is the pointed recognition of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman—leader of the Awami League which swept the east in the national elections—and his followers as the political elements who represent East Bengal.

The relevant portion of the message reads: "Concern is also caused in the Soviet Union by the arrests and persecution of M. Rahman and other politicians who had received such convincing support by the overwhelming majority of the population of East Pakistan at the recent general elections."

Some political observers here suggested that this is a departure from the Soviet view that a unified Pakistan must be maintained. In his message to the Pakistani government, Podgorny still speaks in terms of a united Pakistan, but his language appears to suggest that it may no longer be a practical possibility.

Moscow is not unaware that its appeal will be deliberately interpreted that way by Yahya Khan. Almost certainly it will undo much of the effort Moscow has put into cultivating Pakistan, and may even freeze relations for the next few years.

The Soviets have come to attach considerable importance to Pakistan during the last five or six years. They are most conscious, above all of the inroads made by Communist China in Pakistan and this disturbs them profoundly because of its proximity to the Soviet Union. If, in spite of these factors, Moscow has now chosen publicly to dissociate itself from Yahya Khan's policies, it has not done so without some hard thinking.

The Russians are proverbially cautious about supporting any kind of secessionist movement. Their tacit support for the Bengalis, therefore, indicates that they have grounds for believing that the Bengal nationalist movement possesses greater strength than is normally supposed.

Another factor is undoubtedly India. Although it would be unwise to exaggerate the Indian capability to sway Moscow from a settled course, India has been very active at a diplomatic level in trying to persuade the Kremlin to make some kind of gesture.

Premier Indira Gandhi's overwhelming election victory has added to her government's prestige in Soviet eyes. In view of the great emotion aroused in India over the suffering of East Bengalis, Moscow may have come to the conclusion that for the time being it is far better to bank upon India than upon Pakistan.

Moscow came to the conclusion that to express sympathy and concern for the East Bengalis at this stage, when they have been forsaken by almost every country except India, will lay the foundations for sound relations with East Bengal if its independence becomes a fact.

Moscow also is not convinced that there is unanimity in West Pakistan itself about the course Yahya Khan has taken.

Besides these considerations, Moscow has been alarmed that the civil war in Pakistan might spark off a wider conflagration involving India, China and maybe other powers. A peaceful political settlement, Podgorny said, will not only be in the interests of Pakistan, but "in the interests of preserving peace in the area."

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
8 April 1971

CPYRGHT

## Difficult position

# Peking cautious on Pakistan rift

By Henry S. Hayward  
Staff correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

### Hong Kong

Communist China, like the United States and the Soviet Union, is being very careful about becoming involved in the Pakistan internal conflict.

Peking finds itself in a difficult position: It regards Pakistan—meaning East and West combined as one nation—as a useful friend worthy of support.

But when the two halves apparently are involved in a serious civil war that may continue for some time, it's hard for mainland China to decide which side to back. The safest course seems to be to do nothing for the moment.

Yet the revolt in East Pakistan appears as one of those indigenous revolutions Peking normally likes to encourage. And Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman has sounded friendly to mainland China in the past.

### Friendly visit

Moreover, the Chinese probably do not relish being in the position of supporting West Pakistan against the East. That would cast them in the role of backing a military regime which has suspended the normal democratic processes and is accused of oppressing the poor peasants of the eastern half of the country.

Although it was only last November that he paid a friendly visit to Peking, Pakistan President Yahya Khan apparently senses he is not likely to get much help from the People's Republic, and therefore has appealed to Moscow instead, to help keep India from interfering.

This, in effect, is turning to India's Communist friend to exert a restraining influence on New Delhi instead of turning to Pakistan's own friend, China, to restrain India by means of threats or warnings.

Meanwhile, unless the Pakistani central government in Rawalpindi can quickly wipe out Bengali resistance by means of West Pakistani military units, East Pakistan may prove ideal for prolonged guerrilla operations against President Yahya Khan's soldiers. Such operations, of course, are dear to the heart of China's Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

On the other hand, Chairman Mao well knows he has no common border with East Pakistan and consequently to viable method for large-scale support for dissident forces there. This doubtless would be a factor in any Chinese decision not to become involved.

### Model of neutrality

As of April 7, Peking's only comment about the Pakistan crisis was a model of neutrality and noninvolvement issued on April 4. An account of the trouble by the official Chinese news agency Hsinhua reported the sending of West Pakistan troops into East Pakistan and President Yahya's statement blaming "secessionist elements"

who wanted independence for the eastern half of Pakistan.

It also reported Pakistan's protests against alleged Indian interference in its internal affairs. But Peking carefully avoided taking a position behind either the Pakistani Government or the Bangla Desh secessionists.

If East Pakistan manages to become a separate entity, Peking may figure it can maintain good relations with both halves. But if India appears likely to benefit by taking a portion of East Pakistan under its own wing, then the pressure for China to get into the act might well increase.

### Nigeria recalled

For the moment, however, China is remaining aloof, apparently waiting for the dust to settle.

In doing so, Peking's position is not unlike that of Washington, which also seems determined not to become involved in another Asian internal dispute. Observers here are reminded of the parallels with American policy toward the Nigerian civil war, when Biafra attempted to break away.

At that time, the Washington decision was to stand aside, no matter how heart-rending the appeals for aid, on the ground that such a course is better in the long run than becoming involved in yet another Vietnam-like situation.

As far as Pakistan is concerned, Peking thus far seems to be following a very similar line of reasoning.

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WASHINGTON POST  
8 April 1971

### China Charges India On Pakistan's War

NEW DELHI, April 7 (UPI)

—Communist China broke its silence on the civil war in East Pakistan today, charging India with interfering in Pakistani affairs by supporting the separatist movement in the East.

The Indian foreign ministry rejected the protest as unwarranted. The Chinese protest, delivered in written form to the Indian foreign ministry, was the first official Peking statement on the civil war.

Prior to Communist China's protest to the Indian government, Western diplomats in New Delhi noted China's dilemma in deciding whether to support the Bengalis in a "people's war of liberation" Peking has so long advocated or to back Pakistan's government of President Yahya Khan for military and geopolitical reasons.

CPYRGHT

WASHINGTON STAR  
5 April 1971

### CHINESE BACK WEST

## Peking, Moscow Split On Pakistani Fighting

CPYRGHT

By HENRY S. BRADSHIER  
Star Staff Writer

**HONG KONG** — While most nations keep an embarrassed silence on the Pakistani civil war, China and the Soviet Union have publicly taken opposite positions.

China has come out in strong support of the Pakistani government in Islamabad, which is trying to hide the violent suppression of the elected majority political movement.

The Soviet Union has appealed to Islamabad for "most urgent measures to stop the bloodshed and repressions" in East Pakistan.

#### Condemned by India

Meanwhile, the nation closest to and most emotionally involved in the situation, India, again has condemned the Pakistani government's actions.

A resolution of India's governing political party yesterday appealed for "all nations to take urgent and constructive steps to put an end to" what it called "inhuman atrocities" in East Pakistan.

The resolution of the Indian Congress party did not specify what kind of steps Islamabad

continued to charge angry that India was sending weapons to help the East Pakistanis.

Other nations, to which India appealed, have kept silent on the ground that the civil war is an internal matter.

The United States and Britain, the two countries whose armed forces led relief efforts for East Pakistan after November's devastating hurricane, have cautiously avoided flexing their moral or military muscles this time.

Their caution seemed intended to avoid irritating Islamabad, which shows no signs of being receptive to friendly influence on this subject.

#### Wise Policy or Evasion?

It remains to be seen whether the hoarding of any possible influence, against a future day when it might be used to help the East Pakistanis, was a wise policy or merely an evasion of the issue.

This Western caution also seeks to avoid driving Pakistan's government further into the arms which China have just opened wider.

Peking took note over the weekend of the trouble in East

But the New China News Agency account described the trouble only in the one-sided terms of President A. M. Yahya Khan and focused attention on Pakistani charges of Indian interference.

The Chinese account, also broadcast by Peking Radio, amounted to support for Islamabad's version of events.

China has provided and promised more foreign aid to Pakistan than to any other single country—more than \$300 million worth. It also has armed Pakistan.

Now it seems to be trying to protect its most important friendship in Asia, apparently on the assumption that the Islamabad government will prevail in East Pakistan.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, always has put more importance on its friendship with India, the past enemy of both Pakistan and China, than on its tie to Pakistan.

In the 1960s Moscow tried to be friendly with both India and Pakistan. But Indian officials claim their pressure forced the Russians to restrict arms supplies promised Islamabad.

Soviet President Nikolai V.

Khan on Saturday to seek "a peaceful political settlement" in East Pakistan instead of "bloodshed and repressions."

Unless Soviet diplomatic reporting from Pakistan is very bad, Podgorny must have known that the only possibly valid political settlement now is for Islamabad to grant independence to East Pakistan—despite today's Pakistani claim of support by 12 "political leaders" in the East.

The army, which represents West Pakistan, was called in to prevent independence, so no settlement acceptable to both East and West is presently visible.

#### Vital Interests at Stake

Podgorny added that continued "repressive measures and bloodshed . . . may do great harm to the vital interests of the entire people of Pakistan."

This might have been merely a statement of the obvious economic fact of civil war. But it might have been a veiled threat to cut off Soviet economic aid.

The combination of the Soviet pressure and the Chinese support seemed likely to enhance Chinese prestige in Islamabad.

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Middle-level officials of the Pakistani army have been believed by many observers to be mildly pro-Peking ever since the 1965 Pakistan-India war.

Moscow stayed neutral then. But China supported Pakistan and later rearmed it with some 150 light and medium tanks and about 75 MIG19 jet fighters. Further arms aid is believed to have been promised last year.

It is among the colonels and majors that the strongest army pressure is believed to have developed on Yahya Khan to crack down on the

East Pakistani demand for autonomy.

This pressure was directly tied to the political pressure from Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the main elected leader of West Pakistan. Bhutto was cited by Yahya Khan as the key element in the failure of political talks in Dacca which was followed by the army crackdown.

Bhutto represents the same kind of landlord and bureaucratic elements that the army officer corps comes from. As foreign minister in 1963-66, he developed Pakistan's present good relations with China.

BALTIMORE SUN  
12 April 1971

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## PAKISTAN GIVEN PEKING'S BACKING

India, Soviet, U.S. Accused  
Of Plotting Intervention

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By EDWARD K. WU

Hong Kong Bureau of The Sun

Hong Kong, April 11—Communist China today threw its support to Pakistan by denouncing India for conniving in "international intervention" in East Pakistan with Soviet and American support.

In its first official reaction to the secessionist crisis in East Pakistan, the party newspaper, *People's Daily*, declared that the Chinese government and people resolutely would support Pakistan against what it called foreign aggression and intervention.

The comments, made by the newspaper's Commentator, who is usually a high foreign-policy spokesman, avoided choosing sides in the civil war in East Pakistan, which China regards as a domestic issue of Pakistan.

### Internal Affairs

"Anyone who interferes in the internal affairs of other countries in an attempt to achieve one's ulterior aims will never come to a good end," the Commentator article said.

It refrained from saying that it approved or disapproved of the way the Pakistani government was handling the situation in the eastern wing of the country.

It emphasized China's support for Pakistan in its "struggle for safeguarding national independence and state sovereignty and against foreign aggression and intervention."

And it was on the issue of alleged foreign intervention that China hit hard at India and the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, the United States.

Statements, Reports

Citing statements by Indian

leaders and quoting reports of the massing of Indian troops along East Pakistan's border and of armed infiltration into East Pakistan, the *People's Daily* article said: "In league with the two superpowers, the Indian government bustled about scheming for international intervention."

It singled out Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny's recent appeal to President A. M. Yahya Khan to take immediate steps to stop the bloodshed and repression against the people of East Pakistan as a "more blatant act" of intervention than a State Department statement on Pakistan.

President Podgorny's message, it said, "impudently criticized" Pakistan and ignored India's intervention.

"Not Hard To See"

"Judging in association with

what the Soviet Union did in Czechoslovakia, it is not hard to see what the Soviet leadership supports, what it opposes, and on whose side after all it stands when it poses as friend of Pakistan," the article said.

It dismissed India's rationale for viewing the developments in East Pakistan as a threat to its own security.

Describing the whole attitude of the Indian government toward the East Pakistani crisis as "overbearing," the Chinese article said all the acts of India, as well as its fanning up of "anti-Pakistan chauvinist sentiments," once again revealed the "expansionist features of the Indian reactionaries."

China had accused India of pursuing an expansionist policy during the China-India border war in 1962 and in its relations with the three Himalayan states of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim.

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NEW YORK TIMES  
13 April 1971**COMMUNIST CHINA  
BACKS PAKISTAN  
AND WARNS INDIA****Lauds Effort to End East's  
Autonomy Drive—Stay  
Out, New Delhi Told****UNITY IS TERMED VITAL****Direct Peking Involvement  
Doubted by U.S. Aides—  
Kosygin Sees Envoys**

By Reuters

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, April 12—Communist China came out strongly today in support of President Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan and warned India against any aggression against Pakistan.

President Yahya's forces have been putting down a movement for autonomy in East Pakistan.

[United States officials said that they did not believe that the Chinese message presaged any direct involvement by Peking in the Pakistani situation. In Moscow, Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin met with the Pakistani and Indian Ambassadors.]

The message, to the Pakistani President from Premier Chou En-lai, was officially made public here tonight. In it, the Chinese leader said that President Yahya and other Pakistani leaders had "done a lot of useful work to uphold the unification of Pakistan and to prevent it from moving toward a split."

**Pakistan's Policies Backed**

"We believe," the message went on, "that through consultations and the efforts of Your Excellency and leaders of vari-

ous quarters in Pakistan, Pakistan will certainly be restored to normal.

"In our opinion, unification of Pakistan and unity of the peoples of East and West Pakistan are basic guarantees for Pakistan to attain prosperity and strength."

Last Tuesday, the Chinese sent a note to New Delhi that contended India was interfering in East Pakistan.

Since the fighting broke out on March 25, Pakistan has made repeated allegations—denied by India—that Indian armed infiltrators had entered East Pakistan to aid the independence forces of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, head of the Awami League, the major party in the East.

"Should Indian expansion-

ists dare to launch any aggression against Pakistan," the Chinese message said, "the Chinese Government and people will always firmly support the Pakistan Government and people in their just struggle to safeguard their state sovereignty and national independence."

"The Chinese Government," the note said, "holds that what is happening in Pakistan at present is purely an internal affair of Pakistan, which can only be settled by the Pakistan people themselves, and which brooks no foreign interference whatsoever."

**Peking Involvement Doubted**

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 12—United States officials took the view today that Premier Chou En-lai's message of support for Pakistan was primarily political and did not presage any direct Peking involvement.

Officials here said that the consensus in the Administration was that, barring unforeseen developments, the danger of a major Indian-Pakistani confrontation was limited.

American officials tended to doubt that India would take advantage of the East Pakistani fighting to become directly engaged in hostilities with Pakistan. For this reason, they said, Premier Chou's statement of support for Pakistan appeared

Nevertheless, the White House press secretary, Ronald L. Ziegler, said that, "We are following the situation very closely."

**U.S. Not 'Taking Sides'**

Other officials said that, unlike China and the Soviet Union, the United States was "not taking sides." The judgment here is that China regards Pakistan as her ally while the Soviet Union favors India.

However, a State Department spokesman, Charles W. Bray 3d, said that the Nixon Administration had not interrupted the program of sales to Pakistan, mostly for cash, of so-called "nonlethal military equipment" such as spare parts, transport planes and medical supplies. Charges have been made that Pakistan was using United States arms to suppress the East Pakistani rebellion.

Mr. Bray said this "modest" program was now "under review." Mr. Bray was unable to say whether equipment sold to Pakistan before the eruption of the fighting was being delivered at this time. He said the State Department had been unable to determine over the weekend whether there were any ships at sea carrying material to Pakistani ports.

**Kosygin Meets Ambassadors**

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, April 12—Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin met separately today with the Pakistani and Indian ambassadors as part of an apparently growing Soviet effort to seek a solution to the crisis caused by the civil strife in East Pakistan.

Diplomatic sources said that the Soviet Union was deeply concerned over continued bloodshed in East Pakistan and the resulting charges and countercharges between the Pakistan and Indian Governments that have had Communist China to speak out on the side of Pakistan.

The details of Mr. Kosygin's meetings with Ambassador Jamshed J. A. Marker of Pakistan and Ambassador Durga Prasad Ohara of India were not known. Tass, the official press agency, said both sessions were at the request of the ambassadors. It said the talk with Mr. Marker was held in a "friendly atmosphere."

had "a friendly conversation" with Mr. Dhara.

It is presumed by Western diplomats here that Mr. Kosygin has been in private contact

with the Pakistan and Indian Governments over the apparently worsening situation and that both of these countries may have asked to give the Russians their points of view.

**Force Was Criticized**

The wide publicity given the meetings by the Soviet media indicated a Soviet desire to underscore Moscow's effort to remain impartial, even though the Kremlin had already publicly criticized the use of force to quell the East Pakistani independence movement.

President Nikolai V. Podgorny on April 2 sent a public message to President Yahya calling on him to take "the most immediate measures to put an end to bloodshed and repression against the population of East Pakistan and to take measures for a peaceful settlement."

BALTIMORE SUN  
14 April 1971

## Bid To Aid Pakistan Natural For Peking

By EDWARD K. WU  
Hong Kong Bureau of The Sun

Hong Kong, April 13—Communist China's warning to India against any attack on Pakistan in the present civil war in East Pakistan is a natural product of Peking's relations with three of its neighbors—Pakistan, India and the Soviet Union.

It is not surprising that Premier Chou En-lai assured President A. M. Yahya Khan at a critical moment that he could count on China's firm support "should Indian expansionists dare to launch any aggression against Pakistan."

### Pledges Renewed

Peking has made similar pledges before when its two neighbors in the Indian subcontinent were on the brink of war in September, 1965. And whether from the impact of the Chinese warning or other reasons, the full-scale fighting that threat-

ened to erupt then was averted.

Pakistan has also received planes, tanks and other military equipment and substantial economic aid from China to counterbalance what India gets from the Soviet Union.

The Pakistan Army is using American-supplied Patton and Chinese tanks to crush secessionist Bangla Desh, as the rebels call East Pakistan.

But the Chinese premier, in taking sides in the crisis, rallied with Islamabad not ostensibly in the East Pakistan civil war, which he considered a domestic matter for Pakistan, but in the alleged foreign intervention by India and, to a certain extent, by the Soviet Union.

### "Purely Internal"

Mr. Chou said, in his message to the Pakistan president, "The Chinese government holds that

what is happening in Pakistan

at present is purely an internal affair which can only be settled by the Pakistan people themselves and which brooks no foreign interference whatsoever."

China, through its party paper *People's Daily* during the weekend, had accused India of intervening in Pakistan's internal affairs, of massing troops near the border and of conducting armed infiltration into East Pakistan.

It was from this background that Premier Chou warned that any Indian attack on Pakistan would draw strong Chinese support—whatever that meant—for the Muslim state.

### Scores Podgorny

For the Chinese, the recent message of the Soviet president, Nikolai V. Podgorny, to President Yahya was seen as not only a rebuke to Pakistan but a con-

nivance with India.

*People's Daily* said the Soviet request to President Yahya to take effective measures to stop the bloodshed and repression against the East Pakistan people was a "more blatant act" of interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state than what the United States has done.

As Chairman Mao Tse-tung has said that "whatever the enemy supports, we must oppose," China cannot conceivably go along with India and the Soviet Union, with which it is at loggerheads.

And to sacrifice the close and convenient friendship and virtual alliance forged with Pakistan over the years would not be in China's best interest, at least for the present.

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
21 April 1971

CPYRGHT

## The Pakistan tragedy

The outcome of the fighting in Pakistan is nothing for anyone to cheer about. The dominant Punjabis from West Pakistan have refastened their rule on the physically weaker dravidian peoples of the Ganges Valley. It's an old story, the meat-herding mountain tribesmen riding down over the grain-growing folk of the valley.

We who are spectators on the sidelines can only feel sad for the losers in Bengal as we had to feel not so long ago about the Ibo losers in Nigeria.

But the inevitable sadness does not mean that there was a possible better ending.

The hard truth about the whole business is that the great powers all recog-

mented and unstable Pakistan is less dangerous than what might come out of a change.

Certainly a country divided by a thousand miles of India between its two halves and embittered by the dominance of the western Punjabis over the eastern Bengalis has far less reason for existence than does Nigeria. At least Nigeria is made up of contiguous territory. Its tribes have their quarrels but they are bound together by the common interest in having a common market.

Pakistan was bound together in the beginning by the common Moslem religion. It is held together now by the simple fact that any change in southern Asia's present

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ways hear about) could trigger almost anything. The anomaly of the two-part Pakistan is itself part of the "status quo." Upset that, and anything could happen. This is precisely why New Delhi, Washington, and London all watched with intense fascination as Moscow and Peking played the hand, but themselves held their breaths and tiptoed around the edges lest they unintentionally start an avalanche.

For Washington to play the spectator role is a new experience. For some 20 years now the Chinese have been the spectators watching Moscow and Washington maneuver around whatever might be the issue between them of the moment.

The Pakistan story is the first clear-case example of how different things can

be in the chapter of history now opening.

Here was a case where the issue is primarily between Russia and China. The American interest is small compared to the great interests those two Asiatic powers have in southern Asia. India is where either Russia or China might get a decisive advantage over the other. To the United States the interest is in keeping a balance between the two which allows southern Asia to remain independent of either.

For Washington to manage to sit quietly on the sidelines was an exercise in a useful new discipline. For everyone to allow West Pakistan to refasten its grip on East Pakistan was to allow the lesser evil. There wasn't anything better to do.

THE ECONOMIST  
17 April 1971

## The war for Asia

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It is the ideological crossroads of the world, and of course the ideologies have collided there. The great stretch of land which runs from the Sind desert to the Mekong rice-fields has to be seen as a whole. It has never made much sense to think of the Indian sub-continent as something quite separate from south-east Asia; after all, Indochina is called Indochina because that is where the Indian and Chinese cultures met, and they met long before the colonial administrators from Europe started drawing their lines on the map. It makes even less sense to compartmentalise southern Asia in the light of what is now happening in Ceylon and Pakistan.

Of the 12 non-communist countries, with getting on for 800 million people living in them, which lie around a line drawn from Rawalpindi to Saigon, no fewer than eight now have fighting going on in their territory. There is the war in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. There are insurrections in Thailand, Burma and Malaysia which receive help from China, or North Vietnam, or both. And now the civil wars in Pakistan and Ceylon have got the great powers and the ideologies circling above them. Of those 12 countries only four—Nepal, Singapore and Bhutan, and India if you do not count what has been happening in West Bengal for the past four years—are in the state we used to call peace. Of course, it would be nonsense to pretend that each of these conflicts does not have its own local causes. But it would be just as wrong to ignore the fact that these local problems are overlaid by the rivalries of the powers whose claims to influence collide in our time.

This week's news from Ceylon and Pakistan shows that the western part of the region is no more immune to these pressures than the area farther east. It is hard to know what is going on in Ceylon, because Mrs Bandaranaike's government has imposed a very effective censorship (see page 31); but if the estimates of the size of the rebellion are anything like accurate it must be assumed that the rebels have been getting some of their guns, as well as their political ideas, from abroad. There is no apparent reason why the Russians should risk their friendship with India by supporting an attempt to overthrow Mrs Bandaranaike when the Indians are helping to protect her. The most probable providers of arms for the rebels in Ceylon are the Chinese, or the North Koreans; and if it was the North Koreans who sent them the Chinese almost certainly knew about it. And certainly China has made no attempt to conceal its ideas about the crisis in Pakistan. The remarkable thing about the message that Chou En-lai sent to the Pakistani government this week (see page 32) is not that it took a different line about the fighting in East Bengal from the line the Russians had taken the week before; China likes to show it is different from Russia. What is remarkable is that, when it had to choose between joining in the general sympathy for the Bengali rebels and polishing its friendship with President Yahya's military government, China chose the course of *realpolitik*. It is evidence that China is willing to subordinate everything—even, for the moment, the claims to establishing itself as a

power to be reckoned with in southern Asia. The contest for influence in the region is fairly on.

There are two questions which need to be asked about what is happening in Asia. The first is why this particular area should have become the cockpit of the powers ; and the answer to that is fairly easy. The dozen countries between West Pakistan and South Vietnam contain nearly a quarter of the world's population, and a quarter which includes most of the world's very poorest people ; and they happen to lie at the only place where the border between the Soviet Union and China touches the non-communist part of the world. For governments that want to propagate their political ideas—as the government of every great power does, but as relatively young great powers like Russia and China do more than most—the temptation is pretty well irresistible. The arguments of ideology and the arguments of power unite to pull them into a policy of intervention. For Russia and China alike, southern Asia is a rich field for making converts ; it is also a place where neither can afford to let the other get the advantage in winning friends and influencing people. If Russia became the dominant power in the area, the Chinese would find themselves hemmed in by Soviet influence on both their north and their south. If China got the best of it, the Russians would have suffered a major defeat in the battle for the third world, and they would be cut off from a region they have had their eye on for the past century. This is the place where they both have to be afraid of being politically outflanked. That does not mean that either of them is thinking of using its army in southern Asia. They can see the dangers of that ; and anyway it is political supremacy they are after, not military control. But the stakes are high, and it is not impossible that Russia and China may yet find themselves fighting a proxy war with each other through their respective friends on their southern flank.

The other reason why this area is particularly vulnerable is that it lies in the vacuum left by the collapse of British power after 1945. The end of the second world war found the United States occupying positions in central Europe and the western Pacific which, with a couple of crises over Berlin and Korea, have formed a stable dividing line to the west of Russia and the east of China ever since. There has been no equivalent line of demarcation on the southern side of the two great communist powers. The Americans sent their army into Vietnam in 1965 to try to establish such a line at the south-eastern corner of this no-man's land, and six years later they still do not know whether they are going to succeed. The south-western corner of the same void—the Middle East—has seen the Americans and Russians move into the space left by the British retreat. But between those two corners of Asia there is now no centre of power capable of striking a balance with either the Soviet Union or China. India might have been one, but it has not become one yet. That is why this area is so fundamentally fragile. It is

also why the competition for influence within it looks increasingly as if it is going to be largely a competition between the two great communist countries to the north.

And it is why the second question has to be asked. Should it be left to them ? It is tempting to say that this is a part of the world where the west cannot expect to do very much : no more, perhaps, than can be done by foreign ministries performing their tightrope act, and a steadily declining real flow of aid. It is an area which the Chinese can get into overland—they did in 1962—and which lies within fairly easy range of the airfields of Soviet central Asia. But for western traffic it means a long haul by ship or aircraft along routes where the west can no longer be sure of naval or air superiority ; there are no western bases between Cyprus and Singapore except the staging posts on Gan and the Gulf. And this is Asia, and everyone knows what it means to get involved in Asia. For the Americans it would be an intolerable addition to a weight of international responsibilities they are already finding too heavy. For most west Europeans the prospect is still almost as intellectually remote as the moon. The arguments for sitting this one out as a spectator are plain enough.

But something does pull the other way. There is the fact that these dozen countries include five members of the Commonwealth ; and that still counts for something, even if the voices which were calling for a Commonwealth policy on South Africa in January have had very little to say about what is happening in Pakistan and Ceylon. There is also the fact that five of the 12 countries—India, Ceylon, Singapore and still, if only just, Malaysia and South Vietnam—are places where a genuine electoral process does exist and where the population is offered some choice about who should govern it. These things are just as important as the connections of trade, the rubber and tin, the jute and the tea. It is not going to be easy to push aside the fact that the western political idea seems to have a better prospect of surviving in southern Asia—if it gets the chance—than in most other parts of the underdeveloped world. It is not only the Russians and Chinese who have obligations of ideology there.

No doubt somebody in Whitehall was saying this to himself when Britain agreed to send small arms and ammunition to Mrs Bandaranaike, and to buy some American helicopters for her. No doubt it explains why the British and American governments have decided not to say what they both presumably feel about President Yahya's suppression of East Pakistan ; a policy of denunciation is the last resort of people who are otherwise impotent. This is how governments act when they want to stay in the game but do not happen to have much of a hand to play with. But there is no evidence that there exists anything which could be called a western policy for southern Asia. The United States has been occupied with

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Vietnam, Britain with Singapore and the Gulf, France with Africa and Germany with the navel of Europe, and all of them with the Middle East. None of them has had enough intellectual energy to spare for wondering what it would do if the cracks started showing in the region between the Middle East and Singapore. They are showing now.

Something that deserved to be called a policy for southern Asia would have to begin with the recognition that the liberal democracies of the west have a common interest in keeping the multi-party system of government alive on the continent of Asia ; which is much the same as saying that they do not want to see the region fall under the influence of either China or Russia. It would mean keeping the friendship of India, as the centre-piece of Asia. And it would mean maintaining enough military strength available for use in the Indian Ocean to ensure that the sort of help that has been sent to Ceylon this week could be sent to other countries that might need it. This is now a three-superpower world. The exchange of concessions between China and America this week (see the next article) seems to mark the opening of a new period of manoeuvre among the three great powers. It would be a strange abandonment of what the west says it stands for if it left southern Asia to a two-sided competition between Russia and China.

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May 1971

EAST PAKISTAN: A SINO-SOVIET BATTLEGROUND

Pakistan's general elections in December 1970 resulted in the emergence of two political leaders: Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in West Pakistan and Sheik Mujibur Rahman in East Pakistan. Each received electoral support only in his own geographical area; neither had any semblance of a political base in the other's area. Bhutto and Sheik Mujib had been charged by President Yahya Khan to reach an agreement on the form of a new constitution to be presented to a constituent assembly scheduled for 3 March. That assembly was postponed indefinitely by President Yahya on 1 March; it was then obvious that Yahya, Bhutto and Mujib could not reach an agreement. Mujib pressed for a constitution based on a six-point program which would give a high degree of provincial autonomy to East Pakistan and would give the central government the responsibility only for defense and foreign affairs. Bhutto declared his party would boycott the constituent assembly because Mujib was unwilling to compromise and had put West Pakistan in a take it or leave it position. An impasse was reached and the East Pakistanis began seriously talking of independence rather than autonomy. President Yahya tried to mediate the situation, but strikes in provincial government offices, demonstrations and the threat of riots led Yahya to call in troops from West Pakistan to restore order.

On the night of 25-26 March 1971 Sheik Mujib was arrested and taken to prison in West Pakistan, where he has been held on a charge of treason. Violence in East Pakistan ensued and Mujib's followers took up arms to resist the Army troops. However, inadequate arms in the hands of generally untrained and chaotically disorganized Awami League hands have led to a disintegration of effective military resistance to Pakistan Army re-establishing control over at least the major urban areas of East Pakistan. Despite this, Awami League leaders announced the formation of the provisional government of Bangla Desh on 16 April 1971.

Yahya, meanwhile continued using the Pakistan Army in order to crush the rebellion and maintain the unity of Pakistan. Although Yahya considered his actions an internal affair they have been watched and widely commented on internationally.

Internal affair or not, the Soviet Union decided to tell Pakistan how it should handle the situation. The extent of the Soviet meddling even at the earliest stage of Yahya's police action is surprising. On March 28 an oral message from Premier Kosygin was given to Yahya - and even earlier the Soviet Consul General in East Pakistan conferred with Yahya when he visited Dacca. Then on April 3, Soviet President Podgorny, in a formal message to Pakistan, called on Yahya to stop the bloodshed and repression in East Pakistan. He gratuitously reminded Yahya that Sheik Mujib had received the convincing support of the majority of the people and called for the adoption of methods of peaceful political settlement. The Soviets also used their propaganda outlets in India to tell the government of Pakistan how to handle their affairs; and herein lies the clue to why the Soviets have interfered. The famous Indian leftist weekly Blitz, in its lead story on 13 March stated that what is happening in East Pakistan is no longer an open revolt but a "war of liberation - this is revolution itself".

The official organ of the Communist Party of India, New Age in an editorial on March 21 made the statement that the "people of Bangla Desh are not only making history for their own sake but they are contributing to the cause of the world-wide struggle for freedom, democracy and social progress," typical party jargon for wars of national liberation. Both Blitz and New Age apparently got the official party line from a Soviet press official who commented that the entire concept of Pakistan is artificial, is based on a division created by years of imperialistic domination, and that the idea of an Islamic State is a basically reactionary concept. He added that Islam was a progressive historical force in lifting the Arab peoples out of backwardness in the fifth century but it is unrealistic to think any state can be united on religious grounds today.

As might be expected, the press in Pakistan reacted negatively to the Soviet interference. Musawat, an Urdu paper in Lahore reminded the Soviets that they should have recalled Lenin's principle regarding non-interference in other countries' affairs. It also reminded the Soviets that when Soviet interests were challenged in Hungary and Czechoslovakia the Red Army was quick to invade those sovereign countries. Azad, a leftist Urdu paper also in Lahore said it was ironic that the Soviets should express concern for the arrest of Sheik Mujib after what the Soviets did to Czechoslovakia.

There are some indications that the official position of the Pakistan government is to hold down criticism of the Soviets in the press. There are, of course, the Soviet aid projects in Pakistan to be considered. But it is a fact, now becoming obvious, that the Pakistani cultivation of the Soviet Union has led nowhere and that Pakistan in the name of maintaining Soviet good relations ignored activities in both East and West Pakistan prior to this present crisis. Pakistan, by its permissive attitude, invited Podgorny's interference.

But there were other large powers watching the Pakistan crisis. China, at first, reacted cautiously. The New China News Agency on April 4 reported on events in Pakistan but carefully avoided taking a position either for the Pakistan government or for the Bangla Desh secessionists. The Chinese were in a difficult position - the revolt in East Pakistan was clearly the type of indigenous revolution Peking likes to encourage - on the other hand Peking's support of West Pakistan would cast the Chinese in the role of backing a military regime accused of oppressing poor peasants in the eastern half of the country. But, on April 7, Peking made a tentative move off dead center and delivered a formal written protest to the Indian Foreign Ministry charging India with interfering in Pakistan foreign affairs by supporting the secessionist movement in East Pakistan. Apparently China intended to withhold support to the Bengalis in a "peoples war of liberation."

China's next move came on April 11 with the publication in Peoples Daily of a commentary charging the Indian and Soviet governments with interfering in the internal affairs of Pakistan. The article was signed by "Commentator", usually the pen-name for a ranking foreign policy spokesman: "Anyone who interferes in the internal affairs of other countries in any attempt to achieve one's ulterior aims will never come to a good end". "Commentator" also attacked Podgorny's message to Pakistan: "Judging in association with what the Soviet Union did in Czechoslovakia, it is not hard to see what the Soviet leadership supports, what it opposes, and on whose side after all it stands when it poses as a friend of Pakistan".

With this background of Chinese political activity Premier Chou En-lai, on April 13, sent a message to President Yahya Khan calling for unification of Pakistan and assuring Pakistan that it could count on China's support "should Indian expansionists launch an aggression against Pakistan".

Chou En-lai's message to Pakistanis may be read by many West Pakistani's as a message of support but the consensus of other observers is that Chou's message was primarily political, for barring unforeseen developments the danger of a major Indian-Pakistani confrontation is probably limited.

The London Economist on April 17 summed up the slowly developing Chinese policy towards Pakistan by clearly describing Chinese policy as a reaction to Soviet policies in Southern Asia.

"The remarkable thing about the message that Chou En-lai sent to the Pakistani government this week is not that it took a different line about the fighting in East Bengal from the line the Russians had taken the week before; China likes to show it is different from Russia. What is remarkable is that, when it had to choose between joining in the general sympathy for the Bengali rebels and polishing its friendship with President Yahya's military government, China chose the course of realpolitik. It is evident that China is willing to subordinate everything -- even, for the moment, the claims of ideology -- to the business of establishing itself as a power to be reckoned with in Southern Asia. The contest for influence in the region is fairly on."

Essentially the Chinese have given up an opportunity to support a "people's war of national liberation" and after years of calling the Soviets "revisionists" have themselves become revisionists.

What really is happening in Pakistan and Southern Asia is that the countries of the area are being fawned over by the Soviets and the Chinese; neither power can afford to let the other gain any advantage; both are afraid of being politically outflanked. If the Soviets become the dominant power the Chinese would find themselves hemmed in by Soviet influence on both the north and south if the Chinese win out, then the Soviets will have suffered a major setback in the battle for the third world.

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WASHINGTON POST  
6 April 1971

# Soviets Are Shifting Policy on Pakistan

By Dev Murarka

London Observer

MOSCOW—With Presi-

dent Nikolai Podgorny's open appeal over the weekend to the Pakistani head of government, Gen. Yahya Khan, to stop "the bloodshed and repression" in the country's eastern wing, the Soviet Union has turned a new leaf in its relations with South Asia.

The appeal's tone and contents suggest that Soviet policymakers have decided upon a significant change of direction and emphasis in their policy toward the region. In the process they seem to be prepared to risk the displeasure of the West Pakistani leaders in the near future in the hope that in the long run it will pay them political dividends.

The most surprising part of the appeal is the pointed recognition of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman—leader of the Awami League which swept the east in the national elections—and his followers as the political elements who represent East Bengal.

The relevant portion of the message reads: "Concern is also caused in the Soviet Union by the arrests and persecution of M. Rahman and other politicians who had received such convincing support by the overwhelming majority of the population of East Pakistan at the recent general elections."

Some political observers here suggested that this is a departure from the Soviet

view that a unified Pakistan must be maintained. In his message to the Pakistani government, Podgorny still speaks in terms of a united Pakistan, but his language appears to suggest that it may no longer be a practical possibility.

Moscow is not unaware that its appeal will be deliberately interpreted that way by Yahya Khan. Almost certainly it will undo much of the effort Moscow has put into cultivating Pakistan, and may even freeze relations for the next few years.

The Soviets have come to attach considerable importance to Pakistan during the last five or six years. They are most conscious, above all, of the inroads made by Communist China in Pakistan and this disturbs them profoundly because of its proximity to the Soviet Union. If, in spite of these factors, Moscow has now chosen publicly to dissociate itself from Yahya Khan's policies, it has not done so without some hard thinking.

The Russians are proverbially cautious about supporting any kind of secessionist movement. Their tacit support for the Bengalis, therefore, indicates that they have grounds for believing that the Bengal nationalist movement possesses greater strength than is normally supposed.

Another factor is undoubtedly India. Although it would be unwise to exaggerate the Indian capability to sway Moscow from a settled course, India has been very active at a diplomatic level in trying to persuade the Kremlin to make some kind of gesture.

Premier Indira Gandhi's overwhelming election victory has added to her government's prestige in Soviet eyes. In view of the great emotion aroused in India over the suffering of East Bengalis, Moscow may have come to the conclusion that for the time being it is far better to bank upon India than upon Pakistan.

Moscow came to the conclusion that to express sympathy and concern for the East Bengalis at this stage, when they have been forsaken by almost every country except India, will lay the foundations for sound relations with East Bengal if its independence becomes a fact.

Moscow also is not convinced that there is unanimity in West Pakistan itself about the course Yahya Khan has taken.

Besides these considerations, Moscow has been alarmed that the civil war in Pakistan might spark off a wider conflagration involving India, China and maybe other powers. A peaceful political settlement, Podgorny said, will not only be in the interests of Pakistan, but, "in the interests of preserving peace in the area."

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
8 April 1971

## Difficult position

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# Peking cautious on Pakistan rift

By Henry S. Hayward  
Staff correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

### Hong Kong

Communist China, like the United States and the Soviet Union, is being very careful about becoming involved in the Pakistan internal conflict.

Peking finds itself in a difficult position: It regards Pakistan—meaning East and West combined as one nation—as a useful friend worthy of support.

But when the two halves apparently are involved in a serious civil war that may continue for some time, it's hard for mainland China to decide which side to back. The safest course seems to be to do nothing for the moment.

Yet the revolt in East Pakistan appears as one of those indigenous revolutions Peking normally likes to encourage. And Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman has sounded friendly to mainland China in the past.

### Friendly visit

Moreover, the Chinese probably do not relish being in the position of supporting West Pakistan against the East. That would cast them in the role of backing a military regime which has suspended the normal democratic processes and is accused of oppressing the poor peasants of the eastern half of the country.

Although it was only last November that he paid a friendly visit to Peking, Pakistan President Yahya Khan apparently senses he is not likely to get much help from the People's Republic, and therefore has appealed to Moscow instead, to help keep India from interfering.

This, in effect, is turning to India's Communist friend to exert a restraining influence on New Delhi instead of turning to Pakistan's own friend, China, to restrain India by means of threats or warnings.

Meanwhile, unless the Pakistani central government in Rawalpindi can quickly wipe out Bengali resistance by means of West Pakistani military units, East Pakistan may prove ideal for prolonged guerrilla operations against President Yahya Khan's soldiers. Such operations, of course, are dear to the heart of China's Chairman Mao. Tse-tung.

On the other hand, Chairman Mao well knows he has no common border with East Pakistan and consequently to viable method for large-scale support for dissident forces there. This doubtless would be a factor in any Chinese decision not to become involved.

### Model of neutrality

As of April 7, Peking's only comment about the Pakistan crisis was a model of neutrality and noninvolvement issued on April 4. An account of the trouble by the official Chinese news agency Hsinhua reported the sending of West Pakistan troops into East Pakistan and President Yahya's statement blaming "secessionist elements"

who wanted independence for the eastern half of Pakistan.

It also reported Pakistan's protests against alleged Indian interference in its internal affairs. But Peking carefully avoided taking a position behind either the Pakistani Government or the Bangla Desh secessionists.

If East Pakistan manages to become a separate entity, Peking may figure it can maintain good relations with both halves. But if India appears likely to benefit by taking a portion of East Pakistan under its own wing, then the pressure for China to get into the act might well increase.

### Nigeria recalled

For the moment, however, China is remaining aloof, apparently waiting for the dust to settle.

In doing so, Peking's position is not unlike that of Washington, which also seems determined not to become involved in another Asian internal dispute. Observers here are reminded of the parallels with American policy toward the Nigerian civil war, when Biafra attempted to break away.

At that time, the Washington decision was to stand aside, no matter how heart-rending the appeals for aid, on the ground that such a course is better in the long run than becoming involved in yet another Vietnam-like situation.

As far as Pakistan is concerned, Peking thus far seems to be following a very similar line of reasoning.

WASHINGTON POST  
8 April 1971

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### *China Charges India On Pakistan's War*

NEW DELHI, April 7 (UPI)

—Communist China broke its silence on the civil war in East Pakistan today, charging India with interfering in Pakistani affairs by supporting the separatist movement in the East.

The Indian foreign ministry rejected the protest as unwarranted. The Chinese protest, delivered in written form to the Indian foreign ministry, was the first official Peking statement on the civil war.

Prior to Communist China's protest to the Indian government, Western diplomats in New Delhi noted China's dilemma in deciding whether to support the Bengalis in a "people's war of liberation" Peking has so long advocated or to back Pakistan's government of President Yahya Khan for military and geopolitical reasons.

WASHINGTON STAR  
5 April 1971

### CHINESE BACK WEST

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## Peking, Moscow Split On Pakistani Fighting

By HENRY S. BRADSHIRE  
Star Staff Writer

**HONG KONG —** While most nations keep an embarrassed silence on the Pakistani civil war, China and the Soviet Union have publicly taken opposite positions.

China has come out in strong support of the Pakistani government in Islamabad, which is trying to hide the violent suppression of the elected majority political movement.

The Soviet Union has appealed to Islamabad for "most urgent measures to stop the bloodshed and repressions" in East Pakistan.

#### Condemned by India.

Meanwhile, the nation closest to and most emotionally involved in the situation, India, again has condemned the Pakistani government's actions.

A resolution of India's governing political party yesterday appealed for "all nations to take urgent and constructive steps to put an end to" what it called "inhuman atrocities" in East Pakistan.

The resolution of the Indian Congress party did not specify what kind of action it

continued to charge angry that India was sending weapons to help the East Pakistanis.

Other nations, to which India appealed, have kept silent on the ground that the civil war is an internal matter.

The United States and Britain, the two countries whose armed forces led relief efforts for East Pakistan after November's devastating hurricane, have cautiously avoided flexing their moral or military muscles this time.

Their caution seemed intended to avoid irritating Islamabad, which shows no signs of being receptive to friendly influence on this subject.

#### Wise Policy or Evasion?

It remains to be seen whether the hoarding of any possible influence, against a future day when it might be used to help the East Pakistanis, was a wise policy or merely an evasion of the issue.

This Western caution also seeks to avoid driving Pakistan's government further into the arms which China have just opened wider.

Peking took note over the weekend of the trouble in East

But the New China News Agency account described the trouble only in the one-sided terms of President A. M. Yahya Khan and focused attention on Pakistani charges of Indian interference.

The Chinese account, also broadcast by Peking Radio, amounted to support for Islamabad's version of events.

China has provided and promised more foreign aid to Pakistan than to any other single country—more than \$300 million worth. It also has armed Pakistan.

Now it seems to be trying to protect its most important friendship in Asia, apparently on the assumption that the Islamabad government will prevail in East Pakistan.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, always has put more importance on its friendship with India, the past enemy of both Pakistan and China, than on its tie to Pakistan.

In the 1960s Moscow tried to be friendly with both India and Pakistan. But Indian officials claim their pressure forced the Russians to restrict arms supplies promised Islamabad. Soviet President Nikolai V.

Khan on Saturday to seek "a peaceful political settlement" in East Pakistan instead of "bloodshed and repressions."

Unless Soviet diplomatic reporting from Pakistan is very bad, Podgorny must have known that the only possibly valid political settlement now is for Islamabad to grant independence to East Pakistan—despite today's Pakistani claim of support by 12 "political leaders" in the East.

The army, which represents West Pakistan, was called in to prevent independence, so no settlement acceptable to both East and West is presently visible.

#### Vital Interests at Stake

Podgorny added that continued "repressive measures and bloodshed . . . may do great harm to the vital interests of the entire people of Pakistan."

This might have been merely a statement of the obvious economic fact of civil war. But it might have been a veiled threat to cut off Soviet economic aid.

The combination of the Soviet pressure and the Chinese support seemed likely to enhance Chinese prestige in Islamabad.

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Middle-level officials of the Pakistani army have been believed by many observers to be mildly pro-Peking ever since the 1965 Pakistan-India war.

Moscow stayed neutral then. But China supported Pakistan and later rearmed it with some 150 light and medium tanks and about 75 MIG19 jet fighters. Further arms aid is believed to have been promised last year.

It is among the colonels and majors that the strongest army pressure is believed to have developed on Yahya Khan to crack down on the

East Pakistani demand for autonomy.

This pressure was directly tied to the political pressure from Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the main elected leader of West Pakistan. Bhutto was cited by Yahya Khan as the key element in the failure of political talks in Dacca which was followed by the army crackdown.

Bhutto represents the same kind of landlord and bureaucratic elements that the army officer corps comes from. As foreign minister in 1963-66, he developed Pakistan's present good relations with China.

BALTIMORE SUN  
12 April 1971

## PAKISTAN GIVEN PEKING'S BACKING

India, Soviet, U.S. Accused  
Of Plotting Intervention

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By EDWARD K. WU

Hong Kong Bureau of The Sun

Hong Kong, April 11—Communist

China today threw its support to Pakistan by denouncing India for conniving in "international intervention" in East Pakistan with Soviet and American support.

In its first official reaction to the secessionist crisis in East Pakistan, the party newspaper, *People's Daily*, declared that the Chinese government and people resolutely would support Pakistan against what it called foreign aggression and intervention.

The comments, made by the newspaper's Commentator, who is usually a high foreign-policy spokesman, avoided choosing sides in the civil war in East Pakistan, which China regards as a domestic issue of Pakistan.

### Internal Affairs

"Anyone who interferes in the internal affairs of other countries in an attempt to achieve one's ulterior aims will never come to a good end," the Commentator article said.

It refrained from saying that it approved or disapproved of the way the Pakistani government was handling the situation in the eastern wing of the country.

It emphasized China's support for Pakistan in its "struggle for safeguarding national independence and state sovereignty and against foreign aggression and intervention."

And it was on the issue of alleged foreign intervention that China hit hard at India and the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, the United States.

### Statements, Reports

Citing statements by Indian

leaders and quoting reports of the massing of Indian troops along East Pakistan's border and of armed infiltration into East Pakistan, the *People's Daily* article said: "In league with the two superpowers, the Indian government bustled about scheming for international intervention."

It singled out Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny's recent appeal to President A. M. Yahya Khan to take immediate steps to stop the bloodshed and repression against the people of East Pakistan as a "more blatant act" of intervention than a State Department statement on Pakistan.

President Podgorny's message, it said, "impudently criticized" Pakistan and ignored India's intervention.

### "Not Hard To See"

"Judging in association with

what the Soviet Union did in Czechoslovakia, it is not hard to see what the Soviet leadership supports, what it opposes, and on whose side after all it stands when it poses as friend of Pakistan," the article said.

It dismissed India's rationale for viewing the developments in East Pakistan as a threat to its own security.

Describing the whole attitude of the Indian government toward the East Pakistani crisis as "overbearing," the Chinese article said all the acts of India, as well as its fanning up of "anti-Pakistan chauvinist sentiments," once again revealed the "expansionist features of the Indian reactionaries."

China had accused India of pursuing an expansionist policy during the China-India border war in 1962 and in its relations with the three Himalayan states of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim.

NEW YORK TIMES  
13 April 1971

## COMMUNIST CHINA BACKS PAKISTAN AND WARNS INDIA

**Lauds Effort to End East's  
Autonomy Drive—Stay  
Out, New Delhi Told**

**UNITY IS TERMED VITAL**

**Direct Peking Involvement  
Doubted by U.S. Aides—  
Kosygin Sees Envoys**

By Reuters

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, April

12—Communist China came out strongly today in support of President Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan and warned India against any aggression against Pakistan.

President Yahya's forces have been putting down a movement for autonomy in East Pakistan.

[United States officials said that they did not believe that the Chinese message presaged any direct involvement by Peking in the Pakistani situation. In Moscow, Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin met with the Pakistani and Indian Ambassadors.]

The message, to the Pakistani President from Premier Chou En-lai, was officially made public here tonight. In it, the Chinese leader said that President Yahya and other Pakistani leaders had "done a lot of useful work to uphold the unification of Pakistan and to prevent it from moving toward a split."

**Pakistan's Policies Backed**

"We believe," the message went on, "that through consultations and the efforts of Your Excellency and others of vari-

ous quarters in Pakistan, Pakistan will certainly be restored to normal.

"In our opinion, unification of Pakistan and unity of the peoples of East and West Pakistan are basic guarantees for Pakistan to attain prosperity and strength."

Last Tuesday, the Chinese sent a note to New Delhi that contended India was interfering in East Pakistan.

Since the fighting broke out on March 25, Pakistan has made repeated allegations—denied by India—that Indian armed infiltrators had entered East Pakistan to aid the independence forces of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, head of the Awami League, the major party in the East.

"Should Indian expansion-

ists dare to launch any aggression against Pakistan," the Chinese message said, "the Chinese Government and people will always firmly support the Pakistan Government and people in their just struggle to safeguard their state sovereignty and national independence."

"The Chinese Government," the note said, "holds that what is happening in Pakistan at present is purely an internal affair of Pakistan, which can only be settled by the Pakistan people themselves, and which brooks no foreign interference whatsoever."

**Peking Involvement Doubted**

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 12—United States officials took the view today that Premier Chou En-lai's message of support for Pakistan was primarily political and did not presage any direct Peking involvement.

Officials here said that the consensus in the Administration was that, barring unforeseen developments, the danger of a major Indian-Pakistani confrontation was limited.

American officials tended to doubt that India would take advantage of the East Pakistani fighting to become directly engaged in hostilities with Pakistan. For this reason, they said, Premier Chou's statement of support for Pakistan appeared to be "academic."

Nevertheless, the White House press secretary, Ronald L. Ziegler, said that, "We are following the situation very closely."

**U.S. Not 'Taking Sides'**

Other officials said that, unlike China and the Soviet Union, the United States was "not taking sides." The judgment here is that China regards Pakistan as her ally while the Soviet Union favors India.

However, a State Department spokesman, Charles W. Bray 3d, said that the Nixon Administration had not interrupted the program of sales to Pakistan, mostly for cash, of so-called "nonlethal military equipment" such as spare parts, transport planes and medical supplies. Charges have been made that Pakistan was using United States arms to suppress the East Pakistani rebellion.

Mr. Bray said this "modest" program was now "under review." Mr. Bray was unable to say whether equipment sold to Pakistan before the eruption of the fighting was being delivered at this time. He said the State Department had been unable to determine over the weekend whether there were any ships at sea carrying material to Pakistani ports.

**Kosygin Meets Ambassadors**

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, April 12—Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin met separately today with the Pakistani and Indian ambassadors as part of an apparently growing Soviet effort to seek a solution to the crisis caused by the civil strife in East Pakistan.

Diplomatic sources said that the Soviet Union was deeply concerned over continued bloodshed in East Pakistan and the resulting charges and countercharges between the Pakistani and Indian Governments that have led Communist China to speak out on the side of Pakistan.

The details of Mr. Kosygin's meetings with Ambassador Jamshed J. A. Marker of Pakistan, and Ambassador Dudga Prasad Ohara of India were not known. Tass, the official press agency, said both sessions were at the request of the ambassadors. It said he talk with Mr. Marker was held here and that Mr. Kosygin

had "a friendly conversation" with Mr. Dhara.

It is presumed by Western diplomats here that Mr. Kosygin has been in private contact

with the Pakistani and Indian Governments over the apparently worsening situation and that both of these countries may have asked to give the Russians their points of view.

**Force Was Criticized**

The wide publicity given the meetings by the Soviet media indicated a Soviet desire to underscore Moscow's effort to remain impartial, even though the Kremlin had already publicly criticized the use of force to quell the East Pakistani independence movement.

President Nikolai V. Podgorny on April 2 sent a public message to President Yahya calling on him to take "the most immediate measures to put an end to bloodshed and repression against the population of East Pakistan and to take measures for a peaceful settlement."

BALTIMORE SUN  
14 April 1971

CPYRGHT

## Bid To Aid Pakistan Natural For Peking

By EDWARD K. WU  
Hong Kong Bureau of The Sun

Hong Kong, April 13—Communist China's warning to India against any attack on Pakistan in the present civil war in East Pakistan is a natural product of Peking's relations with three of its neighbors—Pakistan, India and the Soviet Union.

It is not surprising that Premier Chou En-lai assured President A. M. Yahya Khan at a critical moment that he could count on China's firm support "should Indian expansionists dare to launch any aggression against Pakistan."

### Pledges Renewed

Peking has made similar pledges before when its two neighbors in the Indian subcontinent were on the brink of war in September, 1965. And whether from the impact of the Chinese warning or other reasons, the full-scale fighting that threat-

ened to erupt then was averted.

Pakistan has also received planes, tanks and other military equipment and substantial economic aid from China to counterbalance what India gets from the Soviet Union.

The Pakistan Army is using American-supplied Patton and Chinese tanks to crush secessionist Bangla Desh, as the rebels call East Pakistan.

But the Chinese premier, in taking sides in the crisis, rallied with Islamabad not ostensibly in the East Pakistan civil war, which he considered a domestic matter for Pakistan, but in the alleged foreign intervention by India and, to a certain extent, by the Soviet Union.

### "Purely Internal"

Mr. Chou said, in his message to the Pakistan president, "The Chinese government holds that

what is happening in Pakistan at present is purely an internal affair which can only be settled by the Pakistan people themselves and which brooks no foreign interference whatsoever."

China, through its party paper *People's Daily* during the weekend, had accused India of intervening in Pakistan's internal affairs, of massing troops near the border and of conducting armed infiltration into East Pakistan.

It was from this background that Premier Chou warned that any Indian attack on Pakistan would draw strong Chinese support—whatever that meant—for the Muslim state.

### Scores Podgorny

For the Chinese, the recent message of the Soviet president, Nikolai V. Podgorny, to President Yahya was seen as not only a rebuke to Pakistan but a con-

nivance with India.

*People's Daily* said the Soviet request to President Yahya to take effective measures to stop the bloodshed and repression against the East Pakistan people was a "more blatant act" of interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state than what the United States has done.

As Chairman Mao Tse-tung has said that "whatever the enemy supports, we must oppose," China cannot conceivably go along with India and the Soviet Union, with which it is at loggerheads.

And to sacrifice the close and convenient friendship and virtual alliance forged with Pakistan over the years would not be in China's best interest, at least for the present.

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
21 April 1971

CPYRGHT

## The Pakistan tragedy

The outcome of the fighting in Pakistan is nothing for anyone to cheer about. The dominant Punjabis from West Pakistan have refastened their rule on the physically weaker dravidian peoples of the Ganges Valley. It's an old story, the meat-herding mountain tribesmen riding down over the grain-growing folk of the valley.

We who are spectators on the sidelines can only feel sad for the losers in Bengal as we had to feel not so long ago about the Ibo losers in Nigeria.

But the inevitable sadness does not mean that there was a possible better ending.

The hard truth about the whole business is that the great powers all recognized that the present condition of a frag-

mented and unstable Pakistan is less dangerous than what might come out of a change.

Certainly a country divided by a thousands miles of India between its two halves and embittered by the dominance of the western Punjabis over the eastern Bengalis has far less reason for existence than does Nigeria. At least Nigeria is made up of contiguous territory. Its tribes have their quarrels but they are bound together by the common interest in having a common market.

Pakistan was bound together in the beginning by the common Moslem religion. It is held together now by the simple fact that any change in southern Asia's present pattern (the famous "status quo" we al-

ways hear about) could trigger almost anything. The anomaly of the two-part Pakistan is itself part of the "status quo." Upset that, and anything could happen. This is precisely why New Delhi, Washington, and London all watched with intense fascination as Moscow and Peking played the hand, but themselves held their breaths and tiptoed around the edges lest they unintentionally start an avalanche.

For Washington to play the spectator role is a new experience. For some 20 years now the Chinese have been the spectators watching Moscow and Washington maneuver around whatever might be the issue between them of the moment.

The Pakistan story is the first clear-case example of how different things can

be in the chapter of history now opening.

Here was a case where the issue is primarily between Russia and China. The American interest is small compared to the great interests those two Asiatic powers have in southern Asia. India is where either Russia or China might get a decisive advantage over the other. To the United States the interest is in keeping a balance between the two which allows southern Asia to remain independent of either.

For Washington to manage to sit quietly on the sidelines was an exercise in a useful new discipline. For everyone to allow West Pakistan to refasten its grip on East Pakistan was to allow the lesser evil. There wasn't anything better to do.

THE ECONOMIST  
17 April 1971

CPYRGHT

## The war for Asia

It is the ideological crossroads of the world, and of course the ideologies have collided there. The great stretch of land which runs from the Sind desert to the Mekong rice-fields has to be seen as a whole. It has never made much sense to think of the Indian sub-continent as something quite separate from south-east Asia; after all, Indochina is called Indochina because that is where the Indian and Chinese cultures met, and they met long before the colonial administrators from Europe started drawing their lines on the map. It makes even less sense to compartmentalise southern Asia in the light of what is now happening in Ceylon and Pakistan.

Of the 12 non-communist countries, with getting on for 800 million people living in them, which lie around a line drawn from Rawalpindi to Saigon, no fewer than eight now have fighting going on in their territory. There is the war in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. There are insurrections in Thailand, Burma and Malaysia which receive help from China, or North Vietnam, or both. And now the civil wars in Pakistan and Ceylon have got the great powers and the ideologies circling above them. Of those 12 countries only four—Nepal, Singapore and Bhutan, and India if you do not count what has been happening in West Bengal for the past four years—are in the state we used to call peace. Of course, it would be nonsense to pretend that each of these conflicts does not have its own local causes. But it would be just as wrong to ignore the fact that these local problems are overlaid by the rivalries of the powers whose claims to influence collide in south-east Asia.

This week's news from Ceylon and Pakistan shows that the western part of the region is no more immune to these pressures than the area farther east. It is hard to know what is going on in Ceylon, because Mrs Bandaranaike's government has imposed a very effective censorship (see page 31); but if the estimates of the size of the rebellion are anything like accurate it must be assumed that the rebels have been getting some of their guns, as well as their political ideas, from abroad. There is no apparent reason why the Russians should risk their friendship with India by supporting an attempt to overthrow Mrs Bandaranaike when the Indians are helping to protect her. The most probable providers of arms for the rebels in Ceylon are the Chinese, or the North Koreans; and if it was the North Koreans who sent them the Chinese almost certainly knew about it. And certainly China has made no attempt to conceal its ideas about the crisis in Pakistan. The remarkable thing about the message that Chou En-lai sent to the Pakistani government this week (see page 32) is not that it took a different line about the fighting in East Bengal from the line the Russians had taken the week before; China likes to show it is different from Russia. What is remarkable is that, when it had to choose between joining in the general sympathy for the Bengali rebels and polishing its friendship with President Yahya's military government, China chose the course of *realpolitik*. It is evidence that China is willing to subordinate everything—even, for the moment, the claims of establishing itself as a

power to be reckoned with in southern Asia. The contest for influence in the region is fairly on.

There are two questions which need to be asked about what is happening in Asia. The first is why this particular area should have become the cockpit of the powers ; and the answer to that is fairly easy. The dozen countries between West Pakistan and South Vietnam contain nearly a quarter of the world's population, and a quarter which includes most of the world's very poorest people ; and they happen to lie at the only place where the border between the Soviet Union and China touches the non-communist part of the world. For governments that want to propagate their political ideas—as the government of every great power does, but as relatively young great powers like Russia and China do more than most—the temptation is pretty well irresistible. The arguments of ideology and the arguments of power unite to pull them into a policy of intervention. For Russia and China alike, southern Asia is a rich field for making converts ; it is also a place where neither can afford to let the other get the advantage in winning friends and influencing people. If Russia became the dominant power in the area, the Chinese would find themselves hemmed in by Soviet influence on both their north and their south. If China got the best of it, the Russians would have suffered a major defeat in the battle for the third world, and they would be cut off from a region they have had their eye on for the past century. This is the place where they both have to be afraid of being politically outflanked. That does not mean that either of them is thinking of using its army in southern Asia. They can see the dangers of that ; and anyway it is political supremacy they are after, not military control. But the stakes are high, and it is not impossible that Russia and China may yet find themselves fighting a proxy war with each other through their respective friends on their southern flank.

The other reason why this area is particularly vulnerable is that it lies in the vacuum left by the collapse of British power after 1945. The end of the second world war found the United States occupying positions in central Europe and the western Pacific which, with a couple of crises over Berlin and Korea, have formed a stable dividing line to the west of Russia and the east of China ever since. There has been no equivalent line of demarcation on the southern side of the two great communist powers. The Americans sent their army into Vietnam in 1965 to try to establish such a line at the south-eastern corner of this no-man's land, and six years later they still do not know whether they are going to succeed. The south-western corner of the same void—the Middle East—has seen the Americans and Russians move into the space left by the British retreat. But between those two corners of Asia there is now no centre of power capable of striking a balance with either the Soviet Union or China. India might have been one, but it has not become one yet. That is why this area is so fundamentally fragile. It is

also why the competition for influence within it looks increasingly as if it is going to be largely a competition between the two great communist countries to the north.

And it is why the second question has to be asked. Should it be left to them ? It is tempting to say that this is a part of the world where the west cannot expect to do very much : no more, perhaps, than can be done by foreign ministries performing their tightrope act, and a steadily declining real flow of aid. It is an area which the Chinese can get into overland—they did in 1962—and which lies within fairly easy range of the airfields of Soviet central Asia. But for western traffic it means a long haul by ship or aircraft along routes where the west can no longer be sure of naval or air superiority ; there are no western bases between Cyprus and Singapore except the staging posts on Gan and the Gulf. And this is Asia, and everyone knows what it means to get involved in Asia. For the Americans it would be an intolerable addition to a weight of international responsibilities they are already finding too heavy. For most west Europeans the prospect is still almost as intellectually remote as the moon. The arguments for sitting this one out as a spectator are plain enough.

But something does pull the other way. There is the fact that these dozen countries include five members of the Commonwealth ; and that still counts for something, even if the voices which were calling for a Commonwealth policy on South Africa in January have had very little to say about what is happening in Pakistan and Ceylon. There is also the fact that five of the 12 countries—India, Ceylon, Singapore and still, if only just, Malaysia and South Vietnam—are places where a genuine electoral process does exist and where the population is offered some choice about who should govern it. These things are just as important as the connections of trade, the rubber and tin, the jute and the tea. It is not going to be easy to push aside the fact that the western political idea seems to have a better prospect of surviving in southern Asia—if it gets the chance—than in most other parts of the under-developed world. It is not only the Russians and Chinese who have obligations of ideology there.

No doubt somebody in Whitehall was saying this to himself when Britain agreed to send small arms and ammunition to Mrs Bandaranaike, and to buy some American helicopters for her. No doubt it explains why the British and American governments have decided not to say what they both presumably feel about President Yahya's suppression of East Pakistan ; a policy of denunciation is the last resort of people who are otherwise impotent. This is how governments act when they want to stay in the game but do not happen to have much of a hand to play with. But there is no evidence that there exists anything which could be called a western policy for southern Asia. The United States has been occupied with

CPYRGHT

Vietnam, Britain with Singapore and the Gulf, France with Africa and Germany with the navel of Europe, and all of them with the Middle East. None of them has had enough intellectual energy to spare for wondering what it would do if the cracks started showing in the region between the Middle East and Singapore. They are showing now.

Something that deserved to be called a policy for southern Asia would have to begin with the recognition that the liberal democracies of the west have a common interest in keeping the multi-party system of government alive on the continent of Asia ; which is much the same as saying that they do not want to see the region fall under the influence of either China or Russia. It would mean keeping the friendship of India, as the centre-piece of Asia. And it would mean maintaining enough military strength available for use in the Indian Ocean to ensure that the sort of help that has been sent to Ceylon this week could be sent to other countries that might need it. This is now a three-superpower world. The exchange of concessions between China and America this week (see the next article) seems to mark the opening of a new period of manoeuvre among the three great powers. It would be a strange abandonment of what the west says it stands for if it left southern Asia to a two-sided competition between Russia and China.

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May 1971

POLLUTION IN THE SOVIET UNION

Many conservationists and social critics are unaware that the Soviet Union has polluted its environment as extensively and severely as any other country in the world. Some have assumed that the basic cause of pollution is the private greed of businessmen in a capitalistic economy who seek profits at the expense of the community. Others have assumed that economic planning in Communist countries would take into account the possibility of pollution and take steps to prevent it. These assumptions are contradicted by the severity of pollution in the Soviet Union.

Water Pollution

The Soviet Union -- in area the largest country in the world -- stretches across two continents from the North Pacific to the Baltic Sea, and has every phase of climate except the deep tropical. One of its great resources is its water supplies.

There are some 150,000 rivers and 250,000 lakes in the Soviet Union. The larger European rivers include the Dnieper, flowing into the Black Sea, the Volga and the Ural into the Caspian Sea, the Don into the Sea of Azov, the Western Dvina into the Baltic and the Northern Dvina into the White Sea. The Asiatic section is drained by the Ob, the Yenisei and the Lena, each over 2,000 miles long, which flow into the Arctic Ocean, and the Amur, which flows into the Pacific. In the European section there is an 88,000 mile inland waterway system in which canals link rivers leading to five seas: the Caspian, Azov, Black, Baltic and White. The Caspian Sea, of which only the south end is in Iran, is the world's largest lake in surface area (143,550 square miles). Other lakes are the Aral Sea (25,300 square miles), Lake Baikal (11,780 square miles), Lake Balkhash (6,720 square miles), and Lake Ladoga (6,835 square miles). The Soviet Union has abundant water resources. They are not distributed evenly -- Soviet Central Asia does not have enough rivers and streams -- but a serious water shortage is developing, not only in the Soviet Union's dry regions but also in areas where its great rivers flow. The cause is easy to find. Water pollution is by far the Soviet Union's biggest environmental problem.

The prime culprits in Soviet water pollution are factories along major rivers which dump their pollutants into the water without regard to the effects on the environment. Fish die and the water becomes unsafe to drink. The Molognaia River in the Ukraine, for instance, has been declared officially to be dead, and chemical pollutants are causing many other rivers in the Soviet Union to lose their capacity to support the water-life that is necessary to man.<sup>1</sup>

The loss of fish as a source of food and the fear of contaminated water is beginning to be felt in town and countryside. In 1968 Radio Moscow warned Soviet citizens not to drink or fish on long stretches of Russia's great rivers. Again in September of that year Radio Moscow complained that the Moskva River, which runs through Moscow, was being heavily polluted by factories that ignored anti-pollution regulations and were not being prosecuted. Ten years had passed, Radio Moscow said, since factories had been advised to use air-cooling plants instead of a water-cooling system, but water-cooling continued to be used by old factories and was even being installed in new factories. Water-cooled systems dump three to four times as much industrial effluent into water supplies as do air-cooled systems.

The danger of dumping chemical pollutants into rivers was illustrated dramatically in Sverdlovsk in 1965, when a careless smoker threw his cigarette into the Iset River and the Iset caught fire. The same year, the Chernorechensk Chemical Plant near Dzerzhinsk killed virtually all fish life in the Oka River by uncontrolled dumping of its industrial wastes. Similar offenses have been committed by factories along the Volga, Ob, Yenesei, Don, Ural, and Northern Dvina rivers, and all these major rivers are now considered highly polluted. In 1967 Soviet journals reported that 65% of all the factories in Russia were discharging their waste without bothering to clean it up, and not one river was left in the Ukraine whose natural state had been preserved.<sup>2</sup>

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1) Goldman, Marshall I., "The Convergence of Environmental Disruption" in Science, 2 October 1970. The author is professor of economics, Wellesley College, and an associate of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University. His article in Science magazine is a condensation of a paper presented to the International Symposium on Environmental Disruption in the Modern World, held in Tokyo in March 1970.

2) Ibid.

One of the worst examples of Soviet industrial pollution occurred in 1966, when a lead and zinc ore enriching plant was built along the Fiagdon River that flows near the city of Ordzhonikidze in the Caucasus. The plant was allowed to dump its wastes into the water, although, as Pravda reported, the river was the sole source of water for about 40 kilometers along its route. Since the industrial authorities felt no responsibility for insuring pure water was available, the local inhabitants were simply left with contaminated water to drink. The same lack of concern by Soviet authorities for a healthy environment can be seen in the fact that important Russian cities like Vladimir which is on the Klyazma River, Chkalov (Orenburg) on the Ural River, and Voronezh which sits on the bank of the Voronezh River near its junction with the Don River, do not have adequate supplies of drinking water.<sup>3</sup>

While industry is most to blame for the Soviet Union's water pollution, Soviet cities add to the problem by not disposing of city sewage in a safe manner. Even the most favored cities of the USSR, the Russian cities of Moscow and Leningrad, do not have enough modern sewage disposal facilities to take care of their waste. In non-Russian population centers of the Soviet Union the situation is usually much worse. The USSR's 1960 census revealed that only 40% of the cities and suburbs in the Russian half of the Soviet Union had sewage treatment facilities, while in the Soviet Union as a whole only 35% of the urban housing units were connected to any sort of sewer system. In 1969 Soviet journals reported that only six of Moldavia's 20 cities had any sewer system, and only two of those cities had sewage treatment facilities attached to their sewer systems to prevent raw sewage from contaminating the water supply.<sup>4</sup>

Far from Moscow, in Soviet Central Asia, a cellulose factory and its lumber mills are polluting one of the largest bodies of fresh water on earth, Lake Baikal. This lake, which holds one-fortieth of all the world's fresh water, is estimated to be over 20 million years old. Until the mills and factory were built along its edge in the 1960's, Lake Baikal was renowned for the purity of its water and the 1200 species of life it contained, including 700 species found in no other place the world.

3) Ibid.

4) Ibid.

Despite the protests of Soviet scientists and conservationists, when the factory opened it began to dump wastes into the lake at the rate of 60 million cubic meters of effluent a year. A few months later, scientists at the Limnological Institute reported that animal and plant life had decreased by one-third to one-half in the area where wastes were being dumped. It was easy to see that such a high rate of contamination posed a danger to the entire lake, despite its huge size. To reduce the pollution, Soviet authorities designed and built a special waste purification plant, but it has failed to stop the factory's pollution. Water coming out of the purification plant has a yellowish tinge and sometimes an odor. An alternate proposal for disposing of the waste has been rejected by the Ministry of Paper and Pulp Industries since it would cost about \$40 million. Although the problem has not been solved, the Ministry has built a second paper and pulp mill near Lake Baikal and has plans for constructing more mills along the Lake's shores.<sup>5</sup>

In addition to water pollution caused by factories and city sewage, Soviet water supplies are also being polluted heavily by its mining operations, oil wells, and ships that freely dump their waste and ballast into the nearest body of water. The shores of the Baltic and Black Sea are often streaked with oil left by Soviet refineries and tankers that ignore oil-disposal regulations. Although the Soviet government laid down strict new regulations in October 1968 for its shipping and oil fields, Soviet scientists noted little improvement had been achieved by 1970 except in Turkmenia where officials succeeded in stopping the dumping of oil effluent and cleaned up the port of Krasnovodsk.

The immense Caspian Sea, once the main source of Russian caviar, has suffered particularly from oil pollution caused by Soviet oil refineries and tankers, that have left a huge oil slick floating over the Northern Caspian. In January 1971 an offshore oil rig caught fire in the Caspian adding even more oil to that already being dumped there. In many parts of the world offshore drilling for oil is under attack by conservationists, but international experts are particularly critical of the way Soviet offshore oil rigs are allowed to operate without taking the kind of precautions that are considered mandatory in other countries.

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5) Ibid.

Two months after the offshore oil-rig fire in the Caspian, the Soviet press, after a long silence on the subject of pollution, revealed that one of the Soviet Union's biggest oil and gas pipelines had ruptured, spewing oil along the Ural River which in turn runs to the Caspian Sea. The break was so serious that Pravda reported on March 21 that the oil leak not only threatened fish-life in the Caspian, but also threatened fertile bottom lands of nearby collective and state farms. When the break occurred, maintenance crews hastily threw up embankments of soil mixed with snow to contain the oil but, as Pravda reported, the mixture of snow and earth could give way during spring thaws and allow the oil to flow. Some of the oil has, in fact, seeped through the ground and appeared many miles away at a truck drivers hostel in Kaleny. Since the pipeline break occurred on the west bank of the Ural River above the city of Guryev it is quite possible that the drinking water of Guryev, as well as other populous areas, is being contaminated.<sup>6</sup>

Soviet authorities are planning to lay a network of large-diameter oil and gas pipelines for thousands of miles from Siberia to as far west as West Germany, France, and Italy. Soviet scientists, however, have warned that the pipelines could be dangerous and give way in many places. The danger is particularly great in Siberia, the source of the oil and gas. A Soviet geologist, Dr. Fabian G. Gurari, deputy director of the Siberian Research Institute of Geology, Geophysics and Mineral Resources in Novosibirsk, warned in the January issue of the Soviet science journal Priroda (Nature) that the warm oil and gas flowing through the pipelines might cause thawing and sagging on the permafrost, leading to pipeline breaks and spillages.<sup>7</sup>

Closely allied to the Soviet Union's water pollution problems are mistakes that have been made in its water management. To meet the demands for raising industrial output set forth in the five-year plans (for instance, the five-year plan prepared in 1966 called for a 50% rise in industrial output), huge dams and reservoirs have been built on important bodies of water to generate electric power for expanding industry. Many of these water works also have a network of canals to supply irrigation to

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6) New York Times, 22 March 1971

7) Ibid.

farmland. In some places the effect has been a disruption of the natural environment that, while contributing to Soviet economic growth now, may in the long run undermine important economic resources.

For instance, dams and irrigation works along the Don and Ural Rivers have diverted large amounts of water that once flowed into the Caspian Sea. During the past 20 years the level of the Caspian Sea has fallen almost 2 1/2 meters. As a result one-third of the spawning beds of the Caspian sturgeon fish are now dry land. The combination of oil slicks on the surface of the Caspian, reducing oxygen in the water, and the loss of ancient spawning beds has reduced the Caspian sturgeon catch from 1,180,400 centners in 1942 to 586,300 centners in 1966. Caviar, which the sturgeon produces, used to be an important source of foreign exchange for both the Soviet Union and Iran. Now, caviar is becoming so scarce, Soviet scientists are experimenting with production of artificial caviar. The overall fish catch from the Caspian is now only one-fourth what it was forty year ago, a sharp loss that affects the economies of the Soviet Union and Iran.<sup>8</sup>

The condition of the Aral Sea is even more serious. In 1970 the Soviet press reported the Aral Sea had dropped 1 to 3 meters in the 1960s. Since the average depth of the Aral is only about 20 to 30 meters, the Aral, in effect, is beginning to disappear and some Soviet scientists fear it will be nothing but a salt marsh by the end of the century. Already, the fish catch from the Aral has been nearly wiped out -- it has fallen 80%. The fish catch from the Sea of Azov has fallen even more -- 91%.<sup>9</sup>

There has also been an increase in the incidence of malaria in the region of the Caspian Sea. When the level of the Caspian dropped due to dams built to the north, new swamps formed on the Soviet shoreline where malaria-carrying mosquitoes could breed. At the same time, a fish called the belyi amur, which had kept down the number of mosquitoes by consuming mosquito larvae, began to disappear from its old feeding-grounds near Ashkhabad, at the mouth of the Volga, as the waters receded from the shore. In 1969 the Soviet press reported the expectable

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8) Goldman, op. cit.; New York Times, 30 March 1971

9) Goldman, op. cit.; Service de Presse I. S. E., 16 February 1971

result, an increase in malaria in the area.<sup>10</sup>

In building great dams and reservoirs in dry regions of the Soviet Union, Soviet engineers have sometimes failed to take elementary precautions against water seepage and against raising the salinity of the soil, which can ruin the soil for farming. Some great Soviet dams have unlined irrigation canals attached to them to carry off some of the water to farmland. Without a lining to stop it, a considerable amount of water is seeping out of the canals along the route. This has caused a rise in the water table in many areas, which in turn has increased soil salinity, especially where the soil is very dry. Some Soviet scientists fear new deserts could be formed. They are also concerned with the way the great dams were built without provision being made for the way they can disrupt the flow of water to underground water reserves or the way great amounts of water can be lost through evaporation in broad-surfaced reservoirs in dry areas.<sup>11</sup>

#### Land and Air

The paper and pulp mills at Lake Baikal not only pose a threat to the lake but to the surrounding land as well. The construction of the mills, and towns for their workers, has involved large-scale cutting of trees, which has weakened the shoreline, allowing the flow of silt into the lake, and removed an important soil stabilizer in the surrounding forests. Just over the border from Lake Baikal is the Gobi Desert in Mongolia. Scientists report that the dunes have already started to move, and some fear that the Gobi Desert will spread into Siberia and destroy the taiga and the lake.<sup>12</sup>

Other forests are being destroyed. A well known case is the destruction of some magnificent oak and pine forest at Yasnaya Polyana, not far from the historic city of Tula. Leo Tolstoy had his summer home at Yasnaya Polyana, and the place became an internationally known tourist attraction with lovely grounds and a museum devoted to the great Russian writer. In 1955 a small coal-gasification plant was built within view of the Tolstoy museum and in 1960 was expanded to produce fertilizer and other chemicals. Now known as the Shchekino Chemical Complex, the plant has over 6,000 employees and produces a wide range of

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10) Goldman, op. cit.

11) Ibid.

12) Ibid.

chemicals, including formaldehyde and synthetic fibers. The smell drives away the tourists, while unseen chemicals in the air eat away the trees.

Air pollution in the Soviet Union, like water pollution, is largely the result of factories which emit harmful wastes into the environment. It was found in 1968 that only 14% of the factories that were polluting the air had fully equipped air-cleaning devices. Another 26% had some air-purifying equipment, but it was frequently either operating improperly or not operating at all. There have been several cases reported of factories sending dangerous amounts of lead into the air. In Sverdlovsk and Magnitorgorsk, public health officials have had to order the closing of factories and boilers to protect the community's health, but periodically there are complaints that factory managers have been able to pressure the public health officials into declaring a factory could be reopened without proper air-purifying equipment.<sup>13</sup>

A number of Soviet cities have developed serious smog problems. Leningrad has 40% fewer clear daylight hours than a nearby town, Pavlovsk. Magnitorgorsk, Alma Ata, and Chelyabinsk, with their metalurgical industries, frequently have a dark blue cap over them. In the hilly cities of Armenia, carbon monoxide in the air frequently exceeds permissible health levels. Tbilisi, the capital of the Republic of Georgia, has smog almost six months of the year, and Kislovodsk, a health resort high in the Caucasus, is becoming an unhealthy place to live. Before World War II, Kislovodsk had 311 days of sun a year. Now it is shrouded with air pollution from lime kilns in a nearby industrial city and the dust in its air exceeds by 50% the norm for a nonresort city.<sup>14</sup>

The Soviet Union has not yet begun to make a serious effort to halt this environmental disruption. Attempts by one set of governmental authorities to save the environment are often undone by another set of governmental authorities who take the side of industry, even when industry is clearly breaking the law. This can be seen in the case of what has been done to save the Georgian Black Sea coast from disappearing. At some places the sea has moved as much as 40 meters inland and there is concern that the mainline railway will be washed away. Excessive construction in the area has

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13) Ibid.

14) Ibid.

has loosened the soil and multiplied many times over the effects of natural erosion. Near the resort area of Adler, hospitals, resort hotels, and even the beach sanitarium of the Ministry of Defense collapsed as the shoreline gave way. In addition, building contractors have exploited the shore's pebbles and sand as a cheap source of gravel. They have hauled away as much as 120,000 cubic meters a year of beach material to use in construction elsewhere.<sup>15</sup>

The problem then was compounded by the government's decision to build a network of dams and reservoirs, which have blocked off the normal wash of new pebbles coming in with streams that feed into the Black Sea.

The dams and reservoirs have provided a source of electric power, but they have robbed the area of beach pebbles which are essential to the shorelines' ability to withstand erosion from the waves beating on the coast. In an effort to save the rest of the shore from erosion, construction close to the shore has been halted and concrete piers have been built to absorb the impact of the waves. The authorities have also had gravel material from inland mountains hauled to the seacoast to replace the gravel removed by building contractors. The building contractors, however, have found they can disregard regulations for protecting the shoreline, without being prosecuted. So they continue to haul away the pebbles and sand, and the seacoast continues to disappear.<sup>16</sup> Construction projects that support heavy industry and meet high-growth targets set by the five-year plan can nullify the regulations designed to protect the environment.

#### Prospects for Pollution Control in the Soviet Union

Soviet economic planning, which emphasizes high industrial output at the expense of all other social considerations, is at the root of the pollution problem in the Soviet Union.

Soviet economic planning as it exists in the 1970s, began in 1928 with Stalin's first five-year plan, which gave every aspect of the economy a "high production orientation." This has influenced development in a variety of ways. Quantity, not quality, of goods has been emphasized. The setting of ambitious production targets has embedded the practice of

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15) Ibid.

16) Ibid.

judging the performance of individual industrial enterprises on their ability to expand existing patterns of production rather than introduce innovations in production techniques. Innovations such as new anti-pollution control devices are not attempted since they might require the attention of the factory's best engineers and involve work-stoppages for re-tooling, both of which would divert the factory from reaching its annual production goal.

The same pressures for high production goals that absorb the energies of factory managers, also affect the willingness of administrative authorities to enforce laws against pollution. Administrative authorities know that if they enforce anti-pollution regulations, local factory output may be lowered and administrative authorities along with factory managers will be criticized. Officials in the Soviet Union, whether they are governmental authorities or factory managers, are judged almost entirely by how much they are able to increase their region's economic growth. Politically, it is easier to allow pollution to continue than to enforce laws that would even temporarily lower industrial output.

Similarly, the lack of a serious intent to control pollution is shown by the Soviet government's failure to create clear lines of authority and responsibility for enforcing pollution-control regulations. Various Soviet agencies, such as the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Public Health, have some responsibility in anti-pollution programs, but their authority is limited and overlapping. When a responsible government authority does not enforce the pollution laws, industrial managers frequently choose to break the law deliberately.

Punishment is often minimal, especially when an important industrial complex is involved. At Lake Baikal the penalty for breaking anti-pollution regulations has been only \$55 per offense, while the cost of eliminating the water pollution has been estimated to be up to 40 million dollars.<sup>17</sup> Although regulations were established for timber cutting and factory operations at Lake Baikal as far back as 1960, they have not been kept; yet more timber and factory operations are being planned for the area. Nikolai Popov, an editor of Soviet Life, has asked: "Why, in a socialist country, whose constitution explicitly says the public interest may not be ignored with impunity, are industry executives permitted to break the laws protecting nature?"<sup>18</sup>

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17) Ibid.

18) Ibid.

Basically the reason is that officials of Gosplan (State Planning) and their allies in other government offices, who see an opportunity to increase industrial output, are able to over-exploit natural resources at will. They cannot be turned out of office by the voters. They can smother the criticism of conservationists which appears occasionally in the state-controlled press. (For three months preceding the Supreme Soviet session at the beginning of 1971, articles describing pollution were apparently censored out of the Soviet press, since they became noticeably few in number.) Finally, Soviet economic planners, with so much power at their disposal, are able to galvanize the direction of Soviet economic growth on such a massive scale that they can cause fundamental disruptions in the environment before they are able to reflect on all the consequences of their decision. When Khrushchev decided in the early 1960s that the Soviet Union needed a large chemical industry, Soviet economic planners ordered chemical plants to be constructed rapidly all over the country and given maximum production targets. These plants have become a major source of water pollution in the Soviet Union and thereby are harming both the people and the economy that depends on water resources.

Another problem contributing to pollution in the Soviet Union is the uneasy relationship that exists between Soviet scientists and the Soviet state, including its economic organs. The type of Soviet economic planning, introduced by Stalin forty years ago, has had an influence on the direction of Soviet science to this day. Since factories have looked solely to raising gross output and have resisted innovations such as anti-pollution devices in production techniques, Soviet scientific research and development has looked mainly to academic success. Research institutes display little interest in the practical application of scientific development in industrial enterprises, so innovative technology, the bridge between industrial production and scientific research, has been neglected.

Writing in Pravda, 18 January 1967, the First Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology, Academician V. A. Trapeznikov, calculated that while the United States was spending three times more on technological development than on scientific research, the Soviet Union was spending more on research than on development. Trapeznikov has advocated a large increase in funds for research and development between 1971 and 1975, but the economic planners of Gosplan have disagreed, arguing that research and development has not been producing as much of an economic gain since 1966 as had been predicted.

Similarly, Academician A. Rumyantsev, writing in a Soviet economic journal in January 1971, complained that increased investments in the technological sciences had not produced a corresponding increase in industrial output and that scientists do not pay enough attention to economic questions. Displaying a characteristic hostility of Soviet economic planners for scientific research and development, he wrote: "The introduction of new machinery requires considerable expenditures. It is not enough to create a technically interesting design, since the economy needs not mere novelties but economically effective solutions." He could not understand why industrial hourly output per worker rose by only 70% between 1959 and 1968 when scientific personnel in the applied sciences increased 240%. He did not indicate that Soviet economic planners take into consideration any values other than increased production when they allocate funds to different sectors of the economy: "The key problem in the development of the socialist economy today is increasing the efficiency of social production in all its spheres and branches. No matter what indices we use to measure this efficiency, in the final analysis what we are talking about is a rise in the productivity of social labor."<sup>19</sup>

At the same time, Soviet emphasis on ideology, which permeates every field, including science, has repeatedly prejudiced scientific discussions and hidden the merits of scientific research. As is well known, ideology set Soviet genetics back two centuries under Stalin and halted Soviet investigation of cybernetics which Stalin termed "that bourgeois science." Today, of course, it is recognized in the Soviet Union that cybernetics, along with its data processing machines, is essential for keeping proper control of modern industrial processes and that cybernetics has a crucial role to play in predicting the environmental damage that could be caused by new factories, dams, irrigation works, chemicals, etc. In fact, the anti-scientific mentality of Soviet ideologists, as the anti-scientific mentality of Soviet economists; can be said to play an important role in allowing Soviet industry to exploit and abuse the environment.

The Soviet Union will have to acknowledge considerations other than industrial output in its economic planning if its pollution problem is to be solved; it will have to allocate adequate funds for scientific research and development, if

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19) Academician A. Rumyantsev, "Questions of Scientific and Technical Progress" in Voprosy ekonomiki No. 1, January 1971

anti-pollution techniques are to be found and applied to industry; and finally, it will have to enforce its anti-pollution laws, if it is serious about stopping its destruction of the environment.

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

May 1971

DATES WORTH NOTING

May 2-15	Prague	UN Economic Commission for Europe meets. Environmental problems to be discussed.
May 10	Vietnam	3rd anniversary of the start of the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam, in 1968.
May 13-16	Budapest	World Peace Assembly sponsored by the World Peace Council. About 200 participants, members of the WPC and the Soviet Bloc's other international Communist fronts, are expected. Indo-China, the Middle East and European Security are on the agenda. In preparation for the Assembly, WPC Secretary Nikolai Voshchinin (USSR) on 31 March called for peace groups to support national liberation movements.
May 25-27	Helsinki	25th Congress of the Socialist Internationale, which draws participants from Labor, Socialist and Social Democratic Parties.
May 25	Prague	Czechoslovak Party Congress meets. There have been persistent news reports in the West that Czechoslovakia plans mass arrests prior to the Congress, of those who supported the Prague Spring reforms three years ago.
June 1	USSR	New corrective labor codes go into effect. The new legislation for Soviet forced labor camps, provides a harsher

		prison routine for "dangerous" criminals and expands the types of offenders who fall into this category.
June--	Moscow	5th Congress of Soviet Writers meets. Missing will be most of the Soviet Union's finest writers, such as: Aleksander Solzhenitsyn, a Nobel Prize winner who was expelled from the Soviet Writers Union in 1969 for writing unflattering portraits of Soviet life; Andre Sinyavskit, serving a prison sentence in a forced labor camp for publishing abroad books said to "slander" the Soviet Union; Yuli Daniel, tried and convicted with Sinyavskiy on the same charge, imprisoned in a forced labor camp, released in broken health, currently in exile in a small town southwest of Moscow called Kaluga.
June 2-24	Geneva	56th Session of the International Labor Organization. Soviet influence in this body is said to have increased.
June 7-9	Helsinki	20th General Assembly of the International Press Institute. On 3 March 1971 IPI Director Ernest Meyer announced at a Geneva press conference that IPI's "Men at War" Committee, for the Safety of Journalists on Dangerous Missions, was sending a mission to Southeast Asia to investigate the fate of 17 journalists missing in Cambodia and to seek recognition from SEA governments of the IPI identification card carried by journalists. The IPI mission hopes to visit Hanoi, Peking and Phnom Penh.

June 14	East Germany	East German Party Congress meets.
June 22	USSR	30th anniversary of beginning of Soviet "Great Patriotic War," 1941: Soviet Union switches sides in WW II when Germany breaks Nazi-Soviet Pact and invades USSR. Although the Red Army was numerically superior, it was unprepared for the attack and Soviet losses were heavy, because Stalin refused to believe reports that Hitler would break their pact.
June 25	Moscow	1st anniversary of unveiling of Stalin bust over his grave, 1970.
June 26	Czechoslovakia	1st anniversary of Dubcek's expulsion from Czech CP, 1970. <u>Quick</u> , the illustrated West German weekly, reported 29 April that the former Party leader and reformer now manages a garage in Bratislava.
June 28	Poland	15th anniversary of the Poznan workers riots, 1956, which brought Gomulka to power at the head of -- Poles hoped -- a liberalized regime. Under pressure from Soviet and Polish hardliners, Gomulka reverted to a harsh rule. A deteriorating economy, exploitation of the workers, and sudden price increases set off new workers riots in December 1970, that swept Gomulka out of office and again brought hopes of liberalization to Poland.

July 1	China	50th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party.
July 4	Philippines	25th anniversary of Philippine independence, 1946, provided for by act of U.S. Congress in 1934.

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

May 1971

SHORT SUBJECTS

SWEDEN SCORES RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT FROM USSR. The 1963 nuclear test ban agreement was designed to put an end to atmospheric pollution caused by atomic tests whose radioactive fallout threatened to contaminate the entire planet. One of the most important provisions of the treaty was the banning of all surface experiments and the stipulation that no underground test should cause damage to neighboring countries. Details of the Soviet Union's most recent and fourth violation of the test ban treaty which put a radioactive cloud over Sweden, are given in the attached reprint from Paris L'Aurore of 17-18 April. Previous Soviet violations occurred in January 1965 and in October and December 1966. The U.S. too has had "nuclear leaks" but no radioactivity from them went beyond American boundaries, notes L'Aurore. In an appearance on Swedish TV, Minister of Culture Alva Myrdal called this latest treaty breach a shocking event and the Swedish government on 21 April sent the government of the USSR a formal memorandum of complaint.

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HOW THE KREMLIN TRAPS JOURNALISTS. In mid-February the Soviet Union ousted one of Moscow's most highly respected and one of the more knowledgeable of Western journalists assigned to the Soviet capital, Per Egil Hegge, correspondent for the three largest Scandinavian dailies. Hegge had maintained a unique contact with Nobel Prize winner Alexander Solzhenitsyn and had been the one to obtain a telephone interview with the Soviet author just after his prize award had been announced. Hegge, a Norwegian citizen, was expelled from the USSR ostensibly for "currency speculation and black market activities." On his return to Oslo, Hegge wrote a series of articles on some of his Moscow experiences and giving his side of the reasons for his expulsion. Reprints of excerpts from these articles are attached for use either as background color for feature material or as examples of life amid the Soviet realities.

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"CONFESSION" AND RELEASE OF CUBAN POET. Echoes of the darkest days of Stalinist repression, and indications that the Castro regime is patterning itself more and more in the style of the Soviet police state come to the fore in the "confession" signed by Cuban poet Heberto Padilla and sent, as a self-accusatory letter, to the Cuban Revolutionary Government. Padilla, who had been arrested without explanation on 20 March, on Castro's personal order, was released 27 April. He had lived in the United States until 1959, and had been criticized several times in recent years for failing to follow the regime's literary line. Two years ago his book, "Outside the Game," which won a national literary prize, set off a dispute between the judges, who believed he deserved the award, and Castro's officials who branded his book as "revolutionarily unfit". Although the book was finally published, it carried a lengthy prologue which described it as full of "skepticism, ambiguities, critical philosophy and anti-historicism." (Attached is the text of a broadcast by Havana Radio, giving details of the "confession," as well as an article, with translation, from Le Monde, on Padilla's arrest, and the text of a letter of protest against it, signed by a group of French intellectuals. In view of previous policy instructions concerning this case, this material is for your information only.)

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BULGARIA: THE 16TH SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC? The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) officially consists of 15 so-called republics. Looking at Bulgaria, one might say that de facto but not yet de jure, it constitutes the 16th Soviet Socialist Republic.

Each of the USSR's European Satellites has had some distinguishing feature: Romania for its occasional and daring divergence from Soviet foreign policy, Hungary and Czechoslovakia for their former resistance to the Soviet model of socialism --- a resistance which earned them Soviet aid in the form of invading troops and tanks, Poland for its periodic uprisings against that same model (but thus far spared Soviet fraternal assistance), and even East Germany which hampers Soviet efforts to make deals with West Germany. Bulgaria, the quietest Satellite, for its part is distinguished by the fact that it is indistinguishable from the official Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Bulgarian 10th Party Congress, 20-25 April, which was postponed in favor of the 24th Congress of the CPSU in order to see what it should conform to, gave news media the rare pretext for trying to make news out of that benighted country. Surveying accounts of everything from the speeches and formal proceedings of the Congress to the pattern of life in Sofia, the outsider is left wondering why the USSR and Bulgaria bother maintaining the fiction that Bulgaria is an independent country.

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KHRUSHCHEV MEMOIRS AUTHENTIC. Of the hundreds of news accounts dealing with the origins and authenticity of the Khrushchev memoirs, the attached article "Nikita Khrushchev's Memoirs Are Genuine Enough," appearing in the Norwegian daily Aftenposten of 6 March 1971 and written by Norwegian journalist Per Egil Hegge, formerly posted in Moscow, is by far the most convincing. Hegge came into some exclusive and closely held information (the source of which journalistic ethics precludes his revealing) and otherwise reasons very cogently from indirect evidence to make a strong case for the authenticity of the memoirs, which were published by Little, Brown and Co., in book form last year under the title Khrushchev Remembers and now available in many languages.

In the course of his article, he refutes many of the arguments advanced by those who wish to consider the memoirs fraudulent. It deserves dissemination to a wider audience than Hegge's own, the Norwegian public.

L'AURORE, Paris  
17-18 April 1971

# DISARMAMENT MINISTER SAYS RUSSIAN FALLOUT HITS SWEDEN

Will the hellish cycle of radioactive fallout start all over again? This woman tells the world that a Russian atomic cloud has spread over Sweden.

On Stockholm's TV screens flashes the fine, thoughtful face, illumined with an inner light, of an old lady. Alva Myrdal, 68, is Minister for Cultural Affairs in the present Swedish government. When she speaks to her fellow-countrymen, they listen with fascination and reverence.

In Sweden, Alva Myrdal is a kind of national monument, something like Indira Ghandi in India, or Golda Meir in Israel. At the United Nations, she holds top offices in UNESCO. She has served as her country's ambassador to India, Burma, Ceylon, and Nepal. And since 1962 she has been fighting fiercely at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, championing the little nations against the predominance of the great nuclear powers.

This evening, her tone is grave and determined: "I am shocked," she says, "Terribly shocked. We have just learned that a radioactive cloud has been spreading over a part of our country for several days now. This cloud came from a foreign nuclear test. This fact shows that the great powers do not honor the Moscow treaty, even though they signed it and forced it upon other countries."

In her speech, Mrs Myrdal was referring to the USSR. Because it is the Soviet Union which is responsible for the atomic cloud that has alarmed the Swedes.

This happened on 31 March. That day, the Swedish nuclear detection system, which is one of the most advanced in the world, if not the best of them all, picked up traces of radioactivity. There was three times the normal level of radioactivity in the atmosphere. Instantly upon receipt of the alert, other measurement and detection instruments went into action.

And in a very short time the Swedish National Defense Research Institute, which is a kind of passive defense ministry, had tracked the cloud. On 23 March, the Russians had

fired a nuclear test shot in the Urals. It was an underground shot, and unquestionably the most powerful they had fired since the Moscow treaty was signed in 1963. Apparently its power was on the order of 5 megatons, or 5 million tons of TNT, which is the standard explosive. For the last 8 years, under a tacit understanding, the super-powers have observed a ceiling of one megaton per shot.

When this test shot was fired, some accident apparently caused a fissure in the earth through which radioactivity escaped. This formed the atomic cloud, which drifted off toward the West and reached Southern Sweden around 31 March, then thinned out around 5 April as it continued to drift to the West.

Sweden is a country that invests a large share of its defense budget (almost half) to atomic defense, building giant shelters which incorporate hospitals, schools, hotels, garages, etc., and have 35-ton armor-plate doors. Its detection systems are highly developed, complete with laboratory aircraft flying round-the-clock patrols to test and monitor atmospheric radioactivity. This is a nation of 7.9 million souls, which has made the option to prepare for anything, including the worst. "After all," reason the Swedes, "maybe it is money thrown away, but insurance only looks expensive until you have an accident."

Alva Myrdal was careful to reassure her compatriots: "The radioactive cloud detected over our country constituted no immediate danger. But it is nevertheless an unpleasant sign."

This nuclear leak from the Urals is a violation of the famous Moscow agreements. Those agreements were drafted by Kennedy and Khrushchev. In the American president's view, the object was to put a final end to the tragic pollution of our atmosphere by atomic tests. Radioactivity was threatening to contaminate the whole planet and to trigger horrifying biological mutations.

### Protest

And so it was stipulated in the Moscow treaty that all experiments on the surface would be banned. Underground explosions were the only ones permissible, and these only on condition -- and this is the most important point -- that they cause no damage to neighboring countries. This means that in no case may radioactive particles from an underground nuclear explosion go beyond the territorial limits of the country that performs the test.

Spelled out, these provisions called on all signatories of the Moscow treaty to surround themselves with all possible safeguards if they were running tests, to keep strict monitoring and

control procedures on all tests, and to stop playing sorcerer's apprentice with the atom. Doubtless there would be accidents and leaks, but the partners in nuclear disarmament were pledged to calculate the risk involved as carefully as humanly possible, and absolutely bound to keep any fallout within their own boundaries.

"Nuclear leaks" have occurred in the United States, for example, but no radioactivity from them has ever gone beyond that country's borders. On 23 March 1971, however, the USSR does not seem to have been paying much attention to the Moscow treaty. And for the first time since 1963, the spectre of radioactivity is again hanging over our heads.

"The USSR has violated several very clear provisions," they say in Stockholm, where they were getting ready to send a note of protest to the Kremlin on the basis of the absolutely undebatable evidence of their nuclear detection apparatus.

And Alva Myrdal goes on with the fight she began nearly 10 years ago, battling for a total ban on all atomic, biological, and chemical weapons.

PHOTO CAPTION

Cabinet minister in the Swedish government, dauntless defender of the small countries at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, Alva Myrdal accuses the Russians of having violated the Moscow treaty by causing radioactive fallout banned since 1963.

L'AUORE, Paris  
17-18 April 1971

LE CYCLE INFERNAL DES RETOMBÉES RADIOACTIVES  
VA-T-IL REPRENDRE ?

**Cette femme révèle au monde :  
un nuage atomique russe  
s'est étendu sur la Suède...**

**S**UR l'écran de la télévision de Stockholm apparaît le beau visage, pensif et tout illuminé de l'intérieur, d'une vieille dame. Alva Myrdal, 68 ans, ministre des Cultes dans l'actuel gouvernement suédois, s'adresse à ses compatriotes. On l'écoute avec fascination et vénération.

PROTESTATION BERLIN

Car Alva Myrdal est, en Suède, une sorte de monument national, comme Indira Gandhi en Inde, Golda Meir en Israël. Aux Nations unies, à l'Unesco, elle revêt les plus hautes fonctions. Elle fut ambassadrice de son pays en Inde, en Birmanie, à Ceylan et au Népal. Et, depuis 1962, à la Commission du désarmement de Genève, elle se bat au nom des petites nations contre la prédominance des grandes puissances nucléaires.

Ce soir, son ton est grave et décidé: « Je suis choquée, dit-elle terriblement choquée. Nous venons d'apprendre qu'un nuage radioactif s'est étendu, pendant plusieurs jours, sur une partie de notre pays. Ce nuage provenait d'une expérience atomique étrangère. Ce fait montre que les grandes puissances ne respectent pas le traité de Moscou, qu'elles ont pourtant signé et imposé à d'autres pays... »

En fait, dans son intervention, Alva Myrdal faisait allusion, plus précisément, à l'URSS. Car c'est l'Union soviétique qui est responsable du nuage atomique qui a inquiété les Suédois.

Cela s'est passé le 31 mars. Ce jour-là, le système de détection antinucléaire suédois, qui est l'un des plus perfectionnés du monde, le meilleur peut-être, décèle des traces suspectes. Une radioactivité atmosphérique dépassant de trois fois le seuil normal. Aussitôt, d'autres instruments de mesure et de recherche se mettent à fonctionner.

Et, en très peu de temps, l'Institut suédois de recherches de la Défense nationale, une sorte de ministère de la Défense passive, est en mesure de connaître l'origine du nuage atomique: le 23 mars dernier, dans l'Oural, les Russes ont procédé à une expérience nucléaire souterraine, sans doute la plus puissante depuis la signature du traité de Moscou, en 1963. De l'ordre de cinq mégatonnes, vraisemblablement, soit la force de 5 millions de tonnes de T.N.T., l'explosif traditionnel. Depuis huit ans, selon un accord tacite, les deux super-Grands se limitaient à une mégatonne par explosion...

Lors de cet essai, un accident a dû produire une fissure provoquant une fuite de radioactivité. D'où formation d'un nuage atomique qui s'est dirigé vers l'ouest, atteignant la Suède méridionale vers le 31 mars, puis se dissipant vers le 5 avril, tout en poursuivant sa route au-dessus de l'Occident.

La Suède est un pays qui investit une bonne partie de son budget de défense (près de la moitié) dans la prévention atomique: construction d'abris géants comportant hôpitaux, écoles, hôtels, garages, portes blindées de 35 tonnes. Systèmes de détection parfaitement au point, grâce à des « rondes » permanentes d'avions-laboratoires qui contrôlent la radioactivité de l'atmosphère. C'est une nation de 7,9 millions d'êtres qui a préféré tout prévoir et, notamment, le dire en se disant qu'après

tout, « c'est peut-être de l'argent inutilement dépensé, mais que l'assurance ne paraît chère qu'avant l'accident ».

Alva Myrdal a tenu toutefois à rassurer ses compatriotes: « Le nuage radioactif décelé au-dessus de notre pays ne comportait pas de danger immédiat. Mais c'est néanmoins un signe fâcheux... »

Car cette fuite nucléaire en provenance de l'Oural soviétique est en contravention avec les fameux accords de Moscou. Ils furent, ces accords, préparés par Kennedy et Khrouchtchev. Dans l'esprit du président américain, il s'agissait de mettre enfin un terme à la dramatique pollution de notre atmosphère par les essais atomiques. La radioactivité risquait de contaminer toute la planète, de léser notre descendance, de provoquer de terrifiantes mutations biologiques.

## Protestation

Il fut donc stipulé, dans le traité de Moscou, que toutes les expériences en surface seraient interdites. Que seules pourraient être poursuivies les explosions souterraines. A condition — et c'est le plus important — qu'il n'en résulterait aucun dommage pour les pays limitrophes. C'est-à-dire qu'en aucun cas des particules radioactives provenant d'une

explosion nucléaire souterraine ne devaient sortir des limites territoriales de l'Etat expérimentateur.

En clair, ces dispositions invitaient chacun des signataires du traité de Moscou à s'entourer de toutes les précautions possibles en cas d'expérience, à contrôler soigneusement le déroulement de tous les essais et à ne plus jouer aux apprentis sorciers de l'atome. Sans doute y aurait-il des accidents, des fuites, mais les partenaires du désarmement nucléaire étaient tenus de calculer ces risques au plus juste, de les limiter impérativement au territoire national.

C'est ainsi que des « fuites nucléaires » se sont produites aux Etats-Unis, sans jamais dépasser toutefois les frontières du pays. Mais le 23 mars dernier, l'URSS ne semble pas avoir tenu compte du traité de Moscou. Et pour la première fois depuis 1963, le spectre de la radioactivité s'est à nouveau promené au-dessus de nos têtes.

« L'URSS a enfreint des stipulations très nettes », dit-on à Stockholm où l'on se préparerait à envoyer une note de protestation au Kremlin, sur la base des révélations absolument indiscutables des appareils de détection nucléaire.

Et Alva Myrdal poursuit le combat entrepris depuis près de dix ans pour l'interdiction totale de toutes les armes atomiques, biologiques, chimiques.

AFTENPOSTEN, Oslo  
14 February 1971

THE KREMLIN LAYS TRAPS FOR JOURNALISTS

I will not try to describe the atmosphere among my colleagues in Moscow at the end of January after Western journalists had on several occasions been exposed to physical harassment. Our working conditions had been difficult -- in Moscow they probably always will be -- but now we were confronted by a new situation. And the only protection we had was to publicize these harassments. Soviet authorities would just have to understand that they could not use such tactics without the situation being made public knowledge.

In other words we found it necessary to present the authorities with a choice: Either they were to act like normal people or they would have to accept publicity when they failed to do so. In my case they chose to deport me. This was an honest action; I had no objections because of the situation as it had been during the last few months.

If the price of being a reporter in Moscow means accepting physical harassment and then shutting up about it, I, at any rate, give up. There are certain things a reporter must refuse to accept. One of my American colleagues was subjected to similar attacks last year. He chose to keep quiet and asked his colleagues to do the same. The harassments continued and the story of what he had to go through is a long, sad one. He finally chose to leave the country "of his own free will". No one should overestimate his ability to hold out under the pressure which the Soviet authorities can exert if they decide to do so.

Neither I nor my colleagues have any doubt that I was deported because of official dissatisfaction with my reports from the Soviet Union. Such dissatisfaction applies to most Western correspondents, and it leads relatively often to deportation. I was the fifth in the course of barely thirteen months who had to leave the Soviet Union before he actually planned to.

I believe that the decision to get me out of the country was taken sometime last fall. It was necessary to find a suitable occasion. Last year I could not be sent away since everyone would then believe

that it was done in connection with the interview with Alexander Solzhenitsyn. During my talk at the (Soviet) press section last Tuesday I was told that I had engaged in activities incompatible with my status as a correspondent, and that the press section had received letters from Soviet citizens, asking to be protected against my influence. (The accusations of efforts to drag Soviet citizens into blackmarket deals and currency swindle appeared first in the Tass report on my eviction, a report that had not been printed in soviet papers prior to my deportation).

One of those who wrote and asked for protection against me is the father of one of the Jews who has been in jail in Leningrad since 5 June last year, Vladimir Mogilever. I visited the Mogilever family in Leningrad on 8 January. I did not interview them; we only had a short talk. I assumed that I was being tailed, but also figured that the family's situation could not be much worse than it already was -- with the breadwinner in jail. The case should have begun on 6 January, and in Moscow no one knew what was going on. Mogilever's family did not know either.

The Soviet authorities have responded to Mogilever's request to be protected against me and my visits, possibly because they want to assure him of a nice, safe old-age. If they also released his son, and let him be relieved of having to hear his grandson ask every day "if Papa is coming home from his work soon", perhaps his old age would be even better. This is just a fleeting thought.

Vladimir Mogilever applied for permission to emigrate to Israel with his wife, his son and his old parents. He was arrested the same day as those accused of hijacking, but he is not accused of participation in the plan. His family is not allowed to visit him in prison or to correspond with him.

Very possibly it was my visit to the Mogilevers that was the final straw. But there were already definite signs that the authorities were out to compromise me, and I will tell one story about such an effort:

During the week between Christmas and New Year's I came home one evening and was told that two youngmen had been waiting for me at home for two hours. They had left a note saying they would call me later that evening. The names and the note were completely unfamiliar to me. At 8:30 that evening a man called and introduced himself as Ivan J. He had to talk to me about something important that could not be mentioned on the telephone, and asked if I could meet him at a designated place in the middle of town. It was so difficult to come to my apartment, since the entrance is guarded, he said. (But he had sat in that apartment with his friend, and had talked to my Soviet secretary and, in her presence, left a note with his and his friend's signatures).

To be on the safe side I took two friends with me and left my watch and wallet at home. At the appointed place stood two men whom I had never seen before. Their errand was this: They could not stand living in the Soviet Union anymore, and asked me to help them get an exit permit to a Western country. Preferably they wanted to go to West Germany.

I said that in that case they would have to go to the West German Embassy. Ivan believed that he could get an exit permit if he wrote a statement that would be made public at a press conference. He thought that I could arrange this press conference. I didn't want to say right out in the open that he should have his script writers think of something better, so I promised to consider the matter and meet him at the same place one week later. I also promised to mention the matter to a West German colleague, a promise I naturally did not keep.

The following week Ivan appeared alone. He had brought four typewritten pages of a statement to various authorities saying that he wanted to give up his Soviet citizenship and live in West Germany because he was unable to live in the Soviet Union. He wanted me to take these statements and show them to my colleagues. The statements were very well formulated and written on very good paper.

I said that I could not take the statements. (If I had done so, I would undoubtedly have been stopped for some traffic misdemeanor on the way home, arrested, frisked and deported for trying to help a Soviet citizen commit treason). For all I know the Foreign Ministry's press section may well have received a letter from Ivan's relatives, asking that he be protected from injurious influence on the part of a Norwegian reporter who is trying to get him to leave the country.

I said that he should go to the West Germany Embassy and talk to the diplomats there. He said that he did not know anyone, and that it was so difficult to get inside foreign embassies.

This last statement is true enough: An ambassador from a NATO-country was stopped by the police guards in front of the American Embassy in Moscow last week and had to show his identification papers before he was allowed inside. But Ivan had gotten my address by going to the Norwegian Embassy and asking if there was a Norwegian correspondent who worked for a newspaper of approximately the same political views as the Finnish newspaper Uusi Suomi.

I said that it was just as well that we did not meet anymore, and we said goodbye. He said that he would travel south, because the police had begun to be interested in him since he didn't have any work. I wished him good luck.

But about two weeks later he called again and wanted to meet me. By that time I was being shadowed constantly and pretended that I would be shadowed on my way to meet him. The tailing didn't seem to bother him particularly, and now he asked to borrow money from me for his trip south. I would get it back in May.

The possibility that I wasn't going to be in Moscow in May was now fairly clear to me, so I said no. Ivan was on the verge of tears and said that he did not have anyone who could help him, no relatives or any good friends. Previously, he had given me his sister's telephone number in Moscow. Ivan, who has a great deal of acting talent, must learn his part better next time.

This story is nothing to get upset about -- it is normal and trivial. I doubt that my colleagues in Moscow would even bother to read my story about Ivan all the way through.

Our friends have asked us if we think it's sad to leave Moscow. The answer is no, even though our life there has not been dull, by any means.

The evening before we left one of my best Russian friends called to say goodbye.

"You will remember Moscow", he said.

I agreed.

"It's like Christiania in the first sentence of Hunger by Knut Hamsun, isn't it?" he asked.

"Yes, it is exactly like the first sentence in Hunger, I answered.

The next morning we drove away from Moscow -- "this strange city which no one leaves without being marked by it".

AFTENPOSTEN, Oslo  
14 February 1971

CPYRGHT

# Kreml legger feller for journalister Vanskelige arbeidsforhold for de vestlige pressefolk

Fra Aftenpostens medarbeider PER EGIL HEGGE.

Helsingfors, 14. februar.

Jeg skal ikke gjøre noe forsøk på å skildre stemningen blant mine kolleger i Moskva i slutten av januar, da vestlige journalister ved et par anledninger var blitt utsatt for korporlige trakassier. Våre arbeidsforhold hadde vært vanskelige — i Moskva vil de sannsynligvis alltid være det — men nu sto vi overfor en helt ny situasjon. Og den eneste beskyttelse vi hadde, var mulighetene til å gi disse trakassier publisitet. De sovjetiske myndigheter måtte få klart for seg at de ikke kunne bruke slike metoder uten at det ble omtalt.

Vi fant det med andre ord nødvendig å stille myndighetene overfor et valg: Enten fikk de oppføre seg som folk, eller så fikk de ta publisiteten når de ikke gjorde det. I mitt tilfelle valgte de å utvise meg. Det er forøvrigt en ærlig sak, jeg har ingen innvendinger slik situasjonen har vært de siste måneder.

Hvis prisen for å få arbeide som journalist i Moskva skal være at man aksepterer korporlige trakassier og tier om dem i det ene håp om å få fortsette, melder i alle fall jeg pass. Det er enkelte ting en journalist skal nekte å finne seg i. En av mine amerikanske kolleger var ifjor utsatt for lignende overgrep. Han valgte å tie og ba sine kolleger også å gjøre det. Trakassierne mot ham fortsatte, og historien om alt han måtte gjennomgå, er lang og trist. Han reiste til slutt «av egen fri vilje». Ingen bør overvurdere sin evne til å holde ut under det press som sovjetiske myndigheter kan øse på en som stemmer seg for det.

## Offisiell misnøye

Jeg selv og alle mine kolleger er ikke i tvil om at jeg ble utvist på grunn av offisiell misnøye med mine reportasjer fra Sovjet. Denne misnøye gjelder forøvrigt de fleste vestlige korrespondenter, og den fører forholdsvis ofte til utvisning. Jeg er den femte i løpet av knapt tretten måneder som forlater Sovjet før det var planlagt.

Hadde jeg ventet å bli utvist? Nå etterpå kan jeg godt innse at det før eller senere ville ha endt med det. Jeg hadde ikke ventet det akkurat nå. Kanskje burde jeg ha ventet det. Enkelte av mine bekjente viste seg å ha bedre vurderingsevne i så måte.

Personlig mener jeg at beslutningen om å få meg ut av landet ble fattet en gang i fjor høst. Det gjaldt å finne en passende anledning og et passende tidspunkt. I fjor høst kunne jeg ikke godt sendes av gårde, siden alle da ville oppfatte det dit hen at den sovjetiske presse var i ferd med å bli Aleksandr Solsjenitsyn.

Under samtalen i presseavdelingen sist tirsdag fikk jeg høre at jeg hadde drevet virksomhet som var uforenlig med min status som korrespondent, og at presseavdelingen hadde mottatt brev fra Sovjet-borgere som bad om å bli beskyttet mot min påvirkning. (Beskyldningen om forsøk på å trekke Sovjet-borgere inn i svartebørs-affærer og valutavindl, dukket først opp i Tass-meldingen om utvisningen, en melding som ved min avreise ikke hadde vært trykt i sovjetiske aviser).

## Ba om beskyttelse

En av dem som skrev og ba om beskyttelse mot meg, er far til en av de jøder som har sittet arrestert i Leningrad siden 5. juni ifjor, Vladimir Mogilever. Jeg oppsøkte familien Mogilever i Leningrad den 8. januar. Jeg intervjuet dem ikke, vi førte bare en kort samtale. Jeg regnet med at jeg ble skværet, men regnet også på at familien skulle kunne bli stort verre enn den var.

—, med forsørgeren i fengsel. Rettssaken skulle ha vært innledet 6. januar, men var utsatt, og i Moskva visste ingen hvordan det lå an. Mogilevers familie visste det heller ikke.

Sovjet-myndighetene har etterkommet Mogilevers anmodning om å bli beskyttet mot mine besøk, muligens fordi de ønsker å sikre ham en god og trygg alderdom. Hvis de også løslot hans sønn, og lot ham slippe å høre sin sønnesønn spørre hver dag om «ikke pappa kommer hjem fra jobben snart», ville hans alderdom kanskje bli enda bedre. Det er bare en strøtanke.

Vladimir Mogilever har søkt om tillatelse til å utvandre til Israel sammen med sin hustru, sin sønn og sine gamle foreldre. Han ble arrestert samme dag som de siktede i flykapringssaken, men han er ikke siktet for delaktighet i den. Hans familie får ikke lov til å besøke ham i fengselet eller til å korrespondere med ham.

### *Forsøk på kompromittering*

Muligens var det mitt besøk hos Mogliever som gjorde utslaget eller fikk begeret til å flyte over. Men det forelå allerede sikre tegn på at man var ute etter å få meg kompromittert, og jeg skal fortelle historien om et forsøk:

I romjulen kom jeg hjem en aften og fikk høre at to yngre menn hadde sittet i to timer og ventet på meg hjemme. De hadde efterlatt en lapp hvor det sto at de ville ringe meg senere på kvelden. Underskriftene og lappen var helt ukjente for meg. Ved halv ni-tiden ringte en mann og presenterte seg som Ivan J. Han måtte snakke med meg om noe viktig som ikke kunne nevnes på telefon og spurte om jeg kunne møte ham et angitt sted i sentrum. Det var så vanskelig å komme til leiligheten, siden innkjørselen jo er bevoktet, sa han. (Men sammen med sin kamerat hadde han altså sittet i min leilighet og snakket med min sovjetiske sekretær — og i hennes påsyn efterlatt en lapp med sin og kamera-tens underskrift.)

For sikkerhets skyld tok jeg to bekjente med og lot armbandsur og lommebok ligge hjemme. På det avtalte sted sto to karer jeg aldri hadde sett før. Deres ærendene var følgende: De kunne ikke lenger holde ut å leve i Sovjet, og ba meg hjelpe dem med å oppnå utreisettillatelse til et vestlig land.

Helst ville de til Vest-Tyskland.

Jeg svarte at de i så fall måtte oppsøke den vest-tyske ambassade. Ivan mente at han kunne få utvirket reisettillatelse hvis han skrev en erklæring som ble kjent på en pressekonferanse. Denne pressekonferanse skulle jeg arrangere, mente han. Jeg ville ikke si rett ut at han burde se sine manuskriptforfattere tenke ut noe bedre, så jeg lovet å overveie saken og møte ham på samme sted en uke senere. Jeg lovet også å nevne saken for en vest-tysk kollega, et løfte jeg naturligvis ikke holdt.

### *Ivan kom alene*

Neste uke kom Ivan alene. Han hadde da med fire maskinskrevne erklæringer til forskjellige instanser om at han ønsket å frasi seg sitt sovjetiske statsborgerskap og bosette seg i Vest-Tyskland fordi han var ute av stand til å leve i Sovjet. Disse erklæringer ville han at jeg skulle ta med og vise mine kolleger. Erklæringerne var meget fint formulert og skrevet på fint papir.

Jeg sa at jeg ikke kunne ta erklæringerne. (Hadde jeg gjort det, ville jeg temmelig sikkert blitt stanset for en trafikkforseelse på vei hjem, anholdt, kroppsvistert og utvist for forsøk på å hjelpe en sovjetisk statsborger til å begå landsforræderi. For alt jeg vet, kan utenriksdepartementets pres-seavdeling godt ha mottatt et

brev fra Ivans slektninger med bønn om at han måtte bli beskyttet mot skadelig påvirkning fra en norsk journalist som forsøker å få ham til å forlate landet.)

Jeg sa at han fikk gå til den vest-tyske ambassade og snakke med diplomatene der. Han sa at han ikke kjente noen, og at det var så vanskelig å komme inn i utenlandske ambassader.

Det siste er riktig nok: En ambassadør fra et NATO-land ble i forrige uke stanset av politivakten foran den amerikanske ambassade i Moskva og måtte legitimere seg før han slapp inn. Men Ivan hadde fått min adresse ved å gå til den norske ambassade og spørre om det fantes en norsk korrespondent som arbeidet for en avis av omtrent samme politiske legning som den finske avis *Uusi Suomi*.

### *Politiet interessert*

Jeg sa at det var like greit vi ikke møttes mer, og vi tok avskjed. Han sa at han skulle reise sydover, fordi politiet var begynt å interessere seg for ham fordi han ikke hadde noe arbeid. Jeg ønsket ham lykke til.

Men omtrent to uker senere ringte han igjen og ville møte meg. Jeg var på den tid under stadig skygging og lot som jeg trodde jeg ble skygget på vei til møtet med ham også — hva jeg rimelig nok ikke ble. Skyggingen lot ikke til å bekymre ham syn-

derlig, og na spurte han om å få låne penger av meg til reisen sydover. Dem skulle jeg få igjen i mai.

Muligheten for at jeg ikke ville være i Moskva i mai, sto nå temmelig klart for meg, så jeg sa nei. Ivan var da på gråten og sa at han ikke hadde noen som kunne hjelpe ham, ingen slektninger eller nære venner. Tidligere hadde han gitt meg telefonnummeret til sin søster i Moskva. Ivan, som er et betydelig skuespillertalent, må lære rollen sin bedre neste gang.

Denne historien er intet å opprøres over — den er normal og triviell. Jeg tviler på at mine kolleger i Moskva ville gidde å lese min fortelling om Ivan til ende.

### *«Ikke uinteressant»*

Våre venner har spurt oss om vi synes det er leit å forlate Moskva. Svaret er nei, selv om vår tilværelse på ingen måte har vært uinteressant.

Kvelden før vi reiste, ringe en av mine beste russiske venner for å si farvel.

— Du kommer til å huske Moskva, sa han.

Jeg samtykket.

— Det er som Kristiania i første setning i Sult av Knut Hamsun, ikke sant? sa han.

— Ja, det er akkurat som første setning i Sult, svarte jeg.

Neste morgen kjørte vi ut av Moskva — «denne forunderlige by som ingen forlater uten å ha fått merker av den».

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MOSCOW: TASS TELLS YOU WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW

Irreconcilable Soviet and Western Views on Duties of the Press

"These correspondents make so many difficulties. They call up and dig around and ask about everything. They can read what Tass sends out -- they'll find everything there that they need to know". This remark was made by a high-ranking Soviet official in a talk with a Western Moscow-diplomat a few years ago. It reflects the Soviet authorities' idea of what the duties of correspondents really are, and it also reflects their views on news service and news coverage in general.

The views of the authorities and the newspaper men on the duties of the press will never agree, and probably shouldn't, either -- in any country. But this built-in state of disagreement is, and must be particularly serious in connection with the Soviet authorities and those Western correspondents who are stationed in the Soviet Union. A Western journalist is taught not only to describe but also to criticize and analyze policies of the authorities and conditions in the country in which he is working, whether it be his own country or another one. This is the very reason for his existence. The reason for existence among his Soviet colleagues is to praise their own country's policies. Here we are confronted by two ways of thinking which are not only impossible to reconcile but which are almost without any point of contact.

One of the most usual Soviet objections to Western journalists' articles about the Soviet Union is that they are in general so critical. This is how it must appear, because it is the bad news that is given most space in Western newspapers. But this is true of news that is given most space in Western newspapers. But this is true of news from every country. And it looks very unjournalistic to a Western newspaper-reader when he sees that the most important news of the day in a Soviet paper is that the workers in a factory have decided to fulfill the quarterly plan before the opening of the Party Congress on 30 March. It is necessary to have read the Soviet press for awhile in order to have any idea at all of how different it is from ours.

One of the elementary slogans of the Soviet State is that it is hammered together in monolithic unity. There is unity between the Party and the people, there is unity among all of the Soviet's nationalities, and there is unity among the farmers, the workers and the intelligentsia. The Soviet Union is a one-track state and shall, according to the political teachings to which the bodies in power are committed, be that way.

If signs appear that this unity is not total, immediately the seeds of conflict appear. And foreign newsmen enter the center of the conflict. The conflict becomes particularly sharp if the unity is lacking on a point on which the authorities are especially sensitive.

Such a conflict arose in connection with the Jewish court case in Leningrad when the two death-sentences were pronounced on Christmas Eve. In addition to the strong protests heard from outside the Soviet Union, several groups of Soviet Jews protested against the sentences. This was a break in the unity, and the outside world knew of it only with the help of the foreign newspapermen. It happened in a sphere in which the authorities were particularly sensitive.

For me -- as for most of my colleagues -- there was never any doubt that a part of our job was to report on this protest. At the same time it was our duty to repeat the official stand in this matter. We did both -- and we were on a collision course with the official views on news reporting: "Tass sends out what we need to know".

It is often been said -- and not without justification -- that Western correspondents in Moscow devote too much attention to the opposition, and thus exaggerate their strength and their importance. There are varying degrees of opposition in the Soviet Union. But even taken altogether, they represent a very small minority. This minority should not have to be considered by the authorities. It does not represent any threat to the Soviet State, and for my part I have never doubted that the Soviet Union will survive until 1984 and even longer. It should never be forgotten that the Soviet state-system has survived more gruesome and lengthier trials in the course of its 53 years than any other state in the world -- under sufferings which no one has the ability to imagine.

But the Soviet authorities do mind this minority; it makes a crack in the unity-surface which is to be presented to the outside world. Therefore, the correspondents alone are not to blame for the fact that many people abroad place a greater importance on the opposition than it actually has: The authorities' propaganda and the measures the authorities take against this minority give the impression is that this minority worries the people in power.

Attacks against the opposition became harsher after Aleksandr Solhenitsyn received the Nobel Prize. At the same time working condition became more difficult for foreign journalists. Our Soviet acquaintances became much more careful. (This was not true of people in official positions, such as the Soviet journalists, for instance. They have a solid position and risk nothing in their contacts with more or less "untouchable" foreign colleagues. But as is reasonable, they do not utter anything other than pro-Party statements. But it can be interesting to talk to them, if for no other reason than because it is possible to discuss more sensitive subjects which cannot be mentioned in the Soviet press -- for example, books which are not published in the Soviet Union but which these entrusted persons have read and on which they may have many differing views).

People who have been long enough in Moscow so that they have a basis for comparison believe that working conditions for foreign correspondents are now more difficult than they have been at any time during the last ten years, when censorship was abolished. I cannot judge this. My impression is that this winter has been more difficult for most of us than last winter was. Many assume, or hope that the difficulties are only temporary, and that conditions will be better when the Party Congress is over. Personally I doubt this; but this can only be pure guess work.

On the basis of what has been said here, do I believe that it is worth the expense for a newspaper to keep a correspondent in Moscow? To that I can only answer an unconditional "Yes". The views of a Great Power are important for all of us, whether we agree with them or not, and they must be brought to our attention. Realities of life in this Great Power-country are also important for us, particularly for those of us in the Nordic countries. These views can be learned by reading the Soviet newspapers, and this one could do in Scandinavia just as well as in Moscow. The realities must be experienced on the spot; it is not possible to just read and gain a real impression of these.

I have already been asked many times if I think that more deportations can be expected by Moscow. To this the answer is an equally unconditional "Yes". Correspondents will always be evicted from Moscow so long as those correspondents continue to work in the manner to which they are accustomed -- so long as they do not accept that "Tass tells them everything they need to know". It is no more complicated than that.

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16 February 1971

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# Moskva: Tass forteller det dere behøver å vite

Sovjets og Vestens syn på pressens oppgaver er uforenelige

Fra Aftenpostens medarb. leder PER EGIL HEGGE

Helsingfors, 15. februar.

«Disse korrespondentene lager så nye vanskeligheter. De ringer og graver og spør om alt mulig. De kan jo lese det som Tass sender ut — der står alt de behøver å vite.» Denne bemerkning falt fra en høyere sovjetisk tjenestemann i en samtale med en vestlig Moskva-diplomat for noen år siden. Den gjenspeiler de sovjetiske myndigheters oppfatning av hva korrespondentenes oppgave egentlig består i, og den gjenspeiler deres syn på nyhetstjeneste og nyhetsdekning i sin almindelighet.

Myndigheters og pressefolks syn på pressens oppgave vil aldri falle sammen og bør neppe gjøre det heller — i noe land. Men dette innebygde motsetningsforhold blir, og må bli, særlig alvorlig i forbindelse mellom sovjetiske myndigheter og de vestlige korrespondenter som er stasjonert i Sovjet. For en vestlig journalist er opplært til ikke bare å skildre, men også til å kritisere og granske myndighetenes politikk og forholdene i det land hvor han arbeider, enten det er i hans eget eller i et annet. Dette er selve hans eksistensberettigelse. Hans sovjetiske kollegas eksistensberettigelse er å hyde sitt eget lands politikk. Man står overfor to tankeganger som ikke bare umulig lar seg forene, men som nærmest er uten berøringspunkter.

## Kritiske og negative

En av de vanligste sovjetiske innvendinger mot vestlige journalisters artikler om Sovjet er at de generelt er så kritiske, så negative. Slik må det fortone seg, for det er de dårlige nyheter som får mest plass i vestlig presse. Men det gjelder vel å merke nyheter fra alle land. Og det virker ujournalistisk på en vestlig avisleser når han ser at en Sovjet-avis' viktigste nyhet en dag er at arbeiderne i en fabrikk har besluttet å oppfylle kvartalsplanen for åpningen av partikongressen den 30. mars. Man må ha lest sovjetisk presse en tid for å ha noen som helst forestilling om hvor forskjellig den er fra vår.

Det er et av Sovjet-statens grunnleggende slagord at den er sammentømret i monolitisk enhet. Det er enhet mellom partiet og folket, det er enhet mellom alle Sovjets nasjonaliteter, og det er enhet mellom bondene, ar-

beiderne og intelligenslaen. Sovjet er en ensrettet stat og skal ifølge den politiske lære som de maktthavende organer bekjenner seg til, være det.

Hvis det dukker opp tegn til at denne enhet ikke er total, har man straks kimen til en konflikt. Og de utenlandske pressefolk kommer i konfliktens sentrum. Konflikten blir særlig skarp hvis enheten mangler på et punkt hvor myndighetene følger seg spesielt hårsåre.

Det oppsto en slik konflikt i forbindelse med jøderettsaken i Leningrad før jul og i alt oppstyrt om de to dødsdommer som ble avsagt julaften. Ved siden av sterke protester utenfor Sovjet, protesterte flere grupper av sovjetiske jøder mot domsavsigelsen. Det var en brist i enheten, og den kom til utenverdenens kjennskap ved de utenlandske pressefolks hjelp. Det skjedde på et saksområde hvor myndighetene var spesielt ømtåelige.

For meg — som for de fleste av mine kolleger — var det aldri noen tvil om at en del av vår oppgave var å omtale denne protest. Samtidig var det vår oppgave å gjengi det offisielle standpunkt i saken. Vi gjorde begge deler — og vi var på kollisjonskurs med det offisielle syn på nyhetsformidling: «Tass sender ut det vi behøver å vite».

## De opposisjonelle

Ofte har det — og ikke uten en viss rett — vært sagt om de vestlige korrespondenter i Moskva at de vier de opposisjonelle for stor oppmerksomhet, og dermed gir et feilaktig bilde av deres styrke og deres betydning. Nu finnes det flere grader og sjatteringer av opposisjon i Sovjet. Men rent sammenfattende kan man si at

det dreier seg om en ytterst liten minoritet. Denne minoritet skulle det faktisk ikke være noen grunn til å bry seg om fra myndighetenes side. De representerer ingen trusel mot Sovjet-staten, og jeg har for min del aldri vært i tvil om at Sovjet vil overleve både til 1984 og enda lenger. Man skal aldri glemme at det sovjetiske statssystem har utholdt mer grusomme og langvarige prøvelser i løpet av sine 53 år enn noen annen stat i verden — under lidelser som ingen har evne til å forestille seg.

Men Sovjet-myndighetene bryr seg om dette mindretall. For det utgjør en sprekke i den enhetsflate som skal presenteres for utenverden. Og pressefolkene blir derfor ikke alene om skylden for at mange i utlandet tilskriver opposisjonen en større betydning enn den har: Gjennom myndighetenes propaganda og tiltak mot denne minoritet formidles et inntrykk av at den bekymrer makt-haverne.

## Skjerpede utfall

Utfallene mot de opposisjonelle ble skjerpet etter at Aleksandr Solzjenitsyn fikk Nobel-prisen. Samtidig ble også arbeidsforholdene vanskeligere for utenlandske journalister. Våre sovjetiske bekjente ble mer forsiktige. (Dette gjaldt ikke folk i offisielle stillinger, som f. eks. sovjetiske journalister. De har en solid posisjon og risikerer intet ved kontakter med mer eller mindre «spedalske» utenlandske kolleger. Fra dem kommer rimeligvis heller ikke annet enn partiløje uttalelser. Men det kan være interessant å snakke med dem, om ikke annet så fordi man kan drøfte mer ømtåelige emner som ikke omtales i

sovjetisk presse — f. eks. bøker som ikke er utgitt i Sovjet, men som disse betrodde personer har lest og som de kan ha ganske nyanserte synspunkter på).


De som har vært så lenge i Moskva at de har et sammenligningsgrunnlag, mener at arbeidsforholdene for utenlandske pressefolk nu er vanskeligere enn noen gang på 10 år, da forhåndscensuren ble opphevet. Jeg kan ikke bedømme dette. Mitt inntrykk er at denne vinteren for de fleste av oss var vanskeligere enn den forrige. Mange regner med eller håper at vanskelighetene er forbigående, og at tilstandene vil bli bedre når partikongressen er over. Personlig tviler jeg, men dette kan ikke bli annet enn rene gjetninger.

## Utgiftene verd?

Mener jeg så på grunnlag av det som her er sagt at det er omkostningene verd for en avis å ha en korrespondent i Moskva? Til det kan jeg bare svare et ubetinget ja. En stormakts synspunkter er viktige for oss alle, enten vi er enige i dem eller ikke, og de må bringes til vår kunnskap. Forholdene i denne stormakt er også viktige for oss, spesielt for oss i Norden. Synspunktene kan man skaffe seg rede på ved å lese sovjetiske aviser, og det kan man forsåvidt gjøre i Skandinavia like godt som i Moskva. Forholdene må oppleves på stedet — man kan ikke lese seg til et skikkelig inntrykk av dem.

Jeg er allerede flere ganger blitt spurt om jeg tror at flere utvisninger kan ventes fra Moskva. Til det er svaret et like ubetinget ja. Fra Moskva vil det alltid bli utvist korrespondenter så lenge korrespondentene fortsetter å arbeide på den måte de er vant til fra hjemlandet — så lenge de ikke bryr seg om å «Tass forteller dem alt de behøver å vite». Det er ikke mer komplisert enn som så.

CPYRGHT



LE MONDE, Paris  
9 April 1971

MANY PERSONS ARE DISTURBED  
ABOUT THE ARREST OF THE CUBAN  
POET HEBERTO PADILLA

The Cuban writer Heberto Padilla, who won the Cuban national poetry prize in 1968 for his book "Outside of the Game," has been imprisoned in Havana since 22 March. No precise details have yet been supplied on the nature of the offenses he is accused of (Le Monde of 23 March). On the other hand, in a conversation with the students of Havana University, Prime Minister Fidel Castro recently admitted that he personally decided on the arrest of the poet, which caused deep emotion in Cuban intellectual circles.

He told his listeners that other Cuban intellectuals were involved. Fidel Castro said "there are a number of facts which, when they are revealed, will cause indignation." And he added that the intellectuals could not have any privileged immunity protecting them from possible counterrevolutionary activities. He indicated that the international reactions caused by the Padilla affair would allow the Cuban revolution to distinguish between its real friends and the friends who lay down conditions to be recognized as such.

A group of persons has just sent the following letter to the Prime Minister:

"The signers, who support the principles and objectives of the Cuban revolution, appeal to you to express their concern about the arrest of the poet and writer Heberto Padilla and request you be good enough to examine the situation created by such an arrest.

Inasmuch as the Cuban Government has not supplied any information up till now on this subject, we can fear the reappearance of a sectarian development stronger and more dangerous than the one you denounced in March 1962 and which Commander "Che" Guevara referred to several times, when he denounced the suppression of the right of criticism within the revolution.

At a time when the establishment of a Socialist Government in Chile and the new situation created in Peru and Bolivia are facilitating the collapse of the criminal blockade of Cuba by United States

imperialism, the use of repressive measures against intellectuals and writers who have exercised the right of criticism in the revolution can only have profoundly negative effects on the anti-imperialistic forces of the entire world and more particularly in Latin America, for whom the Cuban revolution is a symbol and a flag.

In thanking you for the attention that you should be kind enough to give to this request, we reaffirm our solidarity with the principles which have guided the struggle in the Sierra Maestra and which the Cuban Government has expressed so many times in the words and actions of its Prime Minister, "Che" Guevara and so many other revolutionary leaders."

We observe among the signers the names of: Carlos Barral, Simone de Beauvoir, Italo Calvino, Jose Maria Castellet, Fernando Claudin, Julio Cortazar, Jean Daniel, Marguerite Duras, Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Jean-Pierre Faye, Carlos Franqui, Carlos Fuentes, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Juan Goytisolo, Luis Goytisolo, Alain Jouffroy, Andre Pieyre de Mandlary, Joyce Mansour, Dionys Mascolo, Alberto Moravia, Maurice Nadeau, Helene Parmelin, Octavio Paz, Anne Philipe, Pignon, Jean Pronteau, Rebeyrolles, Rossana Rossanda, Francisco Rosi, Claude Roy, Jean-Paul Sartre, Jorge Semprun, Mario Vargas Llosa.

In Cuba, the French citizen Pierre Golendorf, who was arrested on 18 February by the State Security Services for "counterrevolutionary activities" was authorized for the first time on Wednesday, 7 April to receive a visit of a counselor of the French Embassy in Havana, Serge Bataille." The Cuban authorities have not yet made a definite charge against Golendorf. A representative of the Ministry of the Interior simply stated on 20 March that the arrest of the Cuban poet Herberito Padilla was connected with that of Pierre Golendorf.

LE MONDE, Paris  
9 April 1971

CPYRGHT

## De nombreuses personnalités s'émouvent de l'arrestation du poète cubain Heberto Padilla

L'écrivain cubain Heberto Padilla, qui avait remporté en 1968 le Prix national cubain de poésie pour son livre *Fuera del Juego* (Hors-Jeu) est emprisonné à La Havane depuis le 20 mars. Aucune précision n'a encore été fournie sur la nature des délits qui lui sont reprochés (*le Monde* du 23 mars). En revanche, dans un entretien avec les étudiants de l'université de La Havane, le premier ministre, M. Fidel Castro, a récemment reconnu que l'arrestation du poète, qui a causé une profonde émotion dans les milieux intellectuels cubains, avait été décidée sous sa responsabilité personnelle.

Devant ses auditeurs, il a précisé que d'autres intellectuels cubains étaient impliqués « Il y a une série de faits, a déclaré M. Fidel Castro, qui, lorsqu'ils seront rendus publics, provoqueront l'indignation. » Et il a ajouté que les intellectuels ne sauraient avoir un privilège d'immunité quelconque protégeant d'éventuelles activités contre-révolutionnaires. Il a laissé entendre que les réactions internationales provoquées par l'affaire Padilla permettraient à la révolution cubaine d'établir la distinction entre ses vrais amis et les amis qui, pour être reconnus comme tels, posent des conditions.

Un groupe de personnalités vient précisément d'adresser au premier ministre cubain la lettre suivante :

« Les signataires, solidaires des principes et objectifs de la révolution cubaine, s'adressent à vous pour vous exprimer leurs inquiétudes à la suite de la détention du poète et écrivain Heberto Padilla, et vous demander de bien vouloir examiner la situation créée par une telle détention.

« Etant donné, que le gouvernement cubain n'a fourni jusqu'à présent aucune information sur ce sujet, nous pouvons craindre la réapparition d'un processus de sectarisme plus fort et plus dangereux que celui que vous avez dénoncé en mars 1962 et auquel le commandant « Che » Guevara a fait plusieurs fois allusion lorsqu'il dénonçait la suppression du droit de critique au sein de la révolution.

« Au moment où l'instauration d'un gouvernement socialiste au

Chili et la nouvelle situation créée au Pérou et en Bolivie facilitent la rupture du blocus criminel de Cuba par l'impérialisme nord-américain, l'emploi de méthodes répressives contre des intellectuels et écrivains qui ont exercé le droit de critique dans la révolution ne peut avoir qu'une répercussion profondément négative parmi les forces anti-impérialistes du monde entier, et plus spécialement d'Amérique latine, pour qui la révolution cubaine est un symbole et un drapeau.

« En vous remerciant de l'attention que vous voudrez bien apporter à cette demande, nous réaffirmons notre solidarité envers les principes qui ont guidé la lutte dans la Sierra Maestra et que le gouvernement révolutionnaire de Cuba a exprimés tant de fois à travers la parole et l'action de son premier ministre, du commandant « Che » Guevara et de tant d'autres dirigeants révolutionnaires. »

Parmi les signataires on relève les noms de : Carlos Barral, Simone de Beauvoir, Italo Calvino, José María Castellet, Fernando Claudin, Julio Cortázar, Jean Daniel, Marguerite Duras, Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Jean-Pierre Faye, Carlos Franqui, Carlos Fuentes, Gabriel García Márquez, Juan Goytisolo, Luis Goytisolo, Alain Jouffroy, André Pieyre de Mandiargues, Joyce Mansour, Dionys Mascolo, Alberto Moravia, Maurice Nadeau, Hélène Parmelin, Octavio Paz, Anne Philipe, Pignon, Jean Prouteau, Rebeyrolles, Rossana Rossanda, Francisco Rosi, Claude Roy, Jean-Paul Sartre, Jorge Semprun, Mario Vargas Llosa.

« A Cuba, le ressortissant français Pierre Golendorf, arrêté le 18 février par les services de la sécurité d'Etat pour « activités contre-révolutionnaires », a été autorisé, le mercredi 7 avril, pour la première fois, à recevoir la visite d'un conseiller de l'ambassade de France à La Havane, M. Serge Bataille. Les autorités cubaines n'ont encore formulé aucune accusation concrète contre M. Golendorf. Un représentant du ministère de l'Intérieur a simplement précisé, le 20 mars, que l'arrestation du poète cubain Heberto Padilla était liée à celle de Pierre Golendorf. — (A.F.P.)

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NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS  
6 May 1971

## An Open Letter to Fidel Castro

*Herberto Padilla, one of Cuba's leading poets, was arrested and imprisoned in Havana on March 20. No details have yet been made public of the charges against him. The following open letter to Fidel Castro from prominent European and Latin American writers was published in Le Monde on April 9.*

The undersigned, supporters of the principles and objectives of the Cuban Revolution, address you in order to express their disquiet as a result of the imprisonment of the poet and writer Herberto Padilla and to ask you to re-examine the situation which this arrest has created.

Since the Cuban government up to the present time has yet to supply any information about this arrest, we fear the re-emergence of a sectarian tendency stronger and more dangerous

than that which you denounced in March, 1962, and to which Major Che Guevara alluded on several occasions when he denounced the suppression of the right of criticism within the ranks of the revolution.

At this moment—when the installation of a socialist government in Chile and the new situation in Peru and Bolivia help make it possible to break the criminal blockade imposed on Cuba by North American imperialism—the use of repressive measures against intellectuals and writers who have exercised the right of criticism within the revolution can only have deeply negative repercussions among the anti-imperialist forces of the entire world, and most especially of Latin America, for which the Cuban Revolution is a symbol and a banner.

In thanking you for the attention you may give to this request, we

reaffirm our solidarity with the principles which guided the struggle in the Sierra Maestre and which the revolutionary government of Cuba has expressed so many times in the words and actions of its Prime Minister, of Major Che Guevara, and of so many other revolutionary leaders.

Simone de  
Beauvoir  
Italo Calvino  
Jose Maria  
Castellet  
Julio Cortazar  
Jean Daniel  
Marguerite Duras  
Hans Magnus  
Enzensberger  
Carlos Franqui  
Carlos Fuentes  
Gabriel Garcia  
Marquez  
Juan Goytisolo

Luis Goytisolo  
Alain Jouffroy  
André Pieyre de  
Mandiargues  
Dionys Mascolo  
Alberto Moravia  
Maurice Nadeau  
Octavio Paz  
Francisco Rosi  
Rossana Rossanda  
Claude Roy  
Jean-Paul Sartre  
Jorge Semprun  
Maria Vargas  
Llosa

(partial list)

HAVANA RADIO  
27 April 1971

HAVANA IN SPANISH TO THE AMERICAS 1600 GMT 27 APR 71 C

In a letter addressed to the Cuban Revolutionary Government, writer Heberto Padilla, who was arrested recently in Havana, has admitted that he engaged in counterrevolutionary activities—including giving information to foreign visitors whom he described as CIA agents. Padilla said that because of what he terms literary vanity, intellectual and political conceit, and counterrevolutionary hostility, he seriously violated the morality of the true intellectual, and what is even worse, he stressed, the revolution itself.

Padilla stated furthermore that his principal counterrevolutionary activity was publicly defending Guillermo Cabrera Infante—a traitor and CIA agent—and attacking the Union of Writers and Artists and the Cuban Foreign Ministry. I wanted, he said, to be the only writer in Cuba capable of fighting the revolutionary process and imposing my ideas. What I sought, he added, was to attract attention and benefit from the scandal.

Padilla added that this attitude immediately won for him the attention of journalists, sociologists, and foreign pseudopoets who showered him with interviews and praise. Among them he mentioned Polish-French journalist K.S. Karol and French agronomist Rene Dumont, both of whom, says the letter, are definitely CIA agents who wrote slander against our revolution. Their writings presented Heberto Padilla as one of the few revolutionary and friendly persons.

Padilla insists in his letter that his image as a rebel intellectual became very popular among newsmen and writers known as liberals or democrats, whom he said are more concerned with intellectual conflict than with imperialist Yankee bombing of Vietnam.

Furthermore, he calls his book "Out of the Game," a book of insidious and provocative poems subtly expressing the temperament of a nonbeliever, a cynic, a poet caught in the trap of his own moral and intellectual limitations. This book, which was awarded the national poetry prize in 1968 by an international jury, was published in Cuba with a critical prologue by the executive leadership of the national Union of Writers and Artists. Thus, adds Padilla, a literary scandal followed which provoked a typical reaction from bourgeois intellectuals: in Paris, London, the United States, Italy, and the Scandinavian countries it became the basis for discussions about freedom within socialism. Heberto Padilla said that in view of this acquired notoriety he decided that his intellectual and political success was assured and that the Cuban revolution would have to consult him and give him special attention.

Padilla adds that he also made contacts with editor Hans Magnus Ezensberger and a sociologist whose last name is Kisler--both West Germans. He said that to this one he gave details about Cuba--asking that he hide them lest they possibly fall into the hands of the state security department. Padilla confessed that he put Kisler in contact with other Cubans in positions similar to his.

Padilla recalled that after a year without working, he wrote a letter to Prime Minister Maj Fidel Castro, and his job application [as heard] was answered rapidly and respectfully by the revolutionary government. I was so deeply infatuated, angry, and blind, he said, that I considered this to be the proof that my intellectual worth and prestige abroad were recognized and even feared by the revolution, and that from now on I would have complete immunity to talk inconsiderately about anything I wanted to, to mock whatever I wanted, to spread poison everywhere without any fear, to meet with other disaffected intellectuals--particularly foreigners-- to release our sick and counterrevolutionary spirits, and to engage in the continuous, customary work of plotting against all of the revolution's initiatives, accusing the revolution unjustly, and constantly slandering it.

Huberto Padilla said that it was then that he thought of writing a novel whose main character would (?attack) the work of the revolution. It would be a subtle novel reflecting his opinions against the Cuban revolution. He wrote a few chapters of this novel and recommended it to the English writer (Toich) and discussed it with Jose Agustin (Goitisololo), who told Spanish writer Barral about it. Barral sent Padilla several messages asking him for the original of the novel, and Padilla, through writer Julio Mordazas, promised he would send it with some trustworthy traveler from among the members of the jury for the 1971 Casa de las Americas prize. Heberto Padilla added: My goal was to live a double life--to vegetate like a parasite in the shadows of the revolution and to cultivate literary popularity abroad at the expense of the revolution and aided by its enemies.

Padilla concluded by thanking the Cuban Revolutionary Government for allowing this letter to be read publicly and for discussing and arguing with those who are committing or are going to commit similar mistakes. Padilla said that the way of living and social conduct of many Cuban writers is similar to his past behavior and concludes: I am sure that this personal experience of mine and my words will become unimpeachable if some good talent succeeds in liberating itself from the enemy's common trap and becomes useful to the revolutionary cause.

WASHINGTON POST  
26 APRIL 1971

CPYRGHT

# Bulgaria Grows Rapidly As a Junior Soviet Union

By Dan Morgan  
Washington Post Foreign Service  
SOFIA — Drop a candy

wrapper on the spotlessly clean streets of Sofia and the shrill blast of a policeman's whistle sounds out a sharp reprimand.

Heads snap round; the violator stoops and retrieves his litter, chastened and slightly shaken.

While Bulgarians sleep, crews of street cleaners hose down the wide boulevards and vistas of the capital. During the day, women zealously manicure the flower beds behind the mausoleum of Georgi Dimitrov, where the late Communist leader lies embalmed inside a lighted glass case.

In its cleanliness, its vigilant traffic policemen, its wide streets and shiny, if somewhat antiseptic skyscraper hotels, Sofia resembles no city in the East so much as East Berlin.

As in East Germany, order and discipline are the hallmarks of Bulgaria, as it enters what was formally proclaimed by the 10th Communist Party congress that met here this week as the "developed stage of socialism."

And nowhere are those virtues more evident than in Bulgaria's loyal adherence to its principal benefactor, the Soviet Union.

Under Soviet patronage, Bulgaria has emerged as a semi-industrial state, with 54 per cent of its population living in urban areas and agriculture officially accounting for only a quarter of the national product. In the last five years it doubled production of electric power, plastics, cement and fertilizers and trebled steel output while making almost no concessions to such alleged marks of creeping capitalism as small-scale private enterprise, decentralization or limited market mechanisms in the economy.

## Respite From War

Under Soviet protection it has also won a respite from the war and instability that wrecked it for centuries. Czarist Russian intervention against the Turks helped liberate Bulgaria from 500 years of Ottoman domination in 1878, but between 1912 and 1944, it was involved in two Balkan conflicts and two world wars. Between the wars there was a soldier rebellion, an abortive Communist insurrection, four army coups and innumerable political twists and turns.

Bulgaria's legendary special relationship with Russia, partly historical and romantic, partly a product of self-interest, cannot therefore be dismissed as pure servility. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev himself this week described Bulgaria as "sovereign."

But peace and rising prosperity are the rewards for what some Western diplomats feel is increasing Soviet predominance in all spheres of life, a phenomenon which they say has become more accented since the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Mediterranean buildup.

"The Bulgarian Communist Party and the Bulgarian people need Bulgarian-Soviet friendship the way all living things need sun and air," party leader Todor Zhivkov told the congress delegates this week.

"Friendship forever," proclaim huge signs displayed throughout the Bulgarian capital. On the Lenin boulevard a giant red drape shows Zhivkov and Soviet party leader Leonid Brezhnev standing arm in arm.

## Friendship Cult

No personality cult surrounds Zhivkov, however, as it does (for quite different reasons) President Tito of Yugoslavia or the bright of East Germany. Instead there is the cult of

friendship with the Soviet Union.

All last week awed schoolchildren filed through the museum of the revolution which traces the history of the Bulgarian Communist Party from its founding in 1891, and, incidentally, outlines its close bonds to the Russian Bolsheviks.

According to Western diplomats, the proposed new Bulgarian constitution, to be adopted later this year by referendum, is the first in Eastern Europe to formally link its foreign policy to that of the Soviet Union.

The new five-year development plan calls for further integration of the Bulgarian economy with that of the Soviet Union, a process that is already well under way. This will mean more specialization by Bulgarian industry. Bulgaria is producing batteries for Fiat cars built in the Soviet Union, and taking payment in the form of Fiats for the Bulgarian market.

Meanwhile, Moscow is said to be building up its largest new embassies in the world here and to be preparing to pour 350 million rubles in credits into Bulgaria in the next five years.

## New Military Equipment

Western diplomats also say that Bulgaria is receiving highly advanced military equipment for its army, though one diplomat said it "probably was not quite as advanced as what is on the west bank of the Suez Canal."

The visit of Soviet party leader Brezhnev to Sofia for the party congress last week indicated the sincerity of the Soviet commitment to Bulgaria.

In the ideological and cultural sphere, Western analysts believe that Bulgaria is a useful Soviet proving ground for ideas that could be tried later in the Soviet Union. The "new economic mechanism" introduced Jan.

1; for instance, contains important innovations such as the creation of giant farm conglomerates which are to be run on industrial lines and which eventually will eliminate differences between factory and farm labor. In some respects, the Bulgarian economy, which continues to be centrally planned, rigid and resistant to any revisionist thinking, seems an orthodox alternative to the liberal, decentralizing reforms that have been winning respect all over Eastern Europe for the Hungarians.

A strong Bulgaria, said one diplomat, is also valuable to the Soviets as a potential "cats paw" in the Balkans—the main Soviet ally and strategic bastion in an area where neighboring countries run the political spectrum from pro-Chinese Albania to military-ruled Greece.

For this reason, it does not surprise observers here that Bulgaria has begun to take the initiative for a Balkan-wide security arrangement. This would fit well into the Soviet Union's drive for a European security conference and could also form links and extend Soviet bloc interests to countries outside the Warsaw Pact in southeast Europe.

## Cafes Are Full

Daily life is not all drab in Sofia. The new and tastefully laid out city parks are full of promenading people, and the cafes are full. The rooftop restaurant and bar of the hotel Hemus attracts young Bulgarians at night who look out at a brightly lit city that no longer qualifies as "the big village," as it once was called.

Yet the rigidity of the regime gives life an orthodox hue. Guests at the Hemus must pass muster by the doorman, for instance, and occasionally Western guests are challenged for their identification.

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The main artistic attraction in town during the congress is an exhibition of Bulgarian socialist realist painting, where the emphasis is on steel workers, chemical plants and life on collective farms. The only relief from the genre is a rather freely rendered portrait of American radical Angela Davis by artist Vladimir Ganecovski.

Despite the influx of hundreds of thousands of West European tourists each summer, Bulgarians' contact with foreigners is sharply limited. An American diplomat this week threw a cocktail party to which 24 Bulgarian journalists were invited. None showed up.

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NEW YORK TIMES  
25 April 1971

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## Sofia Puts Its Best Foot Forward For Week of Communist Party Congress

By ALFRED FRIENDLY JR.

Special to The New York Times

SOFIA, Bulgaria, April 22

The day before Bulgarian Communists opened their tenth party congress here, the concierge of the high-rise apartment building where many diplomats live came to call on his tenants. His message was simple.

For the rest of the week, while the party gathering lasted, residents were not to hang laundry to dry on their balconies overlooking the modern convention hall.

Such attention to decorative detail is understandable in Bulgaria, where surface appearances matter at least as much as the underlying and not quite so appetizing reality. For the same reasons, some of the charming buildings in the city's

center were given a coat of fresh paint before the congress, shops were amply stocked with goods and a new park was opened in a city already well provided with playgrounds and stretches of greenery.

Street markings were also painted over the yellow cobbles that make Sofia's thoroughfares look like the road to Oz. Unfortunately, rain and traffic kept wiping out the new white lines, and several coats had to be applied before the Congress opened Tuesday.

**Zhivkov Glowing Report**

The report delivered that day by Todor Zhivkov, the 59-years-old leader of Bulgaria, also presented a glowing version of the country's present and future. But while Bulgaria has made some remarkable economic progress, with a 10 per cent annual growth rate, the country's political control, she scarcely ap-

pears to be a nation on the threshold of becoming what Mr. Zhivkov described is a "developed socialist society."

Such a step forward, the party program declares, will "create socially homogeneous society" without class differences able to "leap from the kingdom of necessity into the kingdom of freedom."

The leap will have to be a long one. Individual Bulgarians are still so closely watched that few dare enter the reading rooms of Western embassies. Instead, crowds of Bulgarians stand outside the American library to stare at pictures of Tricia Nixon and her fiancé and of United States automobile racing drivers and their cars.

A Western correspondent, trying to reach a private Bulgarian citizen, whose name had been obtained from mutual

friends, was anonymously but firmly advised not to pursue his efforts.

**Visitor Is Hushed**

Even more striking was the experience of a Greek-American who spent some time recently with relatives, who were forcibly moved to Bulgaria 25 years ago during the Greek civil war. Visiting them in a small village, he found that they refused to believe that Americans had telephones and television, much less color television and a choice of channels to watch.

He was also hastily hushed by his brother when he began to criticize Bulgaria. The wife of another brother, he was told, was a police agent charged with spying on the former Greeks.

—journalists with foreign-language ability, sports figures and specialists in foreign trade. Foreign commerce is becoming a popular field of study for young Bulgarians who want to travel outside their own country and know they can only go to the West if they have official business there.

One young man who has made foreign trade a career agreed, speaking figuratively, that Austria, for example "smells better" than his own country. But he added: "It is unfair to compare our situation with that of the advanced nations. A better measure of our progress is to put us where we belong historically and geographically, next to Greece, Turkey or Yugoslavia."

**2d Fastest Growth Rate**

Using that rating, Bulgaria — with the fastest rate of economic growth in the world after Japan — looks rather good. But party leaders, putting a new stress on consumer welfare for the coming five-year plan, forecast food imports to a nation that is traditionally an agricultural exporter.

The progress achieved is partly the product of hard work at home but is also the result of extensive Soviet aid, estimated at more than \$2-billion in the last quarter century. Bulgaria, which says she sold Russia 200 million bottles of wine last year, is planning to maintain that profitable relationship. Some 82 per cent of her trade over the next five years is to stay inside the Communist bloc, and 58 per cent with the Soviet Union.

AFTENPOSTEN, Oslo  
6 March 1971

NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV'S MEMOIRS GENUINE ENOUGH  
By Per Egil Hegge

In this article, Per Egil Hegge, the Aftenposten correspondent recently sent home from Moscow, examines the much-discussed book, Khrushchev's Memoirs, which will be available on the Norwegian market very soon. The doubts he had earlier disappeared when Pravda printed Khrushchev's own denial -- a confirmation in itself! It is not quite clear how the memoirs came into the hands of the American Time-Life concern, but Hegge names here one of the men who could probably tell the whole story -- Time correspondent Jerold Schecter, who left Moscow last September.

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The origin of the Khrushchev Memoirs was one of the topics I was working on when my work was so rudely interrupted five weeks ago. Much of the information I obtained cannot be published for fear of placing some people in a difficult situation. Both this information and the circumstances I will relate in this article tend without exception to substantiate Time-Life's claim that the memoirs are authentic, that is to say they come, for the most part, from the retired Mr. Khrushchev. How much is based on records from Khrushchev's period of glory will remain a secret, because the people directly involved in this affair are obliged by contract to keep quiet about it.

A Soviet acquaintance told me in May 1970 that Khrushchev was writing his memoirs. I did not have much faith in this information. It was reasonable that rumours would circulate that a retired man with Khrushchev's level of activity and need to talk would write something down. Nor did I have any reason to believe that my confidant had any special knowledge of what Khrushchev was doing behind his guarded fence -- it was only later that I understood clearly the level of his contact with the Khrushchev family. I thought too that this was material neither I nor any other western journalist would ever get to see and that, therefore, the information was uninteresting from a news angle.

Even after the report that the memoirs would be published, I remained skeptical, reasoning like many other people that even if Khrushchev had his own ideas about the policies of the present leaders, particularly the Stalin question, he was still a loyal communist who would not send critical material out of the country. For that reason I assumed that the memoirs were a forgery.

I changed my mind when Khrushchev's so-called disclaimer was published on 16 November. This must be regarded as one of the most affirmative disclaimers the world has ever seen, since it said between the lines that material for reminiscences did exist. What Khrushchev did deny was that he had personally delivered such material to anyone -- which no one had claimed he had.

In his denial, Khrushchev described the memoirs with a word commonly translated as forgery. But the word has a more limited, precise meaning than that. If, for example, the memoirs were edited without the cooperation of the author, as the translator, Strobe Talbott, says they were, they can quite

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philologically be regarded as "falchivka" and still be genuine. Thus Khrushchev is telling the truth -- and so are the publishers.

The denial was dated 10 November, but was sent out by the Tass bureau on 16 November. Several days later I heard from a source I considered and still consider very credible and reliable the story of how Khrushchev had been summoned to Arvid Pelshe, member of the Politbureau and chairman of the supervisory commission of the party. There he was ordered to sign a denial that had already been drawn up. During his conversation with Pelshe, Khrushchev claimed that he had no idea how his memoirs had ended up outside the country, a statement that might be correct, although I and most of the Russians I knew doubted it. Khrushchev yielded to pressure and signed the disclaimer after making certain changes -- which I do not know. The excitement was hard on the 76-year-old pensioner and he entered the hospital immediately afterward.

An experienced colleague of mine in Moscow warned me against sending this story. They'll expel you for it, he told me. I did not follow his advice and it appeared in Aftenposten on 27 November. The story also appeared in other newspapers and led people in Washington to think that my source must be Khrushchev's son-in-law, former editor-in-chief of Izvestia, Alexei Adzhubei. Thus Stewart Alsop wrote in Newsweek at the beginning of January that Adzhubei granted an interview with western journalists in Moscow at the end of November. He gives that as an established fact. It is pure fabrication. And it is regrettable that it was taken seriously and kept turning up -- for example in Professor John Sannes' otherwise excellent introduction to the Norwegian edition that will be out soon -- but in a very diluted form.

This is the background of the Memoirs. In the fall of 1969 or just after New Year's Day 1970, Khrushchev got a tape recorder and was very pleased with it. Every time he had someone to listen to him, the old popular speaker awoke in him, and it was mainly his many grandchildren who heard grandfather talk while the tape recorder operated. Without an audience, nothing would have come of it. I do not know who turned the tape recorder off and on or who removed the tapes. But I doubt that it could have happened without Khrushchev having some idea what was going on.

Henry Shapiro, UPI correspondent in Moscow for many years, also investigated these matters and came to the conclusion that it was Lev Petrov, Khrushchev's fatally ill son-in-law, who saw to it that the reminiscences got into the hands of a foreigner. For all I know, this could be true. Petrov suffered from incurable cancer and had only a few months left last spring. He died last fall before the news of the memoirs became known.

Right after Christmas, Moscow journalist Victor Louis was a steady visitor in the home of the Khrushchev family. His name was immediately mentioned in connection with memoirs in the West. The only reason for it at that time was that people knew he had been engaged in similar affairs in the past. Louis is a Soviet citizen, a Moscow correspondent for the London Evening News, a KGB agent, and a frequent traveler abroad. The suspicion that he had something to do with the matter was strengthened when his stay in Copenhagen on 24 August became known. In Copenhagen he met one of the top men in the Time-Life concern, Murray Garth, and Jerrold Schecter, at that time Moscow correspondent for Time.

One theory is that the manuscript -- or the tapes -- was handed over then and there. That can't be true -- according to my information, all the material

was out of the Soviet Union and almost completely translated by that time.

Louis' name has been cited as proof that it was the KGB that was behind the export of the memoirs. Nothing I know excludes the possibility that the KGB had quite a bit to do with it. But Victor Louis engages in a multi-faceted activity, the object of which in the main is simply to earn money -- and only that. I would not offhand exclude the possibility that this was the idea this time too.

The man who could tell the whole story is undoubtedly Jerrold Schecter. This very likeable, capable, and most active correspondent left Moscow last September, despite the fact this left the Time office empty, as it has remained ever since -- a void that a news magazine like Time shuns like the plague and must have had very good reasons for considering -- to say nothing of accepting. It should surprise no one that Schecter is one of those obligated by contract to keep quiet, an obligation he has honored. (I for one would give a lot to hear his comments about the theory of the British expert on Soviet affairs, Victor Zorza, that the material was delivered to Time by CIA agents who claimed to be Russians!)

In my opinion, the strongest confirmation of the authenticity of the memoirs lies in the treatment afforded them by the Soviet press. Aside from the "denial," printed 17 November, and some dark allusions to "memoirs of all kinds" there has been total silence. It is also revealing that the Soviet press has not printed summaries of the articles in western newspapers seeking to prove that the memoirs were forged.

But most revealing is the following detail I hear from a Soviet acquaintance in a position to know -- at the last minute three or four critical portions dealing with the memoirs were deleted from the manuscript of an article printed in the party organ, Pravda, last 17 December. This article was signed I. Alexandrov, a pseudonym used under particularly authoritative statements. "Alexandrov's" articles are written by a group of leading writers for Pravda on orders of the party secretariat.

This article dealt with ideological warfare waged by the imperialists and a few remarks about the Khrushchev memoirs would have fitted in very well in this connection if they were forged. My informant had only one comment -- "The memoirs are genuine and they know it. Otherwise Pravda would have used them then."

It is every bit as interesting to speculate on the purpose of the memoirs if they were smuggled out with knowledge of the authorities. That is another -- and very long -- story.

Khrushchev Memoirs Authentic

Of the hundreds of news accounts dealing with the origins and authenticity of the Khrushchev memoirs, the attached article "Nikita Khrushchev's Memoirs Are Genuine Enough," appearing in the Norwegian daily Afternposten of 6 March 1971 and written by Norwegian journalist Per Egil Hegge, formerly posted in Moscow, is by far the most convincing. Hegge came into some exclusive and closely held information (the source of which journalistic ethics precludes his revealing) and otherwise reasons very cogently from indirect evidence to make a strong case for the authenticity of the memoirs, which was published by Little, Brown and Co. in book form last year under the title Khrushchev Remembers and is available in many languages.

In the course of his article, he refutes many of the arguments advanced by those who wish to consider the memoirs fraudulent. It deserves dissemination to a wider audience than Hegge's own, the Norwegian public.

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CPYRGHT

# Nikita Krusjtsjovs minner er ekte nok

Av Per Egil Hegge

Per Egil Hegge, Aftenpostens medarbeider som nylig ble utvist fra Moskva, tar i denne artikkelen for seg den meget omtalte boken «Krusjtsjov minnes» som kommer på det norske marked om kort tid. Hegge tviler ikke på at memoarene er ekte. Den tvil han hadde på et tidlig tidspunkt forsvant da Pravda bragte Krusjtsjovs eget dementi — som i seg selv var en bekref- telse! Hvordan memoarene kom det amerikanske Time—Life- konsernet i hende er ikke helt klarlagt, men Hegge trekker her frem en av de menn som sannsynligvis kan fortelle hele histo- rien: Time-korrespondenten Jerold Schecter som forlot Moskva i september ifjor.

Historien om Krusjtsjov-me- moarenes opprinnelse var ett av de emner jeg holdt på med da jeg fikk et kjedelig avbrekk i arbeidet for fem uker siden. En del av de opplysninger jeg kom frem til, kan jeg ikke offentlig- gjøre av hensyn til personer som da ville havne i en vanskelig situasjon. Både disse opplysnin- ger, og forhold jeg skal nevne i denne artikkel, bidrar uten unn- tagelse til å underbygge Time- Life's påstand, om at memoarene er autentiske; dvs. at de i hoved- sak stammer fra pensjonis- ten Krusjtsjov. Hvor stor del av dem som bygger på arkivmateri- ale fra Krusjtsjovs glansdager, vil forbli en hemmelighet, siden de personer som har vært i direkte kontakt med affæren, er kontraktforpliktet til å holde munn.

En sovjetisk bekjent fortalte meg i mai 1970 at Krusjtsjov var i gang med sine memoarer. Jeg festet ikke noen særlig lit til denne opplysning. Det var rime- lig nok at det skulle oppstå rykter om at en pensjonist med Krusjtsjovs aktivitetsnivå og ta- leferdighet ville sette et eller annet på papiret. Jeg hadde

heller ingen grunn til å tro at min hjemmelsmann skulle ha særlig greie på hva Krusjtsjov foretok seg bak sitt bevoktede gjerde — hans kontaktflate med Krusjtsjov-familien fikk jeg først senere klart for meg. Jeg regnet også med at dette var stoff som hverken jeg eller noen annen vestlig journalist noen gang ville få se, og at opplysningen derfor var uinteressant som nyhet betraktet.

Selv etter meldingen om at memoarene ville bli utgitt var jeg skeptisk og resonerte som så mange andre: Selv om Krusjtsjov nok kan ha sine tanker om de nuværende ledes politikk, sær- lig i Stalin-spørsmålet, er han like fullt en lojal kommunist som ikke ville sende kritisk stoff utenlands. Jeg gikk derfor uten videre ut fra at memoarene var et falskneri.

Jeg skiftet mening da Krusjt- sjovs såkalte dementi ble offent- liggjort den 16. november. Dette dementi må være ett av de mest bekræftende dementier verden noen gang har sett, siden det mellom linjene sto at det eks- isterte et erindringsmateriale. Det

han personlig skulle ha over- levert slikt materiale til noen — og det var det jo heller ingen som hadde påstått.

Krusjtsjov omtaler i dementiet memoarene som falsk, et ord som vanligvis oversettes med falskneri. Men det har en mer begrenset, eksakt betydning enn som så: hvis memoarene f.eks. er redigert uten forfatterens medvirkning, slik oversetteren, Strobe Talbott, sier de er, kan de rent filologisk sett betegnes som falsk, og enda være ekte. Krusjtsjov har dermed sine ord i behold — utgiverne likeså.

Dementiet var datert 10. no- vember, men ble sendt ut på Tass' tjeneste 16. november. Noen dager senere fikk jeg fra en kilde jeg anså og anser som meget troverdig og pålitelig, høre historien om hvordan Krusjtsjov var blitt innkalt til Arvid Pelsje, medlem av politbyrået og for- mann i partiets kontrollkommi- sjon. Her fikk han ordre om å undertegne et dementi som alle- rede lå ferdig. Krusjtsjov hevdet under samtalen med Pelsje at han ikke ante at hans erindringer var havnet i utlandet, en

selv om jeg og de fleste russere jeg kjente, tviler på det. Krusjtsjov bødte seg for presset og undertegnet dementiet etter å ha foretatt enkelte endringer — hvilke vet jeg ikke. Opphisselsen tok sterkt på den 76 år gamle pensjonisten, og han ble umiddelbart etterpå innlagt på sykehus.

Denne historien ble jeg av en erfaren kollega i Moskva advart mot å sende. De kommer til å utvise deg for den, sa han. Jeg fulgte ikke hans råd, og den sto i Aftenposten 27. november ifjor. Historien gikk også i andre aviser, og førte i Washington til at man trodde det var Krusjtsjovs svigersønn, Izvestijas tidligere sjefredaktør Aleksej Adsjubej, som var kilden for den. Stewart Alsop skrev således i Newsweek i begynnelsen av januar at Adsjubej ga et intervju til vestlige journalister i Moskva i slutten av november. Dette slår han fast som et faktum. Det er blankt oppspinn. Og det er beklagelig at det ble tatt alvorlig og stadig spøker — som f. eks. i professor John Sanness' ellers utmerkede forord til den norske utgaven som kommer på markedet om kort tid — men der i sterkt fortynnet form.

Memoarene ble til på følgende måte: Krusjtsjov fikk høsten 1969 eller like etter nyttår 1970 fatt i en lydbåndopptager og ble meget begeistret for den. Hver gang han hadde tilhørere, våknet den gamle folketaler i ham, og det var fortrinnsvis hans mange barnebarn som fikk høre beste-far fortelle mens båndopptageren gikk. Uten publikum fikk han aldri noe til. Jeg vet ikke hvem som skrudde båndopptageren av og på og hvem som fjernet båndene. Men jeg tviler på at det kan ha foregått uten at Krusjtsjov hadde en anelse om det.

UPI's korrespondent i Moskva gjennom mange år, Henry Shapiro, forsket også en del i denne materie og kom til den konklusjon at det var Krusjtsjovs dødsyke svigersønn, Lev Petrov, som sørget for at erindringene kom en utlending i hende. Det kan være riktig for alt jeg vet. Petrov har en utmerkede hukelse

og hadde bare måneder igjen å leve ifjor vår. Han døde ifjor høst, før nyheten om memoarene ble kjent.

Ut over efterjulsvinteren var Moskva-journalisten Viktor Louis en fast gjest i Krusjtsjov-familiens hjem. Louis' navn ble i Vesten med en gang satt i forbindelse med memoarene. Grunnlaget var på det tidspunkt ikke annet enn at man visste at han tidligere hadde syslet med lignende ting. Louis er sovjetisk borger, korrespondent i Moskva for London-avisen Evening News, KGB-agent og en hyppig gjest i utlandet. Mistanken om at han hadde med saken å gjøre, ble styrket da hans opphold i København 24. august ble kjent. I København traff han en av Time-Life-konsernets øverste sjef, Murray Garth, og Time's daværende korrespondent i Moskva, Jerrold Schecter.

En teori går ut på at manuskriptet — eller lydbåndene — ble overlevert der og da. Det kan ikke være riktig — alt materiale var ifølge mine opplysninger ute av Sovjet og praktisk talt ferdig oversatt på det tidspunkt.

Louis' navn er blitt nevnt som bevis for at det var KGB som sørget for eksporten av memoarene. Jeg vet ikke om noe som utelukker at KGB kan ha hatt en viktig finger med i spillet. Men Viktor Louis driver en mangesidig virksomhet hvor formålet i svært mange tilfelle ganske enkelt er å tjene penger — og bare det. Jeg vil ikke uten videre utelukke at det kan ha vært hensikten også denne gang.

Den mann som kan fortelle hele historien, er utvilsomt Jerrold Schecter. Denne ytterst sympatiske, dyktige og meget aktive korrespondent reiste fra Moskva i september ifjor, til tross for at Times kontor da ble stående ubesatt og har stått ubesatt siden — en tomhet som et nyhetsmagasin av Times type skyr verre enn pesten og må ha hatt meget gode grunner for å overveie — enn si akseptere. Det bør ikke overraske noen at Schecter er blant dem som er kontraktforpliktet til å holde munn, en forpliktelse han har

mye for å høre hans kommentar til den britiske Sovjet-eksperten Victor Zorzas teori om at materialet ble overlevert Time av CIA-agenter som utga seg for russere!)

Den sterkeste bekreftelse på at memoarene er autentiske, ligger etter min mening i den behandling sovjetisk presse har gitt dem. Bortsett fra «dementiet», som ble trykt den 17. november, og bortsett fra enkelte dunkle hentydninger til «memoarer av alt mulig slag» har det vært bom stille. Det er også avslørende at sovjetisk presse ikke har trykt utdrag av de artikler i vestlige aviser hvor man har søkt å bevise at memoarene skulle være et falskneri.

Men mest avslørende er følgende detalj, som jeg har fra en sovjetisk bekjent som sitter slik til at han må vite det: Tre-fire fordømmende avsnitt om memoarene ble i siste liten tatt ut av manuskriptet til en artikkel som sto i partorganet Pravda den 17. desember ifjor. Denne artikkel var undertegnet I. Aleksandrov, et pseudonym som brukes under spesielt autoritative erklæringer. «Aleksandrov» artikler skrives av et kollegium ledende medarbeidere i Pravda på partisekretariatets ordre.

Denne artikkel omhandlet ideologisk krigføring fra imperialistenes side, og det ville ha passet bra med noen betraktninger om Krusjtsjov-memoarene i denne sammenheng hvis de hadde vært et falskneri. Min hjemmelsmann hadde bare en kommentar: «Memoarene er ekte, og de vet det. Ellers hadde Pravda tatt seg av dem den dagen.»

Minst like interessant er det å spekulere på hensikten med memoarene, dersom de ble smuglet ut med myndighetenes vitende. Det er en annen — og en meget lang — historie.